The Causes and Consequences of House Price Momentum

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Abstract

House price changes are positively autocorrelated over two to three years, a phenomenon known as momentum. This paper introduces, empirically grounds, and quantitatively analyzes an amplification mechanism that can generate substantial momentum from small frictions and demonstrates that the resulting momentum helps explain the short-run dynamics of housing markets. The amplification is due to a concave demand curve in relative price, which implies that increasing the quality-adjusted list price of a house priced above the market average rapidly reduces its probability of sale, but cutting the price of a below-average priced home only slightly improves its chance of selling. This creates a strategic complementarity that incentivizes sellers to set their list price close to others’. Consequently, frictions that cause slight insensitivities to changes in fundamentals lead to prolonged adjustments because sellers gradually adjust their price to stay near the average. I provide new micro empirical evidence for the concavity of demand—which is often used in macro models with strategic complementarities—by instrumenting a house’s relative list price with a proxy for the seller’s equity. I find significant concavity, which I embed in an equilibrium housing search model in which buyers avoid visiting houses that appear overpriced. I demonstrate and quantitatively evaluate the model’s ability to amplify two frictions: staggered pricing and a fraction of backwards-looking rule-of-thumb sellers. Both frictions are amplified substantially, and the model explains the momentum observed empirically with a small fraction of rule-of-thumb sellers. Strong house price momentum leads households to re-time their purchase or sale, thereby explaining several features of the dynamic relationships between price, volume, inventory, and buyer and seller entry.

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1 Introduction

A puzzling and prominent feature of housing markets is that aggregate price changes are highly positively autocorrelated, with a one percent annual price change correlated with a 0.30 to 0.75 percent change in the subsequent year (Case and Shiller, 1989). This price momentum lasts for two to three years before prices mean revert, a time horizon far greater than most other asset markets. Substantial momentum is surprising because predictable price changes present an arbitrage opportunity and most pricing frictions dissipate quickly.

This paper introduces, empirically grounds, and quantitatively analyzes an amplification mechanism that can generate substantial momentum from small frictions. The mechanism relies on a strategic complementarity among list-price-setting sellers that makes the optimal list price for a house depend positively on the prices set by others (Cooper and John, 1988). Strategic complementarities of this sort are frequently used in macroeconomic models (e.g., Ball and Romer, 1991; Woodford, 2003; Angeletos and La’O, 2013) but there is limited empirical evidence of their importance and strength. In analyzing momentum in the housing market, I provide micro empirical evidence of a prevalent strategic complementarity in the macroeconomics literature and, using a calibrated equilibrium search model, demonstrate that its ability to amplify underlying frictions is quantitatively significant.

I also show that momentum has important consequences that help explain several perplexing features of housing dynamics. These dynamics matter for the macroeconomy because housing markets affect household balance sheets, the financial system, and business cycles and are a potential channel for monetary policy. House price momentum may also explain why recoveries from housing-triggered cycles are slow.

The propagation mechanism I introduce relies on two components: costly search and a demand curve that is concave in relative price. Search is inherent to housing because no two houses are alike and idiosyncratic taste can only be learned through costly inspection. Search and idiosyncratic taste also limit arbitrage by creating endogenous transaction costs and by making the market price for a house difficult to ascertain. Concave demand in relative price implies that the probability a house sells is more sensitive to list price for houses priced above the market average than below the market average. While concave demand may arise in housing markets for several reasons, I focus on the manner in which asking prices direct buyer search. The intuition is summarized by an advice column for sellers: “Put yourself in the shoes of buyers who are scanning the real estate ads...trying to decide which houses to visit in person. If your house is overpriced, that will be an immediate turnoff. The buyer will probably clue in pretty quickly to the fact that other houses look like better bargains and move on.”

1See also Cutler et al. (1991), Abraham and Hendershott (1996), Cho (1996), Malpezzi (1999), Meen (2002), Capozza et al. (2004), Head et al. (2012), and Glaeser et al. (2013).

a concave demand curve in relative price because at high relative prices buyers are on the margin of looking and purchasing, while at low relative prices they are only on the margin of purchasing.

Concave demand incentivizes list-price-setting sellers—who have market power due to search frictions—to set their list prices close to the mean. Intuitively, raising a house’s relative list price reduces the probability of sale and profit dramatically, while lowering its relative price increases the probability of sale slightly and leaves money on the table. Modest frictions that generate initial insensitivities to changes in fundamentals cause protracted price adjustments because sellers find it optimal to gradually adjust their price so that they do not stray too far from the market average.

To evaluate the concavity of the effect of unilaterally changing a house’s relative quality-adjusted price on its sales probability, I turn to micro data on listings for the San Francisco Bay, Los Angeles, and San Diego metropolitan areas from 2008 to 2013. I address bias caused by unobserved quality by instrumenting relative list price with the amount of aggregate price appreciation since the seller purchased. The identification strategy takes advantage of the fact that sellers with low appreciation since purchase set higher list prices because the equity they extract from the sale of their current home constrains their ability to make a down payment on their next home (Stein, 1995; Genesove and Mayer, 1997). Because I compare listings within a ZIP code and quarter, this supply-side variation identifies the curvature of demand if unobserved quality is independent of when a seller purchased their home. The instrumental variable estimates reveal a concave relationship that is statistically and economically significant. My findings about the concavity of demand are robust to other sources of relative price variation that are independent of appreciation since purchase.

To assess the strength of this propagation mechanism, I embed concave demand in a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides equilibrium search model. I explore the effects of two separate pricing frictions. First, I consider staggered pricing whereby overlapping groups of sellers set prices that are fixed for multiple periods (Taylor, 1980). Concave demand induces sellers to only partially adjust their prices when they have the opportunity to do so, and repeated partial adjustment manifests itself as additional momentum. Second, I introduce a small fraction of backward-looking rule-of-thumb sellers as in Campbell and Mankiw (1989) and Gali and Gertler (1999). Backward-looking expectations are frequently discussed as a potential cause of momentum (e.g., Case and Shiller, 1987; Case et al. 2012), but some observers have voiced skepticism about widespread non-rationality in housing markets given the financial importance of housing transactions for most households. With a strategic complementarity, far fewer backward-looking sellers are needed to explain momentum because the majority of forward-looking sellers adjust their prices gradually so they do not deviate too much from the backward-looking sellers. This, in turn, causes the backward-looking sellers to observe more gradual price growth and change their price by less, creating a two-way feedback that amplifies momentum.

I calibrate the parameters of the model that control the shape of the demand curve to match the micro empirical estimates and the remainder of the model to match steady state and time series...
moments. The calibrated model generates substantial amplification of the underlying frictions. With staggered pricing, the model can explain a ten month price adjustment—or about one quarter of the momentum in the data—in response to a shock to fundamentals even though all sellers have reset their price within two months of the shock. With rule-of-thumb sellers, the model generates three years of positively autocorrelated price changes as observed empirically if 26.5 percent of sellers are backward-looking. By contrast, without concave demand, 78 to 93 percent of sellers would have to be backward-looking to generate a three-year response.

The amplification mechanism adapts two ideas from the macro literature on goods price stickiness to frictional asset search. First, the concave demand curve is similar to the frequently used “smoothed kink” extension of Dixit-Stiglitz preferences proposed by Kimball (1995), who builds on Stiglitz’s (1979) notion of a kinked demand curve and a literature on consumer product search (e.g., Benabou, 1992). Second, the repeated partial price adjustment caused by the strategic complementarity is akin to Taylor’s (1980) “contract multiplier.” A lively literature has debated the importance of strategic complementarities and Kimball-style demand in particular for propagating goods price stickiness by analyzing calibrated models (e.g., Chari et al., 2000) and by assessing whether their ramifications are borne out in micro data (Klenow and Willis, 2006; Bils et al., 2012). My analysis of housing markets adds to this literature by directly estimating a concave demand curve and assessing its ability to amplify frictions in a calibrated model.

Having established a propagation mechanism for house price momentum empirically and theoretically, I show that momentum affects the dynamics of sales volume and the inventory of houses for sale. Forward-looking buyers and sellers re-time their purchase decisions due to expectations of predictable future price changes. Such re-timing causes sudden swings in inventory that drive the reversal between a hot market, with a substantial excess of buyers, and a cold market, with a relative dearth of buyers. For instance, at a trough, marginal buyers rush to purchase before prices rise, while marginal sellers wait to obtain a better price for their home, leading inventory to plummet. To formalize this story, I build on Novy-Marx (2009) by including buyer and seller entry decisions in the model.

Forward-looking entry responses in the calibrated model help explain three puzzling features of housing cycles. First, volume and inventory are more volatile than price. This is difficult to reconcile with most calibrations of housing search models in a direct analogue to Shimer’s (2005) unemployment volatility puzzle for labor search models. With momentum, volume and inventory are more volatile not only because price responds gradually but also because the adjustment of inventory is accelerated by the re-timing of entry. Second, in the data, price changes are strongly negatively correlated with inventory levels (Peach, 1983). This “housing Phillips curve” is surprising

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4 Buyer and seller quotes in newspapers provide suggestive evidence of such re-timing. In 2013, when prices were rising, a buyer explained to the Wall Street Journal “if you don’t get in now, things are going to skyrocket over the next year,” while a seller who delayed putting their house on the market told the Journal that “the extra money – that was worth [waiting] for the year.” This effect is part of the folk wisdom of housing markets, yet has not appeared in the academic literature. For instance, Calculated Risk Blog describes a conversation with a real estate agent who argues that “In a market with falling prices, sellers rush to list their homes, and inventory increases. But if sellers think prices have bottomed, then they believe they can be patient, and inventory declines.”
because in most asset pricing models, price changes are correlated with changes in fundamentals such as inventory (Caplin and Leahy, 2011). In my model, the quick responses of inventory and gradual response of prices create a strong correlation between price changes and inventory levels. Third, seller entry remains high as volume plummets at peaks and remains low as volume picks up at troughs, which is the exact pattern created by the re-timing of entry in light of momentum.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces facts about housing dynamics. Section 3 analyzes micro data to assess whether housing demand curves are concave. Section 4 presents the model. Section 5 calibrates the model to the micro estimates and assesses the degree to which strategic complementarities amplify momentum. Section 6 discusses the consequences of this momentum for housing cycles. Section 7 concludes.

2 Four Facts About Housing Dynamics

2.1 Momentum

Since the pioneering work of Case and Shiller (1989), price momentum has been considered one of the most puzzling features of housing markets. While other financial markets exhibit momentum, the housing market is unusual for the strength of the effect and the horizon over which it persists.\(^5\)

**Fact 1:** Price changes are serially correlated for 8 to 14 quarterly lags.

House price momentum has consistently been found across cities and countries, time periods, and price index measurement methodologies (Cho, 1996). Figure 1 shows three measures of momentum for the CoreLogic national repeat-sales house price index for 1976 to 2013.\(^6\) Panel A shows that autocorrelations are positive for 11 quarterly lags of the quarterly change in the price index adjusted for inflation and seasonality. Panel B shows an impulse response in log levels to an initial one percent price shock estimated from an AR(5). In response to the shock, prices gradually rise for two to three years before mean reverting. Finally, panel C shows a histogram of AR(1) coefficients estimated separately for 103 metropolitan area repeat-sales house price indices from CoreLogic using a regression of the annual change in log price on a one-year lag of itself as in Case and Shiller (1989):

\[ \Delta_{t,t-4} \ln p = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta_{t-4,t-8} \ln p + \varepsilon. \]  

(1)

\(\beta_1\) is positive for all 103 cities, and the median city has an annual AR1 coefficient of 0.60. Appendix B replicates these facts for a number of countries, price series, and measures of autocorrelation.\(^7\)

\(^5\)Jagadeesh and Titman (2011) document that momentum in the stock market lasts three to twelve months. Similarly, Cutler et al. (1991) look across a large number of asset classes and find that for the vast majority of assets, positive autocorrelation in returns lasts for less than a year.

\(^6\)As discussed in Appendix B, price indices that measure the median price of transacted homes display momentum over roughly two years as opposed to three years for repeat-sales indices.

\(^7\)In the housing market, the price level appears to be sticky but the rate of change does not appear to react sluggishly. In particular, neither the evidence presented here nor the structural panel VAR in Head et al. (2012) shows evidence of autocorrelations of house price changes near one or delayed “hump shaped” impulse responses of house price changes. This is unlike the CPI or GDP deflator, which demonstrate considerable persistence in the rate of change (Fuhrer, 2011).
The existing evidence suggests that momentum cannot be explained by serially correlated changes in fundamentals. Case and Shiller (1989) argue that momentum cannot be explained by autocorrelation in interest rates, rents, or taxes. Glaeser et al. (2013) estimate a dynamic spatial equilibrium model and find that “there is no reasonable parameter set” consistent with short-run momentum. Capozza et al. (2004) find significant momentum after accounting for six comprehensive measures of fundamentals in a vector error correction model.

Four main explanations have been offered for momentum in asset markets and for the housing market more specifically. First, a behavioral finance literature hypothesizes that investors initially underreact to news due to behavioral biases (Barberis et al., 1998, Hong and Stein, 1999) or loss aversion (Frazzini, 2006) and then “chase returns” due to extrapolative expectations about price appreciation.\(^8\) Both extrapolative expectations and loss aversion are considered to be important explanations for momentum in asset markets.

\(^8\)Frazzini argues that as prices rise, potential sellers who resist selling at a loss relative to their initial purchase
forces in the housing market (Case and Shiller, 1987; Berkovec and Goodman, 1996; Glaeser et al., 2013; Genesove and Mayer, 2001). Second, Anenberg (2013) shows that gradual learning about market conditions by sellers can create momentum. Third, Head et al. (2012) demonstrate that strong search frictions imply that the liquidity of houses adjusts slowly in response to a shock, which causes autocorrelated price changes that are amplified by a lagged construction response. Finally, momentum could result from a gradual spread of optimism if sentiment drives house prices rather than fundamentals (Burnside et al., 2013).

Learning and search have been calibrated quantitatively and cannot explain the full extent of momentum in housing markets. Anenberg’s (2013) structural model of learning can explain an annual AR(1) coefficient of 0.124 relative to between 0.3 and 0.75 in the data. Head et al.’s (2012) calibrated model can explain half of the autocorrelation in prices at one year, but almost none at two years. In Section 5, I show that the vast majority of sellers would have to have a simple form of extrapolative expectations to fully explain the amount of momentum in the data. The role of sentiment has yet to be measured. The amplification mechanism I propose complements these existing explanations by strengthening them so they can better fit the momentum that is empirically observed.

2.2 Housing Cycles

I relate three other facts and puzzles about the short-run dynamics of housing cycles to momentum.

Fact 2: At an annual frequency, the volatility of sales volume is twice that of real price and the volatility of inventory as measured by months of supply is three times that of real price.

Despite the predictability of price changes, the housing market is volatile. Table 1 shows the standard deviation of annual log changes for four series: real disposable personal income, real house prices, sales volume, and “for sale” inventory measured as months of supply (a common metric begin to experience gains. This causes them to sell, putting downward pressure on prices. A similar point could be made with respect to underwater homeowners who regain positive equity as prices rise.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\sigma_{\log x_{q-4}}$</th>
<th>$\rho$, Real HPI</th>
<th>$\rho$, Sales Volume</th>
<th>$\rho$, Months of Supply</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Real Disposable Pers. Income</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>.819</td>
<td>.668</td>
<td>.497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real House Price Index</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>.726</td>
<td>.305</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sales Volume</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>-.263</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inventory: Months of Supply</td>
<td>0.207</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All series are for 1976-2013 at a quarterly frequency. The first column shows the standard deviation of annual log changes, while the other columns show correlation coefficients of log levels at a quarterly frequency. Real disposable personal income is BEA series DPIC96. Real price is the CoreLogic national repeat-sales house price index adjusted for inflation using the CPI. Sales volume is from the National Association of Realtors single-family existing home series. Months of supply is created by dividing homes listed for sale from the Census Vacancy Survey by the NAR sales series. The volume, income, and months of supply series are all seasonally adjusted.
Figures 2: Price Changes Correlated With Inventory Levels

Notes: The figure shows the time series of the annual change in the log CoreLogic national repeat-sales house price index plotted against log months of supply. The latter is calculated by dividing homes vacant for sale from the Census Vacancy Survey by sales of existing single-family homes from the National Association of Realtors (NAR), measured at the midpoint of the yearlong period over which the change in price is computed.

in the housing market). Price is four times more volatile than income, and volume and inventory are, in turn, more volatile than price. The volatility of inventory in particular is of note because substantial fluctuations in inventory at peaks and troughs herald rapid changes between buyers’ and sellers’ markets. Finally, price and volume are highly positively correlated and both are positively correlated with income.9

**Fact 3: (Housing Phillips Curve)** Price changes are negatively correlated with inventory levels, with a one log point increase in months of supply correlated with a 0.14 log point decrease in annual price growth (Peach, 1983; Lazear, 2010; Caplin and Leahy, 2011).

