Bond Convenience Yields and the Changing Nature of UIP Violations

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November 17, 2015

Abstract

The much-studied Uncovered Interest-Rate Parity (UIP) puzzle, the observation that exchange rates do not adjust sufficiently to offset interest rate differentials, is more complicated than commonly understood. It changes nature with the horizon. As is well known, high interest rate currencies depreciate less than predicted by the interest rate differential at short horizons, but at longer horizons (4 to 7 years) I find a reverse puzzle: high interest rate currencies depreciate too much. Decomposing the UIP violations into exchange rate and term-structure effects, I find that they are primarily an exchange rate phenomenon. As an explanation, I propose a novel model based on the mechanism of bond convenience yields. The model matches the UIP violations at all horizons, and presents interesting new links between exchange rates and monetary-fiscal interaction that are consistent with the data. Other key implications of the mechanism are also borne out by the data.

JEL Codes: F31, F41, F42, E43, E52, E63

Keywords: Uncovered Interest Rate Parity, Exchange Rates, Open Economy Macroeconomics, Bond Convenience Yield, Monetary-Fiscal Interaction, Government Debt Dynamics

*I am deeply grateful to Craig Burnside and Cosmin Ilut for numerous thoughtful discussions. I am also thankful to Nir Jaimovich, Pietro Peretto, Juan Rubio-Ramirez and seminar participants at Bank of Canada, Boston College, Boston Fed, Colby College, Duke Macro Workshop, Federal Reserve Board, NBER IFM Spring 2015, New York Fed, SED 2015, SUNY Buffalo, University of Pennsylvania and University of Washington for their insightful comments. All remaining mistakes are mine. Contact Information – Boston College, Department of Economics, Chestnut Hill 02467; e-mail: valchev@bc.edu
1 Introduction

Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIP), an equilibrium condition that equates the expected return on domestic and foreign bonds, is central to exchange rate determination in standard open economy models. The excess return of foreign bonds over home bonds consists of two components: the interest rate difference between the two countries and the exchange rate change over the investment period. Thus, equating expected returns across countries requires that, on average, the exchange rates of high interest rate countries depreciate and offset potential gains that arise from interest rate differentials.

However, despite the fundamental role this condition plays in models, its empirical failure is well established. Numerous papers have documented that currencies fail to depreciate sufficiently to offset interest rate differentials, which opens up profit opportunities (e.g. the carry trade) and violates UIP.¹ This phenomenon, known as the ‘UIP Puzzle’, has been documented extensively at shorter horizons, but more recently, Engel (2015) finds that real exchange rates actually tend to depreciate too much at longer horizons, suggesting that the puzzle changes. ²

In this paper, I provide new empirical evidence that shows the puzzle indeed changes with the horizon and develop a new model as an explanation. I confirm the standard result that currencies fail to depreciate sufficiently in response to high interest rate differentials at horizons of up to 3 years. However, at the longer horizons of 4 to 7 years, I find the reverse puzzle: high-interest rate currencies depreciate too much. Furthermore, I decompose the UIP violations into exchange rate and term-structure anomalies, and find that their changing nature is primarily driven by exchange rate behavior. To address the puzzle comprehensively, I propose a novel model, in which bonds offer non-pecuniary (convenience) benefits, in addition to interest rates. The model can rationalize both the short and the long horizon UIP violations, and links the change in direction to the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy. In addition, I show that the key features of the mechanism are supported by the data.

I test the UIP condition at different horizons by exploiting the implication that excess returns on one-month foreign bonds, over one-month home bonds, must be zero in expectation and, hence, unforecastable at all horizons. I examine this with a series of direct predictive regressions, where I regress the one-month excess return $k$ periods into the future on the current interest rate differential, using a panel of 18 OECD currencies. I find


²The UIP puzzle is separate from the equity risk premium puzzle. The puzzle with currencies is about the time variation in excess returns and in their relationship with interest rate differentials. A constant risk premium, for example, would not resolve the puzzle.
that, at horizons of up to 7 years, the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero, and hence there are forecastable currency returns, which violates UIP. At horizons of up to 3 years, I confirm the usual finding that the coefficients are negative, signifying that high-interest rate currencies do not depreciate sufficiently. However, I find that the coefficients become positive at horizons of 4 to 7 years, implying that high-interest rate currencies eventually start depreciating too much relative to UIP, which constitutes the opposite puzzle. Decomposing the forecastable currency returns into exchange rate and term-structure components, I find that the changing nature of UIP violations is primarily an exchange rate phenomenon.

Furthermore, I find that the sum of positive UIP violations is roughly equal to the sum of negative violations. Thus, the excess depreciation at longer horizons fully offsets the initial insufficient depreciation, and leads exchange rates to converge to the UIP benchmark path in the long run. This result helps provide a new interpretation to previous studies that have found some support for UIP when analyzing the excess returns on long-term bonds (5+ years). My findings show that the UIP puzzle is not a short-run phenomenon that disappears over time and hence averages out in the long-run, but rather it changes its nature. Exchange rate movements violate UIP at both short and long horizons, but the direction of the violations changes, and the effects roughly cancel out in the long-run. This has interesting, non-linear implications about the underlying exchange rate dynamics.

The second part of the paper develops a new international model, based on a mechanism of endogenously time-varying bond convenience yields, and shows that it can closely match both the short-horizon and long-horizon UIP deviations. The key feature of the model is that government bonds offer both financial returns and convenience, or liquidity, benefits. Following the literature on bond convenience yields (e.g. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012)), I refer to the convenience of a bond as the non-pecuniary benefit arising from the fact that safe and liquid government bonds can act as a substitute for money and help facilitate transactions. The convenience yield is the amount of interest investors are willing to forego in exchange for the convenience benefit.

In the model, excess currency returns arise as a compensation for differences in convenience yields across countries, and UIP deviations are driven by endogenous time variation in the convenience yield differential. A decrease in the convenience value of home bonds, relative to foreign bonds, leads to a corresponding, compensating increase in the excess financial return on home bonds, over foreign bonds. This is achieved through excess return on

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3See Flood and Taylor (1996), Chinn and Meredith (2005), Chinn (2006), Chinn and Quayyum (2012). There is an analytical link between the two sets of results under risk-neutrality, but not necessarily otherwise.

4The results in this paper refer to in-sample analysis, and no claims are made about out-of-sample predictability. Incorporating the results and insights in an out-of-sample analysis is a future research project.
the home currency, which constitutes a violation of the standard UIP condition. Moreover, when the home convenience yield falls, the home interest rate tends to rise because investors require a higher financial compensation to hold the supply of home government debt, as its convenience benefit has decreased. This generates the classic UIP puzzle relationship of high-interest rate currencies earning excess returns.

The switch in the sign of UIP violations at longer horizons is driven by the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy. The dynamics of the convenience yield differential are closely linked to the relative supply of government debt, and hence the dynamics of UIP violations are determined by the joint dynamics of interest rates and debt. In particular, when monetary policy is independent of fiscal considerations and tax policy is persistent, debt has cyclical, complex root dynamics that are also imparted on the convenience yield differential. This generates a cyclical profile of UIP deviations that are negative at short horizons, but turn positive at longer horizons. If tax policy reacts quickly to debt levels, or if the central bank helps through inflating debt away, then UIP violations do not change sign at longer horizons and are also smaller in magnitude.

First, I analyze the mechanism in a stylized model that allows me to derive analytical results and helps illustrate the key intuition. Next, I incorporate the mechanism in a benchmark, two-country open economy model, calibrate it to standard parameters and show that it closely matches the estimated UIP deviations at both short and long horizons. Lastly, I provide direct empirical support for the mechanism by verifying two of its key implications in the data. First, I show that excess currency returns are indeed closely related to and forecastable by the level of government debt. Second, I show that two common proxies for monetary independence are strongly positively related to the magnitude of UIP violations and to the change in the direction of violations at longer horizons, as predicted by the monetary-fiscal interplay in the model.

My empirical analysis is closely related to recent work on the relationship between the level of the exchange rate and the real interest rate by Engel (2015), the key finding of which is that the forecastability of excess currency returns changes direction at longer horizons. My empirical results reach the same conclusion, but they are based on a different methodology that does not impose parametric time-series restrictions, leverages the cross-sectional variation in the data and is entirely based on nominal data. In addition, I further analyze the changing nature of UIP violations by decomposing them into separate exchange rate and term-structure anomalies. Lastly, I provide a fully specified model as an explanation.

5The link between debt supply and the convenience yield is also emphasized by the previous literature on bond convenience yields (Bansal and Coleman (1996), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012)).

6In the external validity analysis of the model, I also find that the changing direction of UIP violations correlates with the monetary policy stance.
The theoretical mechanism is novel to the literature on the UIP puzzle, which largely turns to one of two explanations: time-varying risk (Bekaert (1996), Farhi and Gabaix (2008), Alvarez et al. (2009), Verdelhan (2010), Bansal and Shaliastovich (2012), Colacito and Croce (2013) among others), and deviations from rational expectations (e.g. Gourinchas and Tornell (2004), Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2010), Burnside et al. (2011), Ilut (2012)).\(^7\) It has rich and interesting implications about the interplay between exchange rates, monetary policy and fiscal policy, that offer new testable implications and avenues for future research. In addition, I analyze the changing nature of UIP violations at short and long-horizons, whereas the literature has focused on explaining the short-run negative UIP violations. The new mechanism is also complementary to existing ones and incorporating it in a model together with some of the previous approaches is a promising direction for future work.\(^8,9,10\)

A number of papers have quantified convenience yields in the data and documented their important role in the determination of equilibrium bond prices (e.g. Fontaine and Garcia (2012), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012), Smith (2012), Greenwood and Vayanos (2014)). A related theoretical literature has explored bond convenience yields as a possible explanation for asset pricing puzzles such as the equity risk-premium, the low risk-free rate and the term premium (e.g. Bansal and Coleman (1996), Bansal et al. (2011), Lagos (2010, 2011)). I extend the theoretical analysis of convenience yields by introducing it to an open economy setting, applying it to the UIP puzzle, and by studying the implications of endogenously time-varying convenience yield differentials.

Section 2 presents the main empirical results, Section 3 briefly introduces convenience yields and then Section 4 lays out and analyzes the analytical model, while Section 5 presents the quantitative model. Section 6 provides direct empirical evidence in support of the mechanism and Section 7 concludes.

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^7^Gabaix and Maggiori (2014) develop a model where the availability of liquid assets affects the risk-bearing capacity of financial intermediaries, and thus the risk-premia in exchange rate markets.

^8^Lustig et al. (2013) find that transitory risk accounts for the majority of short-horizon carry trade profits. A model that incorporates both risk premia and convenience yields could potentially deliver even stronger negative short-horizon UIP violations, while preserving the long-horizon positive UIP violations.

^9^A number of recent papers find that traditional risk factors cannot explain currency returns (Burnside (2007), Burnside et al. (2010), Burnside (2010, 2011), Menkhoff et al. (2012b)). My model suggests that time-varying convenience yields could have acted as omitted variables in such analyses and incorporating them in future studies could help properly quantify the effects of both risk and convenience factors.

^10^Hassan and Mano (2013) find that a significant portion of carry trade profits is not due to capturing time-variation in excess returns, but rather due to persistent differences in excess returns across currencies. This can also be rationalized by the model, given steady state differences in convenience yields.
2 Uncovered Interest Parity

2.1 The UIP Condition in Economic Models

This section gives a brief overview of the Uncovered Interest Parity condition and highlights the important role it plays in the determination of equilibrium exchange rates in standard open economy models.

To fix ideas, I define $S_t$ to be the exchange rate, in terms of home currency per one unit of foreign currency (e.g. 1.25 USD per EUR), and $i_t$ and $i^*_t$ as the nominal interest rates on default-free bonds at home and abroad. For ease of exposition, I will refer to the US dollar as the “home” currency and the Euro as the “foreign” currency. A $1 investment in US bonds at time $t$ offers a return of $1 + i_t$ dollars next period. The same $1 invested in Euro denominated bonds would earn $S_t(1 + i^*_t)$ dollars next period. That is, we first need to exchange this one dollar for Euros and obtain $\frac{1}{S_t}$ EUR in return. Investing this amount of Euros earns a gross interest rate of $1 + i^*_t$ that next period can be exchanged back into dollars at the rate $S_{t+1}$, for a total return of $S_{t+1}(1 + i^*_t)$ dollars.

Assuming that the law of one price holds the fundamental theorem of asset pricing tells us that there exists a stochastic process $M_{t+1}$, usually referred to as the stochastic discount factor, such that

\begin{align*}
E_t(M_{t+1}(1 + i_t)) &= 1 \quad (1) \\
E_t(M_{t+1} \frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t}(1 + i^*_t)) &= 1. \quad (2)
\end{align*}

For example, in standard representative agent models with separatively additive utility over consumption the stochastic discount factor is equal to the marginal rate of substitution (adjusted for inflation because the payoffs considered here are nominal): $M_{t+1} = \frac{U'(C_{t+1})}{U'(C_t)} \frac{1}{\Pi_{t+1}}$.

To obtain the Uncovered Interest Parity condition log-linearize the two equations, subtract them from one another and re-arrange to arrive at

\begin{equation}
E_t(s_{t+1} - s_t + i^*_t - i_t) = 0
\end{equation}

where lower case letters represent variables in logs and I have used the approximation $i_t \approx$ 

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\textsuperscript{11}The law of one price states that the price of a linear combination of assets must be equal to that same linear combination of the underlying assets’ prices. In other words, a given payoff, whether it is the payoff of a particular asset or formed by constructing a portfolio of distinct assets, must have the same price.
\ln(1 + i_t).^{12}

The condition equates, up to a first order log-approximation, the expected return on foreign bonds, \( E_t(s_{t+1} - s_t + i_t^*) \), to the expected return on the home bond, \( i_t \). This restricts the joint dynamics of exchange rates and interest rates, and delivers strong implications for exchange rate behavior. In particular, the UIP condition states that exchange rates are expected to adjust in response to non-zero interest rate differentials and offset them. Thus, if for example the US interest rate is 1% higher than the Euro interest rate, i.e. \( i_t - i_t^* = 0.01 \), the UIP condition would imply that the Euro is expected to appreciate against the dollar by 1% as well, so that \( E_t(s_{t+1} - s_t) = 0.01 \). Hence, in expectation, there are no gains to be made by borrowing in one currency and investing in the other.

The limited set of assumptions underlying the UIP condition ensures that it obtains, at least up to a first order approximation, in a large class of models. It is a fundamental part of the overwhelming majority of open economy models and it puts important restrictions on the model-implied joint dynamics of exchange rates and interest rates. Given its theoretical importance, it is not surprising that there has been great interest in examining the condition’s validity in the data, and I turn to empirical tests of the UIP condition next.

2.2 The UIP Puzzle

The failure of the UIP condition in the data is a long-standing and well documented puzzle in international finance, with a large and still active literature expanding on the seminal contributions by Bilson (1981) and Fama (1984). For excellent surveys, please see Hodrick (1987), Froot and Thaler (1990), Engel (1996, 2013).^{13,14}

Examining the UIP condition in the data is typically done by testing whether any variable in the time \( t \) information set can help forecast the return on foreign bonds relative to home bonds. As is standard in the literature I will equivalently refer to the relative return on foreign to home bonds as “excess return on foreign bonds” and also as “excess currency

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\(^{12}\)The log-linearization is typically done around the symmetric steady state where \( S_{t+1} = S_t = 1 \) and \( i_t = i_t^* \), because this allows us to express the condition in terms of the log-variables themselves. But the log-linearized condition holds for any arbitrary point of approximation.


\(^{14}\)A related finding is the high profitability of the carry trade, an investment strategy that goes long high-interest rate currencies and short low-interest rate currencies, and that should yield zero average return under UIP. Some papers that document profitable currency trading strategies are Lustig and Verdelhan (2007), Villanueva (2007), Burnside et al. (2008), Brunnermeier et al. (2008), Burnside et al. (2010), Lustig et al. (2011), Menkhoff et al. (2012a)
return”. I denote the one period excess return from time $t$ to $t+1$ as $\lambda_{t+1}$:

$$\lambda_{t+1} \equiv s_{t+1} - s_t + i_t^* - i_t.$$ 

The UIP condition requires $E_t(\lambda_{t+1}) = 0$ and hence $\text{Cov}(\lambda_{t+1}, X_t) = 0$ for any variable $X_t$ in the time $t$ information set. In other words, there should be no variables known this period that can forecast the excess return that will realize next period. The bulk of the empirical work documenting the failure of the UIP condition comes down to showing that the current interest rate differential, $i_t - i_t^*$, can indeed forecast future excess returns.

The vast majority of the literature focuses on some version of the original regression specification estimated by Fama (1984):

$$\lambda_{t+1} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1(i_t - i_t^*) + \xi_{t+1},$$

where typically the base or “home” currency is the USD and $i_t$ is the US interest rate. Under the null hypothesis that the UIP condition holds we should obtain $\alpha_0 = \beta_1 = 0$ so that the average excess return is zero and not forecastable by current interest rates. Contrary to this, numerous papers have found that $\beta_1 < 0$ which implies that currencies which are experiencing high interest rates today are also expected to earn positive excess returns in the future.\(^{15}\) These findings form the basis for the celebrated “UIP Puzzle”\(^{16}\).

For my empirical analysis I construct a data set of 18 major currencies, all advanced OECD countries, with the US dollar as the base currency and the data spans the period 01/01/1976 - 28/06/2013 at the daily frequency.\(^{17,18}\) The data comes from Datastream, and forms an unbalanced panel because the Euro-legacy currencies cease to exist in 1999. As is standard in the literature, I do not enter the Euro as a separate currency but rather attach it at the end of the Deutsche Mark series. The time series for the other Euro-legacy currencies stops on January 1st, 1999, the time of Euro adoption for the currencies in my data set. Per the established convention, the interest rate differentials are computed from forward rates using the Covered Interest Rate Parity (CIP).\(^{19}\)

\(^{15}\)The typical frequency of the regressions is monthly or quarterly.

\(^{16}\)The UIP Puzzle is traditionally centered on the $\beta_1$ coefficient not being zero, and not $\alpha_0$ because most studies find that $\alpha_0$ are indeed insignificantly different from zero.

\(^{17}\)The currencies are for Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

\(^{18}\)Results at the monthly frequency, which have been more often used in the previous literature, are available in the Appendix and show that the estimates are extremely similar to the daily data ones.

\(^{19}\)This is the standard procedure in the literature because data on forward rates is available for more periods and more countries than reliable data on constant maturity, default-free bonds and the CIP has been found to hold very well in the data. Nevertheless, the Appendix shows that the results remain unchanged when considering interest rates on physical assets, although this cuts down on the sample size.
The interest rates I use are for one month (30 days), hence with daily observations on the exchange rate the standard UIP regression can be expressed as

\[ s_{j,t+30} - s_{j,t} + i_{j,t}^* - i_t = \alpha_{j,0} + \beta_{j,1}(i_t - i_{j,t}^*) + \varepsilon_{j,t+1}, \]

and I estimate this equation currency-by-currency, with \( j \) indexing the different currencies. The time period is one day, and \( i_t \) is the 30 day interest rate on USD and \( i_{j,t}^* \) the 30 day interest rate on currency \( j \), hence the left-hand side variable is a 30 day excess return on the foreign currency. I use Newey-West standard errors to correct for the serial correlation induced by the overlapping periods in the dependent variable and report the results in Table 1. My estimates reaffirm the well established UIP Puzzle - I find that all \( \beta_1 \) point estimates are negative and almost all are statistically significant at conventional levels (15 out of 18).\(^{20}\)

The evidence of negative and significant \( \beta_1 \) is pervasive throughout all 18 currencies. Moreover, the actual magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are quite similar to each other which leads me to consider panel regressions as a good way to summarize the results, that also increases efficiency by leveraging the cross-sectional variation of the data.\(^{21}\) I re-estimate the UIP regression as a panel in two ways, first by pooling all the data together and imposing \( \alpha_{j,0} = \alpha_0 \) and \( \beta_{j,1} = \beta_1 \) and second by allowing the constants to differ among currencies (fixed effects) but still restricting the slope to be the same. The resulting coefficient estimates and the corresponding Driscoll and Kraay (1998) errors that correct for both cross-sectional and time series dependence in the error term are presented in the last two lines of Table 1.\(^{22}\) The estimated \( \beta_1 \) coefficients are negative and highly significant and the constants are not statistically different from zero.\(^{23}\)

Lastly, notice that the panel estimates imply that \( \beta_1 \) is roughly \(-1\), which implies that the exchange rates changes are unpredictable on the basis of the interest rate differential. This is also a common finding in the literature and is consistent with the hypothesis that exchange rates are a random walk. There is also a large, related literature, following the seminal contribution of Meese and Rogoff (1983), which has shown that beating the random walk forecast out of sample is exceedingly difficult. Such findings have lead to the general

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\(^{20}\)I also re-affirm the standard finding that the constants in the UIP regression are generally found to be insignificant. I find that only 3 out of the 18 estimates are significant at standard levels, the pooled panel estimate is small and not significant, and I cannot reject the hypothesis that the mean of the fixed effects is different from zero in the fixed effects panel regression.

\(^{21}\)The observation that UIP coefficients tend to be rather similar across countries (at least among developed economies) is a pervasive feature of the data and has been noted as early as Fama (1984).

\(^{22}\)Applying the Vogelsang (2012) asymptotic adjustment does not make any perceptible difference to the inference.

\(^{23}\)In the case of the fixed effects estimation, the overwhelming majority of fixed effect estimates are found to be insignificant. I also cannot reject the hypothesis that the mean of the fixed effects is zero.
### Table 1: UIP Regression Currency by Currency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Currency</th>
<th>$\alpha_0$ (s.e.)</th>
<th>$\beta_1$ (s.e.)</th>
<th>$\chi^2(\alpha_0 = \beta_1 = 0)$</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>AUD</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.002)</td>
<td>-1.63*** (0.48)</td>
<td>16.3***</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>ATS</td>
<td>0.002 (0.002)</td>
<td>-1.75*** (0.58)</td>
<td>9.5***</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>BEF</td>
<td>-0.0002 (0.002)</td>
<td>-1.58*** (0.39)</td>
<td>17.5***</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>CAD</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.001)</td>
<td>-1.43*** (0.38)</td>
<td>19.1***</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>DKK</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>-1.51*** (0.32)</td>
<td>25.4***</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>FRF</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.84 (0.63)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>DEM</td>
<td>0.002 (0.001)</td>
<td>-1.58*** (0.57)</td>
<td>7.9**</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>IEP</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.002)</td>
<td>-1.32*** (0.38)</td>
<td>12.3**</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>ITL</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.79** (0.33)</td>
<td>7.0**</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>JPY</td>
<td>0.006*** (0.002)</td>
<td>-2.76*** (0.51)</td>
<td>28.9***</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>NLG</td>
<td>0.003 (0.002)</td>
<td>-2.34*** (0.59)</td>
<td>16.0***</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>NOK</td>
<td>-0.0003 (0.001)</td>
<td>-1.15*** (0.39)</td>
<td>10.4***</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>NZD</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.002)</td>
<td>-1.74*** (0.39)</td>
<td>28.3***</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>PTE</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.45** (0.20)</td>
<td>5.9*</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>ESP</td>
<td>0.002 (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.19 (0.46)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>SEK</td>
<td>0.0001 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.42 (0.50)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>CHF</td>
<td>0.005*** (0.002)</td>
<td>-2.06*** (0.55)</td>
<td>13.9***</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>GBP</td>
<td>-0.003** (0.001)</td>
<td>-2.24*** (0.60)</td>
<td>14.2***</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel, pooled 0.0002 (0.001) -0.79*** (0.15) 22.3***
Panel, fixed eff. -1.01*** (0.21) 19.1***

This table presents estimates of $\alpha_0$ and $\beta_1$ from the regression $s_{jt+1} - s_{jt} + i_{jt,t} - i_{jt,t} = \alpha_{jt} + \beta_{jt}(i_{jt,t} - i_{jt,t}^*) + \varepsilon_{jt+1}$. The standard errors in single currency regressions are Newey-West errors robust to serial correlation. The standard errors for the panel estimations are computed according to the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) method that is robust to heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and contemporaneous correlation across equations. The base currency is the USD.

