Workshop Schedule for Spring 2015:

The workshop organizers for the Spring 2015 quarter are Lars Stole and Alex Frankel. Please contact Amanda Whittington to be added to the listserv to receive weekly updates.

The Workshop on Applied Theory meets on Mondays, 1:30-3:00 PM, in Harper Center, Room 3B.

March 30

David Rahman, University of Minnesota

Paper Title: The Dilemma of the Cypress and the Oak Tree

 

Abstract: I study repeated games with mediated communication and frequent actions. I derive Folk Theorems with imperfect public and private monitoring under minimal detectability assumptions. Even in the limit, when noise is driven by Brownian motion and actions are arbitrarily frequent, as long as players are suciently patient they can attain virtually ecient equilibrium outcomes, in two ways: secret monitoring and infrequent coordination. Players follow private strategies over discrete blocks of time. A mediator constructs latent Brownian motions to score players on the basis of others' secret monitoring, and gives incentives with these variables at the end of each block to economize on the cost of providing incentives. This brings together the work on repeated games in discrete and continuous time in that, despite actions being continuous, strategic coordination is endogenously discrete. As an application, I show how individual full rank is necessary and sucient for the Folk Theorem in the Prisoners' Dilemma regardless of whether monitoring is public or private.

 

 



April 7

Hosted by the Workshop in Economic Theory (*please note the time is 3:30-5pm in Room SHFE 112 at 5757 S University Ave)

Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University

Paper Title: "Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets"

 

Based on two papers, "Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets" and "Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets"



April 13

Zhiguo He, University of Chicago Booth School of Business

Paper Title: Optimal Long-term Contracting with Learning

 

Abstract: We introduce uncertainty into the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) model to study optimal long-term contracting with learning. In the dynamic relationship, the agent's shirking not only reduces the current output, but also increases the agent's information rent due to the persistent belief manipulation effect. We characterize the optimal contract by solving a dynamic programming problem in which information rent is the unique state variable. We find that in the optimal contract, the optimal effort decreases stochastically over time, exhibiting a front-loaded pattern. Furthermore, the optimal contract exhibits an option-like feature in that incentives increase after good performance.



April 20

Jean Tirole, Toulouse School of Economics

Paper Title: Cognitive Games and Cognitive Traps

 

Abstract: The paper defines “cognitive games” as games in which players first privately choose their information structures, and then play a normal- or extensive-form game under the resulting information structures. It introduces two concepts of “expectation conformity” (which coincide under one-sided cognition): a strong version in which fixing the other players’ information structures, a player has more incentive to select one information structure over another if he expected to do so; a weak version in which it is the entire vector of information structures that is the object of self-fulfilling prophecies.

 

The paper first shows that games of pure conflict (zero-sum games) never give rise to selffulfilling cognition while games of pure alignment (coordination games) always do. Second, it considers “environments with a game setter” in which a player picks an information structure and one of two games to be played. A characterization of the expectation conformity property in terms of rotation points can be obtained for this class of games, which comprises many games of interest to economists, starting with the cognition-augmented lemons model.


The paper then turns to cognition-intensive contracting and shows that a single variable, the “relative exposure to the unexpected”, underlies a variety of concepts such as expectation conformity, over-cognition and the desirability of mandatory disclosure laws. Finally, the paper extends the notion of expectation conformity to (signal-jamming) cognitive games in which players choose their rivals’ information structure.


 

April 28

Hosted by the Workshop in Economic Theory (*please note the time is 3:30-5pm in Room SHFE 112 at 5757 S University Ave)

Ben Golub, Harvard University

Paper Title: TBD

 

Abstract: TBD


 

May 4

Dirk Bergemann, Yale University

Paper Title: TBD

 

Abstract: TBD


 

May 12

Hosted by the Workshop in Economic Theory (*please note the time is 3:30-5pm in Room SHFE 112 at 5757 S University Ave)

Dilip Abreu, Princeton University

Paper Title: TBD

 

Abstract: TBD


May 18

Qingmin Liu, Columbia University

Paper Title: TBD

 

Abstract: TBD



May 26

Hosted by the Workshop in Economic Theory (*please note the time is 3:30-5pm in Room SHFE 112 at 5757 S University Ave)

Yuichiro Kamada, University of California, Berkeley

Paper Title: TBD

 

Abstract: TBD

.

 



June 1

Guillaume Plantin, SciencesPo

Paper Title: TBD

 

Abstract: TBD

 

 

Archives of Past Workshops:

Looking for information about previous workshops? We maintain a partial archive of schedules and papers beginning in the fall of 2005. Please note that in most cases the archived papers have been significantly revised or published.
Go to archives.