Figure 2 shows the time series of the annual change in the log price index and of log inventory, measured as months of supply at the midpoint of the year over which the change in price is calculated. This relationship is reminiscent of the Phillips curve as it relates inventory—the equivalent of unemployment in the housing market—to price appreciation. The visible inverse co-movement in the series is confirmed by a regression: a one percent increase in months of supply is associated

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9There is a substantial literature on the positive correlation of price and sales volume. Stein (1995) and Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006) argue prices affect the ability of homeowners to extract equity and make a down payment on their next home, leading to a feedback from prices to volume. A literature initiated by Wheaton (1990) and Krainer (2001) uses a steady state Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search model to argue that the relative number of buyers and sellers in the market affects the liquidity of homes, creating a feedback from volume to price. Leamer (2007) and Case (2008), among others, suggest that volume is more volatile than price because nominal loss aversion and backwards-looking expectations on the part of sellers make prices sticky downward.
Figure 3: Impulse Response to Inventory Shock in Panel VAR

Notes: The figure shows orthogonalized impulse response functions to a months of supply shock computed from a two-lag panel vector autoregression of log months of supply, log price, and log sales volume for a panel of 42 cities from 1990 to 2013 described in Appendix A. Price and sales are from CoreLogic, with price corresponding to the local CoreLogic house price index adjusted for the CPI and sales corresponding to existing home sales. Months of supply at the MSA level comes from the National Association of Realtors. All data is seasonally adjusted, and the panel VAR, which includes a fixed effect for each city as described in Appendix B, is estimated using system GMM and Helmert mean differencing using a Stata package by Inessa Love. The OIRFs are computed using a Cholesky decomposition with the variables ordered so that months of supply is assumed not to depend contemporaneously on shocks to price or volume and price is assumed not to depend contemporaneously on shocks to volume. The results are robust as long as months of supply is prior to volume in the Cholesky ordering. The blue line is the OIRF, and the grey bands indicate 95% confidence intervals computed using a Monte Carlo procedure that generates 500 impulse responses from draws from the distribution of coefficients implied by the estimated coefficients and their variance-covariance matrix.

with a 0.14 percent annual change in prices with an $R^2$ of 0.53. This relationship is puzzling because most asset pricing models imply price changes should be correlated with changes in variables that reflect fundamentals, such as inventory, rather than with their levels. With mean reverting shocks, such models imply a positive correlation between price changes and inventory levels because when inventory levels are high, inventories tend to fall and prices tend to rise. Caplin and Leahy (2011) show that this effect can be eliminated if prices are posted before shocks are realized.

To bring together the first three facts, I estimate a panel vector autoregression with city fixed effects on log price, log volume, and log inventory using a panel of 42 cities from 1990 to 2013 described in Appendix A. The panel vector autoregression (VAR) is estimated using system GMM as in Arellano and Bover (1995). Figure 3 shows the orthogonalized impulse response functions of months of supply, price, and sales in response to a one standard deviation positive shock to months

\(^{10}\text{Both the numerator of months of supply—homes for sale—and the denominator—volume—matter. Appendix B shows the time series look similar if log homes listed for sale adjusted for a linear time trend replaces months of supply and that a regression of the annual change in log price on log homes listed for sale has an}$ R^2 \text{of 0.40. By contrast, regressing changes on changes gives a weak correlation.}
Notes: Volume is raw data from the National Association of Realtors of sales of existing single-family homes at a seasonally-adjusted annual rate. Homes listed for sale is from the Census Vacancy Survey. Seller entry is computed as \( \text{Entrants}_t = \text{Sellers}_t - \text{Sellers}_{t-1} + \text{Sales}_t \). Buyer entry is computed similarly, but since there is not a raw data series for the stock of buyers it is imputed using a simple Cobb-Douglas matching function \( \frac{\text{Sales}}{S} = \xi \left( \frac{B}{S} \right)^{-8} \) with the 0.8 elasticity from Genesove and Han (2012). In this figure, \( \xi = 1 \) so that in a steady state there is 3 months of supply. All four series are smoothed using a three-quarter moving average.

of supply. This can be thought of as a negative demand shock because the positive co-movement of price and volume implies that demand-side shocks are predominant. Volume immediately falls, and months of supply monotonically and gradually decays back to its steady state value after the initial shock. Prices gradually decline over a 10-quarter period, with the price decline tapering off as inventory returns to steady state. Appendix B shows similar results for a VAR and a vector error correction model estimated on national data.

**Fact 4:** Seller entry rises above sales volume at peaks and falls below sales volume at troughs, corresponding to large and sudden fluctuations in inventory.

Although sales and seller entry track one another, Figure 4 shows that at the peak of the recent boom and bust cycle, seller entry remained high for several quarters as volume began to plunge, which corresponded to a sudden increase in inventory. Conversely, as volume and prices began to rise in 2012 and 2013, seller entry remained low, coinciding with a sudden drop in inventory. Appendix B shows that this fact is not unique to 2003 to 2013. Although there is no data on the stock of buyers, most models imply that if seller entry lags sales, buyer entry must lead sales. Figure 4 illustrates this by using a simple matching function parameterized based on Genesove and
Han (2012) to infer the stock of buyers from sales volume and the stock of homes for sale.

The model presented in this paper implies that housing cycles with these four features arise from the interaction of small underlying frictions, strategic complementarities, and forward-looking decisions about when in the cycle to buy and sell. Several other papers have discussed how the endogenous timing of purchasing decisions affects housing cycles, although not in light of momentum. Novy-Marx (2009) shows that entry responses can amplify the long-run response to shocks and increase the amplitude of cycles. Anenberg and Bayer (2013) demonstrate that the cost of simultaneously holding two homes in an illiquid market can make the number of households who simultaneously buy and sell pro-cyclical, which increases volatility.

More directly related to my paper are explanations for why seller entry may fall at troughs and rise at peaks. One reason why seller entry may remain low as volume rises after a trough is nominal loss aversion (Genesove and Mayer, 2001) and lock in due to negative equity (Stein, 1995). Head et al. (2012) present another mechanism: at a trough, new entrants to an MSA need a place to live, which drives up rents until new homes are built and causes potential sellers to rent their homes temporarily before selling them. More broadly, Head et al. (2012) is most closely related to this research. Their analysis of the joint responses of construction, house prices, house sales, and population to city-level income shocks in a model with momentum is complementary to my focus on the timing of purchase and sale decisions of existing homeowners and residents.

### 3 Are Housing Demand Curves Concave?

I propose an amplification channel for momentum based on search and a concave demand curve in relative price. Search is a natural assumption for housing markets, but the relevance of concave demand requires further explanation.

A literature in macroeconomics shows how strategic complementarities among goods producers can amplify small pricing frictions into substantial price sluggishness by incentivizing firms to set prices close to one another. Strategic complementarities operate either through a monopolistic firm’s marginal cost or its markup, which pushes a firm to price close to the market average if demand is concave in relative price. “Kinked demand” was introduced by Stiglitz (1979), who hypothesized that firms that increase their price induce consumers to search for a new firm, but firms that cut their price only gain a few active searchers. This argument has been formalized in several papers, such as Benabou (1992) and Levin and Yun (2009). Kimball (1995) generalizes Dixit-Stiglitz-style aggregator to allow for concave demand. This innovation has been adopted as an important underlying cause of price stickiness in several popular New Keynesian models (e.g., Smets and Wouters, 2007).

Because momentum is similar to price stickiness in goods markets, I hypothesize that a similar strategic complementarity may amplify house price momentum. There are several reasons why concave demand may arise in housing markets. First, buyers may avoid visiting homes that appear to be overpriced. Second, buyers may infer that underpriced homes are lemons. Third, a house’s
relative list price may be a signal of seller type, such as an unwillingness to negotiate (Albrecht et al., 2013). Fourth, homes with high list prices may be less likely to sell quickly and may consequently be more exposed to the tail risk of becoming a “stale” listing that sits on the market without selling. Fifth, buyers may infer that underpriced homes have a higher effective price than their list price because their price is likely to be increased in a bidding war (Han and Strange, 2012b).

Nonetheless, concrete evidence is needed for the existence of concave demand in housing markets before it is adopted as an explanation for momentum. Consequently, this section assesses whether demand is concave by analyzing micro data on listings matched to sales outcomes for the San Francisco Bay, Los Angeles, and San Diego metropolitan areas from April 2008 to February 2013.\footnote{These metro areas were selected because both the listings and transactions data providers are based in California, so the matched dataset for these areas is of high quality and spans a longer time period.}

The relevant demand curve for list-price-setting sellers is the effect of unilaterally changing a house’s relative quality-adjusted list price on its probability of sale. Detecting a nonlinear effect is challenging because quality is poorly measured, list prices are endogenous, and market conditions vary. Quality differences that are unobserved by the econometrician are particularly important because better houses sell faster, biasing the estimated effect of list price upwards. The analysis is further complicated by the high number of foreclosures and short sales during the period that I analyze. Short sales, which occur when a home is sold for less than the outstanding mortgage balance, are especially worrisome because they often involve lengthy negotiations between the seller and their mortgage servicer which artificially decrease the probability of sale.

To surmount these challenges, I exclude distressed sales and instrument for list price using the average amount of house price appreciation in the ZIP code while the seller owned the home. The instrument takes advantage of the fact that sellers with low appreciation, and thus low equity, tend to list at higher prices because the amount of equity they extract constrains their ability to make a down payment on their next home. If appreciation since purchase is independent of unobserved quality and the only source of variation in relative price, this strategy identifies the demand curve. The concavity of the estimated demand curve, however, is robust to other sources of variation in relative price that are independent of appreciation since purchase. Before presenting the IV estimates, which yield a statistically-significant concave demand curve, I discuss the data and the econometric strategy.

\subsection{Data}

I combine data on listings with data on housing characteristics and transactions. The details of data construction can be found in Appendix A. The listings data come from Altos Research, which every Friday records a snapshot of homes listed for sale on multiple listing services (MLS) from several publicly available web sites and records the address, MLS identifier, and list price. The housing characteristics and transactions data come from DataQuick, which collects and digitizes public records from county register of deeds and assessor offices. This data provides a rich one-time snapshot of housing characteristics from 2013 along with a detailed transaction history of each
property from 1988 to 2013 that includes transaction prices, loans, buyer and seller names and
c characteristics, and seller distress. I limit my analysis to non-partial transactions of single-family
existing homes as categorized by DataQuick.

I match the listings data to a unique DataQuick property ID. To account for homes being de-
listed and re-listed, listings are counted as contiguous if the same house is re-listed within 90 days
and there is not an intervening foreclosure. If a matched home sells within 12 months of the final
listing date, it is counted as a sale, and otherwise it is a withdrawal. The matched data includes
83 percent of single-family transactions in the Los Angeles area and 73 percent in the San Diego
and San Francisco Bay areas. It does not account for the full universe of transactions due to three
factors: a small fraction of homes (under 10%) are not listed on the MLS, some homes that are
listed in the MLS contain typos or incomplete addresses that preclude matching to the transactions
data, and Altos Research’s coverage is incomplete in a few peripheral parts of each metropolitan
area.

I limit the data to homes listed between April 2008 and February 2013. I drop cases in which
a home has been rebuilt or significantly improved since the transaction, the transaction price is
below $10,000, or a previous sale occurred within 90 days. I exclude ZIP codes with fewer than
500 repeat sales between 1988 and 2013 because my empirical approach requires that I calculate a
local house price index. These restrictions eliminate approximately five percent of listings.

The final data set consists of 665,560 listings leading to 467,456 transactions. I focus on the
431,830 listings leading to 318,842 transactions with an observed prior transaction, and my IV
procedure is limited to a more restricted sample described below. Table 2 provides summary
statistics for several different subsamples.

3.2 Empirical Approach

3.2.1 Econometric Model

Before presenting the empirical approach, I introduce an econometric framework for how changes in
list price around a quality-adjusted average price affect probability of sale. Each possible sequence
of list prices is associated with a distribution of time to sale. To simplify the analysis, the unit of
observation is a listing associated with an initial log list price, \( p \). I work with a summary statistic
of the time to sale distribution, \( d \), which in the main text is an indicator for whether the house
sells within 13 weeks, with a withdrawal counting as a non-sale. I vary the horizon and use time
to sale for the subset of listings that sell in robustness checks. The data consist of homes, denoted
with a subscript \( h \), from markets defined by a location \( \ell \) (a ZIP code in the data) and time period

\[ \text{The Altos data begins in October 2007 and ends in May 2013. I allow a six month burn-in so I can properly}
\text{identify new listings, although the results are not substantially changed by including October 2007 to March 2008}
\text{listings. I drop listings that are still active on May 17, 2013, the last day for which I have data. I also drop listings}
\text{that begin less than 90 days before the listing data ends so I can properly identify whether a home is re-listed within}
\text{90 days and whether a home is sold within six months. The Altos data for San Diego is missing addresses until}
\text{August 2008, so listings that begin prior to that date are dropped. The match rate for the San Francisco Bay area}
\text{falls substantially beginning in June 2012, so I drop Bay area listings that begin subsequent to that point.} \]
### Table 2: Summary Statistics For Listings Micro Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Prior Trans</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Prior Trans</th>
<th>IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trans</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Transactions</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transaction</td>
<td>70.20%</td>
<td>73.80%</td>
<td>66.80%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Transaction</td>
<td>64.90%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>68.20%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REO</td>
<td>20.50%</td>
<td>24.90%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>26.70%</td>
<td>31.90%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short Sales</td>
<td>20.60%</td>
<td>24.20%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>20.20%</td>
<td>23.70%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Appreciation</td>
<td>43.00%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>42.30%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                        |       |             |       |       |             |       |             |       |             |       |             |
| Initial List Price     | $642,072 | $586,010 | $817,797 | $581,059 | $541,682 | $789,897 |
| Transaction Price      | $534,886 | $497,901 | $731,757 |
| Weeks on Market        | 15.07  | 15.69      | 12.39  |
| Sold Within 13 Wks     | 43.30% | 44.10%     | 46.80% | 61.70% | 59.70%     | 70.10% |
|                        | 13.90% | 14.10%     | 12.80% | 21.70% | 20.70%     | 28.10% |
| Beds                  | 3.28   | 3.24       | 3.31   | 3.27   | 3.23       | 3.30   |
| Baths                 | 2.19   | 2.12       | 2.28   | 2.15   | 2.10       | 2.26   |
| Square Feet           | 1,810.10 | 1,722.10 | 1,910.40 | 1,762.40 | 1,694.30 | 1,887.50 |
|                        | 1.870   | 1.770      | 1.950   | 1.800  | 1.730      | 1.910   |
| N                     | 665,560 | 431,830    | 111,295 | 467,456 | 318,842    | 74,299  |

Notes: Data covers listings between April 2008 and February 2013 in the San Francisco Bay, Los Angeles, and San Diego areas as described in Appendix A. REOs are sales of foreclosed homes and foreclosure auctions. Short sales include cases in which the transaction price is less than the amount outstanding on the loan and withdrawals that are subsequently foreclosed on in the next two years. Appreciation since purchase is based on the ZIP code repeat-sales price index described in Appendix A.