View that the random walk is a reasonable description of exchange rate behavior.

In summary, all results point to the fact that $\beta_1$ is negative and hence periods of high domestic interest rates tend to forecast positive excess returns on the home bonds versus foreign bonds. This is the crux of the famous “UIP Puzzle” and has given rise to the common saying in the literature that “high-interest rate currencies earn high returns”, a fact that is further supported by the evidence on the profitability of the carry trade.\(^{24}\)

\(^{24}\)Recent work by Hassan and Mano (2013) has shown that only a part of the carry profits can be explained by time-variation in the interest rate differential and that a significant portion is actually related to the persistent differences in interest rates across countries. Nevertheless, Burnside (2013) provides additional evidence that a large part of the carry profits is still traceable to time variation in interest rates.
2.3 The UIP at Different Horizons

In this section I test the UIP hypothesis at different horizons and find that while the UIP condition is violated at horizons of up to 7 years, the nature of the violations changes with the horizon. Similarly to the one-step ahead predictive regressions considered in the previous section, I find that high domestic interest rates today tend to forecast positive domestic currency excess return at horizons of up to 3 years. However, the forecastability pattern flips at longer horizons and it turns out that high interest rates today tend to forecast negative excess returns at horizons of 4 to 7 years. This finding is also a violation of the UIP condition, but constitutes the opposite puzzle, as compared to the standard formulation of the “UIP puzzle”. Thus, the puzzle is more complex than commonly understood – it reverses course at longer horizons.\footnote{These findings do not contradict earlier work by Flood and Taylor (1996), Chinn and Meredith (2005), Chinn (2006) and Chinn and Quayyum (2012) that has found that UIP appears to hold better at horizons of 5+ years. The differences between my results and the previous studies is in the methodology used to test UIP at longer horizons, and in fact my results could help provide an interpretation to the earlier findings. As Appendix C discusses in more details, one can view the methodology of the previous papers as approximately averaging over the violations I document, which change sign with the horizon and tend to cancel out over the long run. The relationship is exact under risk-neutrality, but not necessarily otherwise.} Moreover, this a robust empirical phenomenon, as a similar interpretation arises from the results in Engel (2015), which are based on a different empirical approach and data.

The methodology I follow here is based on forecasting 1-month excess returns $k$ periods into the future. UIP requires that the conditional expectation of the one step-ahead excess return is zero, i.e. $E_t(\lambda_{t+1}) = 0$, and this must be true for all time periods $t$. Hence, for any arbitrary $k > 0$ we have $E_{t+k}(\lambda_{t+k+1}) = 0$ and by the law of iterated expectations,

$$E_t(\lambda_{t+k+1}) = 0,$$

for all $k > 0$. In other words, the UIP hypothesis requires that any future, one-period excess return must be unforecastable with time $t$ information. This observation provides us with a series of conditions that we can test at any horizon $k$.

To test them, I implement a straightforward extension of the standard 1-step ahead UIP regression and estimate the equation

$$\lambda_{j,t+k} = \alpha_{j,k} + \beta_k (i_t - i_{j,t}^*) + \varepsilon_{j,t+k} \quad (3)$$

as a panel regression with fixed effects, where $j$ indexes the currencies and $k = 1, 2, \ldots, 180$ indexes the horizon in months.\footnote{Similarly to the results in the previous section, running separate regressions for each currency, rather than considering a single panel regression, produces similar results across all currencies.} Since the data is at the daily frequency, the left-hand side
variable for $k = 1$ is the 30-day return that ends 30 days into the future, for $k = 2$ this is the 30-day return that ends 60 days into the future (i.e., the return between 30 and 60 days into the future) and so on and so forth. Most importantly, the left-hand side variable in the regressions is always precisely a 1-month excess return of foreign bonds over home bonds and the horizon, indexed by $k$, changes by 1-month increments as well. Thus, each regression tests if a particular 1-month excess return is forecastable by the current 1-month interest rate differential, but the horizon at which the returns are being forecasted changes.

Figure 1 plots the estimated coefficients, $\hat{\beta}_k$, from the above set of regressions on the Y-axis with the horizon $k$, in months, on the X-axis. The solid blue line plots the point estimates and the shaded region represents the 95% confidence intervals around each estimate, computed with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors that correct for heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and spatial correlation. The red dot on the plot is the point estimate of the standard UIP regression that looks one month into the future. This dot is also the estimate reported in Table 1, and the focus of many previous papers on the UIP puzzle.

The plot shows three important results. First, the coefficients are negative and statistically significant at horizons of up to 36 months, a finding that corresponds to the typical statement of the UIP puzzle. Second, the graph shows that the coefficients, however, are positive and statistically significant at horizons between 48 and 84 months. This indicates
that high interest rates today forecast negative excess returns 4 to 7 years into the future, contrary to the standard short-horizon result that high-interest rate currencies tend to earn positive excess returns. And third, after a brief spell at horizons of 100 to 120 months where the point estimates turn negative again, but only a handful are significant, the coefficients appear to converge to zero in the long-run. Overall, the UIP violations follow a clear, cyclical pattern, where they are negative at short horizons, positive at longer horizons, and gradually disappear in the long-run.

The main takeaway from the estimates is that the nature of UIP violations changes with the horizon – the short-horizon violations are characterized by negative coefficients and the longer horizon violations by positive ones. The difference is not so much in the magnitude of violations, which is roughly the same at short and long horizons, but in their fundamental nature. At short horizons we have the finding that exchange rates fail to depreciate sufficiently to fully offset the interest rate differential, while at longer horizons we have the opposite puzzling behavior, as exchange rates in fact depreciate too much.27 The findings show that UIP is violated at both short and long horizons, and suggest that the UIP puzzle is not driven by short-run frictions that disappear over the long-run, but rather that the fundamental nature of the violations changes with the horizon. A comprehensive model of the UIP puzzle should be consistent with this change in the direction of UIP violations.

My analysis is inspired by the essential empirical insights of Engel (2015) regarding excess currency returns and real interest rates. That paper studies the relationship between currency returns, real exchange rate levels and real interest rate differentials, using a VAR on observed exchange rates, price levels and nominal interest rates, for each G7 country (paired with the US). The VAR is used to construct real interest differentials and model-implied ex-ante expected currency returns. Using results from the VAR, Engel (2015) shows that when a country’s real interest rate is high, these expected returns are initially positive, and then, at longer horizons, negative. I take a different look at the data, but my results echo his and thus show that this is indeed a robust empirical phenomenon. My analysis does not impose parametric time-series restrictions, leverages the cross-sectional variation of the data and focuses on nominal data, which is directly observable.

There are also distinctions between the two sets of empirical results. For example, Engel (2015) finds that the forecastability pattern in excess returns changes from positive to negative at horizons of about 10 to 12 months, while I estimate that this occurs after approximately 40 months. Additionally, Engel (2015)’s results suggest that UIP is violated at very long horizons in the sense that long-horizon cumulative returns are predicted to be statistically significantly negative. I do not find an equivalent result when the nominal

27The next section provides a detailed discussion on the implications for exchange rate behavior.
interest rate differential is the predictor. These different quantitative findings could be due
to the specific restrictions implied by Engel’s VAR system. Alternatively, they could be
due to interesting and important differences in how nominal and real interest rates forecast
excess returns at longer horizons, or due to the fact that my analysis also leverages the
cross-sectional variation of the data. I leave disentangling those effects to future work.

2.4 Decomposing the UIP Violations: Exchange rate vs. Term structure anomalies

The assumptions underlying UIP also imply the expectations hypothesis (EH) of the interest
rate term-structure, which has been shown to fail in the data, and thus creates forecastable excess returns in the long-term bonds. As a result, such violations of the EH could be driving the evidence of forecastability of excess currency returns at longer horizons. In this section, I decompose the estimated UIP violations into exchange rate and term-structure components, and show that exchange rate behavior is the primary driving force at all horizons, and is also responsible for the changing nature of the violations.

Under EH, cumulative long-term interest rates are equal to the sum of expected future short-rates over the duration of the long-term interest rate. Hence, a zero coupon \( n \)-month bond’s interest rate, \( R_t^{(n)} \), would be given by

\[
R_t^{(n)} = \sum_{k=0}^{n-1} E_t(i_{t+k}),
\]

where, as before, \( i_t \) is the 1-month interest rate at time \( t \). We can then use this relation to back out risk-neutral expectations of future short-rates from the term-structure itself. For example, let \( i_{t,t+k} \) be the time-\( t \) risk-neutral expectation of the 1-month interest rate at time \( t + k \), also known as the forward interest rate at time \( t \), and note that this will be given by the difference in interest rates of a \((k + 1)\)-months bond and a \( k \)-months bond:

\[
i_{t,t+k} = E_t^Q(i_{t+k}) = R_t^{(k+1)} - R_t^{(k)},
\]

Clearly, \( i_{t,t} = i_t \), but as has been shown extensively, the EH hypothesis fails at longer horizons (e.g. Campbell and Shiller (1991)), and the risk-neutral expectation errors

\[
\eta_{t,t+k} = i_{t,t+k} - i_{t+k}
\]
are forecastable by today’s (time $t$) short-rate.

To see how this could affect currency return forecasts, add and subtract the forward interest differential $\hat{i}_{t,t+k} - i_{t,t+k}$ from the excess currency return $\lambda_{t+k+1}$ to obtain

$$E_t(\lambda_{t+k+1}) = E_t(\Delta s_{t+k+1} + \hat{i}_{t,t+k} - i_{t,t+k}) + E_t\left(\hat{i}_{t,t+k} - i_{t,t+k} - \left(\hat{i}_{t,t+k} - i_{t,t+k}\right)\right).$$

(4)

Forecastability in excess currency returns could arise from either of the two components above. The first piece measures how well exchange rates offset forward interest rates, and captures the exchange rate effect. In essence, it is the expected excess currency return in a world where the EH holds. The second component measures the forecastability of interest-rate excess returns themselves, and captures the term-structure effect behind UIP violations. Given that the EH is indeed violated in the data, we would expect that the overall forecastability of currency returns, at horizons longer than one, is at least partially driven by the second component. To study their relative importance, next I decompose the estimated UIP violations into these two separate effects.

To do so, I construct a zero-coupon term-structure of interest rate differentials by using the forward discount at maturities of up to a year, and data on interest rate swaps from Bloomberg for longer maturities. Data on long-maturity interest rates is only available for a shorter period of time, however, and starts in 1990. The shorter time-series also necessitates dropping Euro-legacy currencies, because they are left with less than 10 years of data. This leaves me with a data set of 10 currencies for the period 1990-2013, and I use it to construct the needed forward interest rates. With those, I compute the two components of currency returns in (4) and run separate forecasting regressions on each,

$$s_{t+k+1} - s_{t+k} + \hat{i}_{t,t+k} - i_{t,t+k} = \alpha_{j,k}^{(1)} + \delta_k(i_{j,t} - \hat{i}_{j,t}) + \nu_{j,t+k}^{(1)}$$

$$\hat{i}_{t+k} - i_{t+k} - \left(\hat{i}_{t,t+k} - i_{t,t+k}\right) = \alpha_{j,k}^{(2)} + \theta_k(i_{j,t} - \hat{i}_{j,t}) + \nu_{j,t+k}^{(1)},$$

to estimate $\delta_k$ and $\theta_k$, which by construction sum up to the UIP coefficients $\beta_k$.

$^{29}$Note that this is not a purely theoretical construct, but agents can in fact form trades that yield this payoff. It can be obtained by going long the excess return on a foreign $k + 1$ months bond and short the excess return on a $k$-months foreign bond:

$$\Delta s_{t+k+1} + \hat{i}_{t,t+k} - i_{t,t+k} = s_{t+k+1} - s_t + R_t^{(k+1)*} - R_t^{(k+1)} - (s_{t+k} - s_t + R_t^{(k)*} - R_t^{(k)})$$
\[ \beta_k = \delta_k + \theta_k. \]

Thus, these two series of estimates decompose the UIP violations into an exchange rate effect, \( \delta_k \), and a term-structure effect, \( \theta_k \). The results are plotted in Figure 2, where the blue line represents the original \( \beta_k \) UIP violations (but now estimated on the smaller data set for comparison purposes), the red dash-dot line plots \( \delta_k \) and the green dashed line plots \( \theta_k \). The shaded region represents the 95% confidence interval around the estimates of \( \delta_k \).\(^{30}\)

The results show that the documented UIP violations, and their changing nature, are primarily driven by the exchange rate behavior. The \( \delta_k \) coefficients are statistically significant, track the \( \beta_k \) estimates closely and display a very similar pattern across horizons, where they start out negative, and then turn positive at the same time as \( \beta_k \). In terms of overall magnitudes, the \( \delta_k \) coefficients account for virtually all of the negative UIP violations at horizons of less than 36 months, and for more than two-thirds of the positive UIP violations at longer horizons. On the other hand, while the term-structure effects are also non-zero and switch from negative to positive, their timing is quite different and the magnitude is much smaller. Thus, the results point to exchange rate behavior as the most important driver.

\(^{30}\)\( \delta_k \) barely miss the 95% significance cut-off at 60-80 month horizons, but are significant at the 90% level.
of the changing nature of UIP violations and suggest that it is primarily an exchange rate phenomenon, with the term-structure effects playing a secondary role.

\section*{2.5 Implications for Exchange Rate Behavior}

In this section, I examine further the underlying exchange rate behavior. I find that, following an increase in the interest rate differential, there is a short-run exchange rate appreciation, which generates the short-horizon negative UIP violations, but that there is also a subsequent, excess depreciation at longer horizons which drives the positive UIP violations. In fact, the eventual depreciation more than offsets the short-run appreciation, and in the long-run the exchange rate depreciates, and converges to the path implied by UIP. But while it catches up in the end, it does so in a way that violates UIP at every step along the way.

To avoid non-stationarity issues, I work with the cumulative change of the exchange rate, \( s_{t+k} - s_t \), and study the impulse response relative to today’s value. I estimate the impulse response to an innovation in the interest rate differential by using the flexible Jorda (2005) method of local projections. This amounts to separately projecting each \( k \)-periods cumulative exchange rate change on the current interest rate differential,

\[
\text{Proj}(s_{t+1} - s_t | i_t - i_t^*) = \gamma_k (i_t - i_t^*),
\]

and the sequence \( \{\gamma_k\} \) forms an estimate of the impulse response function (IRF). The method of local projections is especially well suited for estimating long-run responses because of its flexible nature – there are no restrictions on the dynamics from period to period, as each response horizon is estimated via a separate projection. The coefficients \( \gamma_k \) are estimated through a series of fixed-effects panel regressions like before.

I compare this IRF with the “UIP benchmark”, which is the path the exchange rate is expected to take under UIP. To obtain this, re-arrange the equation \( \lambda_{t+1} = s_{t+1} - s_t + i_t^* - i_t \) to isolate the exchange rate change and sum forward:

\[
\begin{align*}
s_{t+k} - s_t &= \sum_{h=1}^{k} (i_{t+h-1} - i_{t+h-1}^*) + \sum_{h=1}^{k} \lambda_{t+h}^* \sum_{h=1}^{k} \lambda_{t+h}^* 
\end{align*}
\]

Let \( \rho_k \) be the \( k \)-th autocorrelation of the interest rate differential \( i_t - i_t^* \), and project
both sides of (5) onto the time-\(t\) interest rate differential to express \(\gamma_k\) as:

\[
\gamma_k = \sum_{h=1}^{k} \beta_h + \sum_{h=0}^{k-1} \rho_h
\]

Sum of UIP Violations  
Sum of Expected Int Diffs

Using this equation and estimates of \(\beta_k\) and \(\rho_k\), we can obtain different counter-factual paths of the exchange rate. In particular, to obtain the predicted path under UIP set all UIP violations to zero \((\beta_k = 0)\), which yields an exchange rate path that offsets the expected path of future interest rates,

\[
\gamma_{UIP}^k = \sum_{h=0}^{k-1} \rho_h,
\]

so as to eliminate predictable excess currency returns. I estimate \(\rho_k\) with panel regressions and then cumulate the resulting coefficients to come-up with an estimate of \(\gamma_{UIP}^k\).

The actual estimated path of the exchange rate is plotted against this counter-factual path in Figure 3. The blue solid line plots \(\gamma_k\) and the shaded area is the 95% confidence interval. The red dash-dot line represents the UIP benchmark – the expected path of the exchange rate in case all \(\beta_k = 0\). The disparate movement of the blue and the red line at short horizons generates the classic UIP Puzzle. Following an increase in the interest rate differential, interest rates are persistent and stay elevated. UIP predicts that in response, the exchange rate will steadily depreciate to offset this persistent rise in interest rate differentials. On the contrary, however, the exchange rate fails to depreciate and in fact even appreciates at horizons of up to 36 months. Thus, the exchange rates do not close profit opportunities but rather enhances them, and we get the prediction that high-interest rates lead to positive currency returns in the short-run.

This appreciation, however, is not the whole story. There is a turning point after three to four years, at which stage the exchange rate reverses course and experiences a sharp depreciation at horizons of four to seven years. The depreciation is in excess of the UIP prediction, since the corresponding interest rates stay roughly flat, and this generates the positive UIP violations at longer horizons. Thus, due to this swing in the exchange rate, an increase in interest rates would eventually lead to negative currency returns. The changing nature of the exchange rate response, leads to a change in the UIP violations as well.

In fact, the eventual depreciation is strong enough to fully offset the initial appreciation, and to catch up the exchange rate with the UIP-implied path, which makes the long-run
exchange rate behavior roughly consistent with UIP.\footnote{This behavior is in-line with the “delayed overshooting” result of Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), which they obtain through a VAR analysis of the response of exchange rates to identified monetary shocks.} However, the path the exchange rate takes to catch up to the UIP benchmark violates UIP at every step of the way. At first, exchange rates tend to appreciate, while expected to depreciate, and then reverse course and start depreciating too sharply. This cyclical behavior generate the changing nature of the UIP violations and also leads to interesting, predictable movements in the exchange rate, especially in the long-run.

To further illustrate the significance of the changing sign of UIP violations, the green dashed line in Figure 3 plots a counter-factual exchange rate path ($\hat{\gamma}_k^{\lambda \leq 0}$) obtained by setting $\beta_k = 0$ for all $k \geq 36$. The counterfactual emulates exchange rate behavior in a world where UIP violations are always negative and do not change sign at longer horizons. The main difference is the long-run behavior of the exchange rate, where in this counter-factual case it fails to depreciate after its initial appreciation. Thus, the UIP puzzle is not a short-term phenomenon but one that is connected to exchange rate behavior at all horizons.

A model that fully addresses the UIP puzzle must account for both the negative and the positive UIP violations, and feature cyclical dynamics in the exchange rate. Existing models have largely focused on modeling high-frequency exchange rate movements and ex-
explaining the short-horizon UIP violations, and tend to generate UIP deviations that converge monotonically to zero and do not change direction. To address this, the rest of the paper develops and analyzes a novel model, relying on the mechanism of bond convenience yields, and shows that it can rationalize the observed UIP violations and exchange rate behavior at both short and long horizons.

3 Time-Varying Convenience Yields and Excess Currency Returns

The UIP condition relies on two key assumptions: risk-neutrality (due to log-linearization) and the assumption that financial returns are the only benefit to holding bonds. Risk-premia have been extensively studied as a potential resolution to the UIP puzzle, and this paper focuses instead on relaxing the second assumption. I explore the implications of introducing a non-pecuniary benefit to holding bonds and show that this can generate UIP violations that closely match the empirical evidence. The mechanism also ties the nature and the magnitude of the UIP violations to the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy.

A growing empirical literature documents a significant, time-varying “convenience yield” component to government bond yields and shows that it is related to the outstanding amount of government debt (see Reinhart et al. (2000), Longstaff (2004), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012), Greenwood and Vayanos (2014)). The convenience yield is defined as the monetary value the non-pecuniary benefits of owning government debt (e.g. safety, liquidity) and is the amount of interest investors are willing to forego in exchange of those benefits. The literature motivates and relates the convenience yield to the fact that government debt is nominally safe and liquid, and hence could serve as a substitute to money, a special convenience asset that investors are willing to hold at a zero equilibrium rate of return. Government bonds are often an acceptable means of payment among financial intermediaries, serve an important role as collateral that reduces counter-party risk in complex transactions and back checkable deposits all of which make them inherit some of the medium of exchange convenience value of money. On the other hand, there is a special demand for safe assets, from mutual funds or insurance companies mandated to invest in certain class of assets, government units such as the Social Security Fund or long-horizon investors, which make them inherit some of the store of value properties of money.

There is also a sizable theoretical literature that incorporates convenience yield mechanisms in equilibrium models and has shown that they can help account for a diverse set of asset pricing puzzles, such as the low equilibrium risk-free rate, the equity risk premium,
and the term premium (Bansal and Coleman (1996), Bansal et al. (2011), Lagos (2010, 2011), Acharya and Viswanathan (2011)). I build on the theoretical literature by introducing the convenience yield mechanism into an international framework, and analyzing its interaction with monetary and fiscal policies and effects on exchange rate behavior. I contribute to the empirical literature by verifying two of the key implications of the model in the data, by providing novel results that document the relationship between excess currency returns and the outstanding amount of government debt, and the relationship between UIP violations and the degree of monetary policy independence.

