Getting Started

▶ Syllabus
   http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/nicholas.polson/teaching/41900/

▶ General Expectations

1. Read the notes / Practice
2. Be on schedule
Course Expectations

Homework: 20% Assignments. Handed in at Class
   I encourage you to do assignments in groups.
   Otherwise it’s no fun!
   Grading is ✓ −, ✓, ✓ +.

Final: 80% Week 11

Grading: PhD course
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Introduction

1. W1-W8 Probability

Reading: DeGroot and Schervish
Chap 1&2: Probability and Conditional Probability
Chap 3: Random Variables
Chap 4: Expectations
Chap 5: Special Distributions
Chap 6: Hierarchical Models

2. W9-W10 AI and Deep Learning

Reading: DeGroot and Schervish “Probability and Statistics”
(4rd Edition)
Outline

1. **Probability** (axioms, subjective, utility, laws, conditional, Bayes theorem, applications, DNA testing, cdf’s and pdf’s)

2. **Distributions** (discrete, continuous, binomial, poisson, gamma, weibull, beta, exponential family, wishart)
   - Transformations and Expectations (distribution of functions, expectations, mgf’s, convergence, conditional and marginal, bivariate normal, inequalities and identities)

3. **Modern Regression Methods** (Ridge, Lasso)

4. **Bayesian Methods** (Hierarchical Models, Shrinkage, Asset Allocation, Brownian Motion)

5. **AI and Deep Learning** (NNs, SGD, Dropout, Applications)
Overview
Probability and Paradoxes

1. Birthday Problem
2. Exchange Paradox
3. Probability: Axioms and Subjectivity
4. Expected Utility: Preferences
5. Risk
6. Probability and Psychology
7. St. Petersburg Paradox
8. Allais Paradox
9. Kelly Criterion

Reading: DeGroot and Schervish: Chapter 1,1-47.
Ellsberg Paradox

Probability is counter-intuitive!!!

- Two urns
  1. 100 balls with 50 red and 50 blue.
  2. A mix of red and blue but you don’t know the proportion.

- Which urn would you like to bet on?

- People don’t like the “uncertainty” about the distribution of red/blue balls in the second urn.
## Likelihood of Death

120 Stanford graduates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Count</th>
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<tr>
<td>Heart disease</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cancer</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other natural causes</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accident</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other unnatural causes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-The P’s don’t even sum up to one! People vastly overestimate probability of violent death
Probability

Probability is a language designed to communicate uncertainty. It’s immensely useful, and there’s only a few basic rules.

1. If an event $A$ is certain to occur, it has probability 1, denoted $P(A) = 1$

2. Either an event $A$ occurs or it does not.

   $$P(\text{not } A) = 1 - P(A)$$

3. If two events are mutually exclusive (both cannot occur simultaneously) then $P(A \text{ or } B) = P(A) + P(B)$

4. $P(A \text{ and } B) = P(A \text{ given } B)P(B) = P(A|B)P(B)$
The following problem is known as the “exchange paradox”.

- A swami puts $m$ dollars in one envelope and $2m$ in another. He hands on envelope to you and one to your opponent.

The amounts are placed randomly and so there is a probability of $\frac{1}{2}$ that you get either envelope.

You open your envelope and find $x$ dollars. Let $y$ be the amount in your opponent’s envelope.
You know that $y = \frac{1}{2}x$ or $y = 2x$. You are thinking about whether you should switch your opened envelope for the unopened envelope of your friend. It is tempting to do an expected value calculation as follows

$$E(y) = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2}x + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 2x = \frac{5}{4}x > x$$

Therefore, it looks as if you should switch no matter what value of $x$ you see. A consequence of this, following the logic of backwards induction, that even if you didn’t open your envelope that you would want to switch!
Bayes Rule

- Where’s the flaw in this argument? Use Bayes rule to update the probabilities of which envelope your opponent has! Assume \( p(m) \) of dollars to be placed in the envelope by the swami.

- Such an assumption then allows us to calculate an odds ratio

\[
\frac{p \left( y = \frac{1}{2} x | x \right)}{p \left( y = 2x | x \right)}
\]

concerning the likelihood of which envelope your opponent has.

- Then, the expected value is given by

\[
E(y) = p \left( y = \frac{1}{2} x | x \right) \cdot \frac{1}{2} x + p \left( y = 2x | x \right) \cdot 2x
\]

and the condition \( E(y) > x \) becomes a decision rule.
Birthday Problem

Example

".. for the ‘one chance in a million’ will undoubtedly occur, with no less and no more than its appropriate frequency, however surprised we may be that it should occur to us” (Fisher, 1937)

2. Almost Birthdays: Only need 13 people for a Birthday match to within a day.
3. Multiple Matches: 88 people for a triple match
Solution

Easier to calculate $P(\text{no match})$

- The first person has a particular birthday

$$P(\text{no match}) = 1 \times \frac{364}{365} \times \ldots \times \frac{364-N+1}{365}$$

Substituting $N = 23$ you get $P(\text{no match}) = \frac{1}{2}$.

- General rule-of-thumb:
  
  $N$ people, $c$ the number of categories

  Then $N = 1.2\sqrt{c}$ for a 50/50 chance.

- To apply this to Birthdays we use: $c = 365$ and $N = 23$
  
  For near Birthdays $c = 121$ and $N = 1.2\sqrt{121} = 13$. 
Example

We can calculate

\[
P(\text{no match}) = \prod_{i=1}^{N-1} \left(1 - \frac{i}{c}\right)
\]

\[
= \exp \left(\sum_{i=1}^{N-1} \log \left(1 - \frac{i}{c}\right)\right) \approx \exp \left(-\frac{N^2}{2c}\right)
\]

where \(\log \left(1 - \frac{i}{c}\right) \approx -\frac{i}{c}\) for \(i \ll c\) and \(\sum_{i=1}^{N-1} i = \frac{1}{2}N(N-1)\).
Bayes Theorem

Many problems in decision making can be solved using Bayes rule.

- Rule-based decision making. Artificial Intelligence.
- It’s counterintuitive! But gives the “right” answer.

Bayes Rule:

$$P(A|B) = \frac{P(A \cap B)}{P(B)} = \frac{P(B|A)P(A)}{P(B)}$$

Law of Total Probability:

$$P(B) = P(B|A)P(A) + P(B|\bar{A})P(\bar{A})$$
Bayes Theorem

Disease Testing example ....

Let $D = 1$ indicate you have a disease

Let $T = 1$ indicate that you test positive for it

If you take the test and the result is positive, you are really interested in the question: Given that you tested positive, what is the chance you have the disease?
Bayes Theorem

We have a probability table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>D</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.9702 0.001</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0098 0.019</td>
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</table>

Bayes Probability

\[
P(D = 1 | T = 1) = \frac{0.019}{(0.019 + 0.0098)} = 0.66
\]
Probability

Subjective probability is very different from the (non-operational) approach based on long-run averages.

2. Ramsey (1926) Truth and Probability
3. deFinetti (1930) Theory of Probability
4. Kolmogorov (1931) Probability
5. von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) Theory of Economic Games and Behaviour

Principle of Coherence: A set of subjective probability beliefs must avoid sure loss
Subjective Probability, Preferences and Utility

- Axiomatic probability doesn’t help you find probabilities. It describes how to find probabilities of more complicated events.

- Subjective probability measures *your* probability as a propensity to bet (willingness to pay). Utility effects are “assumed” to be linear (risk neutral) so you value everything in terms of expected values.

- \( P(A) \) “measures’ how much you are willing to pay to enter a transaction that pays $1 if \( A \) occurs and 0 otherwise.
Odds

We can express probabilities in terms of Odds via

\[ O(A) = \frac{1 - P(A)}{P(A)} \quad \text{or} \quad P(A) = \frac{1}{1 + O(A)} \]

- For example if \( O(A) = 1 \) then for ever $1 bet you will payout $1. An event with probability \( \frac{1}{2} \).
- If \( O(A) = 2 \) or \( 2:1 \), then for a $1 bet you’ll payback $3. In terms of probability \( P = \frac{1}{3} \).
US Presidential Election 2020

Oddschecker

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>bet365</th>
<th>skybet</th>
<th>Ladbrokes</th>
<th>Marathon</th>
<th>Betfair</th>
<th>William Hill</th>
<th>Coral</th>
<th>Betfred</th>
<th>Boylesports</th>
<th>Betway</th>
<th>BetBright</th>
<th>Sportingbet</th>
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<th>888sport</th>
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Figure: Presidential Odds 2020

- Odds can dynamically change in time as new information arrives.
How do people form probabilities or expectations in reality? Psychologists have categorized many different biases that people have in their beliefs or judgments.

**Loss Aversion** The most important finding of Kahneman and Tversky is that people are loss averse. Utilities are defined over gains and losses rather than over final (or terminal) wealth, an idea first proposed by Markowitz. This is a violation of the EU postulates. Let \((x, y)\) denote a bet with gain \(x\) with probability \(y\).

To illustrate this subjects were asked:

*In addition to whatever you own, you have been given $1000, now choose between the gambles \(A = (1000, 0.5)\) and \(B = (500, 1)\).*

\(B\) was the more popular choice.
Example

The same subjects were then asked: *In addition to whatever you own, you have been given $2000, now choose between the gambles* $C = (-1000, 0.5)$ and $D = (-500, 1)$.

- This time $C$ was more popular.

- The key here is that their final wealth positions are identical yet people chose differently. The subjects are apparently focusing only on gains and losses.

When they are not given any information about prior winnings, they choose $B$ over $A$ and $C$ over $D$. Clearly for a risk averse people this is the rational choice.

- This effect is known as loss aversion.
Representativeness

When people try to determine the probability that evidence $A$ was generated by model $B$, they often use the representative heuristic. This means that they evaluate the probability by the degree to which $A$ reflects the essential characteristics of $B$.

A common bias is *base rate neglect* or ignoring prior evidence. For example, in tossing a fair coin the sequence $HHTHTHHTHH$ with seven heads is likely to appear and yet people draw conclusions from too few data points and think 7 heads is representative of the true process and conclude $p = 0.7$. 
Expected Utility (EU) Theory

Normative

Let $P, Q$ be two probability distributions or risky gambles/lotteries. $pP + (1 - p)Q$ is the compound or mixture lottery. The rational agent (You) will have preferences between gambles.

- We write $P \succeq Q$ if and only if You strictly prefer $P$ to $Q$. If two lotteries are indifferent we write $P \sim Q$.

- EU – a number of plausible axioms – completeness, transitivity, continuity and independence – then preferences are an expectation of a utility function.

- The theory is a normative one and not necessarily descriptive. It suggests how a rational agent should formulate beliefs and preferences and not how they actually behave.

- Expected utility $U(P)$ of a risky gamble is then

$$P \succeq Q \iff U(P) \geq U(Q)$$
Attitudes to Risk

The solution depends on your risk preferences:

- **Risk neutral**: a risk neutral person is indifferent about fair bets. Linear Utility

- **Risk averse**: a risk averse person prefers certainty over fair bets.
  \[
  \mathbb{E}(U(X)) < U(\mathbb{E}(X)).
  \]
  Concave utility

- **Risk loving**: a risk loving person prefers fair bets over certainty.

Depends on your preferences.
What are you willing to pay to enter the following game?

- I toss a fair game and when the first head appears, on the $T$th toss, I pay you $2^T$ dollars.
- First, probability of first head on $T$th toss is $2^{-T}$

\[
E(X) = \sum_{T=1}^{\infty} 2^T 2^{-T} \\
= 2(1/2) + 4(1/4) + 8(1/8) + \ldots \\
= 1 + 1 + 1 + \ldots \to \infty
\]

- Bernoulli (1754) constructed utility to value bets with $E(u(X))$. 
Allais Paradox

You have to make a choice between the following gambles

▸ First compare the “Gambles”
  \( \mathcal{G}_1 \): $5 million with certainty
  \( \mathcal{G}_2 \): $25 million \( p = 0.10 \)
    - $5 million \( p = 0.89 \)
    - $0 million \( p = 0.01 \)

▸ Now choose between the Gambles
  \( \mathcal{G}_3 \): $5 million \( p = 0.11 \)
    - $0 million \( p = 0.89 \)
  \( \mathcal{G}_4 \): $25 million \( p = 0.10 \)
    - $0 million \( p = 0.90 \)

Fact: If \( \mathcal{G}_1 \geq \mathcal{G}_2 \) then \( \mathcal{G}_3 \geq \mathcal{G}_4 \) and vice-versa.
Solution: Expected Utility

Given (subjective) probabilities \( P = (p_1, p_2, p_3) \). Write \( E(U|P) \) for expected utility.

- Without loss of generality we can set \( u(0) = 0 \) and for the high prize set \( u(\$25 \text{ million}) = 1 \). Which leaves one free parameter \( u = u(\$5 \text{ million}) \).

- Hence to compare gambles with probabilities \( P \) and \( Q \) we look at the difference

\[
E(u|P) - E(u|Q) = (p_2 - q_2)u + (p_3 - q_3)
\]

- For comparing \( G_1 \) and \( G_2 \) we get

\[
E(u|G_1) - E(u|G_2) = 0.11u - 0.1
\]

\[
E(u|G_3) - E(u|G_4) = 0.11u - 0.1
\]

The order is the same, given your \( u \).

- If your utility satisfies \( u < 0.1/0.11 = 0.909 \) you take the “riskier” gamble.
Utility Functions

Power and log-utilities

- Constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).
- Advantage that the optimal rule is unaffected by wealth effects. The CRRA utility of wealth takes the form

$$U_\gamma(W) = \frac{W^{1-\gamma} - 1}{1 - \gamma}$$

- The special case $U(W) = \log(W)$ for $\gamma = 1$. This leads to a myopic Kelly criterion rule.
Kelly Criterion

Kelly Criterion corresponds to betting under binary uncertainty.

- Consider a sequence of i.i.d. bets where

\[ p(X_t = 1) = p \quad \text{and} \quad p(X_t = -1) = q = 1 - p \]

The optimal allocation is \( \omega^* = p - q = 2p - 1 \).

- Maximising the expected long-run growth rate leads to the solution

\[
\max_{\omega} \mathbb{E} \left( \ln(1 + \omega W_T) \right) = p \ln(1 + \omega) + (1 - p) \ln(1 - \omega) \\
\leq p \ln p + q \ln q + \ln 2 \quad \text{and} \quad \omega^* = p - q
\]
Kelly Criterion

If one believes the event is certain i.e. $p = 1$, then one bets all wealth and a priori one is certain to double invested wealth.

If the bet is fair, i.e. $p = \frac{1}{2}$, one bets nothing, $\omega^* = 0$, due to risk-aversion.

- Let $p$ denote the probability of a gain and $O = (1 - p)/p$ the odds. We can generalize the rule to the case of asymmetric payouts $(a, b)$ where

$$p(X_t = 1) = p \quad \text{and} \quad p(X_t = -1) = q = 1 - p$$

- Then the expected utility function is

$$p \ln(1 + b\omega) + (1 - p) \ln(1 - a\omega)$$

- The optimal solution is

$$\omega^* = \frac{bp - aq}{ab} = \frac{p - q}{\sigma}$$
Kelly Criterion

▶ If $a = b = 1$ this reduces to the pure Kelly criterion.

▶ A common case occurs when $a = 1$. We can now interpret $b$ as the odds $O$ that the market is willing to offer the invest if the event occurs and so we write $b = O$. The rule becomes

$$\omega^* = \frac{p \cdot O - q}{O}$$

Example

▶ Two possible market opportunities: one where it offers you 4/1 when you have personal odds of 3/1 and a second one when it offers you 12/1 while you think the odds are 9/1. In expected return these two scenarios are identical both offering a 33% gain. In terms of maximizing long-run growth, however, they are not identical.
Example

- Table 1 shows the Kelly criteria advises an allocation that is twice as much capital to the lower odds proposition: 1/16 weight versus 1/40.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market</th>
<th>You</th>
<th>$p$</th>
<th>$\omega^*$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4/1</td>
<td>3/1</td>
<td>1/4</td>
<td>1/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/1</td>
<td>9/1</td>
<td>1/10</td>
<td>1/40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table : Kelly rule

- The optimal allocation $\omega^* = (pO - q)/O$ is

$$
\frac{(1/4) \times 4 - (3/4)}{4} = \frac{1}{16} \text{ and } \frac{(1/10) \times 12 - (9/10)}{12} = \frac{1}{40}
$$
Assignment 1

Probability and Paradox

1. Envelope Paradox
2. Galton’s Paradox
3. Prosecutors’ Fallacy
4. St Petersburg Paradox
5. Kelly Criterion
6. OJ Simpson Case
Probability: 41901

Week 2: Conditional Probability and Bayes Rule

Nick Polson

http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/nicholas.polson/teaching/41901/
Topics

1. Conditional Probability
2. Bayes Rule
3. Prisoner’s Dilemma/Monte Hall
4. Using Probability as Evidence
5. Island Problem and DNA Evidence
6. Combining Evidence
7. Prosecutors and base-rate fallacies.