I am interested in the impact of quality-adjusted list price relative to the average quality-adjusted list price in the market on probability of sale. The quality-adjusted average list price $\tilde{p}_{hlt}$ has two additive components: the average log list price in location $l$ at time $t$, represented by a fixed effect $\xi_{lt}$, and quality $q_{hlt}$ that is only partially observable to the econometrician:

$$\tilde{p}_{hlt} = \xi_{lt} + q_{hlt}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

In a Walrasian world, there would be no variation in $p_{hlt} - \tilde{p}_{hlt}$ because sellers would all price homes at $\tilde{p}_{hlt}$ understanding that homes priced above $\tilde{p}_{hlt}$ would not sell and that pricing below $\tilde{p}_{hlt}$ leaves money on the table. In the housing market, however, there are search frictions and substantial amounts of idiosyncratic preference that cause demand to be a downward-sloping function of $p_{hlt} - \tilde{p}_{hlt}$, which can be thought of as the seller’s relative markup. Variation in the relative markup represents differences in sellers’ outside options due to factors like liquidity.

Formally, I model the probability of sale $d_{hlt}$ as:

$$d_{hlt} = g(p_{hlt} - \tilde{p}_{hlt}) + \psi_{lt} + \varepsilon_{hlt}.$$ \hspace{1cm} (3)

The demand curve in relative price $g(\cdot)$ is assumed to be invariant across markets defined by a
location and time net of an additive fixed effect \( \psi_{lt} \) that represents local market conditions. \( \varepsilon_{hlt} \) is an error term that represents luck in finding a buyer and is assumed to be independent of the relative markup \( p_{hlt} - \tilde{p}_{hlt} \).\(^{13}\)

If \( \tilde{p}_{hlt} \) were observable, one could directly estimate (3) by approximating \( g(\cdot) \) with a flexible function and using ordinary least squares or by using non-parametric regression. However, observable measures of quality are imperfect, so quality \( q_{hlt} \) likely has a component that is unobserved to the econometrician. I consequently model quality as a linear function of observed measures of quality \( X_{hlt} \) and quality unobserved by the econometrician \( u_{hlt} \):

\[
q_{hlt} = \beta X_{hlt} + u_{hlt}.
\] (4)

I include two measures of each house’s value at listing as quality measures in \( X_{hlt} \): a repeat-sales predicted price equal to the price the last time the house sold converted to today’s prices using a repeat-sales house price index and a predicted price from a hedonic index that values the house based on its characteristics.\(^{14}\) To construct the repeat-sales predicted price, I first estimate interval-weighted geometric repeat-sales house price index for each ZIP code as in Case and Shiller (1989). The log index for a given time period is a time dummy in a regression of log house price on house and time fixed effects. The log predicted price \( \tilde{p}_{hlt}^{\text{repeat}} \) at time \( t \) for a house \( h \) in location \( \ell \) that sold for \( P_{h\tau} \) at time \( \tau \) is equal to \( \log \left( P_{h\tau} \frac{\phi_{\ell t}}{\phi_{\ell \tau}} \right) \), where \( \phi_{\ell t} \) is the ZIP code repeat-sales index at time \( t \). To construct the hedonic predicted price, I estimate a hedonic house price index for each ZIP code using a third order polynomial in age, log square feet, bedrooms, and bathrooms for the hedonic factor. The predicted log price \( \tilde{p}_{hlt}^{\text{hedonic}} \) is the sum of a house’s hedonic value as implied by a regression and the fixed effect in the regression for a given time period. The construction of both indices follows practices common in the literature and is detailed in Appendix A. I include both predicted prices in \( X_{hlt} \) because each approach has its virtues (Meese and Wallace, 1997).\(^{15}\)

In Appendix C, I show the results are robust to modeling quality as a more flexible function of the predicted prices and to including other observables in \( X_{hlt} \).

Combining (2) and (4), the reference price \( \tilde{p}_{hlt} \) can be written as:

\[
\tilde{p}_{hlt} = \xi_{lt} + \beta X_{hlt} + u_{hlt}.
\] (5)

\(^{13}\)Demand shocks like \( \varepsilon_{hlt} \) traditionally cause an endogeneity problem because they are correlated with price. However, here the variable of interest is relative price, so the effect of demand shocks on average price levels is absorbed into \( \xi_{lt} \). Similarly, the effect of prices on aggregate demand is absorbed into \( \psi_{lt} \). It is thus natural to assume that \( \varepsilon_{hlt} \) is independent of the relative markup in this framework.

\(^{14}\)The inclusion of a predicted price to estimate the effect of a “markup” on probability of sale builds on Yavas and Yang (1995). More broadly, my empirical question and approach are similar to a real estate literature that seeks to assess the impact of list price on time on the market (Kang and Gardner, 1989; Knight 2002; Anglin et al. 2003; Haurin et al., 2010). This literature has not focused on nonlinearity, in part because of small sample sizes.

\(^{15}\)The hedonic approach uses a limited set of characteristics and assumes that their valuation over time is constant because I have only a single snapshot of characteristics, but it uses all sales. Repeat sales controls for home fixed effects but only uses a subset of the data and assumes that house quality is constant and that the set of houses trading at any given time is representative.
unobserved quality.

3.2.2 Instrument

To identify the demand curve $g(\cdot)$ in the presence of unobserved quality, I use plausibly exogenous supply-side variation in the list price due to the liquidity needs of sellers. Homeowners with low equity positions set higher list prices and receive higher transaction prices (Genesove and Mayer, 1997; Genesove and Mayer, 2001). This is the case because many sellers put the equity they extract from sale towards the down payment on their next home (Stein, 1995). For sellers with low equity, each additional dollar of equity extracted can be leveraged to buy a substantially better house, whereas the purchasing power of individuals who extract substantial equity is limited more by their creditworthiness than the cash they have on hand. Because of their higher marginal value of cash on hand, individuals with low equity set higher prices. Financing and refinancing decisions make the equity of sellers endogenous, so for exogenous variation I use the log of appreciation in the ZIP repeat-sales house price index since purchase $z_{ht} = \log \left( \frac{\phi_\tau}{\phi_\tau} \right)$, where $\phi$ is the repeat-sales house price index, $t$ is the period of listing, and $\tau$ is the period of previous sale.\footnote{Here $z_{ht}$ is a measure of liquidity, whereas when multiplied by the previous price $P_{ht\tau}$ in $X_{ht\tau}$ it is used to convert the previous price to present values and constrained to have the same coefficient as the previous price $P_{ht\tau}$.} This would be isomorphic to equity if all homeowners took out an identical mortgage and did not refinance.

If variation in seller liquidity represented by $z_{ht}$ is independent of unobserved quality and is the only source of variation in price conditional on quality and average price, $z_{ht}$ can be used as an instrument to trace out the demand curve $g(\cdot)$. Because existing evidence shows that the effect of equity is non-linear and strongest for sellers with low equity (Genesove and Mayer, 1997), I let $z_{ht}$ affect price through a flexible function $f(\cdot)$. Formally, $g(\cdot)$ is identified if:

**Condition 1**

$$z_{ht} \perp (u_{ht}, z_{ht})$$

and

$$p_{ht} = f(z_{ht}) + \tilde{p}_{ht} = f(z_{ht}) + \xi_{ht} + \beta X_{ht} + u_{ht}. \quad (6)$$

The first half of Condition 1 is an exclusion restriction that requires that appreciation since purchase have no direct effect on the outcome, either through fortune in finding a buyer $\varepsilon_{ht\tau}$ in equation (3) or through unobserved quality $u_{ht\tau}$. If this is the case, $z_{ht}$ only affects probability of sale through the relative markup $p_{ht\tau} - \tilde{p}_{ht\tau}$. Because I use ZIP × quarter of listing fixed effects, the variation in $z_{ht}$ comes from sellers who sell at the same time in the same market but purchased at different points in the cycle. Condition 1 can thus be interpreted as requiring that unobserved quality be independent of when the seller purchased.

This assumption is difficult to test because I only have a few years of listings data, so flexibly controlling for when a seller bought weakens the effect of the instrument on price in equation (6)
and widens the confidence intervals to the point that any curvature is not statistically significant. However, the results are robust to including a linear time trend in date of purchase or time since purchase, excluding sellers who have positive equity because they purchased after the mid-2000s bust, and limiting the sample to sellers who purchased in a 10 year window from 1995 to 2004, as discussed in Appendix C. While this should assuage some concerns, if homes with very low appreciation since purchase are of substantially lower unobserved quality despite their higher average list price, my identification strategy would overestimate the true amount of curvature in the data.

I focus on sellers for whom the exogenous variation is cleanest and consequently exclude three groups. First, many individuals who have had negative appreciation since purchase are not the claimant on the residual equity in their homes—their mortgage lender is. For these individuals, appreciation since purchase is directly related to how far underwater they are, which in turn affects the foreclosure and short sale processes of the mortgage lender or servicer. Because I am interested in market processes, I exclude short sales, withdrawals that are subsequently foreclosed upon, and individuals who have had negative appreciation since purchase from the analysis.\footnote{I also drop individuals with negative equity to ensure a monotonic first stage.} Second, mortgage servicers and government-sponsored enterprises selling foreclosed homes have no reason to be sensitive to the amount of appreciation since the foreclosed-upon homeowner purchased and are dropped. Finally, investors who purchase, improve, and flip homes typically have a low appreciation in their ZIP code since purchase but improve the quality of the house in unobservable ways. To minimize the effect of investors, I exclude sellers who previously purchased with all cash, a hallmark of investors.

The second part of Condition 1 requires that liquidity embodied in \(z_{htt}\) is the only reason for variation in \(p_{htt} - \tilde{p}_{htt}\). This is a strong assumption because there may be components of liquidity that are unobserved or other reasons that homeowners list their house at a price different from \(\tilde{p}_{htt}\), such as heterogeneity in discount rates. If the second part of the condition did not hold, then the estimates would be biased because the true \(p_{htt} - \tilde{p}_{htt}\) would equal \(f(z_{htt}) + \zeta_{htt}\), and the unobserved error \(\zeta_{htt}\) enters \(g(\cdot)\) nonlinearly.

However, if other sources of variation in the relative markup \(p_{htt} - \tilde{p}_{htt}\) are independent of the variation induced by the instrument, the error in \(p_{htt} - \tilde{p}_{htt}\) would not cause spurious concavity. Intuitively, noise in \(p_{htt} - \tilde{p}_{htt}\) would cause the observed probability of sale at each observed \(p_{htt} - \tilde{p}_{htt}\) to be an average of the probabilities of sale at true \(p_{htt} - \tilde{p}_{htt}\)S that are on average evenly scrambled. Consequently, although the slope may be biased, the curvature of a monotonically-decreasing demand curve is preserved. An analytical result can be obtained if the true \(g(\cdot)\) is a cubic regression function as in Hausman et al. (1991):

\[
\text{Lemma 2} \quad \text{Consider the econometric model described by (3) and (5) and suppose that: } \\
\begin{align*}
z_{htt} & \perp (u_{htt}, \varepsilon_{htt}) , \\
p_{htt} &= f(z_{htt}) + \zeta_{htt} + \tilde{p}_{htt} ,
\end{align*}
\]

\[16\]
\( \zeta_{hlt} \perp f(z_{hlt}) \), and the true regression function \( g(\cdot) \) is a third-order polynomial. Then estimating \( g(\cdot) \) assuming that \( p_{hlt} = f(z_{hlt}) + \tilde{p}_{hlt} \) yields the true coefficients of the second- and third-order terms in \( g(\cdot) \).

**Proof.** See Appendix C. ■

While clearly a special case, Lemma 2 makes clear that the bias in the estimated concavity is minimal if \( \zeta_{hlt} \perp f(z_{hlt}) \). Spurious concavity is, however, a possibility if other sources of variation in the relative markup are correlated with time since purchase and \( f(z_{hlt}) \). I am assessing the potential degree of bias in this case and for a more general \( g(\cdot) \) through simulation in ongoing work.

### 3.2.3 Estimation

Under Condition 1, \( p_{hlt} - \tilde{p}_{hlt} = f(z_{hlt}) \), and \( g(\cdot) \) can be estimated by a two-step procedure that first estimates equation (6) and then uses the predicted \( f(z_{hlt}) \) as \( p_{hlt} - \tilde{p}_{hlt} \) to estimate equation (3). Both equations are estimated by OLS, and in the main text I weight the specifications by the inverse standard deviation of the error in the repeat-sales index to account for the reduced precision of the predicted prices in areas with fewer transactions. I use a third-order polynomial for \( f(\cdot) \). Appendix C shows that the results are robust to the order of the polynomial used for \( f(\cdot) \).

I use three methods to approximate \( g(\cdot) \). First, I use a three-part spline in the relative markup \( p_{hlt} - \tilde{p}_{hlt} \), with the knot points spaced so that each segment includes one-third of the data. This allows me to statistically test for nonlinearity. I calculate standard errors by block bootstrapping the entire procedure and clustering on 35 units defined by the first three digits of the ZIP code (ZIP-3).\(^{18} \) Second, to visualize the data, I construct a binned scatter plot, which bins the data into 25 equally-sized groups of the log list price relative to the reference price, \( p_{hlt} - \tilde{p}_{hlt} \), and, for each bin, plots the mean of \( p_{hlt} - \tilde{p}_{hlt} \) against the mean of the probability of sale net of the average probability of sale in the market, \( d_{hlt} - \psi_{lt} \). This approximates \( g(\cdot) \) using indicator variables for the 25 bins of \( p_{hlt} - \tilde{p}_{hlt} \), as detailed in Appendix C. Third, I use a third-order polynomial to approximate \( g(\cdot) \) and plot the estimated polynomial with the binned scatter plot.

There may be small-sample bias introduced into the estimation if \( g(\cdot) \) is non-linear and the fixed effects \( \xi_{lt} \) are imprecisely estimated with a small number of homes in a ZIP-quarter cell.\(^{19} \) Appendix C shows that the results are not substantially changed by limiting the sample to fixed effect cells with at least 15 homes. Because the error in the estimated fixed effects is likely minimal for these cells, this suggests that imprecision in the estimated fixed effects is not driving the results.\(^{20} \)
Figure 5: Instrumental Variable Estimates of the Effect of List Price on Probability of Sale

Notes: Panel B shows a binned scatter plot of the probability of sale within 13 weeks net of fixed effects (with the average probability of sale within 13 weeks added in) against the estimated log relative markup \( p - \hat{p} \). It also shows an overlaid cubic fit of the relationship, as in equation (3). To create the figure, a first stage regression of the log list price on a third-order polynomial in the instrument, fixed effects at the ZIP x first quarter of listing level, and repeat sales and hedonic log predicted prices, as in (6), is estimated by OLS. The predicted value of the polynomial of the instrument is used as the relative markup. The figure splits the data into 25 equally-sized bins of this estimated relative markup and plots the mean of the estimated relative markup against the mean of the probability of sale within 13 weeks net of fixed effects for each bin, as detailed in Appendix C. Before binning, the 1st and 99th percentiles of the log sale price residual and any observations fully absorbed by fixed effects are dropped. The entire procedure is weighted by the reciprocal of the standard deviation of the prediction error in the repeat-sales house price index in the observation’s ZIP code from 1988 to 2013. The sample is limited to the IV subsample of homes that are not sales of foreclosures or short sales, sales of homes with negative appreciation since the seller purchased, or sales by investors who previously purchased with all cash. Panel A shows the first stage relationship between the instrument and log initial list price in equation (6) by residualizing the instrument and the log initial list price against the two predicted prices and fixed effects, binning the data into 25 equally-sized bins of the instrument residual, and plotting the mean of the instrument residual against the mean of the log initial list price residual for each bin. \( N = 111,293 \) observations prior to dropping the 1st and 99th percentiles and unique zip-quarter cells.

### 3.3 Results

Figure 5 shows the resulting first and second stage binned scatter plots. As shown in panel A, the instrument induces a small amount of variation in the list price set by sellers.\(^ {21}\) This is the variation I use to identify the shape of demand. The first stage is strong with a joint F statistic for the third

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\(^{18}\) I do not bootstrap the estimation of the house price indices and the predicted prices. This may add noise through a generated regressor problem (Murphy and Topel, 1985).

\(^{19}\) There are 9,200 fixed effects. Less than half a percent of the data is unused because there is only a single house sold in a ZIP-quarter cell.

\(^{20}\) An alternative approach is to use a random effects estimator, which I am implementing in ongoing work.