I proceed in two steps. First, I develop an intentionally stylized model that allows me to analytically characterize the main results and showcase the key intuition. Next, I relax the simplifying assumptions of the analytical model and set the mechanism in a benchmark, two-country open economy model. I calibrate the model with standard parameters and show that it can closely match the UIP violations and exchange rate behavior at all horizons.\footnote{The model abstracts from trade in forward contracts, however, Appendix B shows that introducing forward markets does not change the results. The intuition is that buying foreign currency forward opens a position long foreign and short home currency, and thus creates a synthetic position that is simultaneously long foreign bonds and short home bonds, and hence earns the respective convenience yield differential.}

\section{Analytical Model}

In this section, I present a stylized model which allows me to derive analytical results and is useful in understanding and illustrating the main mechanism. There are two countries, a large home country and a small (measure zero) foreign country that is negligible in world equilibrium.\footnote{The small foreign country assumption allows for a great deal of analytical tractability without affecting the way the mechanism works, as illustrated by the two-country model I study in the next section.} There is a representative home country household that consumes a single consumption good, in fixed supply, and can invest in home and foreign nominal bonds. In addition to the interest rate payment, bonds also offer a non-pecuniary, convenience benefit (i.e. the “convenience yield”) that is modeled directly as part of the utility function.\footnote{As shown later, we can equivalently model the convenience benefit as a transaction cost rather than as part of the utility. Not surprisingly, the two approaches yield very similar results.} The convenience benefit is motivated by the evidence in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) and the related literature, and is meant to capture the idea that government bonds, through their high nominal safety and liquidity, are a close substitute for money and thus share in some of its special medium of exchange and store of value properties.

The goal of this paper is to study the implications of bond convenience yields on equilibrium exchange rates, and not the specific microstructure that generates the convenience benefits. To this end, I follow much of the previous literature and assume a flexible, reduced
form specification for the convenience benefits and then study their asset pricing implications (Bansal and Coleman (1996), Bansal et al. (2011)). In addition, in the stylized model analyzed in this section, I study the limiting case of a cashless economy and abstract from money holdings. This greatly helps the analytical tractability and makes the mechanism more transparent. I introduce money later and show that all insights and intuition gained from the analytical model are preserved.

Finally, there is a government that sets interest rates by following a standard Taylor rule and finances a fixed level of expenditures by levying lump-sum taxes and issuing government bonds. The government is the sole supplier of the bonds that the households trade, and hence I use the terms “government debt”, “government bonds” and “bonds” interchangeably.

4.1 The Household

The household is infinitely lived and has additively separable preferences over consumption, and real holdings of home and foreign bonds, with the instantaneous utility function

\[ u(c_t, b_{ht}, b_{ft}) = \frac{c_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + \psi \frac{(b_{ht} + \delta b_{ft})^{1-\nu}}{1-\nu}, \]

where \( c_t \) is consumption, \( b_{ht} \) and \( b_{ft} \) are the real holdings of home and foreign bonds respectively, and \( \psi, \sigma, \nu > 0 \) and \( \delta \in [0,1) \). The assumption \( \delta < 1 \) models the idea that nominal government bonds denominated in foreign currency are not a perfect substitute for home government bonds, and generally offer inferior convenience benefits.

The household faces the following budget constraint at date \( t \)

\[ c_t + b_{ht} + b_{ft} = y - \tau_t + b_{ht,t-1} \frac{(1 + i_{t-1})}{\Pi_t} + b_{ft,t-1} \frac{(1 + i_{t-1}^*)}{\Pi_t} \frac{S_t}{S_{t-1}} \]

where \( y \) is the endowment of the consumption good, which is constant over time, \( \tau_t \) are real lump-sum taxes, \( \Pi_t \) is the gross inflation rate, \( i_t \) and \( i_t^* \) are the domestic and foreign nominal interest rates, and \( S_t \) is the exchange rate, expressed in terms of home currency units per unit of foreign currency. This yields the following Euler equations:

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35 For a more micro-founded approach to convenience yields see for example Lagos (2010, 2011).
36 An older draft presented a version of the analytical model that incorporates money holdings as well. The conclusions from that model are very similar, and that draft is available upon request.
37 The separability of preferences is not important for the mechanism and the quantitative model generalizes to non-separable preference for liquidity. The functional form of utility is not important either, and the analytic results can be generalized as long as home and foreign bonds are not perfect substitutes.
38 For tractability reasons, here I study the limiting case of a cashless economy, and thus we can view \( b_{ht} \) and \( b_{ft} \) as bond holdings relative to real money holdings.
1 = \beta E_t[(\frac{c_{t+1}}{c_t})^{-\sigma} \frac{1 + i_t}{\Pi_{t+1}}] + \psi c_t^\sigma (b_{ht} + \delta b_{ft})^{-\nu}

1 = \beta E_t[(\frac{c_{t+1}}{c_t})^{-\sigma} \frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t} \frac{1 + i_t^*}{\Pi_{t+1}}] + \delta \psi c_t^\sigma (b_{ht} + \delta b_{ft})^{-\nu}

The Eulers equate the real cost of one extra unit of investment in bonds (home or foreign) to the discounted, expected payoff. The cost is simply the one unit of foregone consumption today and the payoffs are composed of both financial returns and convenience benefits (i.e. direct utility effect). For example, the top equation shows that an additional unit of home bonds offers the (real) financial return \(\frac{1 + i_t}{\Pi_{t+1}}\), appropriately discounted by the marginal rate of substitution, and also provides the convenience benefit (expressed in consumption good terms) \(\psi c_t^\sigma (b_{ht} + \delta b_{ft})^{-\nu}\). The real payoff to an extra unit of investment is the sum of the two – it includes both financial and non-pecuniary benefits. For future reference, I define the following notation for the convenience returns on home and foreign bonds:

\[ \Psi_{b_h,t} \equiv \psi c_t^\sigma (b_{ht} + \delta b_{ft})^{-\nu} \]

\[ \Psi_{b_f,t} \equiv \psi c_t^\sigma (b_{ht} + \delta b_{ft})^{-\nu} \]

### 4.2 The Government

The government sets monetary policy according to the Taylor rule

\[
\frac{(1 + i_t)}{1 + i} = (\frac{\Pi_t}{\Pi})^{\phi_e} e^{\nu_t}
\]

where \(v_t\) is white noise. On the fiscal side, it faces a constant level of real expenditures \(g\) and the budget constraint

\[ b_t^G + \tau_t = (\frac{1 + i_{t-1}}{\Pi_t}) b_{t-1}^G + g \]

where \(b_t^G\) is real government debt. I follow the literature on the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy and assume that the lump-sum taxes are set according to the linear rule,\(^{39}\)

\[ \tau_t = \rho_\tau \tau_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_\tau) \kappa b_{t-1}^G, \]

where $\rho_t \geq 0$ is the tax smoothing parameter and $\kappa_b \geq 0$ controls how strongly taxes respond to debt levels. The rule models the general idea that the government adjusts taxes to stay solvent, but does so gradually. This policy framework is not meant to capture optimal policy, but rather model government behavior in a tractable and, yet, empirically relevant way.

### 4.3 Equilibrium Relations

The foreign country is small and does not affect world markets, hence equilibrium in the goods market implies that the home household’s consumption is constant over time:

$$c_t = c + g = y.$$  

The small size of the foreign country also implies that foreign bonds are in zero net supply, $b_{ft} = 0$, and that home agents must hold the whole supply of home bonds:

$$b_{ht} = b_t^G.$$  

I solve the model by log-linearizing around the zero inflation steady state. Start by log-linearizing the Euler equation for home bonds:

$$\hat{i}_t - E_t(\hat{\pi}_{t+1}) + \frac{\Psi_{bh}}{\beta(1 + \hat{i})} \hat{\Psi}_{bh,t} = 0$$  

where $\hat{\Psi}_{bh,t}$ is the log-linearized marginal convenience value of home bonds. Since consumption is constant, the marginal rate of substitution between consumption today and tomorrow is also constant and hence the right-hand side is zero. The left-hand side of the equation is the log-linearized, real return on home government debt: the real interest rate plus the convenience yield. This relation shows that the convenience yield is the amount of interest agents are willing to forego in exchange for the non-pecuniary benefits of the bonds. Naturally, there is a negative relationship between the convenience yield and the equilibrium interest rate – the higher the convenience yield, the lower the equilibrium interest rate the household requires in order to hold the full supply of government debt.

Log-linearizing the expression for the marginal convenience benefit of the home bond

---

40Bohn (1998) documents that US primary surpluses indeed respond to the level of government debt.
41In Nagel (2014) interest rates and convenience yields have a positive relationship, as a rise in interest rates increases the opportunity cost of money. This is possible in this model as well, but in general will depend on the type of shock that hits the economy, as shown in greater detail by the quantitative model.
and using the equilibrium condition \( b_{ft} = 0 \) yields

\[
\hat{\Psi}_{b_{ht},t} = -\nu \hat{b}_{ht} = -\nu \hat{b}_{ht}^G,
\]

which shows two important things. First, the convenience yield is decreasing in the amount of bonds owned by the household.\(^{42}\) Second, in this simple model the convenience yield is entirely determined by the supply of government bonds. This is due to the combined effects of constant consumption and additively separable utility.\(^{43}\) While this is an extreme case, it highlights one of the key ingredients of the mechanism: the effect of real government debt on the convenience yield.\(^{44}\)

Furthermore, substituting this relationship in the home bonds Euler equation we get:

\[
\hat{i}_t - E_t(\hat{s}_{t+1} + 1) = -\nu \frac{\Psi_{b_{h}}}{\beta (1 + \hat{i})} \hat{b}_{ht}.
\]

This shows that the convenience yield mechanism establishes a downward sloping demand for government bonds – the higher is the outstanding supply of debt, the lower is the convenience yield, and hence the higher the equilibrium interest rate.

### 4.4 Currency Returns and UIP Violations

Log-linearizing the Euler condition for foreign bonds around the symmetric, zero inflation steady state where \( S = 1 \), we obtain

\[
\begin{align*}
\hat{\pi}^* - E_t(\hat{s}_{t+1}) + E_t(\hat{s}_{t+1} - \hat{s}_t) + \frac{\Psi_{b_{f}}}{\beta (1 + \hat{i}^*)} \hat{\Psi}_{b_{f},t} &= 0.
\end{align*}
\]

Combine with the equation for the home interest rate to obtain a modified version of the UIP condition:

\[
E_t(\hat{s}_{t+1} - \hat{s}_t + \hat{\pi}^* - \hat{i}_t) = \frac{\Psi_{b_{h}}}{\beta (1 + \hat{i})} \hat{\Psi}_{b_{h},t} - \frac{\Psi_{b_{f}}}{\beta (1 + \hat{i}^*)} \hat{\Psi}_{b_{f},t}.
\]

Uncovered Interest Rate Parity does not hold in this model and there are predictable, excess returns on cross-country investment. The predictable returns arise as a compensation

---

\(^{42}\)The liquidity preferences exhibit diminishing marginal utility of convenience assets.

\(^{43}\)Both of which will be relaxed in the quantitative model.

\(^{44}\)Debt supply as a driver of convenience yield fluctuations is also emphasized by the previous literature on the convenience yield.
for differences in the convenience yields on home and foreign bonds. The left hand side of the equation gives the expected excess financial return of foreign bonds over home bonds. In equilibrium, the expected excess returns are equal to the difference in the convenience values of home and foreign bonds. Thus, when the home bond’s convenience value increases, the foreign bond is compensated with higher expected financial returns and vice versa. Without the convenience yield mechanism, there will be no UIP violations in the model.

Since foreign bond holdings are constant in equilibrium (zero in net supply), we have that the convenience value of the foreign bond is again driven by holdings of home debt

\[ \dot{\Psi}_{bf,t} = -\nu \hat{b}_{ht} \]

and defining \( \eta_b \equiv \nu \frac{\Psi_{bh}}{\beta(1+i)} - \nu \frac{\Psi_{bt}}{\beta(1+i^*)} \) we have

\[ E_t(\dot{s}_{t+1} - \dot{s}_t + \dot{i}^* - \dot{i}_t) = -\eta_b \hat{b}_{ht}. \]

Thus, in this stylized model the convenience yield differential and hence the UIP violations are driven by movements in home government debt. Moreover, since \( \delta \in [0,1) \) we can show that \( \eta_b > 0 \). Thus, the convenience yield differential and the expected excess returns on the foreign bond are decreasing in government debt. This is due to the diminishing marginal convenience value of debt and the fact that the home convenience yield is more responsive to movements in home debt, than the foreign convenience yield. When home government debt increases, the convenience value of home bonds drops faster than the convenience value of foreign bonds and decreases the convenience yield differential.

To fully characterize exchange rate dynamics and the implied UIP regression coefficients, we also need to model foreign monetary policy. For simplicity, here I assume that the foreign Central Bank keeps a constant interest rate \( i^* = i^* \), and hence

\[ \dot{i}_t = \dot{i}^* = \dot{i}^* = E_t(\dot{\pi}_{t+1}) + \gamma_b \hat{b}_{ht} \]

\[ E_t(\lambda_{t+1}) = -\eta_b \hat{b}_{ht}, \]

where \( \gamma_b = \nu \frac{\Psi_{bh}}{\beta(1+i)} > 0 \) and \( \eta_b > 0 \).\(^{45}\) Thus, the interest rate differential is positively related to the current level of government debt, while the next period excess currency return is negatively related to it. This induces a negative relationship between excess currency returns and the interest rate differential at short horizons. The reason is that when bond supply is high the home convenience yield falls, as the marginal benefit of an extra unit of

\(^{45}\) The results are robust to different foreign monetary policies, but this case is analytically tractable.
bonds decreases. The fall in the convenience yield serves to increase the equilibrium interest rate at home, because investors require a higher financial compensation to offset the decrease in the non-pecuniary benefit of home bonds. Similarly, the return of the home bonds, relative to the foreign bonds, also increases because the relative convenience value of the home bond has decreased. Thus, we have the standard UIP puzzle relationship where high interest rate currencies tend to earn positive excess returns at short horizons.

To fully characterize the whole profile of UIP violations at different horizons, in the next section I solve for the equilibrium dynamics of government debt and inflation.

4.5 Model Solution

There are four equilibrium equations and four equilibrium variables – inflation, government debt, taxes and the interest rate. The equations are the log-linearized Euler equation for home bonds,

\[ \hat{i}_t = E_t(\hat{\pi}_t) + \gamma_b \hat{b}_t, \]

the log-linearized government budget constraint,

\[ \hat{b}_t + \tau_b \hat{\tau}_t = (1 + i)(\hat{b}_{t-1} + \hat{i}_{t-1} - \hat{\pi}_t), \]

the log-linearized Taylor rule

\[ \hat{i}_t = \phi_{\pi} \hat{\pi}_t + v_t, \]

and the log-linearized tax rule

\[ \hat{\tau}_t = \rho_{\tau} \hat{\tau}_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_{\tau}) \kappa_{\tau} \frac{b}{\tau} \hat{b}_{t-1}. \]

The model’s solution depends on the monetary and fiscal policy stances. I use the standard terminology in the literature and call a policy ‘active’ when it is unconstrained and can actively pursue its objective. And ‘passive’ when it needs to obey the equilibrium constraints imposed by the other policy authority, and passively adjusts the variable under its control, either interest rates or taxes, to keep the government solvent.

As summarized in Lemma 1 below, there are two combinations of monetary and fiscal policies that yield unique, stationary solutions. One is the ‘active monetary’ and ‘passive fiscal’ policy mix, where \( \phi_{\pi} > 1 \) and the monetary authority reacts strongly to inflation, while the fiscal authority must adjust taxes strongly enough to fully fund its debts. The other is the mirror image situation, where the fiscal authority is ‘active’ and does not adjust taxes strongly, and deficits must be financed by the ‘passive’ monetary authority, \( \phi_{\pi} < 1, \)
which allows inflation to rise and inflate debt away as needed.

**LEMMA 1 (Existence and Uniqueness).** When taxes respond non-negatively to debt, \( \kappa_b \geq 0 \), a stationary solution to the system of equilibrium equations, exists if and only if we have one of the following two policy combinations:

(i) **Active Monetary, Passive Fiscal policy:** \( \phi_\pi > 1 \), \( \kappa_b \in (K - 1, \frac{1 + \rho_\tau}{1 - \rho_\tau} (K + 1)) \), \( \rho_\tau \in [0, \frac{1}{K}) \).

(ii) **Passive Monetary, Active Fiscal policy:** \( \phi_\pi < 1 \), \( \kappa_b \in [0, K - 1) \), \( \rho_\tau \in [0, 1) \).

where \( K = (1 + i)(1 + \gamma_b) > 1 \). When the solution exists, it is unique.

Moreover, the stronger restriction \( \kappa_b \in [0, \frac{K}{1 - \rho_\tau}) \) ensures that the equilibrium variables, \( \hat{b}_t, \hat{\tau}_t, \hat{p}_t, \hat{i}_t \), have non-negative autocorrelation.

**Proof.** See Appendix A.1.

To gain some intuition about the result, substitute the Taylor rule into the Euler equation for home bonds to obtain

\[
\hat{p}_t = \frac{1}{\phi_\pi} \left( E_t(\hat{p}_{t+1}) + \gamma_b \hat{b}_t - v_t \right). \tag{8}
\]

If monetary policy is active and \( \phi_\pi > 1 \), we can solve for inflation ‘forward’ using equation (8), and express it as a sum of expected future debt levels and the monetary policy shock \( v_t \). Since monetary policy is actively fighting inflation and disregards the fiscal condition of the government, the tax authority must adjust taxes sufficiently sharply, e.g. \( \kappa_b \geq K - 1 \), to ensure debt is stationary and the government is solvent. In fact, the lemma also specifies an upper bound on \( \kappa_b \) in order to ensure that the tax response is not overly strong, which will introduce a negative root larger than one in absolute value. Lastly, there’s also an upper bound on the tax smoothing parameter \( \rho_\tau \), because a smoothed tax policy introduces feedback effects from debt to taxes and back into debt. When smoothing is excessively high, \( \rho_\tau \geq \frac{1}{K} \), the feedback effects make debt and taxes unbounded.

If the conditions for a ‘passive’ fiscal policy stance are satisfied, we can solve for the needed sum of expected future debt levels from the budget and tax rule equations, and substitute them in the inflation equation to obtain a solution for inflation in terms of current debt and taxes. To do this, date the government budget constraint one period ahead, take conditional time-t expectation and use the home bond Euler equation to obtain

\[
E_t(\hat{b}_{t+1}) + \frac{\tau}{b} E_t(\hat{\tau}_{t+1}) = (1 + i)(1 + \gamma_b)\hat{b}_t
\]

Then combine it with the expectation of the tax rule to get
We can use this relation to solve for $E_t(\hat{b}_{t+j})$ for any $j > 1$ and substitute it in the expression for inflation. Next, substitute out inflation and the interest rate from the budget constraint and combine with the tax rule to obtain a system of two equations,

$$
\begin{bmatrix}
\hat{b}_{ht} \\
\hat{\tau}_{ht}
\end{bmatrix}
= A
\begin{bmatrix}
\hat{b}_{ht-1} \\
\hat{\tau}_{ht-1}
\end{bmatrix}
+ \begin{bmatrix}
\frac{1}{\phi_x} \\
0
\end{bmatrix}
v_t,
$$

that we can solve ‘backward’ for the equilibrium levels of debt and taxes. The conditions for a ‘passive’ tax rule ensure that both eigenvalues of the matrix $A$ lay inside the unit circle.

On the other hand, if monetary policy is ‘passive’ and $\phi_x < 1$ we cannot solve for inflation forward from equation (8). However, if fiscal policy is ‘active’ and taxes do not adjust strongly to movements in debt, $\kappa_b \in [0, K - 1)$, we can solve the budget equation ‘forward’ to obtain a solution for equilibrium debt. In that case the matrix $A$ has one eigenvalue outside the unit circle and one inside, and we can obtain a ‘forward’ solution for $\hat{b}_{ht}$ from the system (9). We can then solve for taxes and inflation.

The solutions under the two possible combinations of policy stances have important similarities and differences vis-a-vis their implications about UIP violations. To better understand those relationships, next I characterize the impulse response function (IRF) in respect to the monetary shock $v_t$. Recall that the expected excess currency return is

$$
E_t(\hat{\lambda}_{t+1}) = -\eta_b \hat{b}_t,
$$

and hence we need to analyze the response of debt.

The only exogenous shock in this economy is the monetary shock $v_t$ and hence the Wold decomposition of $\hat{b}_{ht}$ can be expressed as

$$
\hat{b}_t = a_{b0}v_t + a_{b1}v_{t-1} + a_{b2}v_{t-2} + a_{b3}v_{t-3} + \ldots,
$$

and the IRF of debt is given by the sequence $\{a_{bk}\}_{k=0}^{\infty}$. We can then study the dynamics of government debt and hence the dynamics of UIP violations by characterizing that sequence.
I do this in two steps. Lemma 2 characterizes the IRFs under the Active Monetary/Passive Fiscal policy mix and Lemma 3 treats the Passive Monetary/Active Fiscal case.

**LEMMA 2 (IRF: Active Monetary/Passive Fiscal).** Let \( \phi_{\pi} > 1, \kappa_b \in (K - 1, \frac{K}{1 - \rho_{\tau}}) \), and define \( \rho(\kappa_b) = \frac{\kappa_b(k_b + 1 - K) + K - 2\sqrt{K\kappa_b(k_b + 1 - K)}}{(1 + \kappa_b)^2} > 0. \) Then,

(i) If \( \rho_{\tau} \in [0, \rho(\kappa_b)] \) the autoregressive matrix \( A \) in (10) has two real, non-negative eigenvalues and the IRF never crosses the steady state:

\[
a_{bk} > 0 \text{ for } k = 0, 1, 2, 3, \ldots
\]

(ii) If \( \rho_{\tau} \in (\rho(\kappa_b), \frac{1}{K}) \) the autoregressive matrix \( A \) in (10) has a pair of complex conjugate eigenvalues which can be written as \( \lambda_k = a \pm bi \) for \( k \in \{1, 2\} \), and the corresponding conjugate eigenvectors are of the form \( \vec{v}_k = [x \pm yi, 1]' \), where \( a, b, x, y \) are real numbers and \( i \) is the imaginary unit. Furthermore, the IRF follows the dampened cosine wave:

\[
a_{bk} = \bar{a}_b|\lambda|^k \sqrt{1 + \left(\frac{x}{y}\right)^2} \cos(k\chi + \psi - \frac{\pi}{2}), \text{ for } k = 1, 2, 3, \ldots
\]

where \( \bar{a}_b = \frac{(1+i)(\phi_{\pi}-\rho_{\tau})(\phi_{\pi}-K) + \phi_{\pi}\kappa_b(1-\rho_{\tau})}{\phi_{\pi}(\phi_{\pi}-\rho_{\tau})(\phi_{\pi}-1) + \phi_{\pi}\kappa_b(1-\rho_{\tau})} > 0, \chi = \arctan\left(\frac{y}{x}\right) = \arctan\left(\frac{\sqrt{4K\rho_{\tau}-(K-(1-\rho_{\tau})\kappa_b+\rho_{\tau})^2}}{K-(1-\rho_{\tau})\kappa_b+\rho_{\tau}}\right) \in (0, \frac{\pi}{2}) \) and \( \psi = \arctan\left(\frac{x}{y}\right) \). Moreover, it is guaranteed that \( a_{bk} > 0 \) for \( k \in \{0, 1\} \).

