University of Chicago Booth School of Business
5807 S Woodlawn Ave
Chicago, IL 60637
Phone: (773) 702-7309
email: lars.stole@chicagobooth.edu
EDUCATION:
Ph.D.,Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1991
M.Sc.,Economics, London School of Economics, 1986
B.A.,Economics, University of
Illinois, summa cum laude with highest distinction, 1985
B.A.,Political Science, University of
Illinois, summa cum laude with highest distinction, 1985
RESEARCH AREAS:
Strategic pricing, incentives theory, industrial economics, game theory, price theory.
CURRENT POSITION AND AFFILIATIONS:
Eli B. and Harriet B. Williams Professor of Economics,
2002-present
Research Fellow, Center for Economic Studies, CESifo, 2002-present
Co-Director, Initiative for Applied Theory, Booth School of Business,
2009-present
PREVIOUS POSITIONS AND EXPERIENCE:
Professor of Economics, University of Chicago, G.S.B.
1998-2002
Visiting Lecturer, CES, Munich, Germany, 2002
Editor, RAND Journal of Economics, 1997-2000
Associate Professor of Economics, University of Chicago, G.S.B.
1995-1998
Associate EditorRAND Journal of
Economics, 1995-1996
Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Chicago, G.S.B.
1991-1995
Visiting Professor, MIT, Department of Economics,
1993
Lecturer, CERGE (Prague, C.R.) and Bratislava School of
Economics (Slovakia), 1993
Consultant, The Rand Corporation, 1988-89
HONORS, GRANTS AND AWARDS:
Honors and Awards:
David W. Johnson Professor of Economics, 2001-2002.
Einhorn Hillel Award for Excellence in Teaching (annual prize):
2001-2007
Fellowships:
Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellow, 1995-1997
National Science Foundation, Presidential Faculty Fellow, 1994-1999
Centel Foundation/Robert P. Reuss Scholar, 1993-1994
Claude Lambe Graduate Fellowship - MIT, 1990-1991
Olin Graduate Fellowship - MIT, 1990-1991
Olin Fellowship in Law and Economics - Harvard Law School,
1988-1990
National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship - MIT, 1986-1990
Sir Arthur Lewis Studentship - London School of Economics, 1985-1986
CURRENT RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:
“Public Contracting in Delegated Common Agency Games,” (with David Martimort, Paris School of Economics), revised August 2011.
“The Collective Wisdom of Beauty Contests,” (with David Martimort, Paris School of Economics), July 2011.
“Aggregate Representations of Aggregate Games with Applications to Common Agency,” (with David Martimort, Paris School of Economics), revised June 2011.
“A useful necessary and sufficient condition for non-smooth optimal control problems,” (with David Martimort, Paris School of Economics), October 2009.
“Common Screening Games,” (with David Martimort, Paris School of Economics), May 2005.
“Mergers, Employee Hold-up and the Scope of the Firm: An Intrafirm Bargaining Approach to Mergers,” (with Jeffrey Zwiebel, Stanford University, GSB), minor revision, August 2008.
OLDER RESEARCH PAPERS OF
POTENTIAL INTERESTS:
“Common Agency Equilibria with Discrete Mechanisms and Discrete Types,” (with David Martimort, Paris School of Economics), January 2003.
Lectures in Contract Theory, monograph, May 2001.
“Barter, Liquidity, and Market Segmentation,” (with Canice Prendergast, University of Chicago, GSB), October 1997 (last revision September 2001).
“Monetizing Social Exchange,” (with Canice Prendergast, University of Chicago, GSB), September 1997.
“Competitive Nonlinear Pricing,” (with Jean-Charles Rochet, Institut D'Economie Industrielle, Toulouse), 1997.
“Mechanism Design under Common Agency,” 1990. Chapter 1 of Ph.D. thesis, MIT. The results of this paper have been largely reproduced and extended in joint work with David Martimort, “Market Participation under Delegated and Intrinsic Common Agency Games,” (with David Martimort, Paris School of Economics), RAND Journal of Economics, Spring 2009. (See below.)