\(^{21}\) Genesove and Mayer (1997) find that a house with 100 percent loan-to-value ratio is on average listed at a price four percent higher than a home with an 80 percent loan-to-value ratio. Subsequent work (Genesove and Mayer, 2001) finds slightly smaller numbers conditioning on whether a seller has experienced a nominal loss. Nonetheless, the similarity between their four percent figure and the amount of variation induced by the instrument in my first stage is reassuring.
Table 3: The Effect of List Price on Probability of Sale: Regression Results

Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Var:</th>
<th>Sell Within 13 Weeks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample:</td>
<td>All Listings With Prior Observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(431,830 obs, 420,820 After Dropping 1st and 99th % and Cells With One Obs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls:</td>
<td>ZIP × Quarter × Distress FE, Repeat and Hedonic Predicted Price</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lowest Tercile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient on List Price</td>
<td>0.161***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Spline</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bootstrapped 95% CI</td>
<td>[-0.767,-0.555]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel B: Instrumental Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Var:</th>
<th>Sell Within 13 Weeks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample:</td>
<td>Listings With Prior Obs, excluding REO, Short Sales, Investors, Neg Appreciation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(111,293 obs,108,696 After Dropping 1st and 99th % and Cells With One Obs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls:</td>
<td>ZIP × Quarter FE, Repeat and Hedonic Predicted Price</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument:</td>
<td>Appreciation Since Purchase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lowest Tercile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient on List Price</td>
<td>-0.320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Spline</td>
<td>(0.334)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bootstrapped 95% CI</td>
<td>[-3.577,-1.293]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Each row shows regression coefficients when g(.) in equation (3) is approximated using a three-segment linear spline with an equal fraction of the data in each segment. This relationship represents the effect of the log relative markup on the probability of sale within 13 weeks. In the IV panel, a first stage regression of log list price on a third-order polynomial in the instrument, fixed effects at the ZIP x first quarter of listing level, and log predicted price using both a repeat-sales and a hedonic methodology, as in (6) is estimated by OLS. The predicted value of the polynomial of the instrument is used as the relative markup in equation (3), which is estimated by OLS. The sample is restricted to non-REOs, non-short sales, properties with positive appreciation since purchase, and properties not previously purchased with all cash (investors). In the OLS panel, quality is assumed to be perfectly measured by the hedonic and repeat-sales predicted prices and have no unobserved component. OLS thus regresses log list price on fixed effects and the predicted prices and uses the residual as the estimated relative markup into equation (3), as described in Appendix C. OLS uses the full set of listings with a previous observed transaction, so to prevent distressed sales from biasing the results, the fixed effects are at the quarter of initial listing x ZIP x distress status level. Distress status corresponds to three groups: normal sales, REOs (sales of foreclosed homes and foreclosure auctions), and short sales (cases where the transaction price is less than the amount outstanding on the loan and withdrawals that are subsequently foreclosed on in the next two years). Both procedures are weighted by the reciprocal of the standard deviation of the prediction error in the repeat-sales house price index in the observation’s ZIP code from 1988 to 2013. Before creating the spline, the 99th and 1st percentiles of the relative markup are dropped, as are any observations fully absorbed by fixed effects. In addition to the regression coefficients, the difference between the highest and lowest tercile of the spline is reported. Standard errors and the 95 percent confidence interval for the difference between the first and third terciles are computed by block bootstrapping the entire procedure on 35 ZIP-3 clusters.

order polynomial of the instrument in (6) of 128. Panel B shows that a clear concave relationship is visible in the second stage, with very inelastic demand for relatively low priced homes and elastic demand for relatively high priced homes. This curvature is also visible in the cubic polynomial
fit. Table 3 shows regression results when $g(\cdot)$ is approximated by a three-part spline. Panel B shows the IV results. The concavity visible in Figure 5 is apparent, with the highest tercile having a slope that is seven times the lowest tercile. The difference between the highest and lowest tercile slopes is statistically significant.

As a point of comparison, Panel A shows OLS results for the full sample of homes with a prior observed transaction. The fixed effects are at the ZIP $\times$ quarter $\times$ REO seller $\times$ short seller level to prevent distressed sales from biasing the results. OLS assumes away unobserved quality and should be positively biased if $\tilde{p}_{htt}$ is positively correlated with $p_{htt}$ due to omitted unobserved quality. This is the case: the estimated demand curve is more elastic for IV than OLS. In fact, the OLS bias is strong enough that the demand curve slopes significantly upward in the lowest tercile. Nonetheless, a clear pattern of concavity is apparent in the OLS results. Appendix C shows that OLS looks similar on the limited IV sample.

The highest tercile IV estimates imply that raising one’s price by one percent reduces the probability of sale within 13 weeks by approximately 2.3 percentage points on a base of 46.8 percentage points, a reduction of 5 percent. This corresponds to a one percent price hike increasing the time to sale by six to eleven days. This figure is of comparable magnitude to Carrillo (2012), who estimates a structural search model of the steady state of the housing market with multiple dimensions of heterogeneity using data from Charlottesville, Virginia from 2000 to 2002. Although we use very different empirical approaches, in a counterfactual simulation, he finds that a one percent list price increase increases time on the market by a week, while a five percent list price increase increases time on the market by a year. Carrillo also finds small reductions in time on the market from underpricing, consistent with the nonlinear relationship found here.

Appendix C shows that these results are robust across geographies, time periods, and specifications, although in some cases restricting to a smaller sample leads to insignificant results. It also shows that concavity is clearly visible in the reduced-form relationship between the instrument and probability of sale within 13 weeks. The instrumental variable results thus provide evidence of demand concave in relative price for these three MSAs from 2008 to 2013.

4 A Model of House Price Momentum

This section introduces an equilibrium search model with concave demand. The model includes two additional ingredients new to the housing search literature. First, because concave demand only amplifies existing frictions, I introduce variants of the model with two separate frictions: staggered pricing as in Taylor (1980) and a small number of backward-looking rule-of-thumb sellers as in Gali and Gertler (1999). Second, I include an endogenous entry decision for buyers and sellers.

---

22 Most of the curvature comes from the top quarter of the sample because the instrument has the largest effect on the small number of sellers with low appreciation since purchase and a smaller effect on sellers who have experience moderate to high appreciation.

23 Aside from the tail end of my sample, this period was a depressed market. The similarity between my results and Carrillo’s provide some reassurance that the results I find are not specific to the time period, but I cannot rule out that the nonlinearity would look different in a booming market.
so that the same model can be used to assess how the re-timing of purchases and sales in light of momentum affects housing dynamics. Entry is a form of arbitrage that reduces the amount of momentum in the model, but, as in the data, it is not strong enough to eliminate momentum.

The model builds on search models of the housing market, such as Wheaton (1990), Krainer (2001), Novy-Marx (2009), Piazzesi and Schneider (2009), Caplin and Leahy (2011), Genesove and Han (2012), Head et al. (2012), Ngai and Tenreyro (2013), Burnside et al. (2013), and Díaz and Jerez (2013). I also incorporate ideas from models with price posting with undirected search (e.g., Kudoh, 2013).

I first introduce a framework that models a metropolitan area with a fixed population and housing stock. I then describe the housing market component and show how sellers set list prices. I then introduce staggered pricing and rule-of-thumb consumers. The notation used in the model is summarized in Tables 4 and 5.

4.1 Setting

Time is discrete and all agents are risk neutral. Agents have a discount factor of $\beta$ and time $t$ is denoted with a subscript. There is a fixed housing stock of mass one, no construction, and a fixed population of size $\text{Pop}$. Each period occurs in three stages: first search and transactions occur, then flow utilities are realized, and finally mismatch shocks occur.

There are four types of homogenous agents: a mass $B_t$ of buyers, $S_t$ of sellers, $H_t$ of homeowners, and $R_t$ of renters. These agents have flow utilities (inclusive of search costs) $b$, $s$, $h$, and $r$, and value functions $V^b_t$, $V^s_t$, $V^h_t$, and $V^r_t$, respectively. Buyers and sellers are active in the housing market, which is described in the next section. I assume that each agent can own only one home, which precludes short sales and investor-owners, although I allow for arbitrage through the re-timing of buyer and seller entry decisions described below.

Each period with probability $\lambda^b$ and $\lambda^r$, respectively, homeowners and renters receive shocks that cause them to separate from their current house or apartment, as in Wheaton (1990). However, rather than automatically entering the housing market, the shocks cause homeowners and renters to draw a one-time cost, $c \sim C(\cdot)$ for homeowners and $k \sim K(\cdot)$ (likely negative) for renters, that can be paid to stay in their current house or apartment and receive the same flow utility as before instead of moving. Because the seller entry elasticity appears to be constant over the cycle as shown in Appendix E, the cost distributions are parameterized as uniform: $c \sim U(c, \bar{c})$ and $k \sim U(k, \bar{k})$. This setup captures that potential movers have heterogeneous reasons to buy or sell and consequently differ in the ease with which they can re-time their transaction.

A renter who decides not to pay the cost $k$ enters the market as a homogenous buyer. A homeowner who decides not to pay the cost $c$ learns after making their entry decision whether they leave the MSA with probability $L$, in which case they become a seller and receive termination payoff $V^0$ for leaving, or whether they remain in the city with probability $1 - L$. If they remain in the city, they simultaneously become a buyer and a homogenous seller. These two roles are assumed to be quasi-independent so that the value functions do not interact and no structure is put on whether
Table 4: Notation in the Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Masses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop</td>
<td>Total Population (Housing Stock Mass One)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Endogenous Mass of Buyers</td>
<td>Value Fn $V^b$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Endogenous Mass of Sellers</td>
<td>Value Fn $V^s$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>Endogenous Mass of Renters</td>
<td>Value Fn $V^r$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Endogenous Mass of Homeowners</td>
<td>Value Fn $V^h$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Flow Utilities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Flow Utility of Buyer (Includes search cost)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s</td>
<td>Flow Utility of Seller (includes search cost)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>u</td>
<td>Flow Utility of Renter</td>
<td>Shocked Variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h</td>
<td>Flow Utility of Homeowner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moving Shock Probabilities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda^h$</td>
<td>Prob Homeowner Gets Shock</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda^r$</td>
<td>Prob Renter Gets Shock</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Costs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>Stochastic Cost for Homeowner to Stay in Home</td>
<td>$\sim C(c), U(c, \hat{c})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k</td>
<td>Stochastic Cost for Renter to Stay Renter (Negative)</td>
<td>$\sim K(k), U(\hat{k}, \check{k})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$c^*$</td>
<td>Threshold $c$ Above Which Homeowners Enter</td>
<td>Endogenous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$k^*$</td>
<td>Threshold $k$ Above Which Renters Enter</td>
<td>Endogenous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Parameters</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>Discount Factor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Probability Seller Leaves Metro Area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$V^0$</td>
<td>Value Realized Upon Exiting Metro Area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

agents buy or sell first, as in Ngai and Tenreyro (2013) and Guren and McQuade (2013).

A homeowner who draws a cost $c$ enters the market if:

$$c \geq V^h_t - V^s_t - LV^0 - (1 - L) V^h_t \equiv c^*_t.$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)

Similarly a renter enters if

$$k \geq V^r_t - V^b_t \equiv k^*_t.$$ \hspace{1cm} (10)

The cutoffs $c^*_t$ and $k^*_t$ determine the marginal buyer and seller and control their flow into the market.\textsuperscript{24}

Because the population is constant, every time a seller leaves the city they are replaced by a new entrant. Entrants draw a cost of being a renter and decide whether to rent or buy in the same manner as a renter who just experienced a shock. The full closed system is illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 6. The laws of motion and value functions of a homeowner and renter

\textsuperscript{24}This setup makes two implicit assumptions for tractability. First, although individuals are heterogeneous in their motivation to move, once they enter the market they are homogenous. Second, if an individual decides not to move today, they do not make another decision about moving until they get another shock.
are deferred to Appendix D.

4.2 The Housing Market

The search process occurs at the beginning of each period and unfolds in three stages. First, sellers post list prices $\hat{p}_t$. Second, buyers search and stochastically find a single house to inspect. Third, matched buyers inspect the house. When they do so, they observe their idiosyncratic valuation for the house $\varepsilon_m$, which is match-specific, drawn from $F(\varepsilon_m)$ at inspection, and realized as utility at purchase. They also observe the house’s permanent quality $v_h$, which is mean-zero, gained by a buyer at purchase, and lost by a seller at sale. The buyer then decides whether to purchase the house or to continue searching.

I assume all sales occur at list price, or equivalently that risk neutral buyers and sellers expect that the average sale price will be an affine function of the list price. This assumption is made

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25 Lester et al. (2013) show that list prices are an optimal mechanism when inspection is costly. Intuitively, a list price acts as a commitment by sellers not to waste buyers’ time.

26 Traditionally sellers are committed to sell if they receive a credible offer at list price. While a sizable number of homes do trade at list price, the average transaction price has historically been below list price, although price wars have become more common in recent years (Han and Strange, 2012a). Several papers have considered the role of various types of bargaining in a framework with a list price in a steady state search model, including cases in which the list price is a price ceiling (Chen and Rosenthal, 1996; Haurin et al., 2010), price wars are possible (Han and Strange, 2013), and list price can signal seller type (Albrecht et al., 2013).
Table 5: Notation in Housing Market

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(\varepsilon_m)</td>
<td>Match-Specific One-Time Utility Benefit</td>
<td>(\sim F(\varepsilon))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(v_h)</td>
<td>Permanent House Quality</td>
<td>Mean Zero</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stochastic Draws

| \(\eta_{h,t}\) | Noise in Observed \(v_h\), IID Common in Period \(t\) | \(\sim G(\eta)\) |

Parameters / Values

| \(\theta\) | Market Tightness = \(B/S\) | Endogenous |
| \(\hat{\theta}\) | Effective Market Tightness = \(B/S^{visited}\) | Endogenous |
| \(q(\hat{\theta})\) | Prob. Seller Meets Buyer (Matching Function) | Endogenous |
| \(\xi\) | Constant in Matching Function |
| \(\gamma\) | Matching Function Elasticity |
| \(\Omega\) | Distribution of Prices | Endogenous |
| \(\varepsilon^*\) | Threshold \(\varepsilon_m\) for Purchase | Endogenous |
| \(\mu\) | Threshold for Binary Signal |

Distribution Parameters

| \(\chi\) | Exponential Dist Param for \(F(\varepsilon)\) |
| \(\sigma\) | Logistic Variance Param for \(G(\eta)\) |

for tractability and is not essential to the propagation mechanism. It is also less strong than it may first appear: Appendix A.3 shows that in the merged Altos-DataQuick micro data, the modal transaction price is the list price, and the average and median differences between the list and transaction price are less than 0.01 log points and do not vary much across years.\(^{27}\)

Buyer search for homes is partially directed in that buyers search only for homes that do not appear overpriced for their quality, but whether a house is overpriced for its quality is noisily observed. This directs search away from overpriced homes but preserves much of the structure of random search in which frictions prevent buyers from seeking out the lowest price house relative to quality or the house with which they have the best match. Formally, after prices are posted, buyers receive a binary signal from their real estate agent or from advertisements. The signal reveals whether a house’s quality-adjusted price is high relative to the average quality-adjusted price, but quality \(v_h\) is subject to mean zero noise \(\eta_{h,t} \sim G(\cdot)\). This noise, which represents how well a house is marketed in a given period, is common to all buyers but independent and identically distributed across periods.

Because buyers can inspect at most one home per period, they limit their search to homes that the signal indicates are not overpriced. These are homes for which the quality-adjusted price

\(^{27}\) An important feature of the housing market is that most price changes are decreases. Consequently, the difference between the initial list price and the sale price fluctuates substantially over the cycle as homes that do not sell cut their list price. I abstract from such duration dependence to maintain a tractable state space.
where $\Omega$ is the distribution of prices. Because the signal reveals nothing else about the home, buyers cannot do better than searching randomly within homes satisfying (11). I assume that search occurs according a constant returns to scale matching function so that the number of matches can be written as a function of the number of buyers and visited sellers $m(B_t, S_{t}^{visited})$. Because $m$ is constant returns to scale, I rewrite $m$ as a function $q(\tilde{\theta}_t)$ of the ratio of buyers to visited sellers $\tilde{\theta}_t = \frac{B_t}{\sum_{s}^{visited} = \frac{B_t}{\sum E_n[1 - G(p_t - E[p_t] - \mu)]}$. The matching function captures frictions in the search process that prevent all reasonably-priced homes and all buyers from having an inspection each period. For instance, buyers randomly allocating themselves across houses may miss a few houses, or there may not be a mutually-agreeable time for a buyer to visit a house in a given period.