*Proof.* See Appendix A.2. \( \square \)

Lemma 2 makes several important points. First, under active monetary policy, the dynamics of the system are governed by real roots as long as taxes are not too persistent, and by complex roots otherwise. Second, the dynamics under real roots are characterized by an IRF that converges back to steady state without overshooting it, while the IRF under complex roots is given by a cyclical cosine function that crosses steady state before converging. Third, in both cases a contractionary (positive) monetary shock increases debt above steady state on impact, and the effect lasts at least one more period.

Consider the dynamics under real roots first. A contractionary monetary shock does not affect taxes on impact, because they only respond to time \( t - 1 \) variables, but it lowers inflation. The fall in inflation raises the real-value of outstanding government debt and increases the debt servicing costs through higher real interest rates. The two effects combine to worsen the budget and lead to an increase in debt. In the following periods the fiscal authority responds by raising taxes to combat the elevated debt level. When the system is characterized by real roots, taxes respond to changes in government debt quickly, and debt converges back to steady state without overshooting.
In the case of complex roots, the behavior on impact is similar, with both debt and interest rates rising with a positive monetary shock, but the transition dynamics back to steady state are different. Debt dynamics are characterized by a cosine curve with a frequency of oscillation controlled by \( \chi = \arctan(\frac{a}{b}) \in (0, \frac{\pi}{2}) \), where \( a \) and \( b \) are the real and the imaginary parts of the complex roots. The larger \( \chi \) is, the higher the frequency of oscillations, but its upper bound of \( \frac{\pi}{2} \) ensures that the IRF remains above steady state for at least one period after the shock. The cyclical nature of the cosine dynamics, however, guarantees that debt will cross steady state and become negative before converging to s.s., with the number of periods needed for this first crossing to occur depending on the magnitude of \( \chi \).

This cyclical behavior arises when tax policy is adjusting sluggishly, i.e. \( \rho_{\tau} > \rho(\kappa_b) \), and taxes remain high even as debt approaches steady state, because they are still responding to the high debt levels of the past. In other words, the tax increases implemented to combat the initial rise in debt are long-lived, and their lasting effect eventually pushes debt below steady state, giving rise to the cyclical dynamics formalized by the cosine curve in Lemma 2. Due to the one-to-one relationship with excess currency returns, whether debt overshoots steady state also determines whether we see a reversal in UIP violations at longer horizons.

Lemma 3 summarizes the dynamics of the model given a Passive Monetary/Active Fiscal policy mix. It shows that with a Passive Monetary policy, the dynamics of the system are always characterized by real roots, regardless of how sluggish the tax policy is. The intuition is that with a Passive Monetary policy stance the key debt repayment mechanism is inflation and not taxes. Inflation, however, is free to adjust in equilibrium and hence stabilizes debt without implying cyclical dynamics, regardless of how sluggish the actual tax policy is. In fact, in the case of monetary shocks \( v_t \), we have the even stronger result that debt is constant over time, i.e. inflation completely insulates it from monetary shocks.\(^{46}\)

**Lemma 3 (IRF: Passive Monetary/Active Fiscal).** Let \( \phi_\pi < 1 \), \( \kappa_b \in [0, K - 1) \). Then, the autoregressive matrix \( A \) in (10) has two real, non-negative eigenvalues for all \( \rho_{\tau} \in [0, 1) \). Thus, for any fiscal policy for which a solution exists, the IRF never crosses steady state.

For monetary shocks we also have the stronger result that debt does not respond to \( v_t \):

\[
a_{kk} = 0 \text{ for } k = 0, 1, 2, 3, \ldots
\]

**Proof.** See Appendix A.3.

Figure 4 illustrates the type of dynamics we obtain under real and complex roots re-
spectively. The dynamics of the expected excess currency returns, and hence UIP violations, are simply the mirror image of the debt IRF. Recall that the shocks I consider are Taylor rule innovations, hence a positive (contractionary) shock increases interest rates and debt in the home country on impact and, through the relation \( E_t(\hat{\lambda}_{t+1}) = -\eta_b \hat{b}_t \), it also increases the excess returns on the home currency.

Figure 4: Impulse Response Function: Real vs Complex Roots

Given this relation and the shape of the IRFs, it is perhaps not surprising that the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy has a profound effect on the size of UIP violations and whether there are reversals at longer horizons. Under Active Monetary policy, the model generates the standard UIP puzzle relationship at all horizons, for all degrees of sluggishness in the tax rule, and generates a reversal in the direction of UIP violations at longer horizons when taxes are sufficiently persistent. On the other hand, a Passive Monetary policy implies there are no UIP violations, at any horizon, because the monetary authority allows inflation to adjust and immediately stabilize government debt. Theorem 1 formalizes these results.\(^{47}\)

**THEOREM 1 (UIP Violations).** The magnitude and direction of UIP violations and UIP regression coefficients, \( \beta_k \) in \( \hat{\lambda}_{t+k} = \alpha_k + \beta_k(\hat{i}_t - \hat{i}^*_t) + \varepsilon_{t+k} \), depend on the monetary-fiscal policy mix as follows.

\(^{47}\)The result of no UIP violations under passive monetary policy is specific to the monetary shocks – there are violations for fiscal shocks for example, and those violations do not change sign with the horizon.
(i) Active Monetary, Passive Fiscal policy and $\rho < \rho(\kappa_b)$: UIP violations go in the same direction at all horizons with the UIP regression coefficients

$$\beta_k < 0 \text{ for } k = 0, 1, 2, 3, \ldots$$

(ii) Active Monetary, Passive Fiscal policy and $\rho > \rho(\kappa_b)$: UIP violations follow cyclical (cosine) dynamics, and hence reverse course at longer horizons. The UIP regression coefficients start out negative and eventually turn positive, for at least some periods:

$$\beta_k < 0 \text{ for } k < \tilde{k}$$

$$\beta_k > 0 \text{ for some } k > \tilde{k}$$

where $\tilde{k} > 1$.

(iii) Passive Monetary, Active Fiscal policy: UIP violations go in the same direction at all horizons and are in fact always zero:

$$\beta_k = 0 \text{ for } k = 0, 1, 2, 3, \ldots$$

Proof. See Appendix A.4. \(\square\)

Theorem 1 derives the main results of the analytical model and showcases how the monetary-fiscal interaction determines the dynamics and the magnitude of UIP violations. First, it shows that when monetary policy is active, the model generates the standard UIP puzzle relationship, $\beta_k < 0$ at short horizons, for any admissible fiscal policy. Second, if monetary policy is active and taxes adjust quickly the model generates $\beta_k < 0$ at all horizons and there are no reversals of the UIP violations at longer horizons. On the other hand, when monetary policy is passive there is no change in the UIP violations with the horizon, and they are in fact all zero, regardless of the fiscal policy. These two patterns are illustrated by the green and black dashed lines in Figure 5.

On the other hand, if monetary policy is active and taxes are sufficiently sluggish, i.e. $\rho \geq \rho(\kappa_b)$, the model implies the standard UIP puzzle relationship at shorter horizons, but also a reversal in the direction of UIP violations at longer horizons. It generates a pattern of UIP regression coefficients that starts out negative, $\beta_k < 0$ at short horizons, and then follows a cyclical profile, implying that we eventually get $\beta_k > 0$ at longer horizons. Thus, the violations change direction at longer horizons, and in general converge to zero following
a dampened cosine curve. This alternative pattern of UIP coefficients is illustrated by the solid blue line in Figure 5 and is strongly reminiscent of the empirical findings.

Table 2 summarizes the main insights of Theorem 1. When monetary policy is active and taxes adjust quickly, the model implies the standard UIP puzzle relationship of high interest rates forecasting positive excess currency returns ($\beta_k < 0$) at all horizons $k$. This is similar to the majority of existing models of the UIP puzzle, which also imply a pattern of UIP violations that go in the same direction at all horizons. However, when monetary policy is active and taxes adjust slowly, the model generates a reversal in the UIP violations at longer horizons and we have both $\beta_k < 0$ at short horizons and $\beta_k > 0$ at longer horizons. On the other hand, passive monetary policy implies that there are no UIP violations, regardless of the fiscal policy, as the central bank allows inflation to adjust and stabilize debt.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\rho_r \leq \rho$</th>
<th>$\rho_r &gt; \rho$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active Monetary</td>
<td>UIP Puzzle ($\beta_k &lt; 0$) $\forall k$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passive Monetary</td>
<td>No Violations ($\beta_k = 0$) $\forall k$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results showcase one of the key insights of the analytical model – the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy plays a crucial role in determining the magnitude and
dynamics of UIP violations. The nature of the UIP violation is tied to the main government debt repayment mechanism. When debts are paid off through the inflation tax (passive monetary policy) there is no scope for UIP violations, as the flexible repayment mechanism keeps debt, and hence the convenience yield, constant. On the other hand, when debts are paid off through fast-adjusting taxes, but not inflation (active monetary policy), the standard UIP puzzle relationship holds at all horizons and there is no reversal in the UIP violations. Lastly, when the main debt repayment mechanism is sluggish, due to an active monetary policy paired with a sluggish tax policy, the model generates cyclical debt dynamics, and corresponding cyclical UIP violations that reverse course at longer horizons.

To better understand the intuition behind the results, it is useful to follow through the response to a contractionary monetary shock. Under active monetary policy, the shock increases the interest rate and decreases inflation on impact. The fall in inflation leads to an increase in the outstanding amount of real government debt, which lowers its marginal convenience value and thus leads to a compensating, excess financial return on the home currency \((E_t(\hat{\lambda}_{t+1}) = -\eta b_{ht})\). At the same time the fall in the home convenience yield also pushes the home interest rate up, as investors require higher financial compensation to hold the full supply of home government debt (recall equation (6)). This highlights the fact that the short-horizon negative UIP coefficients are a fundamental part of the mechanism, as movements in the convenience yield push interest rates and excess currency returns in opposite directions.

The sluggishness of the main debt repayment mechanism is crucial in the next step. If taxes adjust sufficiently quickly, debt levels, and hence the convenience yield, converge back to steady state without crossing it and \(\beta_k < 0\) for all \(k\). On the other hand, if taxes are sufficiently sluggish, the system is governed by complex roots and the debt dynamics, and hence the convenience yield dynamics, are cyclical. Taxes are slow to adjust downwards as debt falls back towards steady state, which leads debt to overshoot its steady state and go below it before converging. The convenience yield follows a mirror image trajectory and eventually rises above steady state, which pushes the excess returns on the foreign currency above steady state and thus generates positive UIP regression coefficients, \(\beta_k > 0\), at longer horizons. On the other hand, if monetary policy is passive, a contractionary monetary shock leads to higher inflation, rather than lower inflation, which helps pay for the increased interest rate costs of the government and keeps debt constant. Thus, with the most flexible repayment mechanism there are no movements in debt and thus no UIP violations.

To sum up, the UIP violations depend on the interaction between monetary and fiscal

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48There is a corresponding move in the foreign convenience yield as well, because home and foreign debt are substitutes, but \(\delta < 1\) ensures that the convenience yield differential falls as well.
policy, and the resulting dynamics of government debt. When debt is repaid by a fast-adjusting mechanism the UIP violations are smaller in magnitude, and zero in the fully flexible case of the inflation tax, and do not change direction with the horizon. However if the repayment mechanism is sluggish, we still have the standard UIP puzzle at short horizons, but the model also implies that the UIP violations reverse course at longer horizons.

Lastly, the above analysis is not specific to monetary policy shocks, and, in fact, a large variety of shocks (fiscal, technology, etc.) have similar implications. For the sake of brevity, this section analyzed only monetary shocks, but the mechanism is remarkably robust to the source of exogenous variation. It can generate excess return reversals, even conditional on just one shock (as we saw with monetary shocks), and that holds for a broad class of shocks. The crucial thing is the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy, which determines the fundamental dynamics of the system.

5 Quantitative Model

To examine the quantitative performance of the mechanism I relax the simplifying assumptions of the previous section, and set it in a benchmark nominal, two country model (Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), Chari et al. (2002), Clarida et al. (2002)). I then calibrate the model using standard parameters from the literature and show that it can closely match the empirical evidence on UIP deviations at both short and long horizons.

There are two symmetric countries, home (H) and foreign (F). Households have access to a complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities and consume both a domestically produced final good and a foreign final good. Each country’s final good is produced by a representative firm that aggregates domestically produced intermediate goods. The intermediate goods are produced by monopolistically competitive firms that face Calvo (1983) frictions in setting nominal prices. Lastly, there is a government that implements monetary policy by setting the interest rate and finances spending via lump-sum taxation and issuing government bonds.

Next I present the decision problems of the different agents in the home country, with the stipulation that the agents in the foreign country are symmetric.

5.1 Households

I use the same household preferences as in Clarida et al. (2002) and Gali and Monacelli (2005). The representative household maximizes the expected infinite stream of utility:

\[ U = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} u(c_t, \pi_t) \]

Note that studying optimal policy is beyond the scope of this paper and is left to future research. This discussion only intends to highlight how monetary and fiscal policy interaction can affect UIP violations.
\[ \beta \left( \frac{C_{t+j}^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} - \frac{N_{ht}^{1+\phi}}{1+\phi} \right) \]

Consumption is a CES aggregate of home (H) and foreign (F) final goods,

\[ C_t = \left( a_h^\eta C_{ht}^{\eta-1} + a_f^\eta C_{ft}^{\eta-1} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} \]

where \( \eta \) is the elasticity of substitution between the two goods and the weights \( a_h \) and \( a_f \), normalized to sum to 1, determine the degree of home bias in consumption. \( C_{ht} \) and \( C_{ft} \) are the amount of the home final good and the foreign final good that the home household purchases. It follows that the corresponding consumption price index is

\[ P_t = \left( a_H P_{ht}^{1-\eta} + a_F P_{ft}^{1-\eta} \right)^{1-\eta} \]

where \( P_{ht} \) and \( P_{ft} \) are the prices of the home and foreign good in domestic currency.

To motivate the demand for liquidity, I assume that the household incurs transaction costs, \( \Psi_t \), in purchasing consumption, a standard approach in both the monetary literature (e.g. Feenstra (1986)) and the literature on bond convenience yields (Bansal and Coleman (1996), Bansal et al. (2011)). I model the transaction costs with a flexible CES function that includes both real money balances and real bond holdings as convenience assets:

\[ \Psi(C_t, m_t, b_{ht}, b_{ft}) = \psi c^\alpha h(m_t, b_{ht}, b_{ft})^{1-\alpha} \]

The transaction cost function has two components, the level of transactions \( C_t \) and a bundle of transaction services \( h(m_t, b_{ht}, b_{ft}) \), which is generated by the three convenience assets: real money balances \( m_t \) and the real holdings of home and foreign nominal bonds \( b_{ht} \) and \( b_{ft} \). The elasticity parameter \( \alpha > 1 \), hence transaction costs are increasing in the level of purchases (\( C_t \)) and decreasing in the level of transaction services. The transaction services \( h(\cdot) \) are a CES aggregator of real money balances and a bundle of transaction services generated by bonds:

\[ h(m_t, b_{ht}, b_{ft}) = (m_t^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta m}} + \tilde{h}(b_{ht}, b_{ft})^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta m}})^{\frac{\eta m}{\eta m-1}} \]

where

\[ \tilde{h}(b_{ht}, b_{ft}) = \kappa \left( a b_{ht}^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta b}} + (1 - a)b_{ft}^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta b}} \right)^{\frac{\eta b}{\eta b-1}} \]

The dual structure of the transaction services function aims to capture the idea that money and bonds are two separate classes of convenience assets and allows for different
The elasticity of substitution between money balances and the bundle of bonds is given by $\eta_m$, while $\eta_b$ is the elasticity of substitution between the two types of bonds. The parameter $\kappa_b$ shifts the overall level of transaction services provided by bonds and allows me to control the relative importance of bonds as convenience assets. Lastly, the parameter $\kappa_b$ controls the relative importance of home to foreign bonds.

The budget constraint of the household is

$$C_t + \int \Omega_{H,t}(z_{t+1})x(t_{t+1})dz_{t+1} + \Psi(c_t, m_t, b_{ht}, b_{ft}) + m_t + b_{ht} + b_{ft} = w_tN_{it} + \frac{x_{t-1}(z_t)}{\Pi_t} - \tau_t + d_t + \frac{m_{t-1}}{\Pi_t} + b_{ht-1}(1 + i_{t-1}) + b_{ft-1}(1 + i^*_t) \frac{S_t}{S_{t-1}}$$

where $\Omega_{H,t}(z_{t+1})$ is the price, in terms of home currency, of the Arrow-Debreu security that pays off in the state of nature $z_{t+1}$ tomorrow and $x_t(z_{t+1})$ is the amount of this security that the home household has purchased. The household spends money on consumption, Arrow-Debreu securities, transaction costs, money holdings, and home and foreign nominal bonds. It funds purchases with money balances it carries over from the previous period, real wages $w_t$, profits from the intermediate good firms $d_t$, and payoffs from its holdings of contingent claims, and home and foreign bonds. Lastly, it also pays lump-sum taxes $\tau_t$ to the domestic government.

This first-order necessary conditions for home and foreign nominal bond holdings are:

$$1 = \beta E_t \left( \frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t} \right)^{-\sigma} \frac{1 + \Psi(c_t, m_t, b_{ht}, b_{ft})}{1 + \Psi(c_{t+1}, m_{t+1}, b_{ht+1}, b_{ft+1})} \frac{1}{\Pi_{t+1}} \frac{1 + i_t}{1 + \Psi(b_t(c_t, m_t, b_{ht}, b_{ft}))}$$ (11)

$$1 = \beta E_t \left( \frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t} \right)^{-\sigma} \frac{1 + \Psi(c_t, m_t, b_{ht}, b_{ft})}{1 + \Psi(c_{t+1}, m_{t+1}, b_{ht+1}, b_{ft+1})} \frac{S_{t+1}}{\Pi_{t+1}S_t} \frac{1 + i^*_t}{1 + \Psi(b_t(c_t, m_t, b_{ht}, b_{ft}))}$$ (12)

where the term $\Psi_x = \frac{\partial\Psi}{\partial x}$ is the derivative of the transaction costs in respect to the variable $x$. The terms $\Psi_{b_h}$ and $\Psi_{b_f}$ are the marginal transaction benefit of holding an extra unit of home and foreign bonds respectively. Similarly to the analytical model, these marginal benefits determine the convenience yields and will generate UIP deviations.

The foreign household faces a symmetric set of first order conditions, and we can combine the optimality conditions of the two of agents to obtain the following risk-sharing condition:

---

50This framework nests the standard Cobb-Douglas specification as a special case, and I consider it as a robustness check later. The results remain the same.
\[
\left( \frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t} \right)^{-\sigma} \frac{1 + \Psi_c(c_t, m_t, b_{ht}, b_{ft})}{1 + \Psi_c(c_{t+1}, m_{t+1}, b_{ht+1}, b_{ft+1})} = \left( \frac{C^*_{t+1}}{C^*_t} \right)^{-\sigma} \frac{1 + \Psi_c(c^*_t, m^*_t, b^*_{ht}, b^*_{ft})}{1 + \Psi_c(c^*_{t+1}, m^*_{t+1}, b^*_{ht+1}, b^*_{ft+1})} Q_t
\]

where \( Q_t = \frac{S_t P_t^r}{F_t} \) is the real exchange rate. Complete financial markets ensure that the marginal rates of substitution (MRS) are equalized across countries, however in this model the MRS is also adjusted for the liquidity needs of the households. This adjustment acts as a wedge between the consumption growth differential and the real exchange rate depreciation, and breaks the typical result that those two variables are perfectly correlated. In particular, a log-linear approximation of this equation around the steady state yields

\[
\sigma(\Delta c_t - \Delta c^*_t) = \Delta q_t + \frac{\Psi_c}{1 + \Psi_c}(\Delta \hat{\Psi}_{c,t} - \Delta \hat{\Psi}_{c,t}),
\]

which shows that the consumption growth differential is a function of both real exchange rate changes and the differential in marginal transaction costs. This suggests that the model, which is built with an eye towards explaining the UIP Puzzle, can also shed some light on the imperfect correlation between consumption growth differentials and changes in the real exchange rate, the so called risk-sharing or Backus-Smith puzzle.

### 5.2 Final Goods Firms

There is a home representative final goods firm which uses the domestic continuum of intermediate goods and the following CES technology to produce total output \( Y_{H,t} \):

\[
Y_{H,t} = \left( \int_0^1 Y_{it}^{\lambda_H - 1} \, di \right)^{\frac{\lambda_H}{\lambda_H - 1}}.
\]

Profit maximization yields the standard CES demand for intermediate goods

\[
Y_{it} = \left( \frac{P_{it}}{P_{Ht}} \right)^{-\lambda_H} Y_{Ht},
\]

and the price index (GDP Deflator)

\[
P_{H,t} = \left( \int_0^1 P_{it}^{1-\lambda_H} \, di \right)^{-\frac{1}{\lambda_H}}.
\]

### 5.3 Intermediate Goods Firms

Intermediate goods firms use a production technology linear in labor input \( N^D_{it} \),

\[
Y_{it} = A_t N^D_{it},
\]

38
where $A_t$ is an exogenous productivity process. The firms face a Calvo (1983) friction in setting prices and have a probability $1 - \theta$ of being able to adjust prices in any given period. Firms that can adjust choose their optimal price $\bar{P}_t$ so as to satisfy the first-order condition

$$
\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} E_t \Omega_{Ht}(z_{t+j}) Y_{i,t+j} \theta^j \left( \bar{P}_t - \frac{\lambda_H}{\lambda_H - 1} (1 - \tau) \frac{w_{t+j} P_t}{A_{t+j}} \right) = 0.
$$

(13)

Firms that do not get to re-optimize keep their prices constant and adjust their labor input to satisfy demand. Hence, the price of the home final good evolves according to

$$
P_{Ht} = (\theta P_{H,t-1}^{1-\lambda_H} + (1 - \theta) \bar{P}_{it}^{1-\lambda_H}) \frac{1}{1-\lambda_H}
$$

(14)

5.4 Government

The government consists of a Monetary Authority (MA), and a separate Fiscal Authority (FA). The Monetary Authority sets monetary policy according to a standard Taylor rule (in log approximation to steady state):

$$
\hat{i}_t = \rho_i \hat{i}_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_i) \phi_\pi \hat{\pi}_t + v_t
$$

where $\pi_t$ is CPI inflation and $v_t$ is an iid monetary shock.

The MA issues and underwrites the supply of domestic currency, $M^s_t$, and backs a fraction $\frac{1}{\mu}$ of it with holdings of domestic government bonds,

$$
M^s_t \frac{1}{\mu} = B^M_{ht},
$$

where $B^M_{ht}$ is the nominal amount of domestic government bonds held by the CB. The Monetary Authority transfers all seignorage revenues to the fiscal Authority and faces the budget constraint

$$
T^M_t = M^s_t - M^s_{t-1} + B^M_{h,t-1}(1 + i_{t-1}) - B^M_{ht},
$$

where $T^M_t$ is the money transferred to the Fiscal Authority.