PUBLICATIONS:
“Market Participation under Delegated and Intrinsic Common Agency Games,” (with David Martimort, Paris School of Economics), RAND Journal of Economics, Spring 2009.
“Selecting Equilibria in Common Agency Games” (previous version, “On the Robustness of Truthful Equilibria in Common Agency games”), (with David Martimort, Paris School of Economics), Journal of Economic Theory, 2009.
“Price Discrimination in Competitive Environments,” Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 3, 2007.
“Involuntary Unemployment and Intrafirm Bargaining with Replacement Workers: Reply” (with Jeffrey Zwiebel, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business), American Economic Review, March 2003, 93(1): 456-57.
“The Economics of Multidimensional Screening,” (with Jean-Charles Rochet), Advances in Economic Theory, 7th World Congress, Mathias Dewatripont and Lars Hansen, editors, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
“Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria,” (with David Martimort, Paris School of Economics), Advances in Theoretical Economics, 3(1), 2003. http://www.bepress.com.
“The Revelation and Taxation Principles in Common Agency
Games,” (with David Martimort, Paris School of Economics),
Econometrica, July 2002, 70(4): 1659-1673.
“Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation,” (with Jean-Charles Rochet, Institut D'Economie Industrielle, Toulouse), Review of Economic Studies, January 2002, 69(1): 277-311.
“The Non-monetary Nature of Gifts,” (with Canice Prendergast, University of Chicago, GSB), European Economic Review, December 2001, 45(10): 1793-1810.
“Barter relationships,” (with Canice Prendergast, University of Chicago, GSB), in The Vanishing Rouble: Barter Networks and Non-Monetary Transactions in Post-Soviet Societies, Paul Seabright, Ed., Cambridge University Press, 2000.
“Restricting the Means of Exchange within Organizations,” (with Canice Prendergast, University of Chicago, GSB), European Economic Review, April 1999, 43(4-6): 1007-1019.
“Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Oldtimers: Acquiring a Reputation for Learning” (with Canice Prendergast, University of Chicago, GSB), Journal of Political Economy, December 1996, 104(6): 1105-1134.
“Nonmonetary Exchange within Firms and Industry,” in Law and Firm Behaviour, 1996 Industry Economics Conference, published by the Australian Government Publishing Service for the Productivity Commission, December 1996.
“Intrafirm Bargaining under Nonbinding Contracts,” (with Jeff Zwiebel, Stanford University, GSB), Review of Economics Studies, July 1996, 63(3): 375-410.
“Organizational Design and Technology Choice under Intrafirm Bargaining,” (with Jeff Zwiebel, Stanford University, GSB), American Economic Review, March 1996, 86(1): 195-222.
“Mandated Countertrade as Strategic Commitment,” (with Tore Ellingsen, Stockholm School of Economics), Journal of International Economics, February 1996, 40(1): 67-84.
“Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly,” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Winter 1995, 4(4): 529-562.
“Information Expropriation and Moral Hazard in Optimal Second-source Auctions,” Journal of Public Economics, Summer 1994,54: 463-484.
“Do Short-Term Objectives Lead to Under- or Over-Investment in Long-term Projects?,” (with Lucian Bebchuk, Harvard Law School), Journal of Finance, June 1993, 48(2): 719-729.
“Licensing and Technology Transfer,” in Pew Studies in Economics and Security, Incentives in Procurement Contracting, Jim Leitzel and Jean Tirole, Eds., Westview Press, 1993, pp. 121-130.
“The Economics of Liquidated Damage Clauses in Contractual Environments with Private Information,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, October 1992, 8(3): 582-606.
“Fixed-Equilibrium Rationalizability in Signaling Games,” (with Joel Sobel and Inigo Zapater), Journal of Economic Theory, December 1990, 52(2): 304-331.
REFEREE:
Econometrica, American Economic Review, Journal of Political Economy, Review of Economic Studies, Quarterly Journal of Economics, RAND Journal of Economics, Journal of Industrial Economics, Journal of Law and Economics, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Journal of Economic Theory, International Journal of Industrial Organization, National Science Foundation, Journal of Business.
PERSONAL: Married (to Audris S. Wong), two daughters (Lena Xue-Zhen and Sygne Ao-Si)