After inspecting a house, buyers purchase if their surplus from doing so $V_t^h + \xi_m - p - b - \beta V_t^b$ is positive. This leads to a threshold rule to buy if $\xi_m > p_t + b + \beta V_t^b - V_t^h \equiv \xi_t$ and a probability of purchase given inspection of $1 - F(\xi_t)$.\(^{28}\)

Sellers have rational expectations but set their list price before $\eta_{h,t}$ is realized and without knowing the valuation of the particular buyer who visits their house. The demand curve they face when they set their price, $d(p_t, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t)$, is the ex-ante probability of sale for a house with a list price $p_t$ given a distribution of list prices $\Omega_t$ and functional market tightness $\tilde{\theta}_t$. $d(p_t, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t)$ can be written as the product of the probability the house satisfies (11) and is searched, $1 - G(p_t - E[\eta_t] - \mu)$, the probability a house that is searched matches with a buyer, $q(\tilde{\theta}_t)$, and the probability of purchase given inspection, $1 - F(\xi_t)$:

$$d(p_t, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t) = q(\tilde{\theta}_t) (1 - G(p_t - E[\eta_t] - \mu)) (1 - F(\xi_t)).$$ (12)

I parameterize the model by assuming distributions for $F(\cdot)$ and $G(\cdot)$. Specifically, I assume that $F(\xi_m)$ is an exponential distribution with parameter $\chi$, and $G(\eta_{h,t})$ is logistic with mean zero and variance $\sigma^2 \pi^2 / 2$.\(^{29}\) I also assume that the matching function is Cobb-Douglas $q(\theta) = \xi \theta^{-\gamma}$, as is standard in the search literature. While these assumptions matter for precise quantitative predictions of the model, they are not necessary for the intuitions it illustrates.

This setup leads to a concave demand curve with considerable curvature in the neighborhood of the average price. At above average prices, the demand curve is dominated by whether buyers include the house in their search set, creating an elastic demand curve. At below average prices, buyers include the house in their search set with high probability and the demand curve is dominated by purchase decisions based on a trade-off between idiosyncratic match quality $\xi_m$ and price, so

\(^{28}\)Because the signal reveals no information about the house’s quality $\eta_h$, posted price $\tilde{p}_t$, or match quality $\xi_m$, the search and inspection stages are independent.

\(^{29}\)It is useful to work with distributions for which the hazard rate $1/F$ and mean excess function $E[x - x^*|x > x^*]$ have closed-form analytic solutions. The exponential distribution is particularly convenient because it has a single parameter, changes in the tail density do not drive the results, and the hazard and mean excess functions are constant, although using a Weibull or Gamma yields similar results.
Figure 7: The Concave Demand Curve in the Model

Notes: The figures are generated using calibration described in Section 5. All probabilities and the additive markup are calculated assuming all other sellers are setting the steady state price and considering the effect of a unilateral deviation.

demand is less elastic. To illustrate this, Figure 7 shows the shapes of the probability of inspection \( q(\theta_t) (1 - G(p_t - E[\mathcal{L}] - \mu_t)) \), the probability of purchase conditional on inspection \( 1 - F(z^*_t) \), and the overall demand curve \( d(p_t, \Omega_t, \theta_t) \), equal to the product of the first two panels. (Note that the axes are swapped from the traditional Marshallian supply and demand diagram in order to be consistent with the empirical analysis in Section 3.)

4.3 Flexible Price Setting

If sellers can update their list price each period, the buyer and seller value functions are equal to the value of not transacting and remaining in the market next period plus the probability of purchase or sale times the party’s surplus from the transaction relative to remaining in the market.
Mathematically,

\[ V^b_t = b + \beta V^b_{t+1} + \frac{d \left(p_t, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right)}{\theta_t} \left[ V^b_t + \varepsilon^*_t + E \left[ \varepsilon_m - \varepsilon^*_t | \varepsilon_m > \varepsilon^*_t \right] - p - \beta V^b_{t+1} \right] \]

\[ = b + \beta V^b_{t+1} + \frac{d \left(p_t, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right)}{\chi \theta_t} \]  

(13)

\[ V^s_t = s + \beta V^s_{t+1} + \max \left\{ d \left(p_t, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right) \left[ p_t - s - \beta V^s_{t+1} \right] \right\} , \]  

(14)

where (13) follows from the memoryless property of the exponential distribution for \( \varepsilon_m \). Seller optimization implies:

**Lemma 3** The seller’s optimal list price when prices can be set flexibly each period is:

\[ p = s + \beta V^s_{t+1} + \frac{1}{1 - F \left( \varepsilon^*_t \right)} + \frac{g \left(p_t - E_{\Omega} [p_t] - \mu \right)}{1 - G \left(p_t - E_{\Omega} [p_t] - \mu \right)} \]

\[ = s + \beta V^s_{t+1} \frac{1}{\frac{1}{\sigma \left( \frac{p_t - E_{\Omega} [p_t] - \mu}{\sigma} \right)} + \chi} , \]

(15)

(16)

where the second line imposes the distributional assumptions. In a rational expectations equilibrium \( p_t = E_{\Omega} [p_t] \). The optimal list price is unique on an interval bounded away from \( p = \infty \).

**Proof.** See Appendix D.2. ■

Sellers have monopoly power due to costly search. The optimal pricing problem they solve is the same as that of a monopolist facing the demand curve \( d \) except that the marginal cost is replaced by the seller’s outside option of searching again next period. The optimal pricing strategy is a markup over the outside option \( s + \beta V^s_{t+1} \). In equation (15) it is written as an additive markup equal to the reciprocal of the semi-elasticity of demand, \( \frac{d \left(p_t, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right)}{\beta d p_t \tilde{\theta}_t} \). The semi-elasticity, in turn, is equal to the sum of the hazard rates of the idiosyncratic preference distribution \( F \left( \cdot \right) \) and the distribution of signal noise \( G \left( \cdot \right) \).

This creates a strategic complementarity in price setting because the optimal price depends on relative price \( p_t - E [p_t] \) through the hazard rate of the signal \( G \left( \cdot \right) \). In particular, the elasticity of demand rises as relative price increases, causing the optimal markup to fall from \( \frac{1}{\chi} \) to \( \frac{1}{\frac{1}{\sigma} + \chi} \), as illustrated in Figure 7. The markup thus pushes sellers to set prices close to those of others. However, in a rational expectations equilibrium without additional frictions, all sellers choose the same list price and \( p_t = E [p_t] \), so there is no relative price to affect the markup. A shock to home values thus causes list price to jump proportionally to the seller’s outside option. Consequently, I introduce variants of the model with two different pricing frictions to generate some initial momentum.
4.4 Friction 1: Staggered Price Setting

The first friction I consider is staggered price setting as in Taylor (1980). Prices in housing markets are not constantly updated because it takes time to market a house and collect offers, and lowering the price frequently can signal that the house is of poor quality (De Wit and Van Der Klaauw, 2013). While likely not the most important friction in housing markets, staggered pricing has the virtue of being familiar, tractable, and quantifiable in the micro data.

With $N$ groups of sellers, denote the quality-adjusted prices $p$, value functions $V^s$, masses $S$, and purchase thresholds $\varepsilon$ of a specific vintage of sellers using superscripts for the time since they last reset their price $\tau = \{0, ..., N - 1\}$. The buyer’s surplus from purchasing from various sellers is constant due to the memoryless property of the exponential, but the value function must be adjusted to integrate over the sellers in the market:

$$V^b_t = b + \beta E_t V^b_{t+1} + \frac{1}{\chi_t} \sum_{\tau=0}^{N-1} \frac{S^\tau_t}{S^\tau_t} d\left(p^\tau_t, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t\right).$$

(17)

The value function of a seller is similar to the frictionless case except sellers only optimize occasionally so $\tau$ superscripts are necessary:

$$V^{s,\tau}_t = s + \beta E_t V^{s,\tau+1}_{t+1} + d\left(p^\tau_t, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t\right) \left(p^\tau_t - s - \beta E_t V^{s,\tau+1}_{t+1}\right),$$

(18)

where $V^N_t = V^0_t$ and $d\left(p^\tau_t, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t\right)$ is as in equation (12) except $\varepsilon^*_t$ is replaced by a separate threshold match quality $\varepsilon^{*,\tau}_t$ for each vintage of sellers.

Seller optimization implies the optimal list price is reminiscent of a Taylor (1980) or Calvo (1983) model except there is only one good to sell, so demand is replaced by that the probability the house sells in a given period:

**Lemma 4** If posted prices last $N$ periods, the seller’s optimal reset price $p^0_t$, where the superscript is for periods since price is set, is:

$$p^0_t = \frac{\sum_{\tau=0}^{N-1} \beta^\tau D^\tau_t \left(p^0_t\right) \Psi^\tau_t \pi^\tau_t}{\sum_{\tau=0}^{N-1} \beta^\tau D^\tau_t \left(p^0_t\right) \Psi^\tau_t},$$

(19)

where $D^\tau_t (p) = E_t \left[\prod_{\tau=0}^{j-1} \left(1 - d^\tau \left(p, \Omega_{t+\tau}, \tilde{\theta}_{t+\tau}\right)\right)\right] d\left(p, \Omega_{t+j}, \tilde{\theta}_{t+j}\right)$ is the expected probability the

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{30}}I adopt Taylor (1980) staggered pricing rather than Calvo (1983) pricing because the model includes an integral that cannot be updated iteratively in the denominator of $\tilde{\theta}_t$. Staggered pricing allows for a closed form for the integral because the price distribution has finite support.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{31}}Golosov and Lucas (2008), among others, argue that models with fixed adjustment dates generate more persistence than menu cost models with state-dependent adjustment rules. As described in Section 5, I assume prices are fixed for two months based on data from 2008-2013, a depressed market in which sellers would have the strongest incentives to adjust their price quickly. My calibrated model thus serves as a lower bound of the frequency of price resetting one would observe in a calibrated state-dependent model.
house is sold \( \tau \) periods after the price is set, \( \Psi_t^\tau = E_t \left[ \frac{\partial d(p_t, \Omega_t+\tau, \theta_{t+\tau})}{\partial p_t} \right] \) is the semi-elasticity of demand with respect to price, \( \pi_t^\tau = s + E_{t+\tau+1} V_{t+\tau+1}^{s,\tau+1} + \frac{1}{W_t} \) is the expected optimal flexible reset price \( \tau \) periods after the price is set given the expected price distribution in that period, and \( V_{t+\tau}^{s,\tau} = V_{t+\tau}^{s,0} \). The optimal list price is unique on an interval bounded away from \( p = \infty \) given a condition in Appendix D.2, which holds for all simulations considered.

**Proof.** See Appendix D.2. □

As is standard in staggered price models, the optimal price is a weighted average of the optimal flexible prices that are expected to prevail on the equilibrium path until the seller can reset his or her price. The weight put on the optimal flexible price in period \( t + \tau \) is equal to the discounted probability of sale in period \( i \) times the semi-elasticity of demand in period \( i \). Intuitively, the seller cares more about periods in which probability of sale is higher but also about periods in which demand is more elastic because perturbing price has a larger effect on profit.

In equilibrium, all agents behave optimally given the search technology, the noisy signal of relative price, and buyers’ draw of their idiosyncratic taste when they visit a home. Laws of motion apply due to the law of large numbers. A staggered pricing equilibrium is consequently defined by:

**Definition 5** Equilibrium with \( N \) staggered groups of list-price-setting sellers is a set of prices \( p_t^\tau \), demands \( d(p_t^\tau, \Omega, \theta) \), purchase cutoffs \( c_t^*, \tau \), and seller value functions \( V_t^{s,\tau} \) for each group of sellers \( \tau = \{0, ..., N-1\} \), buyer, homeowner, and renter value functions \( V_t^B, V_t^H, \) and \( V_t^R \), entry cutoffs \( c_t^*, \tau \) and \( k_t^*, \tau \), and stocks of each type of agent \( B_t, S_t^\tau, \tau = \{0, ..., N-1\} \), \( H_t \), and \( R_t \) satisfying:

1. Optimal reset pricing (19) and fixed pricing for non-resetters \( p_t^\tau = p_{t-1}^\tau \quad \forall \tau > 0 \)
2. Optimal purchasing decisions by buyers: \( c_t^*, \tau = p_t^\tau + b + \beta V_{t+1}^B - V_t^H \)
3. The demand curve for each type of seller arising from optimal buyer search given the binary signal (12)
4. Optimal entry decisions by homeowners and renters who receive shocks (9) and (10)
5. The value functions for buyers (17) and each vintage of sellers (18) as well as for renters and homeowners defined in Appendix D
6. The laws of motion for all agents defined in Appendix D.

Appendix D shows that the model has a unique steady state that is equivalent to the frictionless case without staggered pricing \((N = 1)\). A frictionless equilibrium is formally defined in the Appendix D.

I add a stochastic shock process to both this model and the analogous rule-of-thumb variant defined subsequently to examine their dynamic implications. The propagation mechanism for momentum does not qualitatively depend on any particular shock. However, the positive correlation...
between price and volume in the data implies that demand-side shocks dominate. Consequently, I use a shock to the flow utility of being a renter $u$ that changes the relative value of homeownership for potential entrants. This takes a cue from Wheaton and Lee (2009), who show that changes in the frequency of transitions between renting and owning due to credit conditions are a precipitating shock for housing cycles. I implement the shock by assuming that $u = \bar{u} + x$, where $x$ is an AR(1) process understood by the forward-looking agents:

$$x_t = \rho x_{t+1} + \eta \text{ and } \eta \sim N \left(0, \sigma^2_{\eta}\right). \tag{20}$$

The model cannot be solved analytically, so I simulate it numerically using a log-cubic approximation pruning higher order terms as in Kim et al. (2008) implemented in Dynare (Adjemian et al., 2013). Appendix F shows that the impulse responses are similar in an exactly-solved model with a permanent and unexpected shock.

### 4.5 Friction 2: A Small Fraction of Rule-of-Thumb Sellers

The second friction I consider is a small fraction of rule-of-thumb sellers. Since Case and Shiller (1987), sellers with backward-looking expectations have been thought to play an important role in housing markets. Previous models assume that all agents have backward-looking beliefs (e.g., Berkovec and Goodman, 1996), but some observers have found the notion that the majority of sellers are non-rational unpalatable given the financial importance of housing transactions for many households. Some fraction of sellers, however, may not find it worthwhile to scrutinize current market conditions, and my model only requires a handful of backward-looking sellers because of the strategic complementarity. Consequently, I introduce a small number of rule-of-thumb sellers, as in Campbell and Mankiw (1989), and assess quantitatively what fraction of sellers is needed to be non-rational to explain the momentum in data, similar to Gali and Gertler (1999).

I assume that at all times a fraction $1 - \alpha$ of sellers set their list price $p_t^R$ rationally according to Lemma 3 and (15) but a fraction $\alpha$ of sellers uses a backward-looking rule of thumb to set their list price $p_t^N$.

The rule-of-thumb sellers are near-rational sellers whose optimizing behavior produces a price-setting rule of thumb based on the recent price path. They are not fully rational in two ways. First, rule-of-thumb sellers understand that a seller solves,

$$\max_{p_t} d\left(p_t, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t\right) p_t + \left(1 - d\left(p_t, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t\right)\right) \left(s + \beta V_{t+1}^s\right),$$

with first order condition,

$$p_t = s + \beta E_t V_{t+1}^s + E_t \left[\frac{1}{\partial d(p_t, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t)/\partial p_t}\right]. \tag{21}$$

---

Footnote: A positive supply-side shock to the flow value $h$ of being a homeowner, for instance, would increase the value of homes but also induce homeowners to endogenously enter less, driving down sales volume.
However, they do not fully understand the laws of motion and how prices and the value of being a seller evolve. Instead, they think the world is a function of a single state variable, price, and can only make “simple” univariate forecasts that take the form of a first order approximation of (21) in price:

\[ p_t = s + \beta (V^s_{t+1} + \pi_1 E[p_t]) + \bar{M} + \pi_2 E[p_t - E[p_t]], \] (22)

where \( V^s, \bar{M}, \pi_1, \) and \( \pi_2 \) are constants.