The Fiscal Authority collects taxes, the transfer of seignorage from the MA and issues government bonds to fund government expenditures and has the the budget constraint

$$
B^G_{ht} + T_t + T^M_t = B^G_{h,t-1}(1 + i_{t-1}) + G_t
$$

51The net supply of government debt is key to the mechanism, hence I model the two authorities as separate in order to account for the Central Bank’s balance sheet and open market operations. In any case, the Appendix shows that using a consolidated government setup has no appreciable effects on the results.

52I allow for $\mu > 1$ to be able to match the fact that the bond holdings of the Central Bank are in fact less than the total amount of money available in the economy.
where $B^G_{ht}$ is the nominal amount of government bonds issued and $T_t$ are the nominal, lump-sum taxes collected. For brevity and simplicity, in much of the analysis I will abstract from movements in government spending and assume it is constant, $G_t = G$.

Lastly, I follow the literature on the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy (e.g. Leeper (1991), Davig and Leeper (2007), Bianchi and Ilut (2013)) and assume that the fiscal authority follows a simple taxation rule which adjusts lump-sum taxes (as a percentage of GDP) in response to the government’s debt to GDP ratio

$$P_t \tau_t = \rho \tau P_{t-1} + (1 - \rho)t \kappa b \tau P_{t-1} b - \kappa b \tau P_{t-1} - (1 - \rho) \kappa b \tau P_{t-1} b$$

5.5 Excess Bond Returns and and UIP violations

Log-linearize equations (11) and (12) around the symmetric, zero-inflation steady state and subtract them from one another to obtain

$$E_t(\hat{s}_{t+1} - \hat{s}_{t} + \hat{i}^e_{t} - \hat{i}_{t}) = \frac{|\Psi_{bh}|}{1 + \Psi_{bh}} \hat{\Psi}_{bh,t} - \frac{|\Psi_{bf}|}{1 + \Psi_{bf}} \hat{\Psi}_{bf,t}$$

where hatted variables represent log-deviations from steady state. The terms $\hat{\Psi}_{bh,t}$ and $\hat{\Psi}_{bf,t}$ are the log-deviations from steady state of the marginal transaction benefits of home and foreign bond holdings, and $\Psi_{bh}$ and $\Psi_{bf}$ are the corresponding steady state values. Note that at the symmetric steady state $\Psi_{bh} = \Psi_{bf}$ and define $\gamma_b \equiv \frac{|\Psi_{bh}|}{1 + \Psi_{bh}} = \frac{|\Psi_{bf}|}{1 + \Psi_{bf}}$.

If there was a home currency nominal bond that did not provide convenience benefits, its interest rate $\tilde{i}_t$ would be

$$\tilde{i}_t = \hat{i}_t + \gamma_b \hat{\Psi}_{bh,t}.$$  

Hence $\gamma_b \hat{\Psi}_{bh,t}$ is the equilibrium convenience yield (in log-deviations from steady state) – the amount of interest the agents are willing to forego in exchange of the convenience benefits of home bonds. On the other hand, $\gamma_b \hat{\Psi}_{bf,t}$ is the foreign bond convenience yield, from the home agent’s perspective.

Thus, equation (15) shows that the expected excess currency return is equal to the convenience yield differential; an increase in the home convenience yield leads to a compensating, expected increase in the excess financial return on the foreign bond. The excess return is a function of time $t$ variables, and is thus forecastable and a violation of UIP. The violations at different horizons are driven by the dynamics of the convenience yield differential, in a similar manner to the analytical results derived earlier. Moreover, we can further simplify (15) to get

53 The Appendix discusses an extension with both fiscal and tax shocks and shows that these type of shocks also generate empirically relevant UIP deviations that switch signs at longer horizons.

54 The results do not change materially if the tax rule is simply linear in real taxes, $\tau_t$. 

40
\[ E_t(\hat{s}_{t+1} - \hat{s}_t + \hat{s}_t^* - \hat{s}_t) = \frac{\gamma_b}{\eta_b}(\hat{b}_{ft} - \hat{b}_{ht}), \]

which showcases the close connection between the relative holdings of government bonds and the convenience yield differential. The more abundant are home bonds, relative to foreign bonds, the lower is the marginal convenience value of holding an extra unit of the home bonds, relative to foreign bonds, and thus the lower is the convenience yield differential. This follows from the fact that the equilibrium convenience yield is equal to the marginal convenience value of each bond, and the marginal convenience value itself is decreasing in the holdings of the bond.

We can also rewrite equation (15) as

\[ E_t(\hat{s}_{t+1} - \hat{s}_t) = \hat{s}_t^* + \gamma_b(\hat{y}_{bht} - \hat{y}_{bfh}), \]

to highlight how exchange rate dynamics are affected. Unlike in a model where the standard UIP condition holds, in this model exchange rates need to offset not just the interest rate differential across countries but the combined effect of the differentials in interest rates and convenience yields. A positive interest rate differential does not necessarily imply a depreciating exchange rate, because we need to factor in the convenience yield differential as well. The convenience yield differential acts as an omitted variable in the standard UIP regression and will lead to non-zero beta estimates.

In the next section, I calibrate the model, quantify the regression bias, and show that the model is able to closely match the empirical estimates at both short and long horizons.

### 5.6 Main Results

I log-linearize the model’s equations around the symmetric, zero-inflation steady state and solve the resulting system of difference equations using standard techniques. Then I calibrate the model’s parameters, using standard values from the literature whenever possible and matching relevant, non-UIP related empirical moments otherwise, and compute the implied UIP regression coefficients.

#### 5.6.1 Calibration

The benchmark calibration is summarized in Table 3 and below I detail the calibration process. In general, the results are very robust to the great majority of coefficients.

As is standard in the literature, one period in the model represents one quarter. I set the coefficient of risk aversion \( \sigma \) equal to 2 and the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply \( \phi = 1.5 \), both of which are standard values in the RBC literature. Estimates of the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods vary a lot, but most estimates fall in the range from 1 to 2 and I follow Chari et al. (2002) and set \( \eta = 1.5 \). I choose the degree of home bias \( a_h = 0.8 \), a common value in the literature that is roughly in the middle of the range of values for the G7 countries.

To calibrate the transaction cost function I proceed as follows. I calibrate \( \alpha_1, \eta_m, \kappa_b, \psi \) to
match the interest rate semi-elasticity of money demand, the income elasticity of money demand, money velocity and the average convenience yield. I target an interest rate semi-elasticity of money demand of 7, roughly in the middle of most estimates, which range from 3 to 11 (see discussion and references in Burnside et al. (2011)). I set the income elasticity of money demand to 1, a widely accepted value, and then set the money velocity equal to 7.7, which is the average value for the M1 money aggregate in the US for the time period 1976 − 2013.55 Next, I target a steady state annualized convenience yield of 1%, which is in the middle of the range of estimates in the literature.56 Finally, I choose \( a_b \) so that foreign bonds constitute 10% of the steady state bond portfolios of the households, implying a strong home bias in accordance with the data.57

Lastly, there is little prior literature guidance in choosing \( \eta_b \), the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign bonds in the transaction cost function. I set it equal to 0.25 in order to match the volatility of foreign bond holdings to GDP. In the model, increasing \( \eta_b \) makes the home and foreign bonds better substitutes and increases the overall volatility of foreign bond holdings, as agents are more likely to substitute into foreign holdings following shocks. The value of 0.25 is also about 2.5 times higher than the elasticity of substitution between money and bonds as a whole, indicating that bonds are better substitutes for each other, than they are for cash.

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**Table 3: Calibration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Param</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Param</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \sigma )</td>
<td>Risk Aversion</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>( G )</td>
<td>Gov Exp to GDP</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \phi )</td>
<td>Inv Labor Elast</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>( k_b )</td>
<td>Gov Debt to GDP</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \eta )</td>
<td>Elast Subst Cons</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>( \phi_\pi )</td>
<td>TR Infl Resp</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( a_h )</td>
<td>Home Bias in C</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>( \rho_i )</td>
<td>TR Smoothing</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \beta )</td>
<td>Time Discount</td>
<td>0.9901</td>
<td>( \sigma_v )</td>
<td>StdDev Mon Shock</td>
<td>0.0033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \alpha_1 )</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>( \eta_m )</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \rho_\tau )</td>
<td>Tax Smoothing</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>( \kappa_b )</td>
<td>Tax Resp to Debt</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \tilde{\psi} )</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.75E-19</td>
<td>( \rho_a )</td>
<td>Autocorr TFP</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \eta_b )</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>( \sigma_a )</td>
<td>StdDev TFP</td>
<td>0.0078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \mu )</td>
<td>Money Multiplier</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>( \eta_m )</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

55 Using instead the money velocity of the \( M_2 \) or \( M_2M \) money aggregates does not affect the results.
56 Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) estimate that the historical average convenience yield difference between Treasuries and AAA and BAA corporate bonds has been 85 and 166 basis points respectively. Using a different methodology, Krishnamurty (2002) finds an average Treasury convenience yield of 144 bp.
57 See Warnock and Burger (2003), Fidora et al. (2007), Coeurdacier and Rey (2013)
Next, I set the money multiplier \( \mu = 2.17 \), the average ratio of the money base to the M1 money aggregate in the US for the 1976-2013 time period. The choice of parameters so far also implies that the Central Bank holds 15% of government bonds in steady-state, which is in line with the US data, and lends further support for the overall parametrization of the liquidity preferences. Lastly, I choose \( \beta = 0.9901 \) which implies a steady state real interest rate of 3% per year.

I calibrate the steady state ratio of government spending to GDP to 22% and the ratio of government debt to GDP to 50%, the average values of total federal spending to GDP and total federal debt to GDP, respectively, in the US data. For the Taylor rule response to inflation I pick \( \phi_\pi = 1.5 \), the original value proposed by Taylor and a common choice in the literature. I then set \( \rho_\pi = 0.9 \) to match the high persistence of interest rate differentials and the high volatility of exchange rate changes relative to interest rate differentials.\(^{58}\) I estimate the coefficients on the taxation rule, \( \rho_\tau \) and \( \kappa_b \), using US data on federal taxes and the federal debt, and obtain \( \rho_\tau = 0.92 \) and \( \kappa_b = 0.48 \). Following Corsetti et al. (2010) the Calvo parameter is set to \( \theta = 0.75 \).

In order to parametrize the technology process I used John Fernald’s TFP data and estimated an AR(1) process in logs which yielded \( \rho_a = 0.97 \) and \( \sigma_a = 0.0078 \). I back out the standard deviation of the Taylor rule shock from the US data as well, using data on the federal funds rate, CPI inflation and the calibrated parameters of the Taylor rule to construct a series of residuals. The standard deviation of the residuals gives me \( \sigma_v = 0.0033 \). This value also implies that a one standard deviation monetary shock results in a 76 bp (in annualized terms) response on impact by the nominal interest rate, which matches the empirical estimate in Eichenbaum and Evans (1995).\(^{59}\)

### 5.6.2 Quantitative Results

In this section I examine the model’s quantitative ability to match the UIP deviations in the data. I do this by computing the implied regression coefficient of the series of UIP regressions:

\[
\lambda_{t+k} = \alpha_k + \beta_k (\hat{i}_t - \hat{i}_t^*) + \varepsilon_{t+k}
\]

where \( \lambda_{t+k} = \hat{s}_{t+k} - \hat{s}_{t+k-1} + \hat{i}_{t+k-1}^* - \hat{i}_{t+k-1} \) is the one period excess foreign bond return. These are the same regressions as in the empirical section, and I compare the model implied sequence of coefficients \( \beta_k \) with their empirical counterparts.

I start by considering the implied regression coefficients conditional on the model being driven by only one type of shock at a time. I show that both monetary and technology shocks, are able to generate empirically relevant UIP violations at both short and long horizons, match the cyclical profile of the violations and the timing at which the violations switch signs. However,

\(^{58}\)Bianchi and Ilut (2013) also estimate a value of 0.9 for the Taylor Rule smoothing parameter.

\(^{59}\)\( \sigma_v = 0.0033 \) is also among the range of common estimates obtained by the prior literature, e.g. Davig and Leeper (2007) estimate 0.0036 and Galí and Rabanal (2005) estimate 0.003.
monetary shocks are in general able to generate stronger UIP violations at all horizons, as compared to technology shocks. When both shocks are operating, the model is able to closely match the magnitude of the empirical estimates of UIP deviations at both short and long horizons.

The solid line in Figure 6 plots the $\beta_k$ coefficients as implied by the model when only monetary shocks are active, and the dashed line plots the empirical estimates. Figure 7 shows the same plot, but for the case when the model is driven by technology shocks only. The main message of the two figures is that the cyclical profile of UIP deviations are fundamental feature of the model’s mechanism and are robust to the source of exogenous variation. Both types of shocks are able to generate negative UIP coefficients at short horizons and positive coefficients at longer horizons, with the switch in signs occurring around 3 years (12 quarters) in the future, just as in the data. Monetary shocks are relatively more successful at matching the magnitude of UIP violations, and generate stronger violations at both short and long horizons.

Figure 6: UIP Regression Coefficients, Monetary Shock

![Figure 6: UIP Regression Coefficients, Monetary Shock](image)

The cyclical profile of UIP violations is a fundamental feature of the model that is closely linked to the cyclical dynamics of government debt, which are in turn driven by the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy. The cyclicality of UIP deviations is not unique to technology and monetary shocks, but can be generated by a number of other shocks, such as fiscal, tax, and liquidity shocks. In that sense, the mechanism is robust to the source of exogenous variation.

Lastly, Figure 8 plots the resulting UIP coefficients when both shocks are active, and shows that in its full complexity, the model is able to closely match the empirical estimates at all horizons.

---

60The model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency, hence the empirical estimates plotted here use 3-month excess returns and interest rates. In the empirical section, the main horizon unit was 1-month.
I conclude the section by examining the model’s implications about exchange rate behavior. In particular, I estimate the same direct projections as as in the empirical section:

\[ \hat{s}_{t+k} - \hat{s}_t = \alpha_k + \gamma_k (\hat{r}_t - \hat{r}_t^*) + \varepsilon_{t+k} \]

Recall that the sequence \( \{ \gamma_k \} \) provides an estimate of the IRF of the cumulative exchange rate change, relative to today, to an innovation in the interest rate differential. The model-implied coefficients \( \gamma_k \) are plotted against their empirical counterparts in Figure 9. They show that the model does an excellent job of matching the initial appreciation of the exchange rate, the turning point at which it starts depreciating and also the level of the long-run depreciation.\(^{61}\)

5.6.3 The Mechanism Explained

The mechanism behind the cyclical UIP violations is very similar to the one in the analytical model considered earlier, with the difference that the quantitative model features two extra channels in additional to cyclical government debt dynamics. Namely, the open market operations of the central bank and the international spillover of shocks also contribute to the UIP deviations. This section will describe all three channels at work and how they propagate monetary and technology shocks. To help frame this discussion, recall that the equilibrium expected excess returns on foreign bonds

---

\(^{61}\)Given that the model matches the UIP deviations well, this graph tells us that it also matches the dynamics of the underlying interest rate differentials. The forecastability pattern of the excess returns arises from the cyclical movements in the exchange rate and not from the interest rate differential.
is driven by changes in the households’ portfolio holdings of home and foreign bonds:

\[ E_t(\hat{s}_{t+1} - \hat{s}_t + \gamma_s^* - \hat{i}_t) = \frac{\gamma_b}{\eta_b}(\hat{b}_{f,t} - \hat{b}_{h,t}) \]
I start by discussing the effects of monetary shocks. A contractionary home country monetary shock raises interest rates and lowers inflation and GDP. The drop in inflation works the same way as before: it re-values existing real debt upwards, lowers seignorage revenues and increases the real cost of servicing debt. On the other hand, the drop in GDP lowers tax revenues. All of these forces tighten the government’s budget constraint and contribute to an increase in debt. The rise in the supply of home debt leads to a proportionate increase in the private agents’ holdings of home government bonds, which lowers the home convenience yield relative to the foreign one. This leads to compensating, financial returns on the home bonds, and generates negative UIP coefficients.

On the other hand, taxes are quite sluggish ($\rho_\tau = 0.92$) and monetary policy is active, which introduces a complex root into the system and generates cyclical government debt dynamics. The reasons for the oscillations is the same as in the analytical model – the main repayment mechanism, persistent taxes, is slow to adjust to changing debt conditions. The cyclical dynamics of debt supply carry over to private bond portfolios, and home bond holdings eventually fall below steady state and generate a positive convenience yield differential. This gives rise to a corresponding positive excess return on the foreign bond and thus positive UIP violations at longer horizons.

The monetary shock also creates UIP deviations through open market operations. A contractionary monetary shock is implemented by open market operations in which the central bank reduces money supply by selling some of its holdings of government bonds. This increases the net supply of home government bonds and through similar reasoning as above, leads to a negative convenience yield differential and negative UIP violations at short horizons. Equilibrium money holdings, however, do not display strong cyclicality and this channel does not contribute much to the positive violations at long horizons.

Lastly, the effects of the monetary shock also spill over to the foreign country. A contractionary home monetary shock leads to a persistent exchange rate appreciation, which increases inflation and output abroad. The rise in inflation and output loosen the foreign government’s budget constraint and leads to a decrease in foreign debt supply, which carries over to the private agents’ portfolios, and holdings of foreign bonds decrease. Thus, the spillovers reinforce the domestic channels, which are increasing the holdings of home bonds, and thus make the convenience yield differential more negative. The persistence in the foreign taxation policy (and active monetary policy) also leads to similar reinforcing effects to the positive UIP deviations at longer horizons.

Now consider a negative technology shock. It decreases output and thus taxes, and increases inflation and the interest rate today. The tax and inflation effects on the government budget constraint roughly cancel out and lead to a negligible change in government debt on impact. However, the technology shock is persistent and leads to a prolonged drop in output, and hence taxes, and thus an eventual increase in government debt. Similarly to before, the increase in home government debt leads to a negative convenience yield differential and generates negative UIP coefficients. The systematic component of tax policy again reacts only sluggishly to the increase in debt and leads to cyclical dynamics in debt supply and positive UIP violations at longer horizons.
The spillover of the shock operates in a similar manner and again reinforces the UIP deviations at both short and long horizons. The open market operations channel, however, only generates negative UIP deviations in the case of technology shocks. The negative TFP shock generates a persistent drop in money supply, but does not impart any cyclicality on the money process. The sum total of all three effects lead to UIP deviations that are similarly cyclical, but dampened in magnitude, as compared to the monetary shock.

In this generalized framework it is also true that the UIP deviations can be traced back to the fact that monetary policy does not accommodate fiscal policy (and vice versa), and this leads to cyclical fluctuations in the relative supply of liquid assets to the economy. If the central bank was committed to stabilizing the net supply of domestic government debt this would eliminate the two domestic channels that generate UIP deviations. The international spillover channel will still be operative, however, and some UIP deviations would be present unless there was cooperation between policy institutions internationally.

6 Testing the Model’s Implications

6.1 Government Debt and UIP Violations in the Data

Government debt dynamics are central to the main mechanism, and in this section I provide empirical evidence that government debt indeed drives excess currency returns.

In the model, the excess return of foreign bonds is equal to the convenience yield differential, which is in turn a function of the relative holdings of home and foreign bonds:

\[
E_t(\hat{s}_{t+1} - \hat{s}_t + \hat{i}^*_t - \hat{i}_t) = \left| \frac{\Psi_{b_h}}{1 + \Psi_{b_h}} \right| \eta_{b}(\hat{b}_{f,t} - \hat{b}_{h,t}).
\]

Hence, UIP violations stem from movements in the relative portfolio composition of the private agents. A direct way to test this implication would be to re-estimate the standard UIP regression and control for the portfolio composition of investors. We would expect to find a significant negative coefficient on home bond holdings and a significant positive coefficient on foreign bond holdings, and an insignificant coefficient on the interest rate differential.

Data on private portfolio compositions is not readily available, but in the model household bond holdings are closely related to the supply of government bonds. Moreover, the supply of government debt is a commonly used proxy for the convenience yield (e.g. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012)). These considerations lead me to estimate an augmented version of the UIP regression by adding the US Debt-to-GDP ratio to the right hand side.\(^\text{62}\)

I also consider two additional control variables: the outstanding amount of USD denominated Commercial Paper (standardized by US GDP) and the VIX index of implied volatility. I include the

\(^{62}\)In the benchmark estimation I only include US Government debt, because of the lack of quarterly data on foreign government debt. Adding foreign debt at the annual frequency does not affect results significantly.
stock of USD Commercial Paper to control for possible substitution effects between public and high quality private debt. A number of papers argue, both theoretically and empirically, that private debt could act as a substitute for government debt in the demand for safe and liquid assets (e.g. Bansal et al. (2011), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012)). In fact, even a cursory look at the data is quite suggestive of this substitution effect. See for example Figure E.2 in the Appendix, which plots the evolution of both US government debt-to-GDP and commercial paper-to-GDP and shows a clear negative relationship, with a correlation coefficient of $-0.87$.

On the other hand, the VIX index is commonly seen as a proxy for the “global risk appetite”, with higher values indicating the market is less willing to accept risk, and I include it to proxy for any possible risk-premia that could be generating UIP deviations. A potential solution to the standard UIP puzzle at short horizons is that high interest rate currencies are riskier than lower interest rate currencies, and hence earn higher excess returns. To control for this effect, I sign the VIX index with the sign of the interest-rate differential, i.e. $\text{sign}(i^*_t - i_t)VIX_t$, so that the risk-factor is properly signed and goes in the direction of the higher interest rate currency.

The updated UIP regression I consider is

$$
\lambda_{j,t+1} = \alpha_j + \beta(i_{j,t} - i^*_{j,t}) + \gamma \ln\left(\frac{DEBT^{US}_t}{GDP^{US}_t}\right) + \delta_1 \ln\left(\frac{CP^{US}_t}{GDP^{US}_t}\right) + \delta_2 \text{sign}(i^*_t - i_t)VIX_t + \epsilon_{j,t+1}.
$$

Due to the availability of data on the stock of Commercial Paper the time period under consideration is shortened to January 1993 to July 2013. Moreover, I drop all Euro legacy currencies (e.g. French Franc, Italian lira etc.), except the Deutsch Mark, which has the Euro series appended to it, because now there is only at most 6 years of data for them.

Table 4 presents the estimation results, with each column representing a different specification. The first column estimates a regression where the interest rate differential is the only regressor, the second column adds $\ln\left(\frac{DEBT^{US}_t}{GDP^{US}_t}\right)$, and so on. Column (1) showcases the standard UIP puzzle with a significantly negative coefficient on the interest rate differential. Column (4), however, shows that augmenting the regression with the two measures of public and private debt changes this result. The two debt variables have significant negative coefficients, as predicted by the theory, while the coefficient on the interest rate differential is cut roughly in half and becomes insignificant. This suggests that the interest rate differential itself is not intrinsically linked to the UIP deviations, but rather shows up significant in standard UIP regressions because it is correlated with debt.

The table also shows that controlling for the private supply of debt is indeed important. Neither government debt nor Commercial Paper are significant regressors when included by themselves, but are both significant and of the right sign when included together. This suggests that the substitution effect might indeed be playing a significant role.

