Alexander Bleck
Assistant Professor of Accounting
University of Chicago
Booth School of Business
5807 South Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
Office: (773) 834-3214
ableck@chicagobooth.edu
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Market Transparency and the Accounting Regime (with X. Liu) Journal of Accounting Research
Provides a rationale
for the shift in accounting standards from historic
cost accounting towards mark-to-market
Social Value of Public Information and the Market
Shows that transparency creates a
trade-off for the market as a whole, in that information stabilizes the market (lowers total
risk) while simultaneously making it more expensive to use (limiting the opportunities to insure against
this shrinking risk)
Where does the Information in Mark-to-Market Come from? (with P. Gao)
Emphasizes that
attempting to use the market for information to be used inside the firm
(via mark-to-market accounting) makes it more difficult to obtain the information thereby changing the
boundary of the firm with the market
Liquidity Flooding, Financial Frictions, and Crowding-out (with X. Liu)
Argues
that, by relying on the credit market to allocate money in the economy, monetary policy could distort the credit market
by crowding out lending across sectors and provides an explanation for
the ineffectiveness of 'excessively' expansive monetary policy in
stimulating the real economy
Self-Defeating Regulation coming soon
Emphasizes that
risk-sensitive (market-based) banking regulation
counterproductively induces greater total risk exposure of banks and provides a
rationale for why
regulation, such as the Basel accords, is not market-based
Optimal Interconnectedness, Runs and Liquidity coming soon
Argues that
interconnections of financial institutions could be their
optimal response to inefficiencies arising from their business
model and emphasizes that macro-economic regulation of interconnections
may inefficiently distort their micro-economic rationale
Disclosure, Insider Trading and Incentives coming soon
Argues that the
attempt to use market-based mechanisms in addition to firm-internal
mechanisms to improve information revelation could adversely affect the
overall production of information