Second, they only see the average prices \( \bar{p} \) of houses that transact between two to four months ago and between five to seven months ago, corresponding to the lag with which reliable house price indices are released. They assume that price follows a random walk with drift with both the innovations \( \varphi \) and the drift \( \zeta \) drawn independently from mean zero normal distributions with variances \( \sigma^2_\varphi \) and \( \sigma^2_\zeta \). Through a standard signal extraction problem, they expect that today’s price will be normally distributed with mean \( E[p_t] = \bar{p}_{t-3} + E[\zeta] \), where \( E[\zeta] = \frac{\sigma^2_\varphi}{\sigma^2_\varphi + \sigma^2_\zeta} (\bar{p}_{t-3} - \bar{p}_{t-6}) \). Given this normal posterior, equation (22) implies \( p_t = E[p_t] \), so the rule-of-thumb sellers follow an AR(1) rule:

\[ p_t^N = \frac{p_{t-2} + p_{t-3} + p_{t-4}}{3} + \phi \left( \frac{p_{t-2} + p_{t-3} + p_{t-4}}{3} - \frac{p_{t-5} + p_{t-6} + p_{t-7}}{3} \right) \] (23)

where \( \phi = \frac{\sigma^2_\zeta}{\sigma^2_\varphi + \sigma^2_\zeta} \). Such an AR(1) rule is a common assumption in models with backward-looking expectations and is frequently motivated by limited knowledge, information costs, and extrapolative biases (e.g., Hong and Stein, 1999; Fuster et al. 2010).

I assume that the rule-of-thumb price setters think that the variance of the innovation \( \sigma^2_\zeta \) is a substantial share of the overall variance in price changes and consequently use a \( \phi \) that is attenuated relative to what one would find if one ran a quarterly AR(1) in the model environment. This is consistent with Case et al. (2012), who survey home buyers for four metropolitan areas from 2003 to 2011 and show that the average predicted amount of price appreciation at a one-year horizon is approximately 43 percent of the actual amount of appreciation. An attenuated AR(1) coefficient is also consistent with psychological theories in which agents overweight and “anchor” on recent observable prices (see Barberis et al., 1998).

I make two additional assumptions for tractability and parsimony that are not crucial for the results. First, I assume that regardless of whether rational or rule-of-thumb sellers sell faster, inflows adjust so that \( \alpha \) of the active listings are houses owned by rule-of-thumb sellers at all times. Second, I assume that entry occurs according to the threshold rules (9) and (10) using rational value functions. The value function of a rational seller, \( V^R_{t+1} \), is the same as equation (14) for the frictionless case, while the buyer value function needs to be altered to integrate over the distribution

---

33 I use three-month averages to correspond to how price indices like the closely watched Case-Shiller index are constructed and to smooth out saw-tooth patterns that emerge with non-averaged multi-period lags.

34 Specifically, \( E[p_t] = s + \beta \bar{V} + \pi_1 E[p_t] + \bar{M} \) and so \( p_t = E[p_t] + \pi_2 E[p_t - E[p_t]] \), which with a symmetric posterior for \( p_t \) implies \( p_t = E[p_t] \).
of sellers:
\[
V^b_t = b + \beta E_t V^b_{t+1} + \frac{1}{\chi \theta_t} \left[ \alpha d \left( p^N_t, \Omega_t, \bar{\theta}_t \right) + (1 - \alpha) d \left( p^R_t, \Omega_t, \bar{\theta}_t \right) \right].
\]  

(24)

Given these assumptions, one can define an equilibrium with rule-of-thumb sellers by:

**Definition 6** Equilibrium with a fraction \( \alpha \) of rule-of-thumb sellers is a set of prices \( p^i_t \), demands \( d(p^i_t, \Omega, \theta) \), and purchase cutoffs \( \varepsilon^i_t \) for each type of seller \( i \in \{N, R\} \), rational seller, buyer, homeowner, and renter value functions \( V^R_t \), \( V^b_t \), \( V^h_t \), and \( V^r_t \), entry cutoffs \( c^*_t \) and \( k^*_t \), and stocks of each type of agent \( B_t, S_t, H_t, \) and \( R_t \) satisfying:

1. Optimal pricing for rational sellers (15) and the pricing rule (23) for rule-of-thumb sellers
2. Optimal purchasing decisions by buyers: \( \varepsilon^i_t = p^i_t + b + \beta V^h_{t+1} - V^h_t \)
3. The demand curve for each type of seller arising from optimal buyer search given the binary signal (12)
4. Optimal entry decisions by homeowners and renters who receive shocks (9) and (10)
5. The value functions for buyers (24) and rational sellers (14) as well as for renters and homeowners defined in Appendix D
6. The laws of motion for all agents defined in Appendix D.

The steady state of this model is the same as the staggered and frictionless models. Consequently, the staggered pricing and rule-of-thumb models can be calibrated using the same procedure.

## 5 How Much Can Concave Demand Amplify Momentum?

To quantitatively assess the degree to which concave demand curves amplify house price momentum, this section calibrates the model to the empirical findings presented in Section 3 and a number of aggregate moments. Before doing so, I briefly analyze the frequency of price adjustment in the micro data to motivate the calibration of the staggered pricing variant of the model.

### 5.1 Frequency of Price Adjustment

Figure 8 shows the Kaplan-Meier survival curve for list prices of homes with an observed prior transaction in the San Francisco Bay, Los Angeles, and San Diego areas between April 2008 and February 2013. Each observation is a list price, with a sale counted as a censored observation and a price change counted as a failure. The curve thus shows the fraction of list prices that have survived a given number of weeks conditional on the house remaining on the market. The curve crosses the 50 percent threshold corresponding to the median time until a price is changed at eight weeks. Consequently, I calibrate the staggered variant of the model so that one period lasts one month, and there are two groups of sellers that alternate setting list prices that last two months.
5.2 Calibration and Estimation

In order to simulate the model, 21 parameters listed in Table 7 must be set. For the rule-of-thumb variant of the model, the AR(1) coefficient in the rule of thumb $\phi$ and the fraction of sellers who follow it $\alpha$ also require numerical values. This section describes the calibration procedure and targets, with details deferred to Appendix E.

Three parameters control the shape of the demand curve and thus have a first-order impact on momentum: $\chi$, the exponential parameter of the idiosyncratic quality distribution, controls the elasticity of demand for low-priced homes that are certain to be visited; $\sigma$, the logistic variance parameter of the signal, controls the elasticity of demand for high-priced homes; and $\mu$, the threshold for being overpriced, controls where on the curve the average price lies. The other parameters affect momentum through equilibrium feedbacks and have a second order effect on momentum. Consequently, I first estimate these three parameters from the instrumental variable micro estimates presented in Section 3 and then calibrate the rest of the model to match steady state and time series aggregate moments. The calibration proceeds in two steps.

First, I estimate $\chi$, $\sigma$, and $\mu$ to match the micro estimates. There is heterogeneity in list price in the micro estimates not in the model, and the low average probability of sale in the 2008-13 period poses a challenge because the data are not generated in a plausible steady state. To account for these features of the data, I express the probability of sale for an arbitrary distribution of prices and an arbitrary average probability of sale as functions of observable variables and the three

Notes: The figure shows the Kaplan-Meier survival curve for list prices, where sales are treated a censored observation and a price change is treated as a failure. The curve thus corresponds to the probability of a list price surviving for a given number of weeks conditional on the property not having sold. The sample is made up of 854,547 list prices for 420,351 listings of homes with observed prior transactions in the San Francisco Bay, Los Angeles, and San Diego areas listed between April 2008 to February 2013.
parameters $\chi$, $\sigma$, and $\mu$. This allows me to approximate the model with the heterogeneity in the data out of steady state for the purposes of calibration, estimate these three parameters, and then conduct my dynamic simulations with the heterogeneity suppressed to maintain a tractable state space.

Specifically, with my assumed functional forms, the probability of sale at the time the list price is posted can be written as:

$$
\begin{align*}
\frac{d}{dt} p_t; t; q_t &= q \left( \frac{\theta_t}{\mu} \right) (1 - G(p_t - E_x [p_t] - \mu)) (1 - F(z_t^x)) \\
&= \kappa_t (1 - G(p_t - E_x [p_t] - \mu)) \exp(-\chi p_t)
\end{align*}
$$

(25)

The aggregate state variables factor out into a multiplicative constant, $\kappa_t$, which can be given a structural interpretation as a shift in the matching function efficiency $\xi$. $\kappa_t$ multiplies two terms: the effect of perturbing price on the probability the house is visited $1 - G(p_t - E_x [p_t] - \mu)$ and a term representing the buyer’s trade-off between idiosyncratic quality and price $\exp(-\chi p_t)$. To simulate the probability of sale, all that is needed are $\chi$, $\sigma$, and $\mu$, observed prices $p$, the observed average price $E_x [p]$, and the observed average probability of sale.

Using equation (25), I calibrate $\chi$, $\sigma$, and $\mu$ to the IV binned scatter plot. The data is 25 ordered pairs $(p_b, d_b)$ corresponding to the log relative markup plus the mean log price in the market and probability of sale within 13 weeks for each of 25 bins $b$ of the distribution of the relative markup. I solve for $\kappa_t$ to match the average probability of sale, and use (25) to simulate $d(p_b)$ in the model for each $p_b$. Because the distribution of the relative markup is compressed and the zero point corresponding to the average price is not precisely estimated, I choose the average price so that the elasticity of demand implies a monthly seller search cost of approximately $10,000 based on evidence from Genesove and Mayer (1997) and Levitt and Syverson (2008) described in Appendix E. Conditional on this average price, the best fit $(\chi, \sigma, \mu)$ is chosen to minimize the sum of squared errors $\sum_b w_b (d_b - d^3_{month}(p_b))^2$ where $w_b$ is a Normal kernel weight to reduce the influence of outliers and $d^3_{month}(\cdot)$ is a simulated 3-month sale probability based on (25). Figure 9 shows the IV binned scatter plot in blue Xs and the model’s predicted $d(p_b)$ for the $(\sigma, \mu, \chi)$ that minimize the distance between the model and the data in red circles. The fit suggests that the demand curve in the calibrated model captures the curvature in the data well.

The second step in the calibration is to match a number of aggregate steady state and stochastic moments given the $\chi$, $\sigma$, and $\mu$ from the first step. I set 14 parameters to match 14 steady state moments listed in the first three panels of Table 6. These targets are either from other papers or are long-run averages for the U.S. housing market, such as the homeownership rate, the average amount of time between moves for buyers and renters, and the average time on the market for buyers and sellers. A few parameters for which data is not easily available are assumed, and the results are not sensitive to the assumed values. I also match three time series moments as indicated by the

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35 The seller search cost is likely large because of the nuisances and uncertainties involved and the need to move quickly. Another factor, highlighted by Anenberg and Bayer (2013), is the high cost of simultaneously holding two homes, which pushes households to sell quickly before buying.
Notes: The blue Xs are the binned scatter plot from the IV specification with 2.5% of the data from each end excluded to reduce the effects of outliers. The red dots are the simulated probabilities of sale at each price level in the calibrated model.

bottom panel of Table 6. The monthly persistence of the shock is set to match the persistence of local income shocks as in Glaeser et al. (2013). The final parameters are set to match the standard deviation of annual log price changes and the elasticity of seller entry with respect to price in stochastic simulations.\textsuperscript{36}

For the rule-of-thumb variant of the model, I set the AR(1) coefficient $\phi$ to 0.4 following evidence from Case et al. (2012). Using surveys of home buyers they show that regressing realized annual house price appreciation on households’ ex-ante beliefs yields a regression coefficient of 2.34. I use this survey evidence to calibrate the beliefs of the rule-of-thumb sellers by dividing the approximate regression coefficient one would obtain in quarterly simulated data (approximately 0.94) by their coefficient. I adjust $\alpha$ and recalibrate the model until the impulse response to the renter flow utility shock matches the matches the 36 months of positively autocorrelated price changes in the AR(5) impulse response estimated on the CoreLogic national house price index in Section 2.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{36}Because the stock of buyers is not observed, I cannot similarly calibrate for the buyer entry elasticity. Consequently, I assume the density of buyer entry costs is the same as the density of seller entry costs. Seller entry tends to track volume, so buyer entry cannot have a substantially different density.

\textsuperscript{37}An alternative approach would be to simulate data, collapse it to the quarterly level, and then estimate the same AR(5) as for the CoreLogic data. Doing so requires a fraction of rule-of-thumb price setters that is approximately ten percent higher than matching the impulse response to the model shock. A comparably higher fraction is also required to match the AR(5) without concavity. As shown in Appendix B, using a median price index generates an impulse response in the data that reaches its peak in two years rather than three years. My approach of calibrating the peak of the impulse response to the renter flow utility shock to the peak of the AR(5) IRF for a repeat-sales index
Table 6: Calibration Targets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Steady State Parameter or Moment</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Source / Justification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parameters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma$ (Matching Function Elasticity)</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>Genesove and Han (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$L$ (Prob. Stay in MSA)</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>Anenberg and Bayer (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate Targets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Discount Rate</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>Carrillo (2012) housing market discount rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time on Market for Sellers</td>
<td>4 Months</td>
<td>Approx average parameter value in literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time on Market for Buyers</td>
<td>4 Months</td>
<td>$\approx$ Time to sell in surveys (Genesove and Han, 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeownership Rate</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>Long run average, 1970s-1990s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time in House For Owner Occupants</td>
<td>9 Years</td>
<td>American Housing Survey, 1997-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Between Moves for Renters</td>
<td>29 Months</td>
<td>American Housing Survey, 1997-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$c^*$ (Cost Marginal $H$ Pays to Avoid Move)</td>
<td>$$37.5k</td>
<td>Moving cost 5% of price (Haurin &amp; Gill, 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$k^*$ (Cost Marginal $R$ Pays to Avoid Buying)</td>
<td>$$20k</td>
<td>Tax benefits of owning 29 months (Poterba &amp; Sinai, 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumed Values</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Between Shocks for Homeowners</td>
<td>29 Months</td>
<td>Same as renter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steady State Price</td>
<td>$$750k</td>
<td>Average log price in IV sample adjusted for down market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$h$ (Flow Utility of Homeowner)</td>
<td>$$7.5k</td>
<td>2/3 of house value from expected flow util</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob Purchase</td>
<td>Inspect</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Series Moments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual SD of Log Price Changes</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>CoreLogic national HPI adjusted for CPI, 1976-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho$ (Monthly Persistence of AR1 Shock)</td>
<td>.990</td>
<td>Persistence of income shocks (Glaeser et al., 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price Elasticity of Seller Entry</td>
<td>.878</td>
<td>CoreLogic, Census, and NAR, 1976-2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The staggered and rule-of-thumb variants differ minutely in their calibrated values so that each matches the volatility of price and entry elasticity in stochastic simulations, as discussed in Appendix E. Table 7 summarizes the calibrated parameter values for the rule-of-thumb variant of the model.  

5.3 Amplification of Momentum in the Calibrated Model

To assess the degree of amplification of momentum in the calibrated model, I compare the frictionless, staggered price, and rule-of-thumb variants of the model to one another and to versions is comparable to simulating data, estimating the AR(5) IRF, and calibrating to match the average of the repeat-sales and median price IRF peak quarters.