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63 Commercial Paper is the short-term (< 1 year) unsecured debt of large banks and corporations with excellent credit ratings. It is a very safe investment, with default rates that are basically zero.

64 Including the short-sample currencies makes no significant difference.
Table 4: Modified UIP Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$i_t - i^*_t$</td>
<td>-2.18**</td>
<td>-2.29**</td>
<td>-2.26**</td>
<td>-1.24</td>
<td>-1.54***</td>
<td>-0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
<td>(0.83)</td>
<td>(0.81)</td>
<td>(0.74)</td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ln \frac{\text{DEBT}_t}{\text{GDP}_t}$</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
<td>-3.54**</td>
<td>-3.36**</td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
<td>(1.60)</td>
<td>(1.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ln \frac{\text{CP}_t}{\text{GDP}_t}$</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>-2.93**</td>
<td>-2.75**</td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
<td>(1.31)</td>
<td>(1.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{sign}(i_t - i^*_t)VIX_t$</td>
<td>0.009**</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>(0.0045)</td>
<td>(0.0045)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table presents estimates of versions of the modified UIP regression $\lambda_{j,t+1} = \alpha_j + \beta(i_{j,t} - i^*_{j,t}) + \gamma \ln \left( \frac{\text{DEBT}^S_{j,t}}{\text{GDP}^S_{j,t}} \right) + \delta_1 \ln \left( \frac{\text{CP}^S_{j,t}}{\text{GDP}^S_{j,t}} \right) + \delta_2 \text{sign}(i_{j,t} - i^*_j)VIX_t + \varepsilon_{j,t+1}$. The regression is estimated as a panel with fixed effects and the reported standard errors are robust to both contemporaneous correlation (within time period and across currencies) and serial correlation.

Lastly, the addition of the signed VIX index has no major effect on the estimated coefficients of the debt variables, which remain negative and significant. The coefficient of the VIX itself is positive, which is the expected sign, but is not significant. Including it, however, does help to further reduce the coefficient on the interest rate differential, which suggests there may be a risk-premium at play as well. But the forecastability in the excess returns appear to be mainly driven by the debt variables.\(^{65}\)

### 6.2 Monetary Policy Independence and UIP Violations in the Data

Another fundamental model prediction is that central bank independence is positively associated with the magnitude of UIP deviations, especially in terms of the positive violations at longer horizons. In this section, I will show that this is also true in the data. I consider two proxies for monetary independence: the degree of capital controls and the average rate of inflation. I use proxies because of the lack of high quality, direct measurements of monetary policy independence that are comparable across countries and span a significant portion of my data set. On the other hand, a number of papers have shown that the degree of capital controls is a good proxy for monetary policy

\(^{65}\)The Appendix also presents results where I estimate the regression on a currency-by-currency basis. The resulting coefficients tell very much the same story as the panel estimates.
independence, and data on capital controls is readily available and comparable across countries.\textsuperscript{66} Similarly, the average rate of inflation is also seen as a common proxy for monetary independence and the data is also readily available and comparable across countries.

I find that the magnitude of UIP violations is strongly negatively associated with both the degree of capital controls and average inflation. Thus, the countries that impose the least amount of capital controls, or have the lowest average rates of inflation, exhibit the largest magnitudes of UIP violations at both short and long horizons.\textsuperscript{67} I measure capital controls with the Chinn and Ito (2006) index of de jure capital controls, a standard choice in the literature. The index is constructed from the binary dummy variables that characterize a country’s restriction on capital flows as reported by the IMF’s “Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions” and higher values mean less capital controls. It is a comprehensive measure, which accounts for both impediments to the free float of exchange rates and varying frictions in actual movements of financial capital in and out of the particular country. For inflation, I use CPI inflation obtained from the OECD database.

Even though my sample is composed mainly of advanced economies there is a significant amount of cross-sectional variation in both the degree of capital controls and average inflation between countries, especially in the early part of the sample. Moreover, since the capital controls index is annual and the inflation data is monthly, and neither is at the daily frequency as the exchange rates data, I focus on exploiting the cross-sectional, between country, variation in both measures. In particular, I average the Chinn-Ito index and inflation over time and differentiate between currencies in their average level of capital controls and inflation.\textsuperscript{68}

In Figure 10 I plot the average Chinn-Ito index of each currency against its estimated 1-month horizon UIP regression coefficient $\beta_1$. The figure displays a strong negative relationship with a correlation coefficient of $-0.72$ that is significant at the 1\% level, and shows that countries with higher degrees of capital controls exhibit smaller UIP violations than countries with open capital markets. Prima facie, this result is counter-intuitive as one of the implicit assumptions underlying the UIP condition is that capital is free to chase the highest available return.\textsuperscript{69} However, this negative correlation is fully consistent with the convenience yield model, when capital controls are viewed as a proxy for monetary policy independence. In the convenience yield model, UIP violations are a direct result of the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies, and are greatly diminished when monetary policy is passive and subordinate to the goals of managing the government’s budget.


\textsuperscript{67}Flood and Rose (1996), one of very few existing papers that have looked at the relationship between UIP violations and capital controls, also finds evidence that countries with fixed exchange rate regimes tend to exhibit smaller UIP violations at horizons of one and three months.

\textsuperscript{68}I also consider a number of ways to control for capital controls and inflation dynamically, despite the differences in the frequencies of the data. The results are very similar and are relegated to the Appendix.

\textsuperscript{69}The results are also counter-intuitive from a risk-premium perspective, considering that historically many of the largest losses to the carry trade strategy stem from the re-valuation of fixed exchange rates.
Figure 10: UIP Coefficients and Financial Openness

![Figure 10: UIP Coefficients and Financial Openness](image)

Figure 11 presents a similar scatter plot, but with average inflation on the x-axis. It tells a very similar story, as it shows that the countries with the lowest average inflation rates tend to exhibit the strongest UIP deviations. Thus again, a proxy for monetary independence shows a strong, positive relationship with the magnitude of UIP violations, consistent with the main mechanism of the model.

Next, I examine how the two proxies are related to UIP deviations at different horizons. To do this, in each case I split the sample of currencies into two groups: the currencies in the top quartile of capital controls and average inflation, respectively, and the rest. The results are not sensitive to the quartile cutoff, but I find that the top quartile is a natural demarcation line because both Figure 10 and 11 exhibit clear clusters of currencies separated around the quartile mark.70

I re-estimate the whole set of UIP regressions (3) on the two different subsamples of currencies for each of the proxies. The estimated coefficients are plotted in the two panels of Figure 12 in the case of capital controls, with the top panel displaying estimates for the subsample of currencies with the least amount of capital controls. Coincidentally, the currencies in the top quartile of average inflation are the same currencies as the ones in the top quartile of the degree of capital controls, hence Figure 12 also shows the results based on the inflation proxy.

The currencies with freer capital accounts (lower average inflation) clearly display stronger UIP violations at all horizons. In fact, the currencies in the top quartile of capital controls (inflation) exhibit statistically significant UIP violations only at very short-horizons and are most consistent

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70This is illustrated in Figure 10 with the red dashed line, which marks the top quartile. Note that the x-axis is financial openness, the inverse of the degree of capital controls, hence the top quartile in terms of capital controls is to the left of the red line.
with the standard formulation of the UIP Puzzle, which emphasizes the negative short-horizon violations. Even at the short horizons, the magnitudes of the deviations are almost three times as small as the estimates for the subset of currencies with open capital markets (low inflation). The difference is even starker at longer horizons, where the currencies with stronger capital controls (higher inflation) display no statistically significant UIP violations.\textsuperscript{71}

Overall, the results point to a strong, negative relationship between capital controls (or inflation) and UIP violations. The higher the degree of capital controls (inflation), the lower are the estimated UIP violations, especially at longer horizons. Hence, for both proxies of monetary independence, the findings support the implications of the model that UIP violations are increasing in monetary policy independence.

7 Conclusion

This paper makes two main contributions. First, it provides new evidence showing that the Uncovered Interest Parity puzzle is more complex than typically understood. The main findings confirm the standard results which show that exchange rates fail to depreciate sufficiently to offset interest rate differentials at short horizons. However, I show that at the longer horizons of 3 to 7 years exchange rates exhibit the opposite puzzling behavior - they depreciate too much. This reversal of

\textsuperscript{71}I have considered a number of robustness checks, including ways of controlling for the two proxies dynamically, and the results do not change. Splitting the sample is most straightforward and I present it as the benchmark, and relegate the rest to the Appendix.
the UIP puzzle has also been documented by Engel (2015) in a recent working paper, but I provide a different look at the data. The changing nature of UIP deviations have important implications about exchange rate behavior, as they introduce cyclical dynamics and also lead exchange rates to converge to the UIP benchmark over the long-run.

The second contribution of the paper is to develop a novel model that can capture the full complexity of the UIP deviations at both short and long horizons. Unlike previous models which have primarily focused on explaining the short horizon, negative UIP violations, I explore a new mechanism that can also deliver the changing nature of UIP deviations at longer horizons. The model relies on endogenously time-varying bond convenience yields and the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy.

The negative short-horizon UIP violations are a fundamental feature of the convenience yield mechanism, which implies a negative, contemporaneous relationship between interest rates and convenience yields. The long-horizon UIP violations are in turn tied to the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy. When monetary policy is independent and free to fight inflation, a sluggish tax policy introduces cyclical dynamics in government debt, which implies that UIP violations reverse direction at longer horizons. When taxes are fast-adjusting, however, or monetary policy is passive, there are no reversals. Lastly, I also show direct empirical evidence that supports the model’s mechanism.
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Appendix

Incomplete and in progress - please see http://sites.duke.edu/rosenvalchev/research for the latest version of the paper and appendix.

A Proofs

A.1 Proof of Lemma 1:

**Lemma 1 (Existence and Uniqueness).** When taxes respond non-negatively to debt, $\kappa_b \geq 0$, a stationary solution to the system of equilibrium equations, exists if and only if we have one of the following two policy combinations:

(i) Active Monetary, Passive Fiscal policy: $\phi_\pi > 1$, $\kappa_b \in (K - 1, \frac{1 + \rho_r}{1 - \rho_r}(K + 1))$, $\rho_r \in [0, \frac{1}{K})$.

(ii) Passive Monetary, Active Fiscal policy: $\phi_\pi < 1$, $\kappa_b \in [0, K - 1)$, $\rho_r \in [0, 1)$.

where $K = (1 + i)(1 + \gamma_b) > 1$. When the solution exists, it is unique.

Moreover, the stronger restriction $\kappa_b \in [0, K - 1 - \rho_r)$ ensures that the equilibrium variables, $\hat{b}_t$, $\hat{\tau}_t$, $\hat{p}_t$, $\hat{i}_t$, have non-negative autocorrelation.

**Proof.** First, I deal with the Active Monetary/Passive Fiscal policy mix. In this case, there exists a covariance stationary solution for $x_t$ if and only if the eigenvalues of the autoregressive matrix $A$ are inside the unit circle, i.e. are less than 1 in magnitude. Thus, in the proof I will show that conditions (i) and (ii) are necessary and sufficient for the eigenvalues of $A$ to be smaller than 1 in absolute value.

I will prove the if direction first. To this end, let $\kappa_b \in (K - 1, \frac{1 + \rho_r}{1 - \rho_r}(K + 1))$ and $\rho_r \in [0, \frac{1}{K})$ and define the useful notation $K = (1 + i)(1 + \gamma_b)$. The two eigenvalues of $A$ are

$$\lambda_{1,2} = \frac{K - (1 - \rho_r)\kappa_b + \rho_r \pm \sqrt{(K - (1 - \rho_r)\kappa_b + \rho_r)^2 - 4K\rho_r}}{2}.$$

The eigenvalues are complex conjugates when $(K - (1 - \rho_r)\kappa_b + \rho_r)^2 - 4K\rho_r < 0$. The left-hand side of this equation defines a quadratic expression in $\rho_r$ that is convex and crosses zero at the following two points

$$\rho(\kappa_b) = \frac{\kappa_b(K + 1 - K) + K - 2\sqrt{K\kappa_b(K + 1 - K)}}{(1 + \kappa_b)^2} < 1$$

$$\overline{\rho}(\kappa_b) = \frac{\kappa_b(K + 1 - K) + K + 2\sqrt{K\kappa_b(K + 1 - K)}}{(1 + \kappa_b)^2} > 0$$

For $\kappa_b = K - 1$ we have $\rho(\kappa_b) = \overline{\rho}(\kappa_b) = \frac{1}{K}$ and for $\kappa_b > K - 1$ we have $\overline{\rho}(\kappa_b) > \frac{1}{K}$. To prove the second fact we will proceed in two steps. First, we will evaluate $\overline{\rho}(\kappa_b)$ at $\kappa_b = (K + 1)\frac{1 + \rho_r}{1 - \rho_r}$ and show that it is greater than $\frac{1}{K}$. Next, we will solve for the first order conditions for the minimization of $\overline{\rho}(\kappa_b)$ in respect to $\kappa_b$ and show that the interior solution is also greater than $\frac{1}{K}$.
Start with evaluating $\overline{\rho}(\kappa_b)$ at $\kappa_b = (K + 1) \frac{1 + \rho_r}{1 - \rho_r}$

$$\overline{\rho}((K + 1) \frac{1 + \rho_r}{1 - \rho_r} - \frac{1}{K} = \frac{2(K(K - 1 + (K^2 - 1)\rho_r + K(1 + K)\rho_r^2 + (1 - \rho_r)\sqrt{2K(1 + K)(1 + \rho_r)(1 + K\rho_r)}) - 2)}{K(2 + K + K\rho_r^2)}$$

Call the numerator of the above quantity $D$ and notice that

$$\frac{\partial D}{\partial \rho_r} = K(K^2 - 1) + 2K(1 + K) - \sqrt{2K(1 + K)(1 + \rho_r)(1 + K\rho_r)} + (1 - \rho_r) \frac{2(K(1 + K)(1 + 2\rho_r + K))}{\sqrt{2K(1 + K)(1 + \rho_r)(1 + K\rho_r)}}$$

and since $\sqrt{2K(1 + K)(1 + \rho_r)(1 + K\rho_r)} \leq 2\sqrt{K(1 + K)} \leq 2K(1 + K)$ it follows that $\frac{\partial D}{\partial \rho_r} > 0$. Therefore, it is enough to show that $D > 0$ for $\rho_r = 0$ to know that $D > 0$ for all $\rho_r \in (0, 1)$. Computing the expression with $\rho_r = 0$ yields:

$$D = 2(K(K - 1) + K\sqrt{2K(1 + K) - 2}) \geq 0$$

where the inequality follows from $K\sqrt{2K(1 + K)} > 2K\sqrt{K} > 2$, and these results imply $\overline{\rho}((K + 1) \frac{1 + \rho_r}{1 - \rho_r}) > \frac{1}{K}$.

Now evaluate the derivative $\frac{\partial \overline{\rho}(\kappa_b)}{\partial \kappa_b}$ to find that the only solution to $\frac{\partial \overline{\rho}(\kappa_b)}{\partial \kappa_b} = 0$ is $\kappa_b = K$.

At the local optimum $\overline{\rho}(K) = \frac{4K}{(1 + K)^2} - \frac{1}{K} = \frac{(K - 1)(2K + 1)}{K(1 + K^2)} > 0$

Thus, we have shown that the minimum of $\overline{\rho}(\kappa_b)$ is obtained at $\kappa_b = K - 1$ and is equal to $\frac{1}{K}$. Hence for $\kappa_b \in (K - 1, (\frac{1 + \rho_r}{1 - \rho_r})(K + 1))$ we have that $\overline{\rho}(\kappa_b) > \frac{1}{K}$.

Now go back to the discriminant in the expression for the eigenvalues $(K - (1 - \rho_r)\kappa_b + \rho_r)^2 - 4K\rho_r$, and notice that the quadratic polynomial in $\rho_r$ is convex and thus

$$(K - (1 - \rho_r)\kappa_b + \rho_r)^2 - 4K\rho_r \geq 0, \text{ for } \rho_r \in [0, \rho_r]$$

$$(K - (1 - \rho_r)\kappa_b + \rho_r)^2 - 4K\rho_r \leq 0, \text{ for } \rho_r \in [\rho_r, \overline{\rho}]$$

If $\rho_r \in [\rho_r, \overline{\rho}]$ the eigenvalues of $A$ are complex and in that case their magnitude is

$$|\lambda_k| = \frac{1}{2} \left( (K - (1 - \rho_r)k + \rho_r)^2 + [4K\rho_r - (K - (1 - \rho_r)\kappa_b + \rho_r)^2] \right)^{\frac{1}{2}}$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{4K\rho_r}$$

$$= \sqrt{K\rho_r}$$

and hence in this case $|\lambda_k| < 1$ if and only if $\rho_r < \frac{1}{K}$. Thus $\rho_r \in [\rho_r, \frac{1}{K})$ results in eigenvalues that are inside the unit circle.

Now consider the case $\rho_r \in [0, \rho_r]$, which results in real eigenvalues. For $\kappa_b = K - 1$ we have
\[
\lambda_1 = \frac{1}{2}(1 + \rho_r K + \sqrt{(1 + \rho_r K)^2 - 4K\rho})
= \frac{1}{2}(1 + \rho_r K + \sqrt{(1 - \rho_r K)^2})
= \frac{1}{2}(1 + \rho_r K + (1 - \rho_r K))
= 1
\]

Next, notice that when \( \kappa_b < \frac{K + \rho_r}{1 - \rho_r} \) we have \( K - (1 - \rho_r)\kappa_b + \rho_r > 0 \) and thus \( \lambda_1 > 0 \). Moreover,

\[
\frac{\partial \lambda_1}{\partial \kappa_b} = -\frac{1 - \rho_r}{2\sqrt{(K - (1 - \rho_r)\kappa_b + \rho_r)^2 - 4K\rho_r}(\sqrt{(K - (1 - \rho_r)\kappa_b + \rho_r)^2 - 4K\rho_r} + K - (1 - \rho_r)\kappa_b + \rho_r) < 0
\]

and since at \( \kappa_b = K - 1 \) we have \( \lambda_1 = 1 \) it follows that for \( \kappa_b \in (K - 1, \frac{K + \rho_r}{1 - \rho_r}) \) we have \( \lambda_1 \in (0, 1) \). Meanwhile since \( (K - (1 - \rho_r)\kappa_b + \rho_r)^2 - 4K\rho_r \geq 0 \), it follows that

\[0 < \lambda_2 < \lambda_1\]

and hence \( \lambda_2 \in (0, 1) \) as well.

If on the other hand \( \kappa_b \in \left[\frac{K + \rho_r}{1 - \rho_r}, \frac{(K + 1)(1 + \rho_r)}{1 - \rho_r}\right] \) and

\[
\lambda_1 = \frac{K - (1 - \rho_r)\kappa_b + \rho_r + \sqrt{(K - (1 - \rho_r)\kappa_b + \rho_r)^2 - 4K\rho_r}}{2}
\leq \frac{K - (1 - \rho_r)\kappa_b + \rho_r + |K - (1 - \rho_r)\kappa_b + \rho_r|}{2}
\leq 0
\]

and thus \( \lambda_2 < \lambda_1 \leq 0 \). Moreover,

\[
\frac{\partial \lambda_2}{\partial \kappa_b} = -\frac{1 - \rho_r}{2\sqrt{(K - (1 - \rho_r)\kappa_b + \rho_r)^2 - 4K\rho_r}(K - (1 - \rho_r)\kappa_b + \rho_r - \sqrt{(K - (1 - \rho_r)\kappa_b + \rho_r)^2 - 4K\rho_r} < 0}
\]

and at \( \kappa_b = \frac{(K + 1)(1 + \rho_r)}{1 - \rho_r} \) we have

\[\lambda_2 = -1\]

Therefore, for \( \kappa_b \in (K - 1, \frac{1 + \rho_r}{1 - \rho_r}(K + 1)) \) and \( \rho_r \in [0, \rho_r] \) the eigenvalues of \( A \) are real and \(|\lambda_k| < 1\). And for \( \rho_r \in \left[\rho_r, \frac{1}{K}\right] \) the eigenvalues are complex and again less than 1 in modulus. This completes the proof that the two conditions are sufficient for a stationary solution.

To prove they are necessary, notice that if \( \rho_{au} \in \left[\frac{1}{K}, \frac{1}{\rho_r}\right] \) then the resulting complex
eigenvalue will be outside of the unit circle. On the other hand, now I will show that \( \rho_r \in [\overline{p}_\tau, 1) \) results in real eigenvalues that are bigger than 1 in absolute value.

At \( \rho_r = \overline{p}_\tau \) the bigger eigenvalue is

\[
\lambda_1(\overline{p}_\tau) = \frac{K + \sqrt{K\kappa_b(\kappa_b + 1 - K)}}{1 + \kappa_b}
\]

and I will show that \( \lambda_1(\overline{p}_\tau) \geq 1 \). Start with observing that since \( K \geq 1 \) we have \( K\kappa_b \geq \kappa_b \geq 1 + \kappa_b - K \) and since \( 1 + \kappa_b - K \geq 0 \) for \( \kappa_b \geq K - 1 \) we have

\[
K\kappa_b \geq 1 + \kappa_b - K \Rightarrow \sqrt{K\kappa_b(1 + \kappa_b - K)} \geq (1 + \kappa_b - K)
\]

and therefore

\[
\lambda_1(\overline{p}_\tau) = \frac{K + \sqrt{K\kappa_b(\kappa_b + 1 - K)}}{1 + \kappa_b} \geq \frac{1 + \kappa_b}{1 + \kappa_b} \geq 1
\]

Therefore, there exist no stationary solutions for \( \rho_r \geq \overline{p}_\tau \). This proves that \( \rho_r \in [0, \frac{1}{K}] \) is a necessary condition.

Now consider \( \kappa_b < K - 1 \). Above we showed that \( \frac{\partial \lambda_1}{\partial \kappa_b} < 0 \) and that \( \lambda_1 = 1 \) when \( \kappa_b = K - 1 \), hence \( \lambda_1 \geq 1 \) for any \( \kappa_b \leq K - 1 \). Similar reasoning and the facts that \( \lambda_2 \) is a decreasing function of \( \kappa_b \) for \( \kappa_b > \frac{K + \rho_r}{1 - \rho_r} \) and \( \lambda_2 = -1 \) for \( \kappa_b = (K + 1)(1 + \rho_r)1 - \rho_r \) lead to the conclusion that \( \kappa_b = (K + 1)(1 + \rho_r)1 - \rho_r \) implies \( \lambda_2 < -1 \). This completes the necessary direction of the proof.