Reading: DeGroot and Schervish: Chapter 2, p.49-97.
Conditional Probability

Bayes Rule

In its simplest form.

- Two events $A$ and $B$. Bayes rule

$$P(A|B) = \frac{P(A \cap B)}{P(B)} = \frac{P(B|A)P(A)}{P(B)}$$

- Law of Total Probability

$$P(B) = P(B|A)P(A) + P(B|\bar{A})P(\bar{A})$$

Hence we can calculate the denominator of Bayes rule.
Three prisoners $A, B, C$.
Each believe are equally likely to be set free.
Prisoner $A$ goes to the warden $\mathcal{W}$ and asks if s/he is getting axed.

- The Warden can’t tell $A$ anything about him.
- He provides the new information: $\mathcal{W}B = \text{“$B$ is to be executed”}$
Prisoner’s Dilemma

Uniform Prior Probabilities:

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Posterior: \( \text{Compute } P(A|WB) \)?

What happens if \( C \) overhears the conversation?

\( \text{Compute } P(C|WB) \)?
The Game Show Problem

Named after the host of the long-running TV show, *Let’s make a Deal*.

- A contestant is given the choice of 3 doors. There is a prize (a car, say) behind one of the doors and something worthless behind the other two doors: two goats.
- The optimal strategy is counter-intuitive
The game is as follows:

- You pick a door.
- Monty then opens one of the other two doors, revealing a goat.
- You have the choice of switching doors.

Is it advantageous to switch?

Assume you pick door $A$ at random. Then $P(A) = \frac{1}{3}$.

You need to figure out $P(A|MB)$ after Monte reveals $B$ is a goat.

21 Kevin Spacey: Monte Hall
Probability as Evidence

evidence: known facts about criminal (e.g. blood type, DNA, ...)
suspect: matches a trait with evidence at scene of crime

Let $\mathcal{G}$ denote the event that the suspect is the criminal.

- Bayes computes the conditional probability of guilt

$$P(\mathcal{G} | \text{evidence})$$

Evidence $\mathcal{E}$: suspect and criminal possess a common trait
Probability as Evidence

Bayes Theorem yields

\[ P(G|\text{evidence}) = \frac{P(\text{evidence}|G)P(G)}{P(\text{evidence})} \]

In terms of relative odds

\[ \frac{P(I|\text{evidence})}{P(G|\text{evidence})} = \frac{P(\text{evidence}|I)P(I)}{P(\text{evidence}|G)P(G)} \]
There are two terms:

1. Prior Odds of Guilt \( O(G) = \frac{P(I)}{P(G)} \)
   
   How many people on the island?
   Sensitivity "what if" analysis?

2. The Bayes factor

   \[
   \frac{P(\text{evidence}|I)}{P(\text{evidence}|G)}
   \]

   is common to all observers and updates everyone’s initials odds
Prosecutor’s Fallacy

The most common fallacy is confusing

\[ P(\text{evidence}|G) \text{ with } P(G|\text{evidence}) \]

- Bayes rule yields

\[ P(G|\text{evidence}) = \frac{P(\text{evidence}|G)p(G)}{P(\text{evidence})} \]

- Your assessment of \( P(G) \) will matter.
Island Problem

Suppose there’s a criminal on a island of $N + 1$ people.

- Let $I$ denote innocence and $G$ guilt.
- Evidence $E$: the suspect matches a trait with the criminal.
- The probabilities are

$$p(E|I) = p \quad \text{and} \quad p(E|G) = 1$$
Bayes factor

Bayes factors are likelihood ratios

- The Bayes factor is given by
  \[ \frac{p(E|I)}{p(E|G)} = p \]

- If we start with a uniform prior distribution we have
  \[ p(I) = \frac{1}{N+1} \text{ and } odds(I) = N \]

- Priors will matter!
Island Problem (contd)

Posterior Probability related to Odds

\[ p(I|y) = \frac{1}{1 + \text{odds}(I|y)} \]

- Prosecutors’ fallacy
  The posterior probability \( p(I|y) \neq p(y|I) = p \).
- Suppose that \( N = 10^3 \) and \( p = 10^{-3} \). Then

\[ p(I|y) = \frac{1}{1 + 10^3 \cdot 10^{-3}} = \frac{1}{2} \]

The odds on innocence are \( \text{odds}(I|y) = 1 \).
There’s a 50/50 chance that the criminal has been found.
Sally Clark was accused and convicted of killing her two children. They could have both died of SIDS.

- The chance of a family which are non-smokers and over 25 having a SIDS death is around 1 in 8,500.
- The chance of a family which has already had a SIDS death having a second is around 1 in 100.
- The chance of a mother killing her two children is around 1 in 1,000,000.
Bayes or Independence

1. Under Bayes

\[ P(\text{both SIDS}) = P(\text{first SIDS}) \cdot P(\text{Second SIDS|first SIDS}) \]
\[ = \frac{1}{8500} \cdot \frac{1}{100} = \frac{1}{850,000} \]

The \( \frac{1}{100} \) comes from taking into account genetics.

2. Independence, as the court did, gets you

\[ P(\text{both SIDS}) = \left(\frac{1}{8500}\right)\left(\frac{1}{8500}\right) = \left(\frac{1}{73,000,000}\right) \]

3. By Bayes rule

\[ \frac{p(I|E)}{p(G|E)} = \frac{P(E \cap I)}{P(E \cap G)} \]

\[ P(E \cap I) = P(E|I)P(I) \] needs discussion of \( p(I) \).
Comparison

- Hence putting these two together gives the odds of guilt as
  \[
  \frac{p(I|E)}{p(G|E)} = \frac{1/850,000}{1/1,000,000} = 1.15
  \]

In terms of posterior probabilities

\[
p(G|E) = \frac{1}{1 + O(G|E)} = 0.465
\]

- If you use independence

\[
\frac{p(I|E)}{p(G|E)} = \frac{1}{73} \text{ and } p(G|E) \approx 0.99
\]

The suspect looks guilty.
The O.J. Simpson trial was possibly the trial of the century. The murder of his wife Nicole Brown Simpson, and a friend, Ron Goldman, in June 1994 and the ensuing trial dominated the TV networks.

- DNA evidence and probability: $p(E|I)$
- Bayes Theorem: $p(G|E)$
- Prosecutor’s Fallacy: $p(G|E) \neq p(E|G)$

Odds ratio with $I = \bar{G}$ gives

$$\frac{p(I|E)}{p(G|E)} = \frac{p(E|I)}{p(E|G)} \frac{p(I)}{p(G)}$$

Prior odds conditioned on background information.
Suppose that you are a juror in a murder case of a husband who is accused of killing his wife.

The husband is known is have battered her in the past.

Consider the three events:

1. $G$ “husband murders wife in a given year”
2. $M$ “wife is murdered in a given year”
3. $B$ “husband is known to batter his wife”
Only 1/10th of one percent of husbands who batter their wife actually murder them.
Conditional on eventually murdering their wife, there a one in ten chance it happens in a given year.

In a given year, there are about 5 murders per 100,000 of population in the United States.

In 1994, 5000 women were murdered, 1500 by their husband
Given a population of 100 million women at the time

\[ p(M|I) = \frac{3500}{1 \times 10^8} \approx \frac{1}{30,000}. \]

We'll also need \( p(M|I, B) \)
OJ Simpson: Prosecutor’s Fallacy

Let $G = \text{Guilt}$ and $E = \text{Evidence}$

*Prosecutor’s Fallacy: $P(G|E) \neq P(E|G)$.*

DNA evidence gives $P(E|I)$ – the $p$-value. What’s the “match probability” for a rare event

Bayes theorem in Odds

$$\frac{p(G|M,B)}{p(I|M,B)} = \frac{p(M|G,B) \ p(G|B)}{p(M|I,B) \ p(I|B)}$$
OJ Simpson: Bayes Theorem

By assumption,

1. \( p(M|G,B) = 1 \)
2. \( p(M|I,B) = \frac{1}{20,000} \)
3. \( p(G|B) = \frac{1}{1000} \) and so

\[
\frac{p(G|B)}{p(I|B)} = \frac{1}{10,000}
\]

Therefore,

\[
\frac{p(G|M,B)}{p(I|M,B)} = 2 \text{ and } p(G|M,B) = \frac{2}{3}
\]

More than a 50/50 chance that your spouse murdered you!
Fallacy $p(G|B) \neq p(G|B,M)$

Alan Dershowitz stated to the press: in any given year

“Fewer than 1 in 2000 of batterers go on to murder their wives”.

▶ Now estimate $p(M|\overline{G},B) = p(M|\overline{G}) = \frac{1}{20,000}$.

▶ The Bayes factor is then

$$\frac{p(G|M,B)}{p(\overline{G}|M,B)} = \frac{1/2000}{1/20,000} = 10$$

which implies posterior probabilities

$$p(\overline{G}|M,B) = \frac{1}{1+10} \quad \text{and} \quad p(G|M,B) = \frac{10}{11}$$

Hence its over 90% chance that O.J. is guilty based on this information!

Dershowitz intended this information to exonerate O.J.
Proving Innocence

DNA evidence is very good at proving innocence:

\[ O(G|E) = \frac{p(y|I)}{p(y|G)} O(G) \]

- A small Bayes factor \( p(y|I)/p(y|G) \) implies \( O(G|E) \) is also small.
- Hence, we see that no match implies innocence.
- Match probability is the probability that unrelated individual chosen randomly from a reference population will match the profile.
More than One Criminal

Let $E$ two criminals and suspect matches $C$.

- Rare blood type ($p = 0.1$) and Common blood type $C$ ($p = 0.6$)
- Evidence for the prosecution?
- Bayes: $P(C|I) = 0.6$ and $P(C|G) = 0.5$

$$
BF = \frac{P(C|G)}{P(C|I)} = \frac{0.5}{0.6} = 0.93 < 1!
$$

Evidence for the Defense. Posterior Odds on Guilt are decreased.
Example

- 1000 people where after collecting receipts (no tickets) you realize only 499 paided.

- On the basis of the base rate evidence - the only potentially relevant evidence – there’s a 0.501 probability that a random person is guilty.

- Does this civil case deserve to succeed on the balance of probabilities?
“Witness” 80 % certain saw a “checker” C taxi in the accident.

▶ What’s your $P(C|E)$?
▶ Need $P(C)$. Say $P(C) = 0.2$ and $P(E) = 0.8$.
▶ Then your posterior is

\[
P(C|E) = \frac{0.8 \cdot 0.2}{0.8 \cdot 0.2 + 0.2 \cdot 0.8} = 0.5
\]

Therefore $O(C) = 1$ a 50/50 bet.
Updating Fallacies

When you have a small sample size, Bayes rule still updates probabilities

- Two players: either 70% A or 30% A
- Observe A beats B 3 times out of 4.
- What’s $P(A = 70\% \text{ player})$?
- Most people don’t update quickly enough in light of new data
  Ward Edwards 1960s
Bellman’s principle of optimality

An optimal policy has the property that whatever the initial state and initial decision are, the remaining decisions must constitute an optimal policy with regard to the state resulting from the first decision. (Bellman, 1956)

In Math!!
For a finite horizon in discrete time with no discounting is given by

\[ V(x, t) = \max_d \left( u(x, d, t) + V(p(x, d, t), t + 1) \right) \text{ for } t < T \]

Value function
Secretary Problem

Also called the matching or marriage problem

- You will see items (spouses) from a distribution of types $F(x)$.
- You clearly would like to pick the maximum.
  You see these chronologically.
  After you decide no, you can’t go back and select it.
- **Strategy:** wait for the length of time

$$\frac{1}{e} = \frac{1}{2.718281828} = 0.3678$$

Select after you observe an item greater than the current best.
What's your best strategy?

- Turns out it's insensitive to the choice of distribution.
- Although there is the random sample i.i.d. assumption lurking.
- You'll not doubt get married between 18 and 60.
  Waiting $\frac{1}{e}$ along this sequence gets you to the age 32!
- Then, pick the next best person!
Q-Learning and Deal-No Deal

Rule of Thumb: Continue as long as there are two large prizes left.

- Continuation value is large.
  For example, with three prizes and two large ones. Risk averse people will naively choose deal, when if they incorporated the continuation value they would choose no deal.

- Data: Suzanne and Frank’s choices on the Dutch version of the show
## Susanne’s Choices

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| Average € | 32,094 | 21,431 | 26,491 | 34,825 | 46,417 | 50,700 | 62,750 | 83,667 | 125,000 |
| Offer €  | 3,400  | 4,350  | 10,000 | 15,600 | 25,000 | 31,400 | 46,000 | 75,300 | 125,000 |
| Offer %  | 11%    | 20%    | 38%    | 45%    | 54%    | 62%    | 73%    | 90%    | 100%    |
| Decision | No Deal| No Deal| No Deal| No Deal| No Deal| No Deal| No Deal| No Deal| No Deal |
## Table: Frank’s Choices

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Average €: 383,427 64,502 85,230 95,004 85,005 102,006 2,508 3,343 5,005
Offer €: 17,000 8,000 23,000 44,000 52,000 75,000 2,400 3,500 6,000
Offer %: 4% 12% 27% 46% 61% 74% 96% 105% 120%
Decision: No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal
Q-Learning
Rationalising Waiting

There’s a matrix of $Q$-values that solves the problem.

- Let $s$ denote the current state of the system and $a$ an action.
- The $Q$-value, $Q_t(s, a)$, is the value of using action $a$ today and then proceeding optimally in the future. We use $a = 1$ to mean no deal and $a = 0$ means deal.
- The Bellman equation for $Q$-values becomes

$$Q_t(s, a) = u(s, a) + \sum_{s^*} P(s^*|s, a) \max_a Q_{t+1}(s^*, a)$$
Value Function

The value function and optimal action are given by

\[ V(s) = \max_a Q(s, a) \quad \text{and} \quad a^* = \arg\max_a Q(s, a) \]

**Transition Matrix.**

Consider the problem where you have three prizes left. Now \( s \) is the current state of three prizes.

\[ s^* = \{ \text{all sets of two prizes} \} \quad \text{and} \quad P(s^*|s, a = 1) = \frac{1}{3} \]

where the transition matrix is uniform to the next state.

**There’s no continuation for** \( P(s^*|s, a = 0) \).
Utility

- Utility.
  The utility of the next state depends on the contestant's value for money and the bidding function of the banker

\[ u(B(s^*)) = \frac{B(s^*)^{1-\gamma} - 1}{1 - \gamma} \]

in power utility case.
Banker’s Function

Expected value implies $B(s) = \bar{s}$ where $s$ are the remaining prizes.

- The website uses the following criteria: with three prizes left:
  
  $$B(s) = 0.305 \times \text{big} + 0.5 \times \text{small}$$

  and with two prizes left

  $$B(s) = 0.355 \times \text{big} + 0.5 \times \text{small}$$
Example

Three prizes left: \( s = \{750, 500, 25\} \).

- Assume the contestant is risk averse with log-utility \( U(x) = \ln x \).
- Banker offers the expected value we get

\[
u(B(s = \{750, 500, 25\})) = \ln\left(\frac{1275}{3}\right) = 6.052
\]

and so \( Q_t(s, a = 0) = 6.052 \).

- In the continuation problem, \( s^* = \{s_1^*, s_2^*, s_3^*\} \) where
  \( s_1^* = \{750, 500\} \) and \( s_2^* = \{750, 25\} \) and \( s_3^* = \{500, 25\} \).
**Q-values**

We’ll have offers 625, 387.5, 137.5 under the expected value.

- As the banker offers expected value the optimal action at time $t + 1$ is to take the deal $a = 0$ with Q-values given by

  $$Q_t(s, a = 1) = \sum_{s^*} P(s^* | s, a = 1) \max_a Q_{t+1}(s^*, a)$$

  $$= \frac{1}{3} (\ln(625) + \ln(387.5) + \ln(262.5)) = 5.989$$

  as immediate utility $u(s, a) = 0$.

- Hence as

  $$Q_t(s, a = 1) = 5.989 < 6.052 = Q_t(s, a = 0)$$

  the optimal action is $a^* = 0$, deal.
Utilities

Continuation value

Not large enough to overcome the generous (expected value) offered by the banker.