One may argue that the flow cost of being a buyer is too large. This could be reduced without meaningfully changing the main results by relaxing several assumptions made to keep the model tractable. The buyer search cost is calibrated to a high level because the flat slope for homes priced below average implies that the exponential distribution for idiosyncratic quality has a long tail. This implies a high value of subsequent search for buyers, which is offset with a high search cost to maintain a reasonable value of being a buyer. Both using an idiosyncratic match quality distribution that is bounded above and allowing the signal to reveal more information so that buyers search houses they expect to like would reduce the calibrated buyer search cost substantially. Ongoing work to adjust for bias in the slope of the micro estimates due to measurement error in the true relative markup, as discussed in Section 3, may also result in a smaller calibrated buyer search cost.
Table 7: Calibrated Parameter Values for Rule of Thumb Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Interpretation</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Interpretation</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>Monthly Discount Factor</td>
<td>0.994</td>
<td>$V^0$</td>
<td>Value of Leaving MSA</td>
<td>$2,631k$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma$</td>
<td>Matching Fn Elasticity</td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td>$h$</td>
<td>Flow Util of H</td>
<td>$7.5k$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\xi$</td>
<td>Matching Fn Efficiency</td>
<td>0.506</td>
<td>$u$</td>
<td>Flow Util of R</td>
<td>$3.6k$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda^h$</td>
<td>Monthly Prob H Moving Shock</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>$b$</td>
<td>Flow Util of B (search cost)</td>
<td>-$92.2k$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda^r$</td>
<td>Monthly Prob R Moving Shock</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>$s$</td>
<td>Flow Util of S (search cost)</td>
<td>-$9.8k$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\bar{e}$</td>
<td>Upper Bound, H Entry Cost Dist</td>
<td>$463k$</td>
<td>$\chi$</td>
<td>Exponential Param for</td>
<td>0.0023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\zeta^h$</td>
<td>Lower Bound, H Entry Cost Dist</td>
<td>-$1,121k$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Idiosyncratic Quality Dist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$k^h$</td>
<td>Upper Bound, R Entry Cost Dist</td>
<td>$412k$</td>
<td>$\sigma$</td>
<td>Variance Param of Signal Noise</td>
<td>3.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$k^r$</td>
<td>Lower Bound, R Entry Cost Dist</td>
<td>-$1,172k$</td>
<td>$\mu$</td>
<td>Threshold for Signal</td>
<td>10.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Pop}$</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>1.484</td>
<td>$\sigma_{\eta}$</td>
<td>SD of Innovations to AR(1) shock</td>
<td>0.360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$L$</td>
<td>Prob Leave MSA</td>
<td>0.700</td>
<td>$\rho$</td>
<td>Persistence of AR(1) shock</td>
<td>0.990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\phi$ AR(1) Param in Rule of Thumb

Notes: The calibration is monthly. The parameters under the line are only used in the rule-of-thumb variant of the model. The parameters for the staggered variant of the model are only minutely different and can be found in Appendix E.

without concave demand. To do so, I examine the impulse response to the model shock to the flow utility of renters. The impulse response is computed as the average difference between two sets of simulations that use the same sequence of random shocks except for one period in which an additional standard deviation shock is added. I contrast the model impulse responses with the impulse response to a one standard deviation price shock to the quarterly CoreLogic national house price index estimated from an AR(5), as in Section 2.

Figure 10 shows the resulting simulations alongside the AR(5) impulse response. The figure shows that the strategic complementarity created by concave demand substantially amplifies both frictions.

Panel A compares a frictionless model with concave demand to staggered price models with and without concave demand, in dotted red, solid blue, and dashed green, respectively.\textsuperscript{39} Without both concave demand and staggering, reset prices jump on impact and reach a convergent path to the stochastic steady state as soon as all sellers have reset their prices, as indicated by the dotted red line and the dashed green line. In combination, however, the two-month staggered pricing friction is amplified into 10 months of autocorrelated price changes, as shown in the solid blue line.

The gradual impulse response results from sellers only partially adjusting their list prices when they have the opportunity to do so in order to not ruin their chances of attracting a buyer by being substantially overpriced. Repeated partial adjustment results in serially correlated price changes that last far beyond the point that all sellers have reset their price.\textsuperscript{40} Note that the impulse

\textsuperscript{39}The non-concave impulse response depends on the semi-elasticity of the non-concave demand function. For the main text, I assume a semi-elasticity that equal to the steady-state semi-elasticity at the average price in the concave case and discuss alternative assumptions in Appendix F.

\textsuperscript{40}With staggered pricing there are further dynamic incentives because price resetters leapfrog sellers with fixed
Notes: Panel A shows the impulse responses to a one standard deviation negative shock to the flow utility of renting in the frictionless model with concave demand, the staggered model with concave demand, and the staggered model without concave demand. For the model without concave demand, the threshold for being overpriced $\mu$ is raised to a level that is never reached, the slope of the demand curve is adjusted to the steady-state slope at the average price in the concave model, the model is recalibrated, and the standard deviation of the stochastic shock is adjusted so that the impulse response is even with the frictionless and concave impulse response after a year. Panel B shows the impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock to the flow utility of renting in the rule-of-thumb model with and without concavity. For the model without concave demand, the threshold for being overpriced $\mu$ is raised to a level that is never reached, the slope of the demand curve is adjusted to the steady-state slope at the average price in the concave model, and the model is recalibrated. Also shown in panel B in the dotted black line and with grey 95% confidence intervals and on the right axis is the impulse response to a one standard deviation price shock estimated from a quarterly AR(5) for the seasonally and CPI adjusted CoreLogic national house price index for 1976-2013, as in Figure 1. Simulated impulse responses are calculated by differencing two simulations of the model from periods 100 to 150, both of which use identical random shocks except in period 101 in which a one standard deviation negative draw is added to the random sequence, and then computing the average difference over 100 simulations.

Response includes endogenous entry, which weakens house price momentum as buyers and sellers re-time their entry into the market to arbitrage the gradual price change. This effect, which is discussed in Section 6, is not strong enough to eliminate momentum. Appendix F shows that concave demand also generates significant momentum for a downward shock. Intuitively, if other sellers do not lower their prices immediately, cutting a house’s price substantially has a small effect on its probability of sale and leaves money on the table.

Despite the five-fold amplification, the staggered-pricing variant of the model only explains one quarter of the three-year impulse response in the data. This is unsurprising: there are many potential frictions that cause momentum, so it would be unrealistic to expect staggered pricing
alone to be amplified by a factor of 20 in order to fully explain the data.\textsuperscript{41}

To fully explain the impulse response in the data, I use the rule-of-thumb variant of the model and raise the fraction of rule-of-thumb sellers $\alpha$ until the impulse response function to the renter flow utility shock peaks after 36 months. This occurs when 26.5 percent of sellers use a rule of thumb. By contrast, without concave demand, between 78 and 93 percent of sellers would have to be rule-of-thumb in order to explain a 36-month impulse response to the renter flow utility shock, with the precise number depending on how the non-concave demand curve is calibrated, as described in Appendix F.

Far fewer rule-of-thumb sellers are needed to match the data with concave demand because the strategic complementarity creates a two-way feedback. When a shock occurs, the rule-of-thumb sellers are not aware of it for several months, and the rational sellers only slightly increase their prices so that they do not dramatically reduce their chances of attracting a buyer. When the rule-of-thumb sellers do observe increasing prices, they observe a much small increase than in the non-concave case and gradually adjust their price according to their AR(1) rule, reinforcing the incentives of the rational sellers not to raise their prices too quickly.

Panel B of Figure 10 compares the model with 26.5 percent rule-of-thumb sellers in solid orange to the AR(5) impulse response in dotted black and a model with an identical fraction of rule-of-thumb sellers without concave demand in dashed turquoise. The impulse response with concave demand and the AR(5) impulse response are similar, although the model impulse response grows less at the beginning and is slightly more S-shaped than the AR(5) impulse response. This is the case because rule-of-thumb sellers are insensitive to the shock for several months and so the growth rate of prices takes a few months to accelerate. Without concave demand, there is an immediate jump in prices as rational sellers raise their prices as soon as the shock to fundamentals occurs. This is followed by nine months of rapid price growth as the rule-of-thumb sellers catch up. The strategic complementarity thus provides considerable amplification.\textsuperscript{42}

With additional frictions it is likely that the 26.5 percent figure could be reduced even further.\textsuperscript{43} Intuitively, other frictions are also amplified by concave demand because the incentive it creates to price close to others interacts with any source of initial insensitivity to create additional momentum. One particular friction that the literature has identified as causing momentum—incomplete information and learning by sellers and possibly buyers—merits additional discussion because the amplification from concave demand is likely to be particularly potent. In a model with dispersed

\textsuperscript{41}The momentum created by staggered pricing cannot be dramatically enhanced by increasing the length of staggering without increasing the average time to sale. For instance, if prices were fixed for four months instead of two months, the longer friction would be offset because there would be fewer sellers who remain stuck at an old price when a group of sellers sets their prices.

\textsuperscript{42}A direct empirical test of the degree to which concave demand amplifies momentum is beyond the scope of this paper. I do, however, have one intriguing data point that may point the way for such a test in the future: a smaller data set of merged Altos-DataQuick listings for Phoenix. Phoenix has a higher housing supply elasticity and by some measures exhibits less momentum than coastal California, and a preliminary analysis of its micro data suggests that the degree of concavity in Phoenix may be weaker. With many MSAs of data, one could evaluate whether the degree of concavity in a cross section of cities can explain differences in momentum across cities.

\textsuperscript{43}For instance, adding staggered pricing to the rule-of-thumb model reduces the fraction of rule-of-thumb sellers needed to explain the data to 23.5 percent.
information without strategic complementarities, such as Lucas’ (1972) “islands” model, Bayesian learning about a change in fundamentals occurs fairly rapidly. Indeed, Anenberg (2013) shows that lagged market conditions do not have a significant impact on seller pricing after a four months. However, with a strategic complementarity and dispersed information, the motive to price close to others makes higher order beliefs—that is beliefs about the beliefs of others—matter, a point first made by Phelps (1983) and modeled by Woodford (2003) and Lorenzoni (2009). Learning about higher order beliefs is far more gradual because agents must learn not only about fundamentals but also about what everyone else has learned. Strategic complementarities in such a framework can cause extremely gradual price adjustment even if first-order learning occurs rapidly.

6 Can Momentum Help Explain Housing Cycles?

This section argues that momentum helps explain the three striking features of the dynamics of housing cycles presented in Section 2: volume and inventory are more volatile than price, price changes and inventory levels are highly correlated, and inventory swings correspond to periods where seller entry and sales move in opposite directions. Momentum plays a role in causing these features because some buyers and sellers re-time their sales and purchases in light of predictable price changes. Before showing how this explains the three facts, I analyze the impulse response for non-price variables to provide intuition. The precise friction causing momentum does not matter greatly for the re-timing of entry, so I focus on the rule-of-thumb model with 26.5 percent rule-of-thumb sellers because it fully captures the momentum in the data.

6.1 Impulse Responses of Non-Price Variables

Figure 11 shows the impulse responses of price, sales volume, months of supply, and buyer and seller entry in a frictionless model without rule-of-thumb sellers (dotted red) and in a model with 26.5 percent rule-of-thumb sellers (solid blue). Recall that the shock reduces the value of being a renter and increases the incentives to enter the market to buy. Without staggered pricing, price jumps immediately and gradually returns towards the stochastic steady state, so there is not a strong incentive to buy or sell today relative to tomorrow. Buyer entry and seller entry, shown in panel D in dotted red and dash-dotted green, both jump on impact due to the change in the relative value of homeownership and the elevated house price. Buyer entry is slightly higher for 18 months as the ratio of buyers to sellers slowly rises until it settles on a stable transition path to the stochastic steady state. The slow adjustment of market tightness, in turn, causes a gradual increase in volume and decrease in months of supply.

By contrast, the momentum generated with a small fraction of rule-of-thumb sellers makes price changes predictable. This creates a strong incentive for potential buyers on the margin of entering to enter today and for sellers on the margin of entering to wait to do so until prices rise.44

44In the model, this operates through the entry cutoffs \( c_t \) and \( k_t \), which are defined by differences of value functions in equations (9) and (10). For instance, the cutoff cost for a renter to enter \( k_t = V_t^r - V_t^b \). Because the value function...
Figure 11: Impulse Response Functions in the Rule-of-Thumb Model

Notes: Each panel plots the indicated impulse response to a one standard deviation shock for the frictionless and rule-of-thumb variants of the model. The frictionless model uses the same calibration and shock as the 26.5 percent rule-of-thumb model with no rule-of-thumb sellers. Simulated impulse responses are calculated by differencing two simulations of the model from periods 100 to 150, both of which use identical random shocks except in period 101 in which a one standard deviation negative draw is added to the random sequence, and then computing the average difference over 100 simulations.

The entry responses are visible in panel D as a gap opens up between the solid blue line, which represents buyer entry with 26.5 percent rule-of-thumb sellers, and the dotted red line, which corresponds to buyer entry in a frictionless model. A similar gap opens up for sellers, as shown by the dashed black line (26.5 percent rule-of-thumb) and the dash-dotted green line (frictionless). Volume picks up and the growth in sales, overshooting of buyer entry, and undershooting of seller entry relative to the frictionless case together cause inventory to adjust more rapidly and substantially than it does in the frictionless model, as shown in panel C. The stock of renters becomes depleted and the stock of homeowners becomes enlarged to the extent that 15 months after the shock, they reverse roles and overshoot the frictionless price path again. This causes inventory and sales volume of being a renter $V_r^r$ accounts for the likelihood of getting a shock and entering as a buyer in the future, when prices are expected to rise $V_r^r$ falls relative to $V_r^b$, $k_t^r$ falls, and the mass of buyer entrants, which is proportional to $1 - K(k_t^r)$, rises.
Table 8: Quantitative Performance of Calibrated Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Frictionless</th>
<th>Staggered</th>
<th>26.5% Rule of Thumb</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>SD Annual Δ log (Real Price)</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.065◊</td>
<td>0.065◊</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD Annual Δ log (Sales)</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD Annual Δ log (Inventory)</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regression Coefficient of log (Inventory) on Δ_yr log (Real Price)</td>
<td>-0.140</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>-0.196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regression R²</td>
<td>0.543</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.797</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ◊ indicates the model is calibrated to match the data. All are statistics calculated as means of 200 random simulations of 500 years. The standard deviations of annual log changes in the model are calculated by collapsing simulated data to the quarterly level, taking logs, and reporting the quarterly standard deviations of annual differences. Inventory is measured as months of supply. The regression of log price changes on log inventory levels is as in equation (26), with inventory measured as months of supply at the midpoint of the year differenced to calculate the log change in price. The frictionless model, which is not recalibrated to match the data, uses the staggered price calibration but would look nearly identical if the rule-of-thumb calibration were used.

...to mean revert more quickly. In fact, inventory and sales overshoot the frictionless impulse response once again as prices begin to stabilize due to the glut of sellers and lack of buyers. These responses look similar to the panel VAR presented in Section 2.

6.2 Explaining the Housing Cycle Facts

6.2.1 The Relative Volatility of Price, Volume and Inventory

In housing search models without momentum, inventory and volume are too smooth relative to the data. The top half of Table 8 shows the standard deviation of annual changes of log price, log volume, and log months of supply in the data and three versions of the model. In the frictionless price model, months of supply is about a fifth as volatile and volume less than half as volatile as the data.

This is not unique to my particular frictionless model. In a broad class of housing search models, combining the steady-state value of being a seller with the steady-state price and differentiating yields:

\[ \frac{dp}{dPr [Sell]} = \frac{Seller Surplus}{1 - \beta}. \]

This steady state response illustrates that if the seller surplus is not miniscule, price is very sensitive to the probability of sale, which is mechanically related to inventory and volume.\(^{45}\) The relative volatility of volume and inventory are also low due to the gradual dynamic adjustment of market

\(^{45}\)Diaz and Jerez (2013) explain the relative volatilities in a model without momentum by using a calibration in which the seller surplus is 0.5% of the purchase price. Consequently, they argue that price is too insensitive and volume and time on the market are too sensitive to shocks and introduce a model with amplified price volatility. My calibration, which uses a seller surplus that is approximately 7.5% of the steady state price, implies that price is too volatile in a frictionless setting. Head et al. (2012) make a similar point that momentum helps reduce price volatility.
tightness as shown in the impulse responses.

The low volatility of inventory is directly analogous to labor search models. Shimer (2005) shows that unless the employer surplus is tiny, labor search models have difficulty accounting for the volatility of unemployment because most of the response to a shock is absorbed by the wage. Here, the unemployment rate is analogous to inventory and the wage rate is analogous to price.