To prove the second result let \( \kappa_b \in (K - 1, \frac{K}{1 - \rho_r}) \) and start by computing the variance on both sides of the tax policy rule to obtain

\[
Var(\tau_t) = \frac{b^2k^2}{(1 + \rho)^2(1 - \rho_r)} Var(b_t) + 2 \frac{bk\rho_r}{(1 + \rho_r)^2} Cov(\tau_t, b_t)
\]

and then combine with

\[
Cov(\hat{\tau}_t, \hat{b}_t) = Cov(\rho \tau_{t-1} + a_{21}b_{t-1}, a_{11}b_{t-1} + a_{12}\tau_{t-1} + b_{11}v_t)
\]

\[
= -\rho_r^2 Var(\hat{\tau}_t) + a_{11}(1 - \rho_r)\kappa_b \frac{b}{\tau} Var(\hat{b}_t) + a_{11} \rho_r - (1 - \rho_r) \kappa_b \rho_r Cov(\hat{b}_t, \hat{\tau}_t)
\]

to obtain

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\[
\text{Cov}(\hat{\tau}_t, \hat{b}_t) = (1 - \rho_\tau)\kappa_\tau \frac{\bar{G} \bar{\tau}}{1 + \rho_\tau (1 + 2\kappa_\tau - K(1 + \rho_\tau))} \text{Var}(\hat{b}_t).
\]

Now work with \(\text{Cov}(\hat{\tau}_{t+1}, \hat{\tau}_t)\) to obtain
\[
\text{Cov}(\hat{\tau}_{t+1}, \hat{\tau}_t) = \text{Cov}(\rho_\tau \hat{\tau}_t + (1 - \rho_\tau) \frac{b}{\tau} \kappa_\tau \hat{b}_t, \hat{\tau}_t)
= \rho_\tau \text{Var}(\hat{\tau}_t) + (1 - \rho_\tau) \frac{b}{\tau} \kappa_\tau \delta \text{Var}(\hat{b}_t)
\]

Combine again with the expression for \(\text{Var}(\hat{\tau}_t)\) and simplify to arrive at
\[
\text{Cov}(\hat{\tau}_{t+1}, \hat{\tau}_t) = \frac{b^2 k^2 (1 - \rho_\tau) \rho_\tau (1 + K - (1 - \rho_\tau)(\kappa_\tau - K \rho_\tau))}{\tau^2 (1 + \rho_\tau (1 + 2\kappa_\tau - K(1 + \rho_\tau)) \text{Var}(\hat{b}_t)
\]

Let
\[
\hat{\rho} = \frac{b^2 k^2 (1 - \rho_\tau) \rho_\tau (1 + K - (1 - \rho_\tau)(\kappa_\tau - K \rho_\tau))}{\tau^2 (1 + \rho_\tau (1 + 2\kappa_\tau - K(1 + \rho_\tau))
\]

Taxes are non-negatively autocorrelated as long as \(\hat{\rho} \geq 0\). Notice that the denominator is always positive and hence this expression is positive only if the numerator is positive. The numerator itself is positive if and only if
\[
\kappa_\tau < \frac{K + 1}{1 - \rho_\tau} + \rho_\tau K
\]

which satisfies our initial assumption.

Now let’s turn our attention to \(\text{Cov}(\hat{b}_{t+1}, \hat{b}_t)\). It is straightforward to show that
\[
\text{Cov}(\hat{b}_{t+1}, \hat{b}_t) = a_{11} \text{Var}(\hat{b}_t) + a_{12} \text{Cov}(\hat{\tau}_t, \hat{b}_t) = (a_{11} + \delta a_{12}) \text{Var}(\hat{b}_t)
\]

where \(a_{kl}\) is the \((k,l)\) element of the matrix \(A\). The coefficient in front of \(\text{Var}(\hat{b}_t)\) can be simplified down to
\[
(a_{11} + \delta a_{12}) = K - \frac{\kappa_\tau (1 - \rho_\tau)(1 + \rho_\tau + \kappa_\tau \rho_\tau)}{1 + \rho_\tau (1 + 2\kappa_\tau - K(1 - \rho_\tau))}
\]

which is non-negative if and only if
\[
K(1 + \rho_\tau (1 + 2\kappa_\tau - K(1 - \rho_\tau))) - \kappa_\tau (1 - \rho_\tau)(1 + \rho_\tau + \kappa_\tau \rho_\tau) \geq 0
\]

the above expression is a convex quadratic polynomial in \(\kappa_\tau\), which crosses zero at the points
\[
\kappa = \frac{\rho_\tau^2 + 2K \rho_\tau - 1 - \sqrt{(1 - \rho_\tau^2)^2 + 4K^2 \rho_\tau^4}}{2(1 - \rho_\tau) \rho_\tau}
\]

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First, I will show that \( \kappa < 0 \) so that under my assumed conditions \( \kappa_b \geq \kappa \). This is trivially true if \( \rho^2 - 2K\rho - 1 < 0 \). Assume that \( \rho \) is high enough so that is positive and assume

\[
\rho^2 + 2K\rho - 1 > \sqrt{(1 - \rho^2)^2 + 4K^2\rho^4}
\]

Take squares on both sides, re-arrange and simplify to arrive at the condition

\[
4K\rho(1 - \rho^2)(K\rho - 1) > 0
\]

but since \( \rho < \frac{1}{K} \) we have reached a contradiction, and thus \( \kappa < 0 < \kappa_b \).

Now, work with \( \kappa_b \):

\[
\kappa_b = \frac{\rho^2 + 2K\rho - 1 + \sqrt{(1 - \rho^2)^2 + 4K^2\rho^4}}{2(1 - \rho)\rho}
\]

\[
= \frac{\rho^2 - 1 + \sqrt{(1 - \rho^2)^2 + 4K^2\rho^4}}{2(1 - \rho)\rho} + \frac{K}{(1 - \rho)}
\]

\[
\geq \frac{\rho^2 - 1 + (1 - \rho^2)}{2(1 - \rho)\rho} + \frac{K}{(1 - \rho)} \geq \frac{K}{(1 - \rho)}
\]

therefore under our assumptions \( \kappa_b < \kappa_b \) and hence, rolling everything back, this implies that

\[
\text{Cov}(\hat{b}_{t+1}, \hat{b}_t) \geq 0
\]

and we are done with this case.

[Add Passive Monetary/Active Fiscal]

\[\Box\]

A.2 Proof of Lemma 2:

**LEMMA 2 (IRF: Active Monetary/Passive Fiscal).** Let \( \phi_x > 1 \), \( \kappa_b \in (K - 1, K) \), and define \( \rho(\kappa_b) = \frac{\kappa_b(K+1-K)+K-2\sqrt{K\kappa_b(K+1-K)}}{(1+\kappa_b)^2} > 0 \). Then,

(i) If \( \rho_x \in [0, \rho(\kappa_b)] \) the autoregressive matrix \( A \) in (10) has two real, non-negative eigenvalues and the IRF never crosses the steady state:

\[ a_{bk} > 0 \text{ for } k = 0, 1, 2, 3, \ldots \]

(ii) If \( \rho_x \in (\rho(\kappa_b), \frac{1}{K}) \) the autoregressive matrix \( A \) in (10) has a pair of complex conjugate eigenvalues which can be written as \( \lambda_k = a \pm bi \) for \( k \in \{1, 2\} \), and the corresponding conjugate eigenvectors are of the form \( \vec{v}_k = [x \pm yi, 1]^t \), where \( a, b, x, y \) are real numbers and \( i \) is the imaginary unit. Furthermore, the Impulse Response Functions follow
increasingly dampened cosine waves:

\[ a_{bk} = \hat{a}_b |\lambda|^k \sqrt{1 + \left(\frac{x}{y}\right)^2} \cos(k\chi + \psi - \frac{\pi}{2}), \text{ for } k = 1, 2, 3, \ldots \]

where \( \hat{a}_b = \frac{(1+i)(\phi_x-\rho_r)(\phi_x-K)+\phi_x\kappa_b(1-\rho_r)}{\phi_x(\phi_x-\rho_r)(\phi_x-1)+\phi_x\kappa_b(1-\rho_r)} > 0 \), \( \chi = \arctan\left(\frac{b}{a}\right) = \arctan\left(\frac{\sqrt{4K\rho_r-(K-(1-\rho_r)\kappa_b+\rho_r)^2}}{K-(1-\rho_r)\kappa_b+\rho_r}\right) \in (0, \frac{\pi}{2}) \) and \( \psi = \arctan\left(\frac{K}{2}\right) \). Moreover, it is guaranteed that \( a_{bk} > 0 \) for \( k \in \{0, 1\} \).

**Proof.** (i) The first part follows directly from the proof of Lemma 1. The eigenvalues of \( A \) are real when

\[ (K - (1 - \rho_r)\kappa_b + \rho_r)^2 - 4K\rho_r \geq 0 \]

which is true for \( \rho_r \in [0, \rho_r(\kappa_v)] \), using the fact that we restrict attention to \( \rho_r \geq 0 \). Moreover, when \( \kappa_b \leq \frac{K}{1-\rho_r} \) it is immediate that \( K - (1 - \rho_r)\kappa_b + \rho_r > 0 \) and hence \( \lambda_1 > 0 \). Moreover,

\[ \lambda_2 \geq K - (1 - \rho_r)\kappa_b + \rho_r + \sqrt{(K - (1 - \rho_r)\kappa_b + \rho_r)^2} \geq 0 \]

Hence both eigenvalues are non-negative.

To characterize the Impulse Response Function not that the Wold Decomposition of \( x_t \) is

\[ x_t = Bv_t + ABv_{t-1} + A^2Bv_{t-2} + \ldots \]

Use the fact that

\[ B = \begin{bmatrix} -(1 + i + \frac{m}{\rho_r}) & 0 \\ 0 & \end{bmatrix} v_t \]

to obtain

\[ \hat{b}_t = -(1 + i + \frac{m}{\rho_r})(v_t + a_{11}^{(1)}v_{t-1} + a_{11}^{(2)}v_{t-2} + a_{11}^{(3)}v_{t-3} + \ldots) \]

\[ \hat{\tau}_t = -(1 + i + \frac{m}{\rho_r})(a_{21}^{(1)}v_{t-1} + a_{21}^{(2)}v_{t-2} + a_{21}^{(3)}v_{t-3} + \ldots) \]

where \( a_{kl}^{(j)} \) is the \( (k,j) \) element of the matrix \( A^j \). Define \( a_{11}^{(0)} = 1 \) and \( a_{11}^{(0)} = 0 \) and the transformation

\[ \tilde{a}_{kl}^{(j)} = -(1 + i + \frac{m}{\rho_r})a_{kl}^{(j)} \]
The sequences \( \{ \tilde{a}_{k1} \}_0^\infty \) define the Impulse Response Functions of \( \hat{b}_t \) (for \( k = 1 \)) and \( \hat{\tau}_t \) (for \( k = 2 \)).

First, I will show that \( a_{k1} \geq 0 \) for all \( j = 1, 2, 3, \ldots \) and \( k = 1, 2 \) when the matrix \( A \) is diagonalizable, and then I will handle the case when the eigenvalue is repeated and \( A \) is not diagonalizable (the only other case we need to worry about for a two by two matrix).

Assuming that \( A \) is diagonalizable, define

\[
\Lambda = \begin{bmatrix} \lambda_1 & 0 \\ 0 & \lambda_2 \end{bmatrix}
\]

as a matrix with the two eigenvalues of \( A \) on its diagonal ordered like \( \lambda_1 > \lambda_2 \) (remember we are handling the case of real eigenvalues right now) and \( P \) as a matrix that has the eigenvectors of \( A \) as its columns. Since we have assumed \( A \) is diagonalizable, we have \( A = P\Lambda P^{-1} \) and in particular

\[
A^j = (P\Lambda P^{-1})^j \\
= (P\Lambda P^{-1})(P\Lambda P^{-1})(P\Lambda P^{-1}) \ldots \\
= P\Lambda^j P^{-1}
\]

and since \( \Lambda \) is diagonal

\[
\Lambda^j = \begin{bmatrix} \lambda_1^j & 0 \\ 0 & \lambda_2^j \end{bmatrix}
\]

and thus if we expand the expression for \( A^j \) we obtain that

\[
a_{11}^{(j)} = \frac{p_{11}p_{22}\lambda_1^j - p_{12}p_{21}\lambda_2^j}{|P|}
\]

where \( |P| \) is the determinant of the matrix of eigenvectors \( P \) and \( p_{kl} \) is its \((k,l)\)-th element. Computing the eigenvectors of \( A \) I obtain

\[
p_{1k} = \frac{\tau \lambda_k}{\sqrt{\tau^2 \lambda_k^2 + b^2(K - \lambda_k)^2}}
\]

\[
p_{2k} = \frac{b(K - \lambda_k)}{\sqrt{\tau^2 \lambda_k^2 + b^2(K - \lambda_k)^2}}
\]

Since both of the eigenvalues are positive and are ordered so that \( \lambda_1 > \lambda_2 \) it follows that \( |P| > 0 \) and hence
This proves that \( a_{11}^{(j)} \geq 0 \) for all \( j \) and hence \( \tilde{a}_{11}^{(j)} \leq 0 \) for all \( j \). On the other hand,

\[
a_{21}^{(j)} = p_{21}p_{22}(\lambda_1 - \lambda_2^j)
\]

and since \( \lambda_k < 1 < K \) it follows that \( p_{21}p_{22} > 0, a_{21}^{(j)} \geq 0 \) and thus \( \tilde{a}_{21}^{(j)} \leq 0 \), which completes the proof for diagonalizable \( A \).

Now assume that \( A \) is not diagonalizable. \( A \) can still be written as \( A = P\Lambda P^{-1} \) but now

\[
\Lambda = \begin{bmatrix}
\lambda_1 & 1 \\
0 & \lambda_2
\end{bmatrix}
\]

and the columns of \( P \) are the generalized eigenvectors of \( A \). In this case, there is only one linearly independent eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue of \( \lambda \), call it \( \vec{p} \), and thus the second generalized eigenvector, call it \( \vec{u} \), is a 2x1 vector that solves

\[
(A - \lambda I)\vec{u} = \vec{p}
\]

Thus \( P = [\vec{p}, \vec{u}] \). We know that the \( \vec{p} \) is a regular eigenvector and hence must satisfy the relationship we derived before:

\[
p_1 = \frac{\tau \lambda}{(K - \lambda)b}p_2.
\]

Using this fact, we can solve \( (A - \lambda I)\vec{u} = \vec{p} \) for \( \vec{u} \) and show that the generalized eigenvector is of the form \([1, 0]\). With these results in mind we can show that for \( j \geq 1 \):

\[
a_{11}^{(j)} = \lambda^{j-1}(\lambda - j\frac{p_{21}p_1}{|P|})
\]

\[
= \lambda^{j-1}(\lambda + j\frac{p_1}{u_1}) > 0
\]

where the second equality follows from the fact that \(|P| = -u_1p_2 \) (remember \( P = \begin{bmatrix} p_1 & u_1 \\ p_2 & u_2 \end{bmatrix} \)) and the inequality on the third line follows from the fact that \( u_1 \geq 0, p_1 \geq 0, \lambda \geq 0 \). On the other hand,
\[
\begin{align*}
a_{21}^{(j)} &= -j \frac{p_2^2}{|P|} \lambda^{j-1} \\
&= j \frac{p_2^2}{u_1} \lambda^{j-1} > 0
\end{align*}
\]

and thus we are done with the case when \( A \) is not diagonalizable. This completes the proof of part [(i)].

(ii) From the proof of Lemma 1 we know that \( \rho_\tau \in (\rho_\tau, \frac{1}{K}) \) implies that the eigenvalues of \( A \) are complex. We can express them as \( \lambda_1 = a + bi \) and \( \lambda_2 = a - bi \) where \( a = \frac{1}{2}(K - (1 - \rho_\tau)\kappa_b + \rho_\tau) > 0 \), \( b = \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{4K\rho_\tau - (K - (1 - \rho_\tau)\kappa_b + \rho_\tau)^2} \geq 0 \) and \( i \) is the imaginary unit. The two conjugate eigenvectors can be written as \( \vec{p}_k = [x \pm yi, 1]' \), where .

\[
\begin{align*}
x &= \frac{(K - (1 - \rho_\tau)\kappa_b - \rho_\tau)\tau}{2b(1 - \rho_\tau)\kappa_b} \\
y &= \frac{\tau \sqrt{4K\rho_\tau - (K - (1 - rho_\tau)\kappa_b + \rho_\tau)^2}}{2b(1 - \rho_\tau)\kappa_b}
\end{align*}
\]

With two conjugate complex eigenvalues \( A \) is diagonalizable and can be expressed as \( A = P\Lambda P^{-1} \) where again \( P \) is a similarity matrix with the eigenvectors of \( A \) as its columns and \( \Lambda \) is a diagonal matrix with the eigenvalues on the diagonal. Next remember that Euler’s formula allows us to express complex numbers in exponential form, so that we can write \( \lambda_1 = a + bi = |\lambda|e^{\phi i} \) where \( \phi = \arctan(\frac{b}{a}) \). This formulation is convenient because it is easy to take powers of the eigenvalues, e.g.

\[
\lambda_1^j = |\lambda|^j e^{j\phi i}
\]

and hence it is easy to compute powers of the eigenvalue matrix \( \Lambda \). Using this, Euler’s formula and the fact that \( A^j = P\Lambda^j P^{-1} \) it is straightforward to compute

\[
\begin{align*}
a_{11}^{(j)} &= |\lambda|^j (\cos(j\phi) + \frac{x}{y} \sin(j\phi)) \\
a_{12}^{(j)} &= -|\lambda|^j \frac{x^2 + y^2}{y} \sin(j\phi) \\
a_{21}^{(j)} &= |\lambda|^j \frac{1}{y} \sin(j\phi)
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \phi = \arctan(\frac{x}{a}) \).

Moreover we can rewrite these expressions as
\[ a_{11}^{(j)} = |\lambda|^j (\cos(j\phi) + \frac{x}{y} \sin(j\phi)) \]
\[ = |\lambda|^j \sqrt{1 + \left(\frac{x}{y}\right)^2 \sin(j\phi + \psi)} \]
\[ = |\lambda|^j \sqrt{1 + \left(\frac{x}{y}\right)^2 \cos(j\phi + \psi - \frac{\pi}{2})} \]

where \( \psi = \arctan\left(\frac{y}{x}\right) + \pi \mathbb{I}(\frac{y}{x} < 0) \). The second equality follows from the formula for linear combinations of trig functions, and the third is simply an application of \( \cos(\theta - \frac{\pi}{2}) = \sin(\theta) \). And similarly

\[ a_{12}^{(j)} = -|\lambda|^j \frac{\sqrt{x^2 + y^2}}{y} \cos(j\phi - \frac{\pi}{2}) \]
\[ a_{21}^{(j)} = |\lambda|^j \frac{1}{y} \cos(j\phi - \frac{\pi}{2}) \]

By the definition of the \( \arctan(\cdot) \) function and the virtue of \( a \geq 0, b \geq 0 \) it follows that \( \phi \in [0, \frac{\pi}{2}) \). Therefore, \( j\phi - \frac{\pi}{2} < \frac{\pi}{2} \) for \( j \leq 2 \) and hence

\[ \cos(j\phi - \frac{\pi}{2}) \geq 0, \text{ for } j \in \{1, 2\} \]

and hence \( a_{21}^{(j)} \leq 0 \) for \( j \in \{1, 2\} \). On the other hand, if \( x \geq 0 \) then \( \psi \leq \frac{\pi}{2} \) and this case \( \cos(j\phi + \psi - \frac{\pi}{2}) \geq 0 \) for at least \( j = 1 \). On the other hand \( x < 0 \) implies that \( \kappa_b > \frac{K - \rho_\tau}{1 - \rho_\tau} \). Then using the formula for addition of arctangent I obtain,

\[ \arctan\left(\frac{b}{a}\right) + \arctan\left(\frac{y}{x}\right) = \arctan\left(\frac{\frac{b}{a} + \frac{y}{x}}{1 - \frac{by}{ax}}\right). \]

where \( 1 - \frac{by}{ax} > 0 \). Working with the numerator I get \( \frac{b}{x} = \frac{b}{a - \rho_\tau} \) and given \( \kappa_b \in \left(\frac{K - \rho_\tau}{1 - \rho_\tau}, \frac{K}{1 - \rho_\tau}\right) \) it follows that \( \frac{by}{2} < a < \rho_\tau \) and thus

\[ \left|\frac{y}{x}\right| > \frac{b}{a}. \]

This shows that \( \frac{b}{a} + \frac{y}{x} < 0 \) and therefore \( \arctan\left(\frac{\frac{b}{a} + \frac{y}{x}}{1 - \frac{by}{ax}}\right) \in (-\frac{\pi}{2}, 0) \). Therefore, we again reach the conclusion that \( \cos(j\phi + \psi - \frac{\pi}{2}) \geq 0 \) for at least \( j = 1 \). This completes the proof of Lemma 2. \( \square \)
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3:

Lemma 3 (IRF: Passive Monetary/Active Fiscal). Let $\phi_\pi < 1$, $\kappa_b \in [0, K - 1)$. Then, the autoregressive matrix $A$ in (10) has two real, non-negative eigenvalues for all $\rho_\tau \in [0, 1)$. Thus, for any fiscal policy for which a solution exists, the IRF never crosses steady state.

For monetary shocks we also have the stronger result that debt does not respond to $v_t$:

$$a_{bk} = 0 \text{ for } k = 0, 1, 2, 3, \ldots$$

Proof. [ADD PROOF OF LEMMA 3] □

A.4 Theorem 1:

THEOREM 1 (UIP Violations). The magnitude and direction of UIP violations and UIP regression coefficients, $\beta_k$ in $\lambda_{t+k} = \lambda_k + \hat{\tau}_t + \beta_k(\hat{i}_t - \hat{i}_t^*) + \varepsilon_{t+k}$, depend on the monetary-fiscal policy mix as follows.

(i) Active Monetary, Passive Fiscal policy, as defined in Lemma 1, and $\rho_\tau \leq \rho(\kappa_b)$: UIP violations go in the same direction at all horizons with the UIP regression coefficients

$$\beta_k < 0 \text{ for } k = 0, 1, 2, 3, \ldots$$

(ii) Active Monetary, Passive Fiscal policy, as defined in Lemma 1, and $\rho_\tau > \rho(\kappa_b)$: UIP violations follow cyclical (cosine) dynamics, and hence reverse course at longer horizons. The UIP regression coefficients start out negative and eventually turn positive for at least some periods:

$$\beta_k < 0 \text{ for } k < \bar{k}$$

$$\beta_k > 0 \text{ for some } k > \bar{k}$$

where $\bar{k} > 1$.