- Sensitivity analysis: Different Banker’s bidding function:
  If we use the function from the website (2 prizes):

\[
B(s) = 0.355 \times \text{big} + 0.5 \times \text{small}
\]

Hence

\[
B(s_1^* = \{750, 500\}) = 516.25 \\
B(s_2^* = \{750, 25\}) = 278.75 \\
B(s_3^* = \{500, 25\}) = 190
\]
Optimal Action

The optimal action with two prizes left for the contestant is

\[ Q_{t+1}(s_1^*, a = 1) = \frac{1}{2} (\ln(750) + \ln(500)) = 6.415 \]
\[ > 6.246 = Q_{t+1}(s_1^*, a = 0) = \ln(516.25) \]
\[ Q_{t+1}(s_1^*, a = 1) = \frac{1}{2} (\ln(750) + \ln(25)) = 4.9194 \]
\[ < 5.63 = Q_{t+1}(s_1^*, a = 0) = \ln(278.75) \]
\[ Q_{t+1}(s_1^*, a = 1) = \frac{1}{2} (\ln(500) + \ln(25)) = 4.716 \]
\[ < 5.247 = Q_{t+1}(s_1^*, a = 0) = (516.25) \]

Hence future optimal policy will be no deal under \( s_1^* \), and deal under \( s_2^*, s_3^* \).
Solve for $Q$-values

Therefore solving for $Q$-values at the previous step gives

$$Q_t(s, a = 1) = \sum_{s^*} P(s^*|s, a = 1) \max_a Q_{t+1}(s^*, a)$$

$$= \frac{1}{3} (6.415 + 5.63 + 5.247) = 5.764$$

with a monetary equivalent as $\exp(5.764) = 318.62$. 
With three prizes we have

\[ Q_t(s, a = 0) = u(B(s = \{750, 500, 25\})) \]
\[ = \ln (0.305 \times 750 + 0.5 \times 25) \]
\[ = \ln(241.25) = 5.48. \]

The contestant is offered $241.

- Now we have \( Q_t(s, a = 1) = 5.7079 > 5.48 = Q_t(s, a = 0) \) and the optimal action is \( a^* = 1 \), no deal. The continuation value is large.

- The premium is $241 compared to $319, a 33% premium.
Overview

Bayes accounts for probability in many scenarios

- Prisoner’s Dilemma
- Monte Hall.
- Island Problem
- Sally Clark
- O.J. Simpson
- Bellman and Sequential Learning
Probability: 41901

Week 3: Distributions

Nick Polson

http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/nicholas.polson/teaching/41901/
Topics

1. Markov Dependence
2. SP500 Hidden Markov Model
3. Random Variables
4. Transformations
5. Expectations
6. Moment Generating Functions

Reading: DeGroot and Schervish: 3, p.97-181 and 4, 181-247
Markov Dependence

- We can always factor a joint distribution as

\[ p(X_n, X_{n-1}, \ldots, X_1) = p(X_n|X_{n-1}, \ldots, X_1) \cdots p(X_2|X_1)p(X_1) \]

Example

- A process has the Markov Property if

\[ p(X_n|X_{n-1}, \ldots, X_1) = p(X_n|X_{n-1}) \]

- Only the current history matter when determining the probabilities.
SP500 daily ups and downs

- Daily return data from 1948 to 2007 for the SP500 index of stocks
- Can we calculate the probability of ups and downs?
A real world probability model
Hidden Markov Models

Are stock returns a random walk?

Hidden Markov Models (Baum-Welch, Viterbi)

▶ Daily returns on the SP500 stock market index. Build a hidden Markov model to predict the ups and downs.

▶ Suppose that stock market returns on the next four days are $X_1, \ldots, X_4$.

▶ Let’s empirical determine conditionals and marginals

\[
P(X_i = x) | \begin{array}{c|cc}
  x & \text{Down} & \text{Up} \\
  \hline
  0 & 0.474 & 0.526 \\
\end{array}
\]

Finding \( p(X_2|X_1) \) is twice as much computational effort: counting \( UU, UD, DU, DD \) transitions.

\[
\begin{array}{c|cc}
  X_i & \text{Down} & \text{Up} \\
  \hline
  X_{i-1} = \text{Down} & 0.519 & 0.481 \\
  X_{i-1} = \text{Up} & 0.433 & 0.567 \\
\end{array}
\]
Conditioned on two days

Let’s do $p(X_3|X_2, X_1)$

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We could do the distribution $p(X_2, X_3|X_1)$. This is a joint, marginal and conditional distribution all at the same time. *Joint* because more than one variable ($X_2, X_3$), *marginal* because it ignores $X_4$ and *conditional* because its given $X_1$. 
Joint Probabilities

- Under Markov dependence

\[ P(UUD) = p(X_1 = U)p(X_2 = U|X_1 = U)p(X_3|X_2 = U, X_1 = U) \]
\[ = (0.526)(0.567)(0.433) \]

- Under independence we would have got

\[ P(UUD) = P(X_1 = U)p(X_2 = U)p(X_3 = D) \]
\[ = (.526)(.526)(.474) \]
\[ = 0.131 \]
Special Distributions

See Common Distributions

1. Bernoulli and Binomial
2. Hypergeometric
3. Poisson
4. Negative Binomial
5. Normal Distribution
6. Gamma Distribution
7. Beta Distribution
8. Multinomial Distribution
9. Bivariate Normal Distribution
10. Wishart Distribution

...
1. We will be interesting in random variables $X : \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$

2. The cumulative distribution function of $X$ is defined as

$$F_X(x) = \mathbb{P}(X \leq x)$$

$$1 - F_X(x) = \mathbb{P}(X > x)$$

3. The probability density function of $X$ is defined as

$$f_X(x) = F'_X(x) \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbb{P}(X \leq x) = \int_{-\infty}^{x} f_X(x) \, dx$$

4. We have the following properties: $f_X(x) \geq 0$ and $F_X(x)$ is non-decreasing

5. $\lim_{x \to -\infty} F_X(x) = 0$ and $\lim_{x \to \infty} F_X(x) = 1$. 
Intuition: cdf

- For a discrete random variable $F_X(x)$ is a step function with the heights of the steps being $\Pr(X = x_i)$.

- For a continuous variable it’s a continuous non-decreasing curve.
The intuitive interpretation of a pdf is that for small $\Delta x$

$$
\Pr( x < X \leq x + \Delta x ) = \int_x^{x+\Delta x} f_X(x) \, dx \approx f_X(x) \Delta x
$$

$X$ lies in a small interval with probability proportional to $f_X(x)$.

We will also consider the multivariate generalization of this.
Transformations

The cdf identity gives

\[ F_Y(y) = \mathbb{P}(Y \leq y) = \mathbb{P}(g(X) \leq y) \]

- Hence if the function \( g(\cdot) \) is monotone we can invert to get

\[ F_Y(y) = \int_{g(x) \leq y} f_X(x) \, dx \]

- If \( g \) is increasing \( F_Y(y) = P(X \leq g^{-1}(y)) = F_X(g^{-1}(y)) \)
  If \( g \) is decreasing \( F_Y(y) = P(X \geq g^{-1}(y)) = 1 - F_X(g^{-1}(y)) \)
Example

- Suppose $X \sim U(0, 1)$ and $Y = g(X) = - \log X \sim \text{Exp}(1)$.
- Suppose $X \sim \Gamma(\alpha, \beta)$ then what is the pdf for $Y = 1/X$?
- Inverse Gamma distribution
  Stochastic variances in regression models.
1. Theorem 1: Let $X$ have pdf $f_X(x)$ and let $Y = g(X)$. Then if $g$ is a monotone function we have

$$f_Y(y) = f_X(g^{-1}(y)) \left| \frac{d}{dy} g^{-1}(y) \right|$$

There’s also a multivariate version of this that we’ll see later.

- Suppose $X$ is a continuous rv, what’s the pdf for $Y = X^2$?
- Let $X \sim N(0,1)$, what’s the pdf for $Y = X^2$?
Theorem

Suppose that $U \sim U[0, 1]$, then for any continuous distribution function $F$, the random variable $X = F^{-1}(U)$ has distribution function $F$.

- Remember that for $u \in [0, 1]$, $\mathbb{P}(U \leq u) = u$, so we have

\[
\mathbb{P}(X \leq x) = \mathbb{P}\left(F^{-1}(U) \leq x\right) = \mathbb{P}(U \leq F(x)) = F(x)
\]

Hence, $X = F_X^{-1}(U)$. 

Probability Integral Transform
Inequalities and Identities

1. Markov

\[ \mathbb{P}(g(X) \geq c) \leq \frac{\mathbb{E}(g(X))}{c} \] where \( g(X) \geq 0 \)

2. Chebyshev

\[ \mathbb{P}(|X - \mu| \geq c) \leq \frac{\text{Var}(X)}{c^2} \]

3. Jensen

\[ \mathbb{E}(\phi(X)) \leq \phi(\mathbb{E}(X)) \]

4. Cauchy-Schwarz

\[ \text{corr}(X, Y) \leq 1 \]

Chebyshev follows from Markov. Mike Steele and Cauchy-Schwarz.
Probability: 41901

Week 4: Expectations

Nick Polson

http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/nicholas.polson/teaching/41901/
Expectation and Variance

- The *expectation* of $X$ is given by
  \[
  \mathbb{E}(X) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} xf_X(x) \, dx
  \]

- The *variance* of $X$ is given by
  \[
  \text{Var}(X) = \mathbb{E} \left( (X - \mu)^2 \right) = \mathbb{E} \left( X^2 \right) - \mu^2
  \]

- Also derivatives of moment generating functions (mgfs).
Conditional Expectation

Let $X$ denote our random variable and $Y$ a conditioning variable.

- In the continuous case
  \[
  \mathbb{E}(g(X)) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g(x)f_X(x)\,dx
  \]

- The conditional expectation (given $Y$) is determined by
  \[
  \mathbb{E}(g(X) | Y) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g(x)f_X(x|Y)\,dx
  \]

  where $f_X(x|Y)$ denotes the conditional density of $X|Y$. 

Iterated Expectation

- The following fact is known as the law of iterated expectation

\[ E_Y \left( E_{X|Y} (X|Y) \right) = E (X) \]

This is a very useful way of calculating \( E (X) \) (martingales)

- Sometimes called the *Tower property of expectations*.

- A similar decomposition for a variance

\[ \text{Var}(X) = E (\text{Var}(X|Y)) + \text{Var} (E(X|Y)) \]
Exponential Distribution

Example

- One of the most important distributions is the exponential
  \[ f_X(x) = \lambda e^{-\lambda x} \quad \text{and} \quad F_X(x) = \int_0^x \lambda e^{-\lambda x} \, dx = 1 - e^{-\lambda x} \]

  \( \lambda \) is called a parameter.

- The expectation of \( X \) is
  \[ E(X) = \int_0^\infty x \lambda e^{-\lambda x} \, dx = \int_0^\infty xd \left( -e^{-\lambda x} \right) = \frac{1}{\lambda} \]

- The variance of \( X \) is
  \[ Var(X) = E(X^2) - \mu^2 = \frac{1}{\lambda^2} \]
Suppose that $X \sim F_X(x)$ and let $Y = g(X)$. How do we find $F_Y(y)$ and $f_Y(y)$?

- **von Neumann**
  Given a uniform $U$, how do we find $X = g(U)$?

- In the bivariate case $(X, Y) \rightarrow (U, V)$.
  We need to find $f_{(U,V)}(u, v)$ from $f_{X,Y}(x, y)$

- Applications: Simulation, MCMC and PF.
Transformations

An important application is how to transform multiple random variables?
Here’s the basic set-up:

▶ Suppose that we have random variables:

\[(X, Y) \sim f_{X,Y}(x, y)\]

A transformation of interest given by:

\[U = g(X, Y) \quad \text{and} \quad V = h(X, Y)\]

▶ The problem is how to compute \(f_{U,V}(u, v)\)? Jacobian

\[J = \frac{\partial(x, y)}{\partial(u, v)} = \begin{vmatrix} \frac{\partial x}{\partial u} & \frac{\partial x}{\partial v} \\ \frac{\partial y}{\partial u} & \frac{\partial y}{\partial v} \end{vmatrix}\]
Bivariate Change of Variable

- **Theorem**: (change of variable)

\[ f_{U,V}(u,v) = f_{X,Y}(h_1(u,v), h_2(u,v)) \left| \frac{\partial (x,y)}{\partial (u,v)} \right| \]

The last term is the Jacobian.

This can be calculated in two ways.

\[ \left| \frac{\partial (x,y)}{\partial (u,v)} \right| = 1/ \left| \frac{\partial (u,v)}{\partial (x,y)} \right| \]

- So we don’t always need the inverse transformation

\[ (x,y) = (g^{-1}(u,v), h^{-1}(u,v)) \]
Example: Exponentials

Example

- Suppose that $X$ and $Y$ are independent, identically distributed random variables each with an $\text{Exp}(\lambda)$ distribution. Let

$$U = X + Y \quad \text{and} \quad V = \frac{X}{X + Y}$$

- The joint probability distribution

$$f_{X,Y}(x,y) = \lambda^2 e^{-\lambda(x+y)} \quad \text{for} \ 0 < x, y < \infty$$

- The inverse transformation is $x = uv, y = u(1 - v)$. The range of definition $0 < u < \infty, 0 < v < 1$. 
We can calculate the Jacobian as

\[ J = \begin{vmatrix}
\frac{\partial x}{\partial u} & \frac{\partial x}{\partial v} \\
\frac{\partial y}{\partial u} & \frac{\partial y}{\partial v}
\end{vmatrix} = \begin{vmatrix}
v & u \\
1 - v & -u
\end{vmatrix} \]

Thus the joint density of \((U, V)\) is

\[ f_{U,V}(u, v) = \lambda^2 u e^{-\lambda u} \]

Therefore

\[ U \sim \Gamma(2, \lambda) \quad \text{and} \quad V \sim U(0,1) \]
Example: Normals

Suppose that $X, Y$ are i.i.d. each with a standard normal $N(0, 1)$ distribution.
Let $D = X^2 + Y^2$ and $\Theta = \tan^{-1}\left(\frac{Y}{X}\right)$.

Joint distribution

$$f_{X,Y}(x, y) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-\frac{x^2}{2}} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-\frac{y^2}{2}} \text{ for } -\infty < x, y < \infty$$

We can calculate the Jacobian as

$$J = \begin{vmatrix} \frac{\partial d}{\partial x} & \frac{\partial d}{\partial y} \\ \frac{\partial \Theta}{\partial x} & \frac{\partial \Theta}{\partial y} \end{vmatrix} = \begin{vmatrix} 2x & 2y \\ -\frac{y}{x^2+y^2} & \frac{x}{x^2+y^2} \end{vmatrix}$$
Example: Normal Simulation

- Thus the joint density of \((D, \Theta)\) is
  \[
f_{D,\Theta}(d, \theta) = \frac{1}{4\pi} e^{-\frac{d^2}{2}} \text{ where } 0 \leq d < \infty, 0 \leq \theta \leq 2\pi
  \]

- Therefore, we have
  \[D \sim \text{Exp} \left( \frac{1}{2} \right) \text{ and } \Theta \sim \text{U}(0, 2\pi)\]

- Box-Muller transform for simulating normal random variables: draw \(D = -2 \log U_1\) and \(\Theta = 2\pi U_2\)
  \[
  X = \sqrt{D} \cos(\Theta) = \sqrt{-2 \log U_1} \cos(2\pi U_2) \\
  Y = \sqrt{D} \sin(\Theta) = \sqrt{-2 \log U_1} \sin(2\pi U_2)
  \]
Cauchy: ratio of normals: $C = X/Y$

Let $X, Y \sim N(0, 1)$.

$$f_{X,Y}(x, y) = \frac{1}{2\pi} e^{-\frac{1}{2}(x^2+y^2)} \quad -\infty < x, y < \infty$$

Transformation $U = X/Y$ and $V = |Y|$. Inverse $x = uv, y = v$
Jacobian

$$\begin{vmatrix} v & u \\ 0 & 1 \end{vmatrix} = v$$

Joint and marginal

$$f_{U,V}(u, v) = \frac{1}{2\pi} ve^{-\frac{1}{2}v^2(1+u^2)} \quad 0 < v < \infty, -\infty < u < \infty .$$

$$f_U(u) = \int_0^\infty f_{U,V}(u, v) dv = 2 \int_0^\infty \frac{1}{2\pi} ve^{-\frac{1}{2}v^2(1+u^2)} dv = \frac{1}{\pi} \frac{1}{1 + u^2}$$

A Cauchy distribution.
Binomial Distribution

This models the number of heads occurring in \( n \) successive trails of the Bernoulli coin.