Like sticky wages in labor search models, momentum makes house prices adjust more slowly and slightly reduces price volatility. Quantities adjust slightly more and inventory adjusts substantially more, as shown in the impulse responses and Table 8, which shows the standard deviation of annual changes for log price, log sales, and log inventory averaged over 200 500-year simulations. Inventory is somewhat too volatile in the calibrated model, although it is of the same order of magnitude as the data in contrast to the frictionless model. Volume, on the other hand, falls slightly short of the data, which suggests that other factors, such as lock in due to equity (Stein, 1995), may play a role in amplifying volume volatility. Appendix B shows that the model’s strongest prediction about relative volatilities—that momentum and inventory volatility are positively correlated—is borne out in the cross-section of cities used for the panel VAR in Section 2.

### 6.2.2 Housing Phillips Curve

In the data price changes are strongly negatively correlated with inventory levels, creating a “housing Phillips curve.” In the frictionless case depicted in Figure 11, price changes are negatively correlated with inventory changes, albeit weakly because the inventory response is delayed due to gradual entry and search frictions. With persistent but mean reverting shocks, this generates a positive correlation between price changes and inventory levels because when inventory is high, prices are low and tend to rise towards the stochastic steady state. This can be seen in the bottom half of Table 8, which shows a regression coefficient $\beta_1$ in:

$$\Delta_{t-4} \log (p) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \log (MS_{t-2}) + \varepsilon,$$

estimated on simulated quarterly data. For a frictionless model, the regression coefficient is significantly positive, although with a small R-squared.

With momentum, inventory rapidly adjusts and then mean reverts while price appreciation grows and then gradually weakens, as shown in Figure 11. This creates a strong negative correlation between price changes and inventory levels. Table 8 shows that with 26.5 percent rule-of-thumb sellers, a robust negative relationship emerges. In fact, the relationship is slightly stronger than in the data with an R-squared of nearly 0.8. Appendix B shows that the housing Phillips curve is stronger, both in terms of the magnitude of $\beta_1$ and in terms of explanatory power, in cities with more momentum. This is consistent with the model.
6.2.3 Buyer and Seller Entry

Forward looking entry responses imply that seller entry and buyer entry move in opposite directions at peaks and troughs, corresponding to periods of sudden inventory adjustment, as shown for the recent boom and bust in Figure 4. While the impulse responses illustrate a similar pattern in the model, Figure 12 provides further confirmation of the model's ability to replicate the data by showing a sample simulation that looks strikingly similar to Figure 4. Initially there is a sellers' market in which inventory is low, and buyer and seller entry track one another. When the market peaks, buyer entry dries up but seller entry remains high as sellers seek to sell to buyers who need to buy now and are willing to pay high prices. As a result, inventory quickly spikes. When buyers finally re-enter the market, seller entry lags and the inventory glut dissipates.

7 Conclusion

The degree and persistence of autocorrelation in house price changes is one of the housing market’s most distinctive features and greatest puzzles. This paper introduces a mechanism that amplifies small frictions that have been discussed in the literature into substantial momentum. Search frictions and concave demand in relative price together imply that increasing one’s list price above the market average is costly, while lowering one’s list price below the market average has little benefit. This strategic complementarity induces sellers to set their list prices close to the market
average. Consequently, modest frictions that generate price insensitivity to changes in fundamentals lead to prolonged periods of autocorrelated price changes as sellers slowly adjust their list price to remain close to the mean.

This amplification mechanism depends critically on a concave effect of unilaterally changing a house's list price relative to the average on the probability of sale. I identify this effect in micro data by instrumenting for list price with a proxy for the equity position of sellers and find statistically and economically significant concavity. This conclusion requires that the instrument be independent of unobserved quality and other sources of relative price differences.

To demonstrate the strategic complementarity’s ability to prolong an initial friction, I introduce an equilibrium search model in which buyers avoid looking at homes they perceive to be overpriced. I calibrate the model to the micro data and consider the quantitative impact of two different frictions. A two-month staggered pricing friction is amplified into ten months of autocorrelated price changes. If just 26.5 percent of sellers use a backward-looking rule of thumb, the impulse response to a shock lasts for three years, as in the data. Without concave demand, 78 to 93 percent of sellers would have to be backward-looking. The amplification channel also interacts with other frictions that have been discussed by the literature. In particular, concave demand in relative price would substantially amplify momentum created by learning in an “islands” model because learning about higher order beliefs is particularly sluggish. Assessing whether such a model can explain the momentum in the data without a small number of non-rational sellers is a promising path for future research.

Momentum has a substantial impact on housing dynamics because it causes forward-looking buyers and sellers to re-time their entry into the housing market in order to sell high and buy low. These buyer and seller entry patterns can help explain the relative volatilities of price, volume, and inventory, the “housing Phillips curve” relationship between price changes and inventory levels, and the sudden reversals between buyers’ and sellers’ markets that occurs at peaks and troughs.

Beyond the housing market, this paper shows how a central idea in macroeconomics—that strategic complementarities can greatly amplify modest frictions—can be applied in new contexts. These contexts can, in turn, serve as empirical laboratories to study macroeconomic phenomena for which micro evidence has proven elusive. In particular, many models with real rigidities use a concave demand curve. This paper provides new evidence that a concave demand curve in relative price is not merely a theoretical construct and can have a significant effect on market dynamics.
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A Data

A.1 Time Series Data

A.1.1 National and Regional Data

In the main text, three data series are used for price, volume and inventory:

- The CoreLogic national repeat-sales house price index. This is an arithmetic interval-weighted house price index from January 1976 to August 2013. The monthly index is averaged at a quarterly frequency and adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index, BLS series CUUR0000SA0.

- The National Association of Realtors’ series of sales of existing single-family homes at a seasonally-adjusted annual rate. The data is monthly for the whole nation from January 1968 to January 2013 and available on request from the NAR. The monthly data is averaged at a quarterly frequency.

- Homes listed for sale comes from vacant homes listed for sale from the Census Housing Vacancy Survey, quarterly from Q1 1968 to Q4 2012. This is divided by the NAR sales volume series to create months of supply.

Other price and inventory measures are used in Appendix B. The price measures include:

- A median sales price index for existing single-family homes. The data is monthly for the whole nation from January 1968 to January 2013 and available on request from the National Association of Realtors.

- The quarterly national “expanded purchase-only” HPIs that only includes purchases and supplements the FHFA’s database from the GSEs with deeds data from DataQuick from Q1 1991 to Q4 2012. This is an interval-weighted geometric repeat-sales index.

- The monthly Case-Shiller Composite Ten from January 1987 to January 2013. This is an interval-weighted arithmetic repeat-sales index.

- A median sales price index for all sales (existing and new homes) from CoreLogic from January 1976 to August 2013.

The additional inventory measure is the National Association of Realtors’ series on inventory and months of supply of existing single-family homes. The data is monthly for the whole nation from June 1982 to February 2013 and is available on request.

For annual AR(1) regressions, I use non-seasonally-adjusted data. Because the volume series comes seasonally adjusted, for any analysis that includes sales volume, I use the data provider’s seasonal adjustment if available and otherwise seasonally adjust the data using the Census Bureau’s X-12 ARIMA software using a multiplicative seasonal factor.

A.1.2 City-Level Data

I create two city-level data sets. The first consists of local repeat-sales price indices for 103 CBSA divisions from CoreLogic. These CBSAs divisions include all CBSAs divisions that are part of the 100 largest CBSAs which have data from at least 1995 onwards. Most of these CBSAs have data
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<tr>
<th>CBSA Code</th>
<th>Main City Name</th>
<th>Start</th>
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<td>2013</td>
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starting in 1976. See Table 9 for the full list of CBSAs and years. This data is used for the annual AR(1) regression coefficient histogram in Figure 1 and is adjusted for inflation using the CPI.

The second city-level data set is used for the panel VAR and several cross-city comparisons in Appendix B. It combines the same CoreLogic city-level repeat-sales house price indices with transaction volume data for existing home sales from CoreLogic and months of supply at the MSA level provided by the National Association of Realtors. The CoreLogic and NAR data sets are merged using the principal city of the MSA and CBSA division. The volume series sometimes have discontinuities corresponding to the introduction of an additional county to a CBSA, so I examine each time series and select a starting date for the volume series for each CBSA division equal to the month after the last discontinuity. Similarly, the NAR months of supply measure is occasionally not reported for a given MSA. I drop all prior quarters if there are four continuous quarters of missing data. There are, however, a few interspersed quarters with missing data. The similarity between the panel VAR and a VAR on national data shows that the missing quarters are not driving the results. Each MSA’s start quarter and end quarter are the first and last quarters, respectively, for which both volume and inventory data are available, with the inventory data typically being the binding constraint. Finally, I limit the sample to 42 MSAs with at least 50 quarters of both inventory and volume data. Table 10 summarizes the full list of MSAs and years in the data set.

### A.2 Micro Data

The matched listings-transactions micro data covers the San Francisco Bay, San Diego, and Los Angeles metropolitan areas. The San Francisco Bay sample includes Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, San Benito, San Francisco, San Mateo, and Santa Clara counties. The Los Angeles sample includes Los Angeles and Orange counties. The San Diego sample only includes San Diego County.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal City</th>
<th>First Date</th>
<th>Last Date</th>
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<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore, MD</td>
<td>1999, Q1</td>
<td>2013, Q1</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>New York, NY</td>
<td>1999, Q1</td>
<td>2013, Q1</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charleston, SC</td>
<td>1997, Q1</td>
<td>2013, Q1</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Newark, NJ</td>
<td>1998, Q1</td>
<td>2013, Q1</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago, IL</td>
<td>1999, Q1</td>
<td>2013, Q1</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Oklahoma City, OK</td>
<td>1990, Q1</td>
<td>2013, Q1</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cincinnati, OH</td>
<td>1990, Q1</td>
<td>2006, Q4</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Omaha, NE-IA</td>
<td>2000, Q3</td>
<td>2013, Q1</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia, SC</td>
<td>1995, Q1</td>
<td>2013, Q1</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>Phoenix, AZ</td>
<td>1993, Q2</td>
<td>2012, Q2</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus, OH</td>
<td>1995, Q2</td>
<td>2013, Q1</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>Portland, OR</td>
<td>1994, Q1</td>
<td>2011, Q3</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas, TX</td>
<td>2000, Q1</td>
<td>2013, Q1</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Providence, RI</td>
<td>1994, Q1</td>
<td>2013, Q1</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denver, CO</td>
<td>1999, Q1</td>
<td>2013, Q1</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Raleigh, NC</td>
<td>1991, Q2</td>
<td>2008, Q2</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenville, SC</td>
<td>1994, Q1</td>
<td>2013, Q1</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Richmond, VA</td>
<td>1990, Q1</td>
<td>2009, Q2</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honolulu, HI</td>
<td>1999, Q1</td>
<td>2013, Q1</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>San Antonio, TX</td>
<td>1998, Q2</td>
<td>2013, Q1</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston, TX</td>
<td>1999, Q3</td>
<td>2013, Q1</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>San Diego CA</td>
<td>1997, Q1</td>
<td>2013, Q1</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas City, MO</td>
<td>1998, Q3</td>
<td>2012, Q3</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>San Francisco, CA</td>
<td>1992, Q2</td>
<td>2009, Q4</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knoxville, TN</td>
<td>1998, Q1</td>
<td>2013, Q1</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Santa Ana, CA</td>
<td>1999, Q1</td>
<td>2013, Q1</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Las Vegas, NV</td>
<td>1992, Q2</td>
<td>2013, Q1</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>St. Louis, MO</td>
<td>1996, Q2</td>
<td>2013, Q1</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little Rock, AR</td>
<td>1998, Q3</td>
<td>2013, Q1</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>Tampa, FL</td>
<td>1999, Q1</td>
<td>2013, Q1</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles, CA</td>
<td>1993, Q3</td>
<td>2013, Q1</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>Tulsa, OK</td>
<td>1999, Q1</td>
<td>2013, Q1</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memphis, TN</td>
<td>1994, Q2</td>
<td>2013, Q1</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>1993, Q2</td>
<td>2013, Q1</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The data from DataQuick run from January 1988 to August 2013. The Altos data run from October 2007 to May 2013. I limit my analysis to April 2008 to February 2013, as described in footnote 12.

A.2.1 DataQuick Characteristic and History Data Construction

The DataQuick data is provided in separate assessor and history files. The assessor file contains house characteristics from the property assessment and a unique property ID for every parcel in a county. The history file contains records of all deed transfers, with each transfer matched to a property ID. Several steps are used to clean the data.

First, both data files are formatted and sorted into county level data files. For a very small number of properties, data with a typo is replaced as missing.

Second, some transactions appear to be duplicates. Duplicate values are categorized and combined into one observation if possible. I drop cases where there are more than ten duplicates, as this is usually a developer selling off many lots individually after splitting them. Otherwise, I pick the sale with the highest price, or, if as a tiebreaker, the highest loan value at origination. In practice, this affects very few observations.

Third, problematic observations are identified. In particular, transfers between family members are identified and dropped based on a DataQuick transfer flag and a comparison buyer and seller names. Sales with prices that are less than or equal to one dollar are also counted as transfers. Partial consideration sales, partial sales, group sales, and splits are also dropped, as are deed transfers that are part of the foreclosure process but not actually transactions. Transactions that appear to be corrections or with implausible origination loan to value ratios are also flagged and dropped. Properties with implausible characteristics (<10 square feet, < 1 bedroom, < 1/2 bathroom, implausible year built) have the implausible characteristic replaced as a missing value.

From the final data set, I only use resale transactions (as opposed to new construction or subdivisions) of single-family homes, both of which are categorized by DataQuick.

A.2.2 Altos Research Listings Data Construction and Match to DataQuick

The Altos research data contains address, MLS identifier, house characteristics, list price, and date for every week-listing. Altos generously provided me access to an address hash that was used to parse the address fields in the DataQuick assessor data and Altos data and to create a matching hash for each. Hashes were only used that appeared in both data files, and hashes that matched to multiple DataQuick properties were dropped.

After formatting the Altos data, I match the Altos data to the DataQuick property IDs. I first use the address hash, applying the matched property ID to every listing with the same MLS identifier (all listings with the same MLS ID are the same property, and if they do not all match it is because some weeks the property has the address listed differently, for instance “street” is included in some weeks but not others). Second, I match listings not matched by the address hash by repeatedly matching on various combinations of address fields and discarding possible matches when there is not a unique property in the DataQuick data for a particular combination of fields, which prevents cases where there are two properties that would match from being counted as a match. I determined the combinations of address fields on which to match based on an inspection of the unmatched observations, most of which occur when the listing in the MLS data does not include the exact wording of the DataQuick record (e.g., missing “street”). The fields typically include ZIP, street name, and street number and different combinations of unit number, street direction, and street suffix. In some cases I match to the first few digits of street number or the first word of a street name. I finally assign any unmatched observations with the same MLS ID as
a matched observation or the same address hash, square feet, year built, ZIP code, and city as a matched observation the property ID of the matched observation. I subsequently work only with matched properties so that I do not inadvertently count a bad match as a withdrawal.

The observations that are not matched to a DataQuick property ID are usually multi-family homes (which I subsequently drop), townhouses with multiple single-family homes at the same address, or listings with typos in the address field.

I use the subset of listings matched to a property ID and combine cases where the same property has multiple MLS identifiers into a contiguous listing to account for de-listings and re-listings of properties, which is a common tactic among real estate agents. In particular, I count a listing as contiguous if the property is re-listed within 13 weeks and there is not a foreclosure between the de-listing and re-listing. I assign each contiguous listing a single identifier, which I use to match to transactions.

In a few cases, a listing matches to several property IDs. I choose the property ID that matches to a transaction or that corresponds to the longest listing period. All results are robust to dropping the small number of properties that match to multiple property IDs.

I finally match all consolidated listings to a transaction. I drop transactions and corresponding listings where there was a previous transaction in the last 90 days, as these tend to be a true transaction followed by several subsequent transfers for legal reasons (e.g., one spouse buys the house and then sells half of it to the other). I first match to