(iii) Passive Monetary, Active Fiscal policy ($\phi_\pi < 1$, $\kappa_b \in [0, K - 1)$, $\rho_\tau \in [0, 1)$): UIP violations go in the same direction at all horizons and are in fact always zero:

$$\beta_k = 0 \text{ for } k = 0, 1, 2, 3, \ldots$$

Proof. [*NEEDS TO BE UPDATED FOR THE COMPOSITION OF THEOREM 1*]

To derive the expression for the UIP regression coefficients notice that $E_t(b_{t+j}) = [1, 0]^T A^j x_t$, hence

$$\text{Cov}(E_t(b_{t+j}), b_t) = a_{11}^{(j)} \text{Var}(\hat{b}_t) + a_{12}^{(j)} \text{Cov}(\hat{\tau}_t, \hat{b}_t).$$

(16)

Compute the variance on both sides of the tax policy rule to obtain

$$\text{Var}(\hat{\tau}_t) = \frac{b^2 k^2_\tau}{(1 + \rho_\tau)^2(1 - \rho_\tau)} \text{Var}(\hat{b}_t) + 2 \frac{bk_\tau}{(1 + \rho_\tau)^2} \text{Cov}(\hat{\tau}_t, b_t).$$

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and then combine with

\[ \text{Cov}(\hat{\tau}_t, \hat{b}_t) = \text{Cov}(\rho\hat{\tau}_{t-1} + a_{21}\hat{b}_{t-1}, a_{11}\hat{b}_{t-1} + a_{12}\hat{\tau}_{t-1} + b_{11}v_t) \]

\[ = -\rho^2 \tau \frac{a_{11}}{b} \text{Var}(\hat{\tau}_t) + a_{11}^2 (1 - \rho^2) \frac{b}{\tau} \text{Var}(\hat{b}_t) + a_{11}^2 \rho^2 - (1 - \rho^2) \kappa b \rho \text{Cov}(\hat{b}_t, \hat{\tau}_t) \]

to obtain

\[ \text{Cov}(\hat{\tau}_t, \hat{b}_t) = (1 - \rho^2) \kappa \frac{b}{\tau} \left( \frac{K(1 + \rho^2) - \kappa}{1 + \rho^2(1 + 2\kappa - K(1 + \rho^2))} \right) \text{Var}(\hat{b}_t). \]

Substituting this back in (16) yields \( \text{Cov}(E_t(\hat{b}_{t+j}), \hat{b}_t) = (a_{11}^{(j)} + \delta a_{12}^{(j)}) \text{Var}(\hat{b}_t) \) and hence

\[ \beta_j = -(a_{11}^{(j)} + \delta a_{12}^{(j)}). \]

This gives us the general expression for the UIP regression coefficients, next I characterize them further under real and complex roots specifically.

To prove (i) let \( \rho^2 \in [0, \rho(\kappa b)] \) and remember that

\[ \hat{b}_t = \hat{a}_0 v_t + \hat{a}_1 v_{t-1} + \hat{a}_2 v_{t-2} + \hat{a}_3 v_{t-3} + \ldots \]

and then

\[ \text{Cov}(E_t(\hat{b}_{t+j}), \hat{b}_t) = a_{11}^{(j)} \hat{a}_1^{(0)} + a_{11}^{(j+1)} \hat{a}_1^{(1)} + a_{11}^{(j+2)} \hat{a}_1^{(2)} + a_{11}^{(j+3)} \hat{a}_1^{(3)} + \ldots. \]

Lemma 2 gives us \( \hat{a}_{11}^{(j)} \leq 0 \) for \( j = 0, 1, 2, 3, \ldots \) and thus all pairs in the above sum are non-negative, and hence \( \text{Cov}(E_t(\hat{b}_{t+j}), \hat{b}_t) \geq 0 \). This gives us that

\[ \beta_j = -\frac{\text{Cov}(E_t(\hat{b}_{t+j}), \hat{b}_t)}{\text{Var}(\hat{b}_t)} \leq 0, \text{ for } j = 1, 2, 3 \ldots. \]

To prove (ii) let \( \rho^2 \in (\rho(\kappa b), \frac{1}{K}] \) and notice that Lemma 2 tells us that the eigenvalues of \( A \) are of the form \( \lambda_k = a \pm bi \) for \( k \in \{1, 2\} \), and the corresponding conjugate eigenvectors are of the form \( \tilde{v}_k = [x \pm yi, 1]^T \), where \( a, b, x, y \) are real numbers and \( i \) is the imaginary unit. Using the expressions for \( a_{11}^{(j)} \) and \( a_{12}^{(j)} \) found in Lemma 2 I get that for \( j > 1 \)

\[ \beta_j = -(a_{11}^{(j)} + \delta a_{12}^{(j)}) = -|\lambda|^j (\cos(j\phi) + \frac{x}{y} \sin(j\phi) - \delta \frac{x^2 + y^2}{y} \sin(j\phi)) \]

\[ = -|\lambda|^j \sqrt{1 + \chi^2 \cos(j\phi + \psi - \frac{\pi}{2})} \]

with \( \chi = \frac{x^2 + y^2}{y}, \phi = \arctan(b/a) > 0, \psi = \arctan(\frac{1}{\chi}) + \pi \Phi(\chi < 0). \) For \( j = 1 \), trivially \( \beta_j = -\frac{\text{Cov}(\hat{b}_t, \hat{b}_j)}{\text{Var}(\hat{b}_j)} = -1. \) Since the cosine function is cyclical at some \( j > 1 \) it will turn negative and hence \( \beta_j > 0 \), and this completes the derivation of the regression coefficients in the case of complex roots.
B Forward Exchange Rate Contracts and UIP Violations

In this section, I augment the model to include trade in forward contracts on currencies, and show that trading in forward contracts creates a synthetic position long one country’s bond and short the other. Hence, it does not matter whether one implements carry trades through forward contracts, or through trades in the bonds themselves, as both trading strategies earn the same convenience yield differential, which violates UIP. In other words, the convenience yield mechanism generates UIP violations that emerge both when looking at exchange rates and interest rates data only, and when only looking at forward and spot exchange rates.

The key to the result is that in a model with bond convenience yields, the Covered Interest Parity (CIP) holds if and only if a covered position in foreign currency is equivalent to a position in home bonds, both in financial terms and in convenience benefits. Why is that? Notice that a covered position in EUR risk-free bonds, where the future interest rate \((1 + i^*_t)\) has been sold forward for dollars at the equilibrium rate \(F_t\), generates a risk-free USD payoff, and not a risk-free EUR payoff. As such, it has a comparable convenience value to the other risk-free USD asset - US Treasuries. Being a risk-free USD asset, it carries the convenience benefits of USD risk-free assets, because it allows the investor to pledge a sure, future amount of USD, and not a sure future amount of EUR. Another way to think about it, is that a covered position in EUR bonds is in fact long USD, and not long EUR. Similarly, buying foreign currency forward is a strategy long in foreign currency and short home currency. It simultaneously increases the pledgeable amount of foreign currency proceeds and decreases the pledgeable amount of home currency, hence it creates a synthetic, zero-cost position that is long home bonds and short foreign bonds, and thus in equilibrium, on average it earns the convenience yield differential.

The CIP condition states that investing in foreign risk-free bonds and using forward contracts to eliminate the exchange rate risk must yield the same rate of return as investing in home bonds. CIP has been shown to hold in the data very well, outside of a few, short-lived episodes during times of extraordinary financial markets turbulence (e.g. some days during the recent financial crisis). The intuition behind the condition is that the covered position in foreign bonds is a risk-free asset denominated in home currency, and not in foreign currency, hence in equilibrium it must have the same rate of return as the domestic bond (another domestic risk-free asset), or otherwise there will be an arbitrage opportunity.

To be more concrete, let \(F_t\) denote the equilibrium USD-EUR forward rate, so that today we can agree to trade 1 EUR tomorrow in exchange of \(F_t\) USD. Imagine then that an investor borrows $1 today at the interest rate \(1 + i_t\), changes it into \(\frac{1}{S_t}\) EURs and invests it at the interest rate \(1 + i^*_t\), and at the same time has sold forward the proceeds at the forward rate \(F_t\). Thus, his payoff from the covered foreign position is \(\frac{F_t}{S_t}(1 + i^*_t)\) and the cost of the 1 USD is \(1 + i_t\) and CIP states:

\[
1 + i_t = \frac{F_t}{S_t}(1 + i^*_t),
\]

so that a position in a US Treasury has an equivalent financial return to a covered position in EUR denominated government bonds (e.g. German Bunds). A position in US Treasuries also
carries the convenience benefit $\Psi_{bh,t}$ and the covered position in foreign bonds is another risk-free USD asset which carries the (possibly different) convenience benefit $\tilde{\Psi}_{bh,t}$. Conditional on CIP, the convenience benefits of the two positions must be the same:

$$\Psi_{bh,t} = \tilde{\Psi}_{bh,t}.$$  

This follows from the fact that an investment in US Treasuries carries a total return of $1 + i_t + \Psi_{bh,t}$, the sum of the financial return and the convenience benefit, and an investment in a covered position in EUR denominated bonds similarly carries a total return of $\frac{F_t}{S_t}(1 + i_t^*) + \tilde{\Psi}_{bh,t}$. The two risk-free returns must be equal, otherwise there is an arbitrage opportunity. Given that CIP restricts the financial returns to be equal, it follows that the convenience benefits must be equal as well: $\Psi_{bh,t} = \tilde{\Psi}_{bh,t}$.

Thus, when CIP holds (as it does in the data) and bonds offer convenience benefits (as is also true in the data), in equilibrium, covered position in foreign bonds, which yield a risk-free payoff in the home currency and not a payoff in foreign currency, must offer the same convenience benefits as an equivalent position in home currency bonds.

This leads to the important result that (in log-approximation) the expected return on buying foreign currency forward (a popular way of implementing the carry trade without the need to transact in bond markets) is:

$$E_t(s_{t+1} - f_t) = E_t(\Delta s_{t+1} + i_t^* - i_t) = \tilde{\Psi}_{bh,t} - \tilde{\Psi}_{bf,t}.$$  

This shows that taking positions in the forwards market is akin to creating a synthetic position that is simultaneously long foreign currency bonds and short home currency bonds. This is of course, very intuitive, as buying foreign currency forward is a contract long in the foreign currency and short in the home currency. Entering into this contract reduces the amount of future USD the investor is able to pledge today as collateral (since he has already sold this USD for EURs) and at the same time increase the pledgeable amount of EUR. At the end of the day, the strategy implemented through forwards market has equivalent financial and convenience returns to a trade in the home and foreign bonds themselves, hence the forwards data would display equivalent UIP violations and the mechanism works in the same way. Due to this equivalence and for simplicity, the benchmark model abstracts from trade in forward contracts.

### C Relationship to existing Long-Run UIP Tests

Previous work by Chinn and Meredith (2005), Chinn (2006) and others has found that UIP tends to hold better over the long run, especially at horizons of five or more years. It is important to note that my results, which find that UIP is violated at horizons of up to 7 years but with a change in the direction of violations, are not contradictory but rather complementary to the previous results. The difference comes from a difference in methodologies, and in fact my results can help interpret and provide context to the existing findings.

The previous literature on the UIP hypothesis at long horizons has focused on testing whether long-run exchange rate changes (say 5+ years) tend to offset the corresponding long-run interest rate differential. The UIP condition equates the rates of return on bonds
of equivalent maturities, hence if \( i_t^{(k)} \) is the yield (per month) on a \( k \)-months to maturity US Treasury bond, and \( i_t^{(k),*} \) is the corresponding yield on a foreign \( k \)-months to maturity bond then for any \( k \) the UIP condition requires:

\[
E_t(s_{t+k} - s_t + k(i_t^{(k),*} - i_t^{(k)})) = 0
\]

Under UIP we would expect the long-term exchange rate change \( s_{t+k} - s_t \) to offset the corresponding \( k \)-month interest rate differential. The existing literature on UIP in the long-run has focused on testing this condition by employing bonds with maturities of up to ten years. The common result is that the empirical evidence against the UIP condition is weaker when using long term bonds with maturities of five or more years. Thus, there is some evidence that the long-run movements in exchange rates tend to offset the corresponding long-term interest rate differential and hence UIP has appeared to hold better over the long run.

In contrast, in this paper I always use one month interest rates and forecast one month excess returns, but I vary the horizon of the forecast. Rather than asking whether the cumulative, five year change in the exchange rate offsets the five year interest rate and hence the five year excess return is zero in expectation,

\[
E_t(s_{t+k} - s_t + k(i_t^{(k),*} - i_t^{(k)})) = 0
\]

I test whether all sixty, intermediate one-month excess returns in the next five years are individually zero in expectation

\[
E_t(s_{t+h} - s_{t+h-1} + i_{t+h-1}^{(1),*} - i_{t+h-1}^{(1)}) = 0 \text{ for } h = 1, 2, \ldots, k
\]

The two approaches are clearly related to each other. In particular, as I will show below, if the expectations hypothesis (EH) on the yield curve held, then the two approaches would have a very clear and intuitive link, where the methodology of the previous papers would amount to averaging over the UIP violations I document. Thus, my results can help us understand why the previous long-run UIP tests have tended to find support for the UIP hypothesis. My findings suggest that this happens because looking at long-run bonds and the corresponding long-run exchange rate changes tends to average over intermediate, higher-frequency UIP violations that change sign and cancel each other out when cumulated over a sufficiently long horizon. Hence, the UIP is violated at both short and long horizons, and this does not appear to be due to a short-term phenomenon that disappears over the long run. Rather, the UIP violations themselves change nature with the horizon, and as I have shown in the main body of the text, the positive violations roughly offset the negative violations in the long-run which makes it appear as if the UIP held in the long-run when only long-run evidence is considered.

To illustrate the connection between the two empirical methodologies, consider the following predictive regression that forecasts the excess return on long term, \( k \)-month bonds held to maturity

\[
\frac{s_{t+k} - s_t + k(i_t^{(k),*} - i_t^{(k)})}{k} = \alpha_k + \delta_k(i_t^{(1)} - i_t^{(1),*}) + \varepsilon_{t+k}
\] (17)
To emphasize the link with my main empirical results, I use the one-month interest rate
differential as the predictive variable, and for the same reason I have standardized (i.e.
divided by \( k \), the holding period) the left hand side to turn it into the *per month* excess return
on the \( k \)-month to maturity bonds. It is worth emphasizing that the predictive variable I
use is not the same as in the previous literature, which has rather used the corresponding
long-term interest rate differential \( i_t^{(k)} - i_t^{(k),*} \) as the regressor. Here I consider instead a
regression on the short-term, one-month interest rate in order to highlight the link with the
main empirical results, which always the one-month interest rate differential as the regressor.

As mentioned earlier, the link between my empirical strategy and the existing studies
is particularly straightforward when the expectations hypothesis on the term structure of
the interest rate differential across countries holds, at least up to a constant risk-premium, so that

\[
i_t^{(k),*} - i_t^{(k)} = \frac{1}{k} \left( \sum_{h=0}^{k-1} E_t(i_{t+h}^{*} - i_{t+h}) + c_k \right).
\]

Intuitively, this means that the yield differential on long-term \( k \)-period bonds is equal to the
expected average of future 1-period short-term interest rate differentials, up to a constant risk-
premium.\(^{72}\) In this case, the long holding period excess returns are equal (up to a constant)
to the expected sum of the future, one-period excess returns from now until maturity:

\[
E_t(s_{t+k} - s_t + k(i_t^{(k),*} - i_t^{(k)})) = E_t\left( \sum_{h=0}^{k-1} (s_{t+h+1} - s_{t+h} + i_{t+h}^{(1),*} - i_{t+h}^{(1)} + c_k) \right) = E_t\left( \sum_{h=0}^{k-1} \lambda_{t+h+1} \right) + c_k.
\]

In other words, the \( k \) period excess return on foreign bonds relative to the home bonds
is akin to cumulating the \( k \) one period, intermediate excess returns. With this result in mind,
it is not surprising that we can re-express the regression coefficient \( \delta_k \) as:

---

\(^{72}\) **Bekaert et al.** (2007) show that this may not be a bad assumption. They show that in international
data the hypothesis is rejected statistically but the actual numerical deviations are quite small and they
argue that they are insignificant from an economic point of view.
\[
\delta_k = \frac{1}{k} \text{Cov}(E_t(s_{t+k} - s_t + k(i_t^{(k)} - i_t^{(k)})), (i_t^{(1)} - i_t^{(1)*}))
\]
\[
= \frac{1}{k} \frac{\text{Cov}(E_t(\sum_{h=0}^{k-1} \lambda_{t+h+1} + c_k, (i_t^{(1)} - i_t^{(1)*}))}{\text{Var}(i_t^{(1)} - i_t^{(1)*}))}
\]
\[
= \frac{1}{k} \sum_{h=0}^{k-1} \frac{\text{Cov}(\lambda_{t+h+1}, (i_t^{(1)} - i_t^{(1)*}))}{\text{Var}(i_t^{(1)} - i_t^{(1)*}))}
\]
\[
= \sum_{h=1}^{k} \frac{\beta_h}{k}
\]

In the above expression \(\beta_h\) are the coefficients obtained in the main set of regressions, defined in equation \((3)\), where we regressed one-month excess returns at different horizons on the current one-month interest rate differential. Thus, the coefficient in a long-run UIP regression that uses long-term, \(k\)-period excess returns as the dependent variable, can be viewed as the average of the \(k\) regression coefficients from the one-period UIP regressions at the intermediate horizons from 1 to \(k\) periods in the future.

This suggests that UIP regressions using long-term bonds and returns tend to average over the high-frequency UIP violations within the full holding period of the long-term bond. Combined with my previous finding that the high-frequency violations change sign at longer horizons, this can help rationalize why previous studies have found strong evidence against the UIP in the short-run but much weaker evidence in the long-run. Moreover, the weaker evidence in long-run studies is not because the UIP condition tends to hold over horizons of five years or more – Figure 1 shows that in fact the UIP is violated at horizons of up to 7 years. Instead, my results suggest that long-run UIP test might find weaker evidence against the UIP because the fundamental nature of the underlying, higher-frequency UIP violations change sign at longer horizons. A regression with a sufficiently long-period cumulative return on the left hand side would average over negative and positive violations that cancel each other out and it may look like UIP holds.

To illustrate the fact that the positive and negative violations roughly cancel out at long horizons, Figure ?? plots \(\delta_k = \sum_{h=1}^{k} \beta_h\), the cumulative sum of the UIP coefficients \(\beta_k\) against the horizon in months on the X-axis. The solid blue line shows the value of the partial sum up to horizon \(k\) and the shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval. The partial sums are at first decreasing, because the short-horizon violations are all negative, but eventually start rising and at the longest horizons appear to be roughly zero. This shows that the cumulative total of the positive UIP violations is approximately equal to the cumulative total of the negative violations.

Thus, the results of this paper support the earlier findings that the exchange rate behavior in the long run, on average, is consistent with the UIP hypothesis. But this is not because UIP violations manifest themselves only in the short-run and get washed out in the longer-run. The reason is instead that the high-frequency violations change sign at
different horizons, and thus tend to cancel each other over the long-run. Interestingly, the UIP condition is still violated in both the short and the long run, but nevertheless exchange rate behavior in the long run appears to be consistent with Uncovered Interest Parity.

D Monetary Independence and UIP Violations in the Model

In this section I will illustrate how monetary independence is related to UIP violations in the (quantitative) model. The relationship is trivial in the analytical model, as keeping debt constant in that model removes any time variation in excess returns. For the quantitative model, I will consider two different experiments, and in both I will only be changing the behavior of the foreign central bank but not the home one. In the first experiment, I will augment the Taylor rule of the bank to include the outstanding stock of government debt and in the second I will consider an Active Fiscal/Passive Monetary policy mix, in which case the fiscal authority does not raise taxes to pay off debt and the central bank is left to induce inflation and keep the government solvent by inflating it away.

For the first experiment, I will keep the assumption that the home central bank follows a standard Taylor rule and is committed to fighting inflation, but will assume that part of the mandate of the foreign central bank is to keep foreign government debt constant. I only change the policy in the foreign country because in the data I take the USD as the benchmark exchange rate and the Federal Reserve’s actions have been apparently independent of fiscal considerations for the time period at hand. I implement this in a straightforward way,
by augmenting the foreign Taylor rule to respond to the outstanding amount of foreign
government debt

\[ \hat{i}_t^f = \rho_i \hat{i}_{t-1}^f + (1 - \rho_i)\phi^*_b \hat{b}_t^f - (1 - \rho_i)\phi^*_b \hat{b}_{t-1}^f + v_t^r, \]

where \( \phi^*_b > 0 \). With this parametrization, when foreign government debt rises, the
foreign central bank lowers interest rates which helps reduce the cost of servicing the debt
and also puts an upward pressure on inflation, and helps inflate some of the debt away.
Overall, increasing \( \phi^*_b \) decreases the volatility of government debt.

I plot the implied UIP regression coefficients from the augmented version of the model
in Figure D.1 for three different values of \( \phi_b \). As we can see, increasing \( \phi_b \) leads to lower UIP
deviations at all horizons, but the effect is particularly visible for the positive long-horizon
violations. With \( \phi_b = 0.25 \) the longer horizon positive violations virtually disappear, while
there are still short-horizon negative violations, although they are small.

![Figure D.1: UIP Regression Coefficients, Augmented Taylor Rule](image)

The intuition for the results is that when the monetary authority is actively trying
to stabilize debt it achieves two things. First, it makes government debt less sensitive to
shocks and second its actions help any new debt to be repaid quicker, which brings debt
back to steady state faster and also greatly reduces the cyclicality in its dynamics. Debt is
less responsive to shocks, because concurrent with the shocks (not only monetary, but any
type of shock, e.g. technology, fiscal etc.) there is a systematic, endogenous response in the
monetary policy that counteracts the shock. Moreover, any new debt ends up being repaid
much faster, as compared to when the fiscal authority is on its own, because the endogenous
monetary policy is persistently helping the fiscal authority pay off its debt through both
reduced interest rates and increased inflation. This second effect is especially important
at long horizons because the quicker repayment of debts reduces the cyclical dynamics of
government debt, and this explains the complete disappearance of positive UIP violations at
longer horizons. Interestingly, it is enough to have only one of the two central banks (home
and foreign) targeting government debt in their policy to achieve a significant reduction in
the generated UIP violations.

Another exercise I consider is moving to an Active Fiscal and Passive Monetary policy
in the foreign country. I use the terms Active and Passive policy as in Leeper (1991), hence
an Active Fiscal and Passive Monetary policy mix is one where the fiscal authority does
not adjust taxes sufficiently to stay solvent on its own, but instead the monetary authority
allows inflation to rise and inflate debt to keep the government solvent. To implement this
experiment, I set $\phi^*_\pi = 0$ and $\kappa_b = 0$, the common parametrization that characterizes Active
Fiscal/Passive Monetary policy mix in the literature. This parametrization implies that in
fact the fiscal authority does not respond to debt at all, and the monetary authority does
not respond to inflation but rather adjusts interest so that inflation is allowed to rise and keep
the government solvent.

The resulting implied coefficients from this experiment are plotted in D.2 and they show
that UIP violations virtually disappear again. The reason is very much the same as before,
the actions of the central bank are again stabilizing foreign debt supply, which makes it less
responsive to shocks and also helps pay it down faster and removes the cyclical dynamics.
This greatly weakens through key mechanisms through which UIP violations are generated:
dynamics of government debt and spillover of shocks abroad. As a result, the implied UIP
deviations become almost negligible.

Figure D.2: UIP Regression Coefficients, Active Fiscal Policy
Figure E.1: Evolution of Capital Openness

E Extra Figures
Figure E.2: The Evolution of Public and Private Debt

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure_e2}
\caption{The Evolution of Public and Private Debt}
\end{figure}

\begin{verbatim}
ln(DEBT/GDP) \quad ln(CP/GDP)
\end{verbatim}