▶ Thus \( \Omega = \{0, 1, \ldots, n\} \) and

\[
 f_X(x) = \binom{n}{x} p^x (1 - p)^{n-x} \quad 0 \leq x \leq n
\]

▶ Generalizations?
Random probability and hierarchical exchangeable models.
Sums of Binomial Distributions

Distribution of sums

- The probability generating function is

\[ E(z^X) = \sum_{r=0}^{n} z^r \binom{n}{x} p^r q^{n-r} = (pz + q)^n \]

- Therefore \( X + Y \sim Bin(n + m, p) \)

- In general \( X_i \sim Bin(n_i, p) \) then \( \sum_{i=1}^{k} X_i \sim Bin \left( \sum_{i=1}^{k} n_i, p \right) \)
Sums of Poisson Distributions

$X + Y$ where $X \sim Poi(\lambda)$ and $Y \sim Poi(\mu)$?

- The probability generating function

$$
E \left( z^X \right) = \sum_{r=0}^{\infty} z^r e^{-\lambda} \frac{\lambda^r}{r!} = e^{-\lambda(1-z)}
$$

Let $z = e^t$ to get the moment generating function.

- Hence for the sum $X + Y$ we have

$$
e^{-\lambda(1-z)} e^{-\mu(1-z)} = e^{-(\lambda+\mu)(1-z)}
$$

Hence $X + Y \sim Poi(\lambda + \mu)$. 
Sums of Random Variables

- For any random variables, the expectation of the sum is the sum of expectations
  \[ \mathbb{E}(X_1 + \ldots + X_n) = \mathbb{E}(X_1) + \ldots + \mathbb{E}(X_n) \]

- If \( X_1, \ldots, X_n \) are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d)
  \[ \text{Var} \left( \frac{X_1 + \ldots + X_n}{n} \right) = \frac{1}{n} \text{Var}(X_1) \]
Cauchy Distribution

The Cauchy distribution has a pdf given by

\[ f_X(x) = \frac{1}{\pi} \frac{1}{1 + x^2} \]

Special case of a \( t_\nu \)-distribution with density

\[ f_X(x|\nu) = C_\nu \left(1 + \frac{x^2}{\nu}\right)^{-\frac{1}{2}(1+\nu)} \]

- \( \nu = 1 \) then \( T \) is a Cauchy
- \( \nu \to \infty \) then \( T \to_d N(0, 1) \)
- \( E(T) = 0, \ Var(T) = \nu / (\nu - 2) \) for \( \nu > 2 \).
Sums of Cauchy’s

Example

- If $X_1, \ldots, X_n \sim C(0, 1)$ then
  \[
  \frac{1}{n} (X_1 + \ldots + X_n) \sim C(0, 1)
  \]

- Averaging a set of Cauchy’s leads back to the same Cauchy!

The normal distribution behaves differently: if $X_i \sim N(\mu, \sigma^2)$

\[
\frac{1}{n} (X_1 + \ldots + X_n) \sim N\left(\mu, \frac{\sigma^2}{n}\right)
\]

Eventually $\bar{X} \to \mu$ a constant (CLT)
Definition. The moment generating function (mgf) is defined by

\[ m_X(t) = E(e^{tX}) \]

that is

\[ m_X(t) = \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{tX} f_X(x) dx \]

Here \( t \) is a parameter.

You’ll need to check when the function \( m_X(t) \) exists.
Moment Identity

- There is an equivalence between knowing the mgf and the set of moments of the distribution given by the following

  **Theorem:** If \( X \) has mgf \( m_X(t) \) then \( \mathbb{E}(X^n) = m_X^{(n)}(0) \)

  Here \( m_X^{(n)}(0) \) denotes the \( n \)th derivative evaluated at zero.

- What about a \( C(0, 1) \) random variable?
Characteristic Function: $\phi_X(t)$.

- This function exists for all distributions and all values of $t$. It is defined by
  $$\phi_X(t) = \mathbb{E} \left( e^{itX} \right)$$

- Here $e^{itX} = \cos(tX) + i \sin(tX)$ with $i^2 = -1$.

- Technically better to do everything in terms of characteristic functions as they always exist.
  $$|\phi_X(t)| \leq \mathbb{E} \left( |e^{itX}| \right) = 1$$
\[ \phi_C(t) = e^{-|t|}. \]

- mgf only exists at the origin
- We can calculate

\[
\phi_X(t) = \frac{1}{\pi} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \frac{e^{itx}}{1 + x^2} \, dx
\]

\[ = e^{-|t|} \]

- Cauchy’s residue theorem calculates the complex integral
Here’s a list of special properties

- **Theorem:** If $M_X(t) = M_Y(t)$ then $F_X(x) = F_Y(y)$.
- mgf of an average $M_{\bar{X}}(t) = M_X \left( \frac{t}{n} \right)^n$
- Example: Normal and Cauchy distributions.
- $M_{aX+b}(t) = e^{bt}M_X(at)$
- Probability generating function $p_X(z) = \mathbb{E} \left( z^X \right)$ with $z = e^\theta$. 
mgf for normals

- The mgf of $X \sim \mathcal{N} (\mu, \sigma^2)$ is given by
  
  $$m_X(\theta) = \exp \left( \mu \theta + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 \theta^2 \right)$$

- Hence the sums of two normals is normal as the mgf is
  
  $$\exp \left( \mu_X \theta + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 \theta^2 \right) \exp \left( \mu_Y \theta + \frac{1}{2} \tau^2 \theta^2 \right)$$

which gives $X + Y \sim \mathcal{N} (\mu_X + \mu_Y, \sigma^2 + \tau^2)$
Sums of mgfs

- If $X_1, \ldots, X_n$ are independent random variables where mgfs $m_{X_i}(\theta)$

$$m_{X_1+\ldots+X_n}(\theta) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} m_{X_i}(\theta)$$

- This follows from the identity

$$\mathbb{E} \left( e^{\theta (X_1+\ldots+X_n)} \right) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} \mathbb{E} \left( e^{\theta X_i} \right)$$

- If there are identically distributed

$$m_{X_1+\ldots+X_n}(\theta) = m_X(\theta)^n$$

mgf=Laplace transform, characteristic function=Fourier.
Properties of mgfs

**Theorem**

The mgf $m_X(t) = \mathbb{E} \left( e^{tX} \right)$ uniquely determines the distribution of $X$ provided it is defined for some open interval of $\theta$ values.

$$m^{(r)}(0) = \mathbb{E} \left( X^r \right)$$

- Key identity is

$$\frac{d}{d\theta} m_X(t) = \mathbb{E} \left( \frac{d}{d\theta} e^{tX} \right) = \mathbb{E} \left( X e^{tX} \right)$$
Distribution of $\bar{X}$

Let $(X_1, \ldots, X_n)$ be an iid sample from any distribution, then

$$m_X(t) = m_X \left( \frac{t}{n} \right)^n$$

- **Example:** Suppose the $X_i$'s are $N(\mu, \sigma^2)$. Then

$$m_X(t) = \exp \left( \mu t + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\sigma^2}{n} t^2 \right)$$

The distribution of $\bar{X}$ is normal.

- **Example:** Suppose the $X_i$'s are $\Gamma(\alpha, \beta)$ then $\bar{X} \sim \Gamma(n\alpha, \beta/n)$. 
Convergence Concepts

- **Convergence in Probability**: A sequence of random variables $X_1, X_2, \ldots$ converges in probability to a random variable $X$ if, for every $\epsilon > 0$,
  \[
  \lim_{n \to \infty} \mathbb{P}(|X_n - X| \geq \epsilon) = 0
  \]
  or equivalently \(\lim_{n \to \infty} \mathbb{P}(|X_n - X| \leq \epsilon) = 1\).

- **Weak Law of Large Numbers**: Let $X_1, X_2, \ldots$ be a random sample (iid) with $E(X_i) = \mu$ and $\text{Var}(X_i) = \sigma^2 < \infty$. Then, for every $\epsilon > 0$, $\bar{X}_n = \frac{1}{n} \sum X_i$ satisfies
  \[
  \lim_{n \to \infty} \mathbb{P}(|\bar{X}_n - \mu| \geq \epsilon) = 0
  \]
Almost Sure Convergence

- **Almost surely:** A sequence of random variables $X_1, X_2, \ldots$ converges almost surely to a random variable $X$ if, for every $\epsilon > 0$,

  $$P \left( \lim_{n \to \infty} |X_n - X| \geq \epsilon \right) = 0$$

- **Strong Law of Large Numbers:** Let $X_1, X_2, \ldots$ be a random sample (iid) with $E(X_i) = \mu$ and $\text{Var}(X_i) = \sigma^2 < \infty$. Then, for every $\epsilon > 0$,

  $$P \left( \lim_{n \to \infty} |\bar{X}_n - \mu| \geq \epsilon \right) = 0$$

  where $\bar{X}_n = \frac{1}{n} \sum X_i$. Hence $\bar{X}_n \to_{a.s.} \mu$.

  Don’t need finite variance (see martingale convergence proof)
Central Limit Theorem

Let $X_1, X_2, \ldots$ be a random sample (iid) with $E(X_i) = \mu$ and $\text{Var}(X_i) = \sigma^2 < \infty$. Suppose that the mgf exists in a neighborhood of zero ie $m_X(\theta)$ exists for some $\theta > 0$.

**Theorem**
The sample mean converges in distribution to a normal random variable

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \mathbb{P} \left( \left| \frac{X_1 + \ldots + X_n - n\mu}{\sigma \sqrt{n}} \right| \leq x \right) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \int_{-\infty}^{x} e^{-\frac{y^2}{2}} dy = \Phi(x)$$

which is the distribution function of a standard $N(0, 1)$.

- One can expand the mgf $m_X(t)$ and take limits as $n \to \infty$.
- $\sqrt{n}(\bar{X}_n - \mu) \xrightarrow{D} \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$
Sketch Proof

Key facts: Taylor Series expansion of mgf

\[ M_{\sqrt{n}(\bar{X}_n - \mu)/\sigma}(t) = \left( M_Y \left( \frac{t}{\sqrt{n}} \right) \right)^n \]

\[ \left( M_Y \left( \frac{t}{\sqrt{n}} \right) \right)^n = 1 + \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{t}{\sqrt{n}} \right)^2 + R_Y \left( \frac{t}{\sqrt{n}} \right) \]

\[ \lim_{n \to \infty} \left( M_Y \left( \frac{t}{\sqrt{n}} \right) \right)^n = \exp(t^2/2) \]

This is the mgf of a \( Z \sim N(0, 1) \)
Order Statistics

The order statistics of a random sample $X_1, \ldots, X_n$ are the sample values in ascending order, denoted by $X_{(1)}, \ldots, X_{(n)}$ or equivalently

$$X_{(1)} = \min_{1 \leq i \leq n} X_i = X_{\text{min}} \quad \text{and} \quad X_{(n)} = \max_{1 \leq i \leq n} X_i = X_{\text{max}}$$

The median $X_{\text{med}}$ is also widely studied as it is a consistent estimator for the location of a distribution for a wide family and is less sensitive to extreme observations (breakdown point).
Proof

Consider $X_{(1)}$ and $X_{(n)}$.

\[
F_{X_{(n)}}(x) = P \left( \max_{1 \leq i \leq n} X_i \leq x \right) = (F_X(x))^n
\]

Differentiating with respect to $x$ gives

\[
f_{X_{(n)}}(x) = nf_X(x) (F_X(x))^{n-1}
\]

For the minimum, let's compute

\[
1 - F_{X_{(1)}}(x) = P(X_{\text{min}} \geq x) = (1 - F_X(x))^n
\]

Differentiating with respect to $x$ gives

\[
f_{X_{(n)}}(x) = nf_X(x) (1 - F_X(x))^{n-1}
\]
Theorem:. Let \( X_{(1)}, \ldots, X_{(n)} \) denote the order statistics from a population with cdf \( F_X(x) \) and pdf \( f_X(x) \). Then the pdf of \( X_{(j)} \) is

\[
f_{X_{(j)}}(x) = \frac{n}{(j-1)(n-j)} f_X(x) (F_X(x))^{j-1} (1 - F_X(x))^{n-j}
\]

- For the general case we get

\[
F_{X_{(j)}}(x) = \sum_{k=j}^{n} \binom{n}{k} (F_X(x))^k (1 - F_X(x))^{n-k}
\]
Probability: 41901

Week 5: Modern Regression Methods

Nick Polson

http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/nicholas.polson/teaching/41901/
Topics

- Keynes vs Buffett: Regression
- Superbowl Spread Data
- Logistic Regression
- Least Squares
- Ridge Regression
- Lasso Regression
Keynes versus Buffett
CAPM

keynes = 15.08 + 1.83 market
buffett = 18.06 + 0.486 market

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King’s College Cambridge

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Superbowl Spread Data

In R: model = lm(Outcome ~ Spread)

Residuals:

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<th>Median</th>
<th>3Q</th>
<th>Max</th>
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Coefficients:

| (Intercept) | Estimate | Std. Error | t value | Pr(>|t|) |
|-------------|----------|------------|---------|---------|
|             | 0.5444   | 4.3790     | 0.124   | 0.9016  |
| Spread      | 0.9299   | 0.5083     | 1.829   | 0.0741  |

Residual standard error: 15.74 on 44 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.07068, Adjusted R-squared: 0.04956
F-statistic: 3.347 on 1 and 44 DF, p-value: 0.07413

SuperBowl = 0.544 + 0.9299 Spread
How Close is the Spread?

Plot the Empirical versus Theoretical

`plot(Outcome, Spread, pch=20, col=4)`  # Plot Data

`abline(super, col=2)`  # Add the least squares line

`abline(a=0, b=1, col=3)`  # Add the line outcome=spread

The two lines are nearly on top of each other!
There’s still a lot of uncertainty left over. Residual standard error: $s = 15.7$
Predictions

Superbowl Data

Outcome

Spread
Superbowl

Let’s look at favourites and underdogs
Residuals

- We should check our modelling assumptions
- The studentized residuals are: \texttt{rstudent(model)}
Logistic Regression

NBA point spreads

Suppose that we have a response variables of ones and zeroes $Y = 1, 0$ and $X$ are our usual set of predictors/covariates.

The logistic regression model is linear in log-odds

$$\log \left( \frac{\mathbb{P} \text{ (win)}}{1 - \mathbb{P} \text{ (win)}} \right) = x^\top \beta$$

Does the point spread predict whether the favourite wins or not?

Logistic regression: $\beta$ will be highly statistically significant.
Data

Let’s look at the histogram of the data first, by group.
Logistic Regression

nbareg = glm(favwin~spread-1, family=binomial)

summary(nbareg)

Call:
glm(formula = favwin ~ spread - 1, family = binomial)

Deviance Residuals:
       Min          1Q       Median          3Q          Max
-2.5741      0.1587      0.4620      0.8135      1.1119

Coefficients:
            Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
spread 0.15600  0.01377   11.33  <2e-16 ***

# prediction

newweek=c(8,4)

pred = nbareg$coef[1]*newweek
exp(pred)/(1+exp(pred))

[1] 0.7769474 0.6511238
Prediction

Let’s build a logit model

\[ P(\text{favwin}|\text{spread}) = \frac{e^{\beta x}}{1 + e^{\beta x}} \]

When \( \beta = 0 \) we have \( p = \frac{1}{2} \).

- Suppose we have new data of 8 and 4.
  The win probabilities for the favourites are given by
  
  0.7769474, 0.6511238

  77% and 65%, respectively.

- Diagnostic plot based on deviances.
Overview: Shrinkage
Basic Selection Principles

The goal is **model selection**

- Why not include all the variables? Big models tend to over-fit and find specific features.
- Need to trade-off fit for making good predictions. Friedman: A good model is one that predicts!
MSE: Out-of-Sample Prediction

A very popular statistical criterion is **mean squared error**

MSE is defined by

\[ MSE = \sum (Y - \hat{Y})^2 \]

- You make a prediction \( \hat{Y} \) about the variable \( Y \).
- After the outcome \( Y \), you calculate \( (Y - \hat{Y})^2 \).
- In data mining, it is popular to use a holdout sample and after you’ve built your statistical model to test it out-of-sample in terms of its mean squared error performance.
Cross-Validation

Cross-Validation: Fit the model on training data.
Use model to predict $\hat{Y}$-values for the holdout sample.
Calculate predicted MSE $\frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^{N} (Y_j - \hat{Y}_j)^2$.
Smallest MSE wins.
Ridge Regression

Ridge Regression is a modification of the least squares criteria that minimizes (as a function of $\beta$'s):

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( Y_i - \beta_0 - \sum_{j=1}^{p} \beta_j X_{ij} \right)^2 + \lambda \sum_{j=1}^{p} \beta_j^2$$

for some value of $\beta > 0$

- The “blue” part of the equation is the traditional objective function of LS
- The “red” part is the shrinkage penalty, ie, something that makes costly to have big values for $\beta$
Ridge Regression

\[ \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( Y_i - \beta_0 - \sum_{j=1}^{p} \beta_j X_{ij} \right)^2 + \lambda \sum_{j=1}^{p} \beta_j^2 \]

- if \( \lambda = 0 \) we are back to least squares
- when \( \lambda \to \infty \), it is "too expensive" to allow for any \( \beta \) to be different than 0...
- So, for different values of \( \lambda \) we get a different solution to the problem
What ridge regression is doing is exploring the bias-variance trade-off! The larger the $\lambda$ the more bias (towards zero) is being introduced in the solution, ie, the less flexible the model becomes... at the same time, the solution has less variance.

As always, the trick to find the “right” value of $\lambda$ that makes the model not too simple but not too complex!

Whenever possible, we will choose $\lambda$ by comparing the out-of-sample performance (usually via cross-validation).
Ridge Regression

- Ridge is computationally very attractive as the “computing cost” is almost the same of least squares (contrast that with subset selection!)

- It’s a good practice to always center and scale the X’s before running ridge

bias2 (black), var(green), test MSE (purple)
The LASSO is a shrinkage method that performs automatic selection. Similar to ridge but it will provide solutions that are **sparse**, i.e., some $\beta$'s exactly equal to 0! This facilitates interpretation of the results...
The LASSO solves the following problem:

\[
\arg\min_{\beta} \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( Y_i - \beta_0 - \sum_{j=1}^{p} \beta_j X_{ij} \right)^2 + \lambda \sum_{j=1}^{p} |\beta_j| \right\}
\]

- Once again, \( \lambda \) controls how flexible the model gets to be
- Still a very efficient computational strategy
- Whenever possible, we will choose \( \lambda \) by comparing the out-of-sample performance (usually via cross-validation).
Ridge vs. LASSO

Why does the LASSO outputs zeros?
Ridge vs. LASSO

Which one is better?

- LASSO will perform better than Ridge when a relative small number of predictors have a strong effect in $Y$ while Ridge will do better when $Y$ is a function of many of the $X$'s and the coefficients are of moderate size

- LASSO can be easier to interpret (the zeros help!)

- But, if prediction is what we care about the only way to decide which method is better is comparing their out-of-sample performance
Choosing $\lambda$

The idea is to solve the ridge or LASSO objective function over a grid of possible values for $\lambda$...
Optimization: Least Squares $L^2$-norm

Gauss invented the concept of least squares

The $L^2$-regression objective function

$$\arg \min_{\beta} ||y - X\beta||^2$$

Here parameter vector is $\beta = (\beta_1, \ldots, \beta_p)$.

This has solution given by

$$\hat{\beta} = (X^TX)^{-1}X^Ty$$

This can be numerically unstable when $X^TX$ is ill-conditioned.

Happens when $p$ is large.
Ridge Regression has the solution

$$\hat{\beta}_{\text{ridge}} = (X^\top X + \lambda I)^{-1}X^\top y$$

You can plot the coefficients over a regularisation path of $\lambda$’s.

This can also be interpreted as a Bayesian hierarchical model with a normal likelihood and prior.
Optimization: LASSO $L^1$-norm

Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO)

The solution to the lasso objective function

$$\arg\min_\beta \left\{ \frac{1}{2} (y - \beta)^2 + \lambda |\beta| \right\}$$

is the soft-thresholding operator defined by

$$\hat{\beta} = \text{soft}(y; \lambda) = (y - \lambda \text{sgn}(y))^+$$

Here $\text{sgn}$ is the sign function and $(x)^+ = \max(x, 0)$.

Define a slack variable $z = |\beta|$ and solve the joint constrained optimisation problem which is differentiable.
Linear Regression

Model $y_i = x_i^\top \beta + \epsilon_i$ where $\beta = (\beta_1, \ldots, \beta_p)$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$.
Equivalently: $y = X\beta + \epsilon$ and $\min_{\beta} ||y - X\beta||^2$.

- Predictive Ability
  The MLE (maximum likelihood) or OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) estimator is designed to have zero bias.
  That means it can suffer with high variance!
  There’s a variance/bias tradeoff that we have to trade-off.

Main Advantage: Interpretability
Example

Simulated Data: \( n = 50, p = 30 \) and \( \sigma^2 = 1 \).

True model: linear with 10 large coefficients between 0.5 and 1.

- Linear Regression
  - Bias squared = 0.006 and variance = 0.627.
  - Prediction error = \( 1 + 0.006 + 0.627 = 1.633 \)

- We’ll do better by shrinking the coefficients to reduce the variance

- How big a gain will we get with Ridge/Bayes Regression?
Example: True Coefficients

Figure: Shrinkage will Help
Example: Prediction error

Figure: Ridge Regression At best: Bias squared $= 0.077$ and variance $= 0.402$. Prediction error $= 1 + 0.077 + 0.403 = 1.48$
Bias-Variance Tradeoff

Simulated data: \( n = 50, p = 30 \).

Figure: Ridge
Example: Prostate Data and Regularisation Path

Cross-Validation: CV

Figure: Lasso
What about Ridge?

Figure: Ridge Coefficient Estimates
Prostate Data

CV Regularisation Path

Hastie, Friedman and Tibshirani (2013). *Elements of Statistical Learning*

**Figure**: Lasso
What about Ridge?

Figure: Ridge: CV regularisation
Netflix Prize

A massive dataset of Netflix customer’s preferences.

People ratings 1 – 5 by Movies 180 million data-points. Movies rated on a scale of 1-5

The challenge was a 10% improvement on the current Netflix prediction algorithm

Build a model to make predictions to recommend movies you haven’t seen yet
MSE Goal

$1 million prize if you could improve the Netflix rating system at 10%

After two years finally won in Oct 2009.

The MSE goal was a level of 0.854.

After two years of improving their MSE and being in the lead for most of 2009, a noted Bayesian Statistician Chris Volinsky and his colleagues ended up losing with 4 mins to go!
Statistical Effects

*Downside momentum:* once start panning movies, people give lower ratings to ones they like

*Time Trends:* Memento (short term memory loss) 3.4 rating on opening days, 4 after a few weeks

*Model averaging:* 700 different models (regressions, ... ) and a weighted averaged prediction seems to work best.

*New prize:* data includes demographics, age, gender, movie details
Probability: 41901

Week 6: Bayesian Statistics

Nick Polson

http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/nicholas.polson/teaching/41901/
Introduction to Bayesian Methods

Modern Statistical Learning

- Bayes Rule and Probabilistic Learning
- Computationally challenging: MCMC and Particle Filtering
- Many applications in Finance:
  Asset pricing and corporate finance problems.

Lindley, D.V. *Making Decisions*
Bernardo, J. and A.F.M. Smith *Bayesian Theory*
Bayesian Books

Bayesian Theory and Applications

- Hierarchical Models and MCMC
- Bayesian Nonparametrics
- Machine Learning
- Dynamic State Space Models . . .
Popular Books

McGrayne (2012): The Theory that would not Die

- History of Bayes-Laplace
- Code breaking
- Bayes search: Air France

...
Nate Silver: 538 and NYT

Silver (2012): The Signal and The Noise

- Presidential Elections
- Bayes dominant methodology
- Predicting College Basketball/Oscars . . .
AIQ: People and Machines
Smarter Together

- Florence Nightingale
- Sir Isaac Newton
- Grace Hopper
Things to Know

Explosion of Models and Algorithms starting in 1950s

- Bayesian Regularisation and Sparsity
- Hierarchical Models and Shrinkage
- Hidden Markov Models
- Nonlinear Non-Gaussian State Space Models

Algorithms

- Monte Carlo Method (von Neumann and Ulam, 1940s)
- Metropolis-Hastings (Metropolis, 1950s)
- Gibbs Sampling (Geman and Geman, Gelfand and Smith, 1980s)
- Sequential Particle Filtering
Probabilistic Reasoning

Bayesians only make Probability statements

- Bayesian Probability (Ramsey, 1926, de Finetti, 1931)
  1. Beta-Binomial Learning: Black Swans
  2. Elections: Nate Silver
  3. Baseball: Kenny Lofton and Derek Jeter

- Monte Carlo (von Neumann and Ulam, Metropolis, 1940s)
  Shrinkage Estimation: (Lindley and Smith, Efron and Morris, 1970s)
Bayes Learning: Beta-Binomial

How do I update my beliefs about a coin toss?

Likelihood for Bernoulli

\[ p(y|\theta) = \prod_{t=1}^{T} p(y_t|\theta) = \theta^{\sum_{t=1}^{T} y_t} (1 - \theta)^{T - \sum_{t=1}^{T} y_t}. \]

Initial prior distribution \( \theta \sim \mathcal{B}(a, A) \) given by

\[ p(\theta|a, A) = \frac{\theta^{a-1} (1 - \theta)^{A-1}}{B(a, A)}. \]
Bayes Learning: Beta-Binomial

Updated posterior distribution is also Beta

\[ p(\theta|y) \sim B(a_T, A_T) \text{ and } a_T = a + \sum_{t=1}^{T} y_t, A_T = A + T - \sum_{t=1}^{T} y_t \]

The posterior mean and variance are

\[ E[\theta|y] = \frac{a_T}{a_T + A_T} \text{ and } var[\theta|y] = \frac{a_T A_T}{(a_T + A_T)^2(a_T + A_T + 1)} \]
Suppose you’re only see a sequence of White Swans, having never seen a Black Swan.

What’s the Probability of Black Swan event sometime in the future?

Suppose that after $T$ trials you have only seen successes $(y_1, \ldots, y_T) = (1, \ldots, 1)$. The next trial being a success has

$$p(y_{T+1} = 1|y_1, \ldots, y_T) = \frac{T + 1}{T + 2}$$

For large $T$ is almost certain. Here $a = A = 1$. 
**Black Swans**

*Principle of Induction (Hume)*

The probability of *never* seeing a Black Swan is given by

$$p(y_{T+1} = 1, \ldots, y_{T+n} = 1|y_1, \ldots, y_T) = \frac{T + 1}{T + n + 1} \to 0$$

*Black Swan* will eventually happen – don’t be surprised when it actually happens.
Bayesian Learning Models

Let’s do some cool applications ...

- Bayes MoneyBall
- Batter-pitcher match-up:
  Kenny Lofton and Derek Jeter
- Bayes Elections
- SAT scores
Example: Baseball

Batter-pitcher match-up?

Prior information on overall ability of a player. Small sample size, pitcher variation.

Let $p_i$ denote Jeter’s ability. Observed number of hits $y_i$

$$(y_i|p_i) \sim Bin(T_i, p_i) \text{ with } p_i \sim Be(\alpha, \beta)$$

where $T_i$ is the number of at-bats against pitcher $i$. A priori $E(p_i) = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \beta} = \bar{p}_i$.

The extra heterogeneity leads to a prior variance $Var(p_i) = \bar{p}_i(1 - \bar{p}_i)\phi$ where $\phi = (\alpha + \beta + 1)^{-1}$. 
## Table: Kenny Lofton hitting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pitcher</th>
<th>At-bats</th>
<th>Hits</th>
<th>ObsAvg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J.C. Romero</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Lewis</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Tomko</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. Hoffman</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. Tapani</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>.489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Cook</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Abbott</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>.412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.J. Burnett</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. Rogers</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>.395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Harang</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. Appier</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Clemens</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>.226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Zambrano</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.222</td>
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<tr>
<td>N. Ryan</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>.200</td>
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<td>E. Hanson</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.171</td>
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<tr>
<td>E. Milton</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Prior</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>7630</td>
<td>2283</td>
<td>.299</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Kenny Lofton versus individual pitchers.**
Kenny Lofton (career .299 average, and current .308 average for 2006 season) was facing the pitcher Milton (current record 1 for 19)

He was rested and replaced by a .275 hitter.

- Is putting in a weaker player really a better bet?
- Over-reaction to bad luck?

\[ P(\leq 1 \text{ hit in 19 attempts}|p = 0.3) = 0.01 \]

An unlikely 1-in-100 event.
Bayes solution: shrinkage. Borrow strength across pitchers
Bayes estimate: use the posterior mean
Lofton’s batting estimates that vary from .265 to .340. The lowest being against Milton.

.265 < .275

**Conclusion:** resting Lofton against Milton was justified!!

**Baseball**

Kenny Lofton
Bayes Batter-pitcher match-up

Here’s our model again ...

- Small sample sizes and pitcher variation.
- Let $p_i$ denote Lofton’s ability. Observed number of hits $y_i$

  $$(y_i|p_i) \sim Bin(T_i, p_i) \text{ with } p_i \sim Be(\alpha, \beta)$$

where $T_i$ is the number of at-bats against pitcher $i$.

Estimate $(\alpha, \beta)$
Example: Derek Jeter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pitcher</th>
<th>At-bats</th>
<th>Hits</th>
<th>ObsAvg</th>
<th>EstAvg</th>
<th>95% Int</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R. Mendoza</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.833</td>
<td>.322</td>
<td>(.282,.394)</td>
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<tr>
<td>H. Nomo</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.600</td>
<td>.326</td>
<td>(.289,.407)</td>
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<tr>
<td>A.J. Burnett</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.600</td>
<td>.320</td>
<td>(.275,.381)</td>
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<tr>
<td>E. Milton</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>.324</td>
<td>(.291,.397)</td>
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<tr>
<td>D. Cone</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>.320</td>
<td>(.218,.381)</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>.467</td>
<td>.326</td>
<td>(.291,.401)</td>
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<td>K. Escobar</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>.410</td>
<td>.322</td>
<td>(.281,.386)</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.400</td>
<td>.318</td>
<td>(.275,.375)</td>
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<tr>
<td>T. Wakefield</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>.321</td>
<td>.318</td>
<td>(.279,.364)</td>
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<tr>
<td>P. Martinez</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>.253</td>
<td>.312</td>
<td>(.254,.347)</td>
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<tr>
<td>K. Benson</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.250</td>
<td>.317</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<td>.315</td>
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<td>.200</td>
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<td>(.253,.355)</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>.000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6530</strong></td>
<td><strong>2061</strong></td>
<td><strong>.316</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Derek Jeter 2006 season versus individual pitchers.
Bayes Estimates

Stern estimates $\hat{\phi} = (\alpha + \beta + 1)^{-1} = 0.002$ for Jeter. Doesn’t vary much across the population of pitchers.

The extremes are shrunk the most also matchups with the smallest sample sizes.

Jeter had a season .308 average.
Bayes estimates vary from .311 to .327–he’s very consistent.

If all players had a similar record then a constant batting average would make sense.
Bayes Elections: Nate Silver
Multinomial-Dirichlet

Predicting the Electoral Vote (EV)

- Multinomial-Dirichlet: $(\hat{p}|p) \sim Multi(p), (p|\alpha) \sim Dir(\alpha)$

  $p_{Obama} = (p_1, \ldots, p_{51}|\hat{p}) \sim Dir(\alpha + \hat{p})$

- Flat uninformative prior $\alpha \equiv 1.$

  http://www.electoral-vote.com/evp2012/Pres/prespolls.csv
Calculate probabilities via simulation: rdirichlet

\[ p (p_{j,O} | \text{data}) \quad \text{and} \quad p (EV > 270 | \text{data}) \]

The election vote prediction is given by the sum

\[ EV = \sum_{j=1}^{51} EV(j) \mathbb{E} (p_j | \text{data}) \]

where \( EV(j) \) are for individual states.
## Electoral Vote (EV), Polling Data: Mitt and Obama percentages

<table>
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<th>State</th>
<th>M.pct</th>
<th>O.pct</th>
<th>EV</th>
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<td>58</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Oregon</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>46</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rhode.Island</td>
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<td>South.Carolina</td>
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<tr>
<td>South.Dakota</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
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<td>Vermont</td>
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<td>Virginia</td>
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<td>Washington</td>
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<td>West.Virginia</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>44</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>42</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure : Election 2008 Prediction. Obama 370
Figure: Election 2012 Prediction. Obama 332.
SAT Scores

SAT (200 – 800): 8 high schools and estimate effects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Estimated $y_j$</th>
<th>St. Error $\sigma_j$</th>
<th>Average Treatment $\theta_i$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- $\theta_j$: average effects of coaching programs
- $y_j$: estimated treatment effects, for school $j$, standard error $\sigma_j$. 
Estimates

Two programs appear to work (improvements of 18 and 28)

- Large standard errors. Overlapping Confidence Intervals?
- Classical hypothesis test fails to reject the hypothesis that the $\theta_j$’s are equal.
- Pooled estimate has standard error of 4.2 with

$$\hat{\theta} = \frac{\sum_j (y_j / \sigma_j^2)}{\sum_j (1 / \sigma_j^2)} = 7.9$$

- Neither separate or pooled seems sensible. Bayesian shrinkage!
Bayesian Model

Hierarchical Model ($\sigma^2_j$ known) is given by

$$\tilde{y}_j | \theta_j \sim N(\theta_j, \sigma^2_j)$$

Unequal variances–differential shrinkage.

- Prior Distribution: $\theta_j \sim N(\mu, \tau^2)$ for $1 \leq j \leq 8$.
  Traditional random effects model.
  Exchangeable prior for the treatment effects.
  As $\tau \to 0$ (complete pooling) and as $\tau \to \infty$ (separate estimates).

- Hyper-prior Distribution: $p(\mu, \tau^2) \propto 1/\tau$.
  The posterior $p(\mu, \tau^2|y)$ can be used to “estimate” $(\mu, \tau^2)$. 
Joint Posterior Distribution $y = (y_1, \ldots, y_J)$

$$p(\theta, \mu, \tau | y) \propto p(y | \theta)p(\theta | \mu, \tau)p(\mu, \tau)$$

$$\propto p(\mu, \tau^2) \prod_{i=1}^{8} N(\theta_i | \mu, \tau^2) \prod_{j=1}^{8} N(y_j | \theta_j)$$

$$\propto \tau^{-9} \exp \left( -\frac{1}{2} \sum_j \frac{1}{\tau^2} (\theta_j - \mu)^2 - \frac{1}{2} \sum_j \frac{1}{\sigma_j^2} (y_j - \theta_j)^2 \right)$$

MCMC!
## Posterior Inference

Report posterior quantiles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>2.5%</th>
<th>25%</th>
<th>50%</th>
<th>75%</th>
<th>97.5%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>µ</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τ</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Schools A and G are similar!
Probability: 41901

Week 7: Bayesian Hierarchical Models and Portfolio Selection

Nick Polson

http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/nicholas.polson/teaching/41901/
Bayesian Shrinkage

Bayesian shrinkage provides a way of modeling complex datasets.

1. Coin Tossing: Lindley’s Paradox
2. Baseball batting averages: Stein’s Paradox
3. Toxoplasmosis
4. SAT scores
5. Clinical Trials
Bayesian Inference

Key Idea: Explicit use of probability for summarizing uncertainty.

1. A probability distribution for data given parameters
   \[ f(y|\theta) \] Likelihood

2. A probability distribution for unknown parameters
   \[ p(\theta) \] Prior

3. Inference for unknowns conditional on observed data
   Inverse probability (Bayes Theorem);
   Formal decision making (Loss, Utility)
Posterior Inference

**Bayes theorem** to derive posterior distributions

\[ p(\theta|y) = \frac{p(y|\theta)p(\theta)}{p(y)} \]

\[ p(y) = \int p(y|\theta)p(\theta)d\theta \]

Allows you to make probability statements

- They can be very different from p-values!
  - Hypothesis testing and Sequential problems
- Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) and Filtering (PF)
Example

- **Definition:** Let $\mathcal{F}$ denote the class of distributions $f(y|\theta)$. A class $\Pi$ of prior distributions is conjugate for $\mathcal{F}$ if the posterior distribution is in the class $\Pi$ for all $f \in \mathcal{F}, \pi \in \Pi, y \in \mathcal{Y}$.

- **Example: Binomial/Beta:**
  Suppose that $Y_1, \ldots, Y_n \sim Ber(p)$.
  Let $p \sim Beta(\alpha, \beta)$ where $(\alpha, \beta)$ are known hyper-parameters.
  The beta-family is very flexible
  Prior mean $E(p) = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \beta}$. 

Conjugate Priors
Posterior

\( p(p|\bar{y}) \) is the posterior distribution for \( p \)

\( \bar{y} \) is a sufficient statistic.

- Bayes theorem gives

\[
p(p|y) \propto f(y|p)p(p|\alpha, \beta) \\
\propto p^{\sum y_i}(1-p)^{n-\sum y_i} \cdot p^{\alpha-1}(1-p)^{\beta-1} \\
\propto p^{\alpha+\sum y_i-1}(1-p)^{n-\sum y_i+\beta-1} \\
\sim \text{Beta}(\alpha + \sum y_i, \beta + n - \sum y_i)
\]

- The posterior mean is a shrinkage estimator

Combination of sample mean \( \bar{y} \) and prior mean \( E(p) \)

\[
E(p|y) = \frac{\alpha + \sum_{i=1}^{n} y_i}{\alpha + \beta + n} = \frac{n}{n + \alpha + \beta} \bar{y} + \frac{\alpha + \beta}{\alpha + \beta + n} \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \beta}
\]
Example

Poisson/Gamma: Suppose that $Y_1, \ldots, Y_n \sim \text{Poi}(\lambda)$.

Let $\lambda \sim \text{Gamma}(\alpha, \beta)$

$(\alpha, \beta)$ are known hyper-parameters.

The posterior distribution is

$$p(\lambda | y) \propto \exp(-n \lambda) \lambda^{\sum y_i} \lambda^{\alpha-1} \exp(-\beta \lambda)$$

$$\sim \text{Gamma}(\alpha + \sum y_i, n + \beta)$$
Example: Clinical Trials

Novick and Grizzle: Bayesian Analysis of Clinical Trials

Four treatments for duodenal ulcers.
Doctors assess the state of the patient.

Sequential data
(\(\alpha\)-spending function, can only look at prespecified times).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treat</th>
<th>Excellent</th>
<th>Fair</th>
<th>Death</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion: Cannot reject at the 5% level

Conjugate binomial/beta model + sensitivity analysis.
Let $p_i$ be the death rate proportion under treatment $i$.  

- To compare treatment $A$ to $B$ directly compute $P(p_1 > p_2 | D)$.
- Prior $\text{beta}(\alpha, \beta)$ with prior mean $E(p) = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \beta}$.
  Posterior $\text{beta}(\alpha + \sum x_i, \beta + n - \sum x_i)$

- For $A$, $\text{beta}(1, 1) \rightarrow \text{beta}(8, 94)$
  For $B$, $\text{beta}(1, 1) \rightarrow \text{beta}(2, 100)$
- Inference: $P(p_1 > p_2 | D) \approx 0.98$
Sensitivity Analysis

Important to do a sensitivity analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treat</th>
<th>Excellent</th>
<th>Fair</th>
<th>Death</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>A</td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>88</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Poisson-Gamma, prior $\Gamma(m, z)$ and $\lambda_i$ be the expected death rate.

Compute $P\left(\frac{\lambda_1}{\lambda_2} > c | D\right)$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prob, $(\text{Prob}, \ (0, 0), (100, 2), (200, 5))$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$P\left(\frac{\lambda_1}{\lambda_2} &gt; 1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P\left(\frac{\lambda_1}{\lambda_2} &gt; 1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Normal-Normal Model

Using Bayes rule we get

\[ p(\mu | y) \propto p(y | \mu) p(\mu) \]

Posterior is given by

\[ p(\mu | y) \propto \exp \left( -\frac{1}{2\sigma^2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} (y_i - \mu)^2 - \frac{1}{2\tau^2} (\mu - \mu_0)^2 \right) \]

Hence \( \mu | y \sim N(\hat{\mu}_B, V_\mu) \) where

\[ \hat{\mu}_B = \frac{n/\sigma^2}{n/\sigma^2 + 1/\tau^2} \bar{y} + \frac{1/\tau^2}{n/\sigma^2 + 1/\tau^2} \mu_0 \quad \text{and} \quad V_\mu^{-1} = \frac{n}{\sigma^2} + \frac{1}{\tau^2} \]

A shrinkage estimator.
Bayes Learning: Update our beliefs in light of new information

▶ In the 2014-2015 season.
  The Bears suffered back-to-back 50-points defeats.
  Partiots-Bears 51 – 23
  Packers-Bears 55 – 14

▶ Their next game was at home against the Minnesota Vikings.
  Current line against the Vikings was −3.5 points.
  Slightly over a field goal

What’s the Bayes approach to learning the line?
Hierarchical Model

Hierarchical model for the current average win/lose this year

\[ \bar{y} | \theta \sim N \left( \theta, \frac{\sigma^2}{n} \right) \sim N \left( \theta, \frac{18.34^2}{9} \right) \]

\[ \theta \sim N(0, \tau^2) \]

Here \( n = 9 \) games so far. With \( s = 18.34 \) points

Pre-season prior mean \( \mu_0 = 0 \), standard deviation \( \tau = 4 \).

Record so-far. Data \( \bar{y} = -9.22 \).
Bayes Shrinkage estimator

\[ \mathbb{E} (\theta | \bar{y}, \tau) = \frac{\tau^2}{\tau^2 + \frac{\sigma^2}{n}} \bar{y} \]

The **Shrinkage factor** is 0.3!!

That’s quite a bit of shrinkage. **Why?**

- Our updated estimator is
  \[ \mathbb{E} (\theta | \bar{y}, \tau) = -2.75 > -3.5 \]

  where current line is -3.5.

- Based on our hierarchical model this is an **over-reaction**.
  One point change on the line is about 3% on a probability scale.
  Alternatively, calculate a **market-based** \( \tau \) given line = -3.5.
Chicago Bears

Last two defeats were 50 points scored by opponent

bears = c(-3, 8, 8, -21, -7, 14, -13, -28, -41)
> mean(bears)
[1] -9.222222
> sd(bears)
[1] 18.34242
> tau = 4

> sig2 = sd(bears) * sd(bears) / 9
> tau^2 / (sig2 + tau^2)
[1] 0.2997225
> 0.2997225 * -9.22
[1] -2.765723
> pnorm(-2.76/18)
[1] 0.4390677

Home advantage is worth 3 points. Vikings an average record.  
Result: Bears 21, Vikings 13
Lindley’s Paradox

Often evidence which, for a Bayesian statistician, strikingly supports the null leads to rejection by standard classical procedures.

- Do Bayes and Classical always agree?
  Bayes computes the probability of the null being true given the data $p(H_0|D)$. That’s not the p-value. Why?

- Surely they agree asymptotically?

- How do we model the prior and compute likelihood ratios $L(H_0|D)$ in the Bayesian framework?
Bayes $t$-ratio

Edwards, Lindman and Savage (1963)

Simple approximation for the likelihood ratio.

\[ L(p_0) \approx \sqrt{2\pi} \sqrt{n} \exp \left( -\frac{1}{2} t^2 \right) \]

- **Key:** Bayes test will have the factor $\sqrt{n}$
  This will asymptotically favour the null.
- There is only a big problem when $2 < t < 4$ – but this is typically the most interesting case!
**Intuition:** Imagine a coin tossing experiment and you want to determine whether the coin is “fair” $H_0 : p = \frac{1}{2}$.

There are four experiments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expt</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$n$</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r$</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>5098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$L(p_0)$</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>11.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Implications:

- Classical: In each case the $t$-ratio is approx 2. They we just $H_0$ (a fair coin) at the 5% level in each experiment.

- Bayes: $L(p_0)$ grows to infinity and so they is overwhelming evidence for $H_0$. Connelly shows that the Monday effect disappears when you compute the Bayes version.
Stein paradox: possible to make a uniform improvement on the MLE in terms of MSE.

- Mistrust of the statistical interpretation of Stein’s result. In particular, the loss function.
- Difficulties in adapting the procedure to special cases
- Long familiarity with good properties for the MLE

Any gains from a “complicated” procedure could not be worth the extra trouble (Tukey, savings not more than 10 % in practice)
Data: 18 major-league players after 45 at bats (1970 season)

| Player       | $\bar{y}_i$ | $E(p_i|D)$ | average season |
|--------------|-------------|------------|----------------|
| Clemente     | 0.400       | 0.290      | 0.346          |
| Robinson     | 0.378       | 0.286      | 0.298          |
| Howard       | 0.356       | 0.281      | 0.276          |
| Johnstone    | 0.333       | 0.277      | 0.222          |
| Berry        | 0.311       | 0.273      | 0.273          |
| Spencer      | 0.311       | 0.273      | 0.270          |
| Kessinger    | 0.311       | 0.268      | 0.263          |
| Alvarado     | 0.267       | 0.264      | 0.210          |
| Santo        | 0.244       | 0.259      | 0.269          |
| Swoboda      | 0.244       | 0.259      | 0.230          |
| Unser        | 0.222       | 0.254      | 0.264          |
| Williams     | 0.222       | 0.254      | 0.256          |
| Scott        | 0.222       | 0.254      | 0.303          |
| Petrocelli   | 0.222       | 0.254      | 0.264          |
| Rodriguez    | 0.222       | 0.254      | 0.226          |
| Campanens    | 0.200       | 0.259      | 0.285          |
| Munson       | 0.178       | 0.244      | 0.316          |
| Alvis        | 0.156       | 0.239      | 0.200          |
Baseball Data
First Shrinkage Estimator: Efron and Morris

Figure: Baseball Shrinkage
Shrinkage

Let $\theta_i$ denote the end of season average

- Lindley: shrink to the overall grand mean

$$c = 1 - \frac{(k - 3)\sigma^2}{\sum (\bar{y}_i - \bar{y})^2}$$

where $\bar{y}$ is the overall grand mean and

$$\hat{\theta} = c\bar{y}_i + (1 - c)\bar{y}$$

- Baseball data: $c = 0.212$ and $\bar{y} = 0.265$.

  Compute $\sum (\hat{\theta}_i - \bar{y}^{obs}_i)^2$ and see which is lower:

  $$MLE = 0.077 \quad STEIN = 0.022$$

  That’s a factor of 3.5 times better!
'Clemente' batting averages over 1970 season:
.400 after 45 at bats; .346 for remainder; .352 overall
Baseball Paradoxes

Shrinkage on Clemente too severe:
\[ z_{CI} = 0.265 + 0.212(0.400 - 0.265) = 0.294. \]
The 0.212 seems a little severe

- Limited translation rules, maximum shrinkage eg. 80%
- Not enough shrinkage eg O’Connor \((y = 1, n = 2)\).
  \[ z_{OC} = 0.265 + 0.212(0.5 - 0.265) = 0.421. \]
  Still better than Ted Williams 0.406 in 1941.
- Foreign car sales \((k = 19)\) will further improve MSE performance! It will change the shrinkage factors.
- Clearly an improvement over the Stein estimator is

\[
\hat{\theta}_{S+} = \max \left( \left( 1 - \frac{k - 2}{\sum \bar{Y}_i^2} \right), 0 \right) \bar{Y}_i
\]
Baseball Prior

Include extra prior knowledge

Empirical distribution of all major league players

$$\theta_i \sim N(0.270, 0.015)$$

The 0.270 provides another origin to shrink to and the prior variance 0.015 would give a different shrinkage factor.

To fully understand maybe we should build a probabilistic model and see what the posterior mean is as our estimator for the unknown parameters.
Shrinkage: Unequal Variances

Model $Y_i|\theta_i \sim N(\theta_i, D_i)$ where $\theta_i \sim N(\theta_0, A) \sim N(0.270, 0.015)$.

- The $D_i$ can be different – unequal variances
- Bayes posterior means are given by

$$E(\theta_i|Y) = (1 - B_i)Y_i \text{ where } B_i = \frac{D_i}{D_i + \hat{A}}$$

where $\hat{A}$ is estimated from the data, see Efron and Morris (1975).

- Different shrinkage factors as different variances $D_i$.
  $D_i \propto n_i^{-1}$ and so smaller sample sizes are shrunk more. Makes sense.
Example: Toxoplasmosis Data

Disease of Blood that is endemic in tropical regions.

Data: 5000 people in El Salvador (varying sample sizes) from 36 cities.

- Estimate “true” prevalences $\theta_i$ for $1 \leq i \leq 36$
- Allocation of Resources: should we spend funds on the city with the highest observed occurrence of the disease? Same shrinkage factors?
- Shrinkage Procedure (Efron and Morris, p315)

$$z_i = c_i y_i$$

where $y_i$ are the observed relative rates (normalized so $\bar{y} = 0$

The smaller sample sizes will get shrunk more.

The most gentle are in the range $0.6 \rightarrow 0.9$ but some are $0.1 \rightarrow 0.3$. 
Multinomial Probit

Multinomial Probit. Choice variable \( Y \in \{0, 1, \ldots, p - 1\} \)

Consumers choices are formed in a random utility model setting

\[
W = X\beta + \epsilon
\]

\[
Y(W) = i \text{ if } \max W = W_i
\]

- Distribution of consumers tastes \( \beta \sim p(\beta) \).
- Applications: Marketing, Economics, Political Science.
Stochastic Volatility

*Stochastic Volatility:* returns $r_t$, expected return $\mu_t$ and volatility $\sqrt{V_t}$

- Hierarchical model defined by the sequence of conditionals

\[
\begin{align*}
    r_t &= \mu_t + \sqrt{V_t} \epsilon_t \\
    \mu_t &= \text{regression} \\
    \log V_t &= \alpha + \beta \log V_{t-1} + \sigma_v \epsilon_t^v
\end{align*}
\]

- Here $\alpha / (1 - \beta)$ describes the long-run average (log)-volatility $\sigma_v$ the volatility of volatility.
Bayes Portfolio Selection

de Finetti and Markowitz: Mean-variance portfolio shrinkage:

\[ \frac{1}{\gamma} \Sigma^{-1} \mu \]

Different shrinkage factors for different history lengths.

Portfolio Allocation in the SP500 index

Entry/exit; splits; spin-offs etc. For example, 73 replacements to the SP500 index in period 1/1/94 to 12/31/96.

**Advantage:** \( E(\alpha|D_t) = 0.39 \), that is 39 bps per month which on an annual basis is \( \alpha = 468 \) bps.

The posterior mean for \( \beta \) is \( p(\beta|D_t) = 0.745 \)

\( \bar{x}_M = 12.25\% \) and \( \bar{x}_{PT} = 14.05\% \).
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Probability: 41901

Week 8: Sports Betting and Brownian Motion

Nick Polson

http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/nicholas.polson/teaching/41901/
Overview

Kelly-Breiman-Merton: **Maximise Expected Growth Rate**

1. **Sir Isaac Newton**: Lost £20,000.
   
   "I can calculate the motion of heavenly bodies, but not the madness of people”  South Sea Bubble Act (1721)


2. **David Ricardo (1815)**
   
   *Bought all issuance of UK Gilts the day before the Battle of Waterloo*

3. **J.M. Keynes (1920-1945)**
   
   *King’s College Fund.*
South Sea Bubble: 1720

Isaac Newton’s Nightmare

South Sea Stock
December 1718 – December 1721

Newton re-enters with a lot
Newton’s friends get rich
Newton exits happy
Newton invests a bit
Newton exits broke

Marc Faber, Editor and Publisher of “The Gloom, Boom & Doom Report.”

Also owned the East India Company: £30,000
Post 1720 Bubble

Volatility: persistent, asymmetric (leverage) and fat-tails

Dutch East India Company

London Stock Market:
1723-1794
# Keynes Investment Returns

## 1928-1945

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<th>Year</th>
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<td>1930</td>
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King’s College Cambridge

Keynes vs Cash
Keynes
Optimal Bayes Rebalancing

Mix of Keynes and Rate

Return from Bayes Portfolio

Optimal allocation $\omega$

Universal Portfolios with Keynes and Rate

Keynes vs Universal vs Cash
Bayesian Learning $\omega^*$
Cover-Stern: Universal Portfolios

Returns i.i.d. and allocation $\max_{\omega} E (\ln(1 + \omega' X))$

- **Realised wealth** \( W_T(X, \omega) = \prod_{t=1}^T (1 + \omega' X_t) \) where

\[
F_X(\omega) = \frac{W_T(X, \omega)}{\int_{\Omega} W_T(x, \omega) d\omega}
\]

Estimate $\omega^*$ with

\[
\hat{\omega} = E_F(\omega) = \frac{\int \omega W_T(X, \omega) d\omega}{\int_{\Omega} W_T(x, \omega) d\omega}
\]

Dynamically rebalance to guarantee “area-under-parabola”
Parrando’s Paradoxes

Two losing bets can be combined to a winner

**Bernoulli:** $1 + f$ or $1 - f$ with $p = 0.51$ and $f = 0.05$

**Caveat:** Growth governed by entropy

$$p \log(1 + f) + (1 - p) \log(1 - f)$$

$$= -0.00025 < 0$$

Brownian Ratchets and cross-entropy of Markov processes

Two Losing Bets + Volatility
Parrando

Optimal allocation $\omega$

Ex Ante vs Ex Post
Breiman-Kelly-Merton Rule

Kelly Criterion: Optimal wager in binary setting

\[ \omega^* = \frac{p \cdot O - q}{O} \]

Merton’s Rule in continuous setting is Kelly

\[ \omega^* = \frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{\mu}{\sigma^2} \]

1. \( \mu \): (excess) expected return
2. \( \sigma \): volatility
3. \( \gamma \): risk aversion
4. \( \omega^* \): optimal position size
5. \( p = \text{Prob}(\text{Up}) \), \( q = \text{Prob}(\text{Down}) \), \( O = \text{Odds} \)
Example: Kelly Criterion S&P500:

Kelly rule is logarithmic utility (CRRA with $\gamma = 1$).

- Given i.i.d. log-normal stock returns with an annualized expected excess return of 5.7% and a volatility of 16% which is consistent with long-run equity returns.

$$\omega^* = \frac{0.057}{0.16^2} = 2.22$$

Kelly implies the investor borrows 122% of wealth to invest a total of 220% in stocks.

- Allocation is highly sensitive to estimation error in $\hat{\mu}$.
  Dynamic learning?
The fractional Kelly rule leads to a more realistic allocation.

- Suppose that $\gamma = 3$. Then the informational ratio is

$$\frac{\mu}{\sigma} = \frac{0.057}{0.16} = 0.357 \text{ and } \omega^* = \frac{1}{3} \frac{0.057}{0.16^2} = 74.2\%$$

An investor with such a level of risk aversion then has a more reasonable 74.2% allocation.

- This analysis ignores the equilibrium implications. If every investor acted this way, then this would drive up prices and drive down the equity premium of 5.7%.
Black-Litterman

Black-Litterman: combining investor’s Bayes views with market equilibrium

- Optimal allocation rule is

\[ \omega^* = \frac{1}{\gamma} \Sigma^{-1} \mu \]

Q. How to specify \((\mu, \Sigma)\) pairs?

- Given \(\hat{\Sigma}\), BL derive Bayesian inference for \(\mu\) given market equilibrium model and \textit{a priori} views on the returns of pre-specified portfolios:

\[ (\hat{\mu} | \mu) \sim N(\mu, \tau \hat{\Sigma}) \text{ and } (Q | \mu) \sim N(P \mu, \hat{\Omega}) . \]
Combining views, the implied posterior is

$$(\mu|\hat{\mu}, Q) \sim N(Bb, B)$$

The mean and variance are specified by

$$B = (\tau\hat{\Sigma})^{-1} + P'\hat{\Omega}^{-1}P$$
$$b = (\tau\hat{\Sigma})^{-1}\hat{\mu} + P'\hat{\Omega}^{-1}Q$$

These posterior moments then define the optimal allocation rule.
Brownian Motion

Stochastic process \( \{ B_t, t \geq 0 \} \) in continuous time taking real values is a Brownian Motion (or a Wiener process)

- for each \( s \geq 0 \) and \( t > 0 \)
  \[
  B_{t+s} - B_t \sim N(0, t).
  \]

- For each \( t > s > 0 \), the random variable \( B_t - B_s \) is independent of \( B_s - B_0 = B_s \).

- \( B_0 = 0 \) and

- \( B_t \) is continuous in \( t \geq 0 \).

- \( B_t \) is standard BM. \( \sigma B_t \) includes a volatility.

Brown (1827) and Einstein (1921).
Here we have the process

\[ X_t = \mu t + \sigma B_t \]
\[ dX_t = \mu dt + \sigma dB_t \]

We can think of the Euler discretization as

\[ X_{t+\Delta} - X_t = \mu \Delta + \sigma \sqrt{\Delta} \epsilon_t \]

where \( \epsilon_t \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1) \).
Geometric Brownian Motion

Geometric Brownian Motion starting at $X_0 = 1$ evolves as

$$X_t = \exp(\mu t + \sigma B_t)$$

We have $\mathbb{E}(X_t) = e^{(\mu + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2)t}$.

This is equivalent differential (SDE) form

$$dX_t = X_t \left( \left( \mu + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 \right) dt + \sigma dB_t \right)$$
Brownian Motion for Sports Scores

Implied Volatility

Stern (1994): *Brownian Motion and Sports Scores*

Polson and Stern (2014): *The Implied Volatility of a Sports Game*

- “Team A” rarely loses if they are ahead at halftime
- Approximately 75% of games are won by the team that leads at halftime.

There’s a 0.5 probability that the same team wins both halves and a 0.25 probability that the first half winner defeats the second half winner.

This only applies to equally matched teams.

- For the team that is ahead after $\frac{3}{4}$ of the game, the empirical frequency of winnings is: basketball 80%, baseball 90%, football 80% and hockey 80%.
μ home point advantage.
Football 3 points, basketball 5 – 6 points.

- Stern estimates for basketball a 1.5 points difference for the first three quarters with a standard deviation of 7.5 points. Fourth quarter the difference is only 0.22 points with a standard deviation of 7. The q-q plot look normals. Correlations between periods are small and so the random walk model appears to be reasonable.
Evolution of a Game

Volatility of Outcome

Superbowl Probability

Winning Margin

Prob

\( P(X > 0) = 0.353 \)

\( \mu = -4, p = 0.353, \sigma = 10.60 \)

Game Evolution: Second half

Time

\( X \)
Brownian Motion for Sports Scores

Probability of team A winning, \( p = \mathbb{P}(X(1) > 0) \), given point spread (or drift) \( \mu \)

Standard deviation (or volatility) \( \sigma \) and final score \( X(1) \sim N(\mu, \sigma^2) \).

- Given the normality assumption, \( X(1) \sim N(\mu, \sigma^2) \), we have

\[
p = \mathbb{P}(X(1) > 0) = \Phi \left( \frac{\mu}{\sigma} \right)
\]

where \( \Phi \) is the standard normal cdf.
Brownian Motion for Sports Scores

Table 1 uses $\Phi$ to convert team A’s advantage $\mu$ to a probability scale using the information ratio $\mu/\sigma$.

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<th>$\mu/\sigma$</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0.25</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>0.75</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1.25</th>
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<td>$p = \Phi(\mu/\sigma)$</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.93</td>
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Probability of winning $p$ versus the ratio $\mu/\sigma$

Evenly matched and $\mu/\sigma = 0$ then $p = 0.5$. 
Conditional Probability

After time $t$ has elapsed:

- Current lead of $l$ for team A as the conditional distribution:
  \[ (X(1)|X(t) = l) = (X(1) - X(t)) + l \sim N(l + \mu(1 - t), \sigma^2(1 - t)) \]

- The probability of team A winning at time $t$ given a current lead of $l$ points is:
  \[ p_t = P(X(1) > 0|X(t) = l) = \Phi \left( \frac{l + \mu(1 - t)}{\sigma \sqrt{(1 - t)}} \right) \]

- Point spread $\mu = -4$ and volatility is $\sigma = 10.6$, then team A has a $\mu/\sigma = -4/10.6 = -0.38$ volatility point disadvantage.
  The probability of winning is $\Phi(-0.38) = 0.353 < 0.5$. 

Implied Volatility

Initial point spread—markets’ expectation—of outcome.

Probability that the underdog team wins is

\[ p = \Phi\left(\frac{\mu}{\sigma}\right) = \Phi\left(-\frac{4}{10.6}\right) = 35.3\%. \]

- The volatility is a decreasing function of \( t \), illustrating that the volatility dissipates over the course of a game.

\[
\begin{array}{c|cccccc}
 t & 0 & \frac{1}{4} & \frac{1}{2} & \frac{3}{4} & 1 \\
\hline
\sigma\sqrt{1-t} & 10.6 & 9.18 & 7.50 & 5.3 & 0
\end{array}
\]

Volatility Decay over Time

Calculate implied volatility, \( \sigma_{IV} \), by solving

\[ \sigma_{IV} : \quad p = \Phi\left(\frac{\mu}{\sigma_{IV}}\right) \quad \text{which gives} \quad \sigma_{IV} = \frac{\mu}{\Phi^{-1}(p)}. \]
Super Bowl XLVII: Ravens vs 49ers

Figure: Super Bowl XLVII
Super Bowl XLVII: Ravens vs 49ers

Super Bowl XLVII was held at the Superdome in New Orleans on February 3, 2013.

We will track $X(t)$ which corresponds to the Raven’s lead over the 49ers at each point in time. Table 3 provides the score at the end of each quarter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$t$</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>$\frac{1}{4}$</th>
<th>$\frac{1}{2}$</th>
<th>$\frac{3}{4}$</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ravens</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49ers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X(t)$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Super Bowl XLVII by Quarter
Initial Market

Initial point spread which was set at the Ravens being a four point underdog, $\mu = -4$.

$$\mu = \mathbb{E}(X(1)) = -4.$$ 

The Ravens upset the 49ers by $34 - 31$ and $X(1) = 34 - 31 = 3$ with the point spread being beaten by 7 points.

To determine the markets’ assessment of the probability that the Ravens would win at the beginning of the game we use the money-line odds.

San Francisco $-175$ and Baltimore Ravens $+155$. This implies that a bettor would have to place $175$ to win $100$ on the 49ers and a bet of $100$ on the Ravens would lead to a win of $155$. Convert both of these money-lines to implied probabilities of the each team winning

$$p_{SF} = \frac{175}{100 + 175} = 0.686 \quad \text{and} \quad p_{Bal} = \frac{100}{100 + 155} = 0.392$$
Probabilities of Winning

The probabilities do not sum to one. This “excess” probability is in fact the mechanism by which the oddsmakers derive their compensation. The difference is the “market vig”, also known as the bookmaker’s edge.

\[ p_{SF} + p_{Bal} = 0.686 + 0.392 = 1.078 \]

providing a 7.8% edge for the bookmakers.

- Put differently, if bettors place money proportionally across both teams then the bookies will make 7.8% of the total staked.

We use the mid-point of the spread to determine \( p \) implying that

\[ p = \frac{1}{2} p_{Bal} + \frac{1}{2} (1 - p_{SF}) = 0.353 \]

From the Ravens perspective, we have

\[ p = \mathbb{P}(X(1) > 0) = 0.353. \]

Baltimore’s win probability started trading at \( p^{mkt}_0 = 0.38 \).
Half Time Analysis

The Ravens took a commanding 21 – 6 lead at half time.

- The market was trading at $p_{mkt}^{1/2} = 0.90$.

During the 34 minute blackout 42760 contracts changed hands with Baltimore’s win probability ticking down from 95 to 94. The win probability peak of 95% occurred again after a third-quarter kickoff return for a touchdown. At the end of the four quarter, however, when the 49ers nearly went into the lead with a touchdown, Baltimore’s win probability had dropped to 30%.
Implied Volatility

To calculate the implied volatility of the Superbowl we substitute the pair \((\mu, p) = (-4, .353)\) into our definition and solve for \(\sigma_{IV}\).

\[
\sigma = \frac{\mu}{\Phi^{-1}(p)},
\]

We obtain

\[
\sigma_{IV} = \frac{\mu}{\Phi^{-1}(p)} = \frac{-4}{-0.377} = 10.60
\]

where \(\Phi^{-1}(p) = qnorm(0.353) = -0.377\). The 4 point advantage assessed for the 49ers is under a \(\frac{1}{2}\sigma\) favorite.

The outcome \(X(1) = 3\) was within one standard deviation of the pregame model which had an expectation of \(\mu = -4\) and volatility of \(\sigma = 10.6\).
What’s the probability of the Ravens winning given their lead at half time? At half time Baltimore led by 15 points, 21 to 6.

The conditional mean for the final outcome is $15 + 0.5 \times (-4) = 13$ and the conditional volatility is $10.6 \sqrt{1 - t}$. These imply a probability of .96 for Baltimore to win the game.

A second estimate of the probability of winning given the half time lead can be obtained directly from the betting market. From the online betting market we also have traded contracts on TradeSports.com that yield a half time probability of $p_{1/2} = 0.90$. 
What’s the implied volatility for the second half?

$p_t^{mkt}$ reflects all available information

- For example, at half-time $t = \frac{1}{2}$ we would update

$$\sigma_{IV,t=\frac{1}{2}} = \frac{l + \mu(1 - t)}{\Phi^{-1}(p_t) \sqrt{1 - t}} = \frac{15 - 2}{\Phi^{-1}(0.9) / \sqrt{2}} = 14$$

where $qnorm(0.9) = 1.28$.

- As $14 > 10.6$, the market was expecting a more volatile second half—possibly anticipating a comeback from the 49ers.
How can we form a valid betting strategy?

Given the initial implied volatility $\sigma = 10.6$. At half time with the Ravens having a $l + \mu(1 - t) = 13$ points edge

- We would assess with $\sigma = 10.6$

$$p_{1/2} = \Phi \left( \frac{13}{(10.6/\sqrt{2})} \right) = 0.96$$

probability of winning versus the $p_{1/2}^{mkt} = 0.90$ rate.

- To determine our optimal bet size, $\omega_{bet}$, on the Ravens we might appeal to the Kelly criterion (Kelly, 1956) which yields

$$\omega_{bet} = p_{1/2} - \frac{q_{1/2}^{mkt}}{O^{mkt}} = 0.96 - \frac{0.1}{1/9} = 0.60$$
Mu = 4, Sigma = 32, P(win) = 0.55

Mu = 4, Sigma = 6, P(win) = 0.75

Mu = 4, Sigma = 16, P(win) = 0.6

Lakers' Final Margin of Victory

Probability

-40 -20 0 20 40
0.000 0.004 0.008 0.012
Mu = 4, Sigma = 32, P(win) = 0.55
Lakers' Final Margin of Victory

Probability

-40 -20 0 20 40
0.000 0.010 0.020
Mu = 4, Sigma = 16, P(win) = 0.6
Lakers' Final Margin of Victory

Probability

-40 -20 0 20 40
0.000 0.010 0.020
Figure: The family of probability distributions for $X(t)$, for any $t$ between 0 and 1. Any vertical slice for a specific value $t_1$ corresponds to a normal distribution for $X(t_1)$. The darker the shading at $t$, the higher the probability of the corresponding score-difference for $X(t)$ along that particular time slice.
Probability: 41901

Week 9 & 10: AI and Deep Learning

Nick Polson  
The University of Chicago Booth School of Business  
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/nicholas.polson/teaching/41901/

Suggested Reading  
AWS/Nvidia/Google DeepMind
Deep Learning: General Introduction

Deep Learning is the most widely used machine learning tool for high dimensional input-output problems

- Speech Recognition
- Image Recognition
- Google Translate
- Driverless Cars

The applications are endless ....
Why do we care about DL?

Input space ($X$) includes numerical, text (word2vec), images, videos
Vectors, matrices and tensors, ...

- Google’s translation algorithm
  $\sim$ 1-2 billion parameters
- Alexa’s speech recognition: 100 million parameters
  Networks will get larger and more efficient
- Google Waymo

Advances in computing speed (Nvidia) lets us train and implement Deep Learning in real-time.
Google Waymo’s Lidar processes 6MB Data per second ...
Multi-Layer Deep Models

- NN models one layer!! Key is to use multi “deep” layers
- Learn weight and connections in hidden layers

Predicting House Prices ...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input(X)</th>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Output(Y)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># bedrooms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zip(postal) Code</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commute (walkability)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Quality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Price
Deep Learning Predictors

Smart conditional averaging

The competitors: Trees and RF.

(a) Tree Kernel  (b) Random Forest Kernel

Few points will be neighbors in a high dimensional input space.
What's wrong with Kernels?

2D image of 1000 uniform samples from a 50-dimensional ball $B_{50}$.

Marginal distribution shrinks as dimensionality of the space grows.

(a) $p = 100$  
(b) $p = 200$  
(c) $p = 300$  
(d) $p = 400$
DL Solves the Problem

\[ \hat{Y}(X) = \sum_{k \in K} w_k(X)\hat{Y}_k(X), \]

Figure: Hyperplanes with 3 neurons and ReLU activation.
Tree vs DL example

\[ Y = \text{softmax}(w^0 Z^2 + b^0) \]
\[ Z^2 = \tanh(w^2 Z^1 + b^2) \quad Z^1 = \tanh(w^1 X + b^1). \]

An advantage of deep architectures is that the number of hyper-planes grow exponentially with the number of layers.
Kolmogorov-Arnold
There are no multivariate functions just superpositions of univariate ones

Let $f_1, \ldots, f_L$ be given univariate activation functions. We set

$$f_l^{W,b} = f_l \left( \sum_{j=1}^{N_l} W_{lj} X_j + b_l \right) = f_l(W_l X_l + b_l), \quad 1 \leq l \leq L,$$

Our deep predictor has hidden units $N_l$ and depth $L$.

$$\hat{Y}(X) = F(X) = \left( f_1^{W_1,b_1} \circ \ldots \circ f_L^{W_L,b_L} \right)(X)$$

Put simply, we model a high dimensional mapping $F$ via the superposition of univariate semi-affine functions.
Examples

Interaction terms, $x_1x_2$ and $(x_1x_2)^2$, and max functions, $\max(x_1, x_2)$
Can be expressed as nonlinear functions of semi-affine combinations.

$$
x_1x_2 = \frac{1}{4}(x_1 + x_2)^2 - \frac{1}{4}(x_1 - x_2)^2
$$

$$
\max(x_1, x_2) = \frac{1}{2}|x_1 + x_2| + \frac{1}{2}|x_1 - x_2|
$$

$$
(x_1x_2)^2 = \frac{1}{4}(x_1 + x_2)^4 + \frac{7}{4 \cdot 3^3}(x_1 - x_2)^4 - \frac{1}{2 \cdot 3^3}(x_1 + 2x_2)^4 - \frac{2^3}{3^3}(x_1 + \frac{1}{2}x_2)^4
$$
Academic Curiosity? ... but it works so well!!

Growth of Deep Learning at Google

Directories containing model description files

and many more . . . .
Deep Architectures

- MLP
- Auto-Encoder
- Convolution

recurrent
Long / short term memory

http://www.asimovinstitute.org/neural-network-zoo/
Training, Validation, and Testing

Given the training dataset \( D = \{ Y(i), X(i) \}_{i=1}^T \) of input-output pairs and a loss function \( \mathcal{L}(Y, \hat{Y}) \), we compute

\[
\hat{W} = (\hat{W}_0, \ldots, \hat{W}_L) \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{b} = (\hat{b}_0, \ldots, \hat{b}_L)
\]

by solving

\[
\arg \min_{W,b} \frac{1}{T} \sum_{i=1}^T \mathcal{L}(Y_i, \hat{Y}^{W,b}(X_i)) .
\]

For the \( L_2 \)-norm for a traditional least squares

\[
\mathcal{L}(Y_i, \hat{Y}(X_i)) = \| Y_i - \hat{Y}(X_i) \|_2^2,
\]

our target function becomes the mean-squared error (MSE).
Cross Validation

We split our training data into complementary subset to then conduct analysis and validation on different sets.

▶ Aims to reduce over-fitting and increase out-of-sample performance.

▶ Provides a tool to decide what levels of regularization lead to good generalization (i.e., prediction), which is the classic variance-bias trade-off.

▶ A key advantage of cross validation (over say $t$-ratios and $p$-values) is that it also allows us to assess the size and depth of the hidden layers (a.k.a. model selection).
Dropout

Dropout is a model selection technique designed to avoid over-fitting in the training process.

It does so by removing input dimensions in $X$ randomly with a given probability $p$.

The dropout architecture becomes

\[
D_i^{(l)} \sim \text{Ber}(p),
\]
\[
\tilde{Y}_i^{(l)} = D^{(l)} \star X^{(l)},
\]
\[
Y_i^{(l)} = f(Z_i^{(l)}),
\]
\[
Z_i^{(l)} = W_i^{(l)} X^{(l)} + b_i^{(l)}.
\]
Tensor Processing Unit

**Problem:** Deep Learning typically for massive data Applications need computational speed

**Solution:** A specialized processor called Tensor Processing Unit (TPU, GPU, CPU)

- Processing advances tied to TPU not CPU
- Google TPU 2.0 and Nvidia TeslaV100
Google’s TPU AI Chip

Google data center runs on 30,000 TPUs. Reduces server needs.
Nvidia’s CUDA is Still Ahead

Many competing packages ...
# Deep Learning Recovers Patterns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pixels:</td>
<td>“lion”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audio:</td>
<td>“see at tuhl res taur aun ts”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;query, doc&gt;</td>
<td>P(click on doc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Hello, how are you?”</td>
<td>“Bonjour, comment allez-vous?”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pixels:</td>
<td>“A close up of a small child holding a stuffed animal”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Matrix Algebra and Automatic Differentiation
TPU Advantages for real-time data analysis

Matrix analysis programmed into chips
- XLA: Accelerated Linear Algebra
- AD: Automatic Differentiation

Keypoint detection → Extract SIFT descriptors → Classification

Prediction = Border Collie!
Image recognition has improved

Machines are becoming better than humans
Identifying Skin Cancer

Dataset: 130,000 images of skin lesions/2,000 different diseases

- Test data: 370 high-quality, biopsy-confirmed images
- Better performance than 23 Stanford dermatologists
- 10,000 hours no match for deep learning and large datasets
Training A New Rembrandt

Analyze all 346 of Rembrandt’s paintings

- Identify all geometric patterns used by Rembrandt.
- Reassemble into a fully formed face and bust

Nvidia Faces
Google αGo

alphaGo

- Supervised and Reinforcement Learning,
- Value Function and Tree Search

Convenient

- Fully observed
- Discrete action space
- Perfect simulator
- Relatively short game
- Trial-and error experience
- Large human datasets

Inconvenient

- Actions executed awkwardly
- Incomplete information
- Imperfect simulator
- Longer tasks, hard to assess value
- Hard to practice millions of times
- Small human data sources
Google: Datacenter Cooling reduced 40%

Monitoring real-time conditions and adjusting data center climate control based on past experience.
Artificial Intelligence in Formula 1

- Strategy teams at the race track and at the team’s HQ are constantly trying to predict the next best optimal move to improve their drivers’ positions.
- **Teams are limited to 60 data scientists**
  
  AI (a.k.a machine learning/deep learning) provides better predictions of when best to stop, when to change tyres, overtake, ...

- Best Strategies can vary quickly from moment to moment.
Google DeepMind

Google DeepMind’s Deep Q-learning playing Atari Breakout

- Google DeepMind created an AI using deep reinforcement learning that plays Atari games and improves itself to a superhuman level.
- Capable of playing many Atari games and uses a combination of deep artificial neural networks and reinforcement learning.
- This was the beginning for Google DeepMind.

OpenAI and Dota2 is the current state-of-the-art
Traffic Prediction

Google Maps provides travel time forecasts

- Path search algorithms to calculate fastest route
Traffic Flow: Heat Map

Speed and Distance looks like an image!

Non-recurrent events: Deep Learners
Image Processing: MNIST
Hand-written digits

Multi-layer fully-connected neural network.
Convolution neural network

Figure: Sample from MNIST datasets
DL Model

**Dataset:** 60\(k\) training and 10\(k\) out-of-sample validation

Pre-process data by scaling so that \(sd = 1\)
2-hidden layer MLP model with ReLU activation function

\[
Y = \text{softmax}(W^3 \tilde{Y}_i^{(3)} + b^3)
\]

\[
\tilde{Y}_i^{(3)} = D^{(3)} \star Z^2
\]

\[
D_i^{(3)} \sim \text{Ber}(0.5)
\]

\[
Z^2 = \max(W^2 \tilde{Y}_i^{(2)} + b^1, 0)
\]

\[
\tilde{Y}_i^{(2)} = D^{(2)} \star Z^1
\]

\[
D_i^{(2)} \sim \text{Ber}(0.5)
\]

\[
Z^1 = \max(W^1 \tilde{Y}_i^{(1)} + b^1, 0)
\]

\[
\tilde{Y}_i^{(1)} = D^{(l)} \star X, \quad X \in R^{1024}
\]

\[
D_i^{(1)} \sim \text{Ber}(0.5)
\]

**Cross-entropy-loss = negative log-likelihood**
SGD and optimisation

Apply mini-batch SGD algorithm with Nesterov acceleration (momentum) with the following parameters

- initial learning rate = 0.01
- learning decayed each time validation performance stalls (divided by 2)
- momentum of 0.9
- batch size of 10
- L2 weight decay / gaussian prior on all parameters = 1e-5
Convergence results. Evaluate out-of-sample every epoch. One epoch is one full pass of SGD over the training set (60,000 samples). Each epoch 6k SGD steps. BLAS library. Training 20 minutes.

* epoch 1: 93.85%
* epoch 2: 95.80%
* epoch 3: 96.15%
* epoch 4: 96.74%
* epoch 5: 97.01%
* epoch 6: 97.17%
* epoch 7: 97.40%
* epoch 8: 97.58%
* epoch 9: 97.56% - performance stalled, learning decreased
* epoch 10: 97.69%
* epoch 11: 97.97%
* epoch 12: 97.97% - performance stalled, learning decreased
* epoch 13: 98.05%
* epoch 14: 98.02% - performance stalled, learning decreased
* epoch 15: 98.08%
* epoch 16: 98.17%
* epoch 17: 98.17% - performance stalled, learning decreased
* epoch 18: 98.26%
* epoch 19: 98.24% - performance stalled, learning decreased
* epoch 20: 98.25% - performance stalled, learning decreased
* epoch 21: 98.25% - performance stalled 3x => termination reached

Best performance at epoch 18, with the out-of-sample accuracy rate of 98.26%.
Google AI: Heart disease from eye scan

Google’s Verily able to accurately deduce an individual’s age, blood pressure, whether or not they smoke, ...

Predict risk of suffering a major cardiac event–heart attack–with roughly the same accuracy as current leading methods. Quick for doctors to analyze a patient’s cardiovascular risk, as it doesn’t require a blood test.

Training 300,000 patients. Eye scans plus general medical data.

Deep learning to mine for patterns in your eye scan
Two images of the fundus—interior rear of your eye.

The left is a regular image; the right shows how Google’s algorithm picks out blood vessels (in green) to predict blood pressure.
Learning Player Trajectories: NHL and EPL

Identify groups from their trajectories

Trajectory Network

player 1 is trying to pass the puck
player 2 is going to block player 1
Rotterdam Port Automation

Rotterdam
Rotterdam Port is one of the most automated ports and one of the largest ports in the world.

Automated container carriers are completely computer controlled, carrying containers to cranes. Meanwhile, the cranes are human controlled and move the containers to the ship.

With the fully automated cranes, the terminal can be run by a team of no more than 10 to 15 people on a day-to-day basis.
Automated Port: Port of Qingdao

Qingdao

- Port of Qingdao is the first automated container terminal in Asia. “Ghost port” since it is all controlled by AI and no workers found in sight.

- Through laser scanning and positioning, the program is able to locate the four corners of each container. Accurately grabs them and puts them onto the driverless trucks. Capable to work in complete darkness.
Rio Tinto: Automation to Boost Efficiency

Rio Tinto

- 73 self-driving trucks that reportedly haul payloads at a cost 15 percent less than those operated by human drivers.
- 15% reduction in the cost of operating the automated trucks compared to those driven by humans, as hauling is among the largest costs to a mining operation.
Google DeepMind: AI vs AI

DeepMind

- Google DeepMind pits Artificial Intelligence against Artificial Intelligence into 2 games to see if they fight or cooperate.

- The first game is Gathering gameplay. Two AI players collect apples (green) and they may zap each other to temporarily remove another. The amount of zapping increased when stocks dwindled and the clever AI zaps more aggressively.

- The second game is Wolfpack gameplay. The wolves (red) chase the blue dot while avoiding grey obstacles. It appears that the cleverer the AI player, the more likely it was to cooperate with other players, since it is better at learning to work with other players to track and herd the prey.
Stanford Cart

- Hans Moravec Robotics Pioneer
- KL10 processor, at about 2.5 MIPS, Moravec was eventually able to use multi-ocular vision to navigate slowly around obstacles in a controlled environment. The cart moved in one meter spurts punctuated by ten to fifteen minute pauses for image processing and route planning.

In 1979, the cart successfully crossed a chair-filled room without human intervention in about five hours.
Watson and Jeopardy

Watson

- IBM super computer Watson beat two former champions of TV game Jeopardy and took home one million dollars prize. Watson is a significant leap a machine’s ability to understand context in human language.

- IBM believes the technology behind Watson can be applied to a variety of fields, most notably medicine.
Not HotDog
Finding Architecture Hard

Silicon Valley: Season 4 Episode 4:
https://youtu.be/ACmydtFDTGs
Topics: 41901

W1-W2: Probability and Bayes
W3-W4: Distributions and Expectations
W5: Modern Regression Methods (Lasso and Ridge)
W6-W7: Bayesian Hierarchical Models
W8: Brownian Motion
W9-W10: AI and Deep Learning

HAVE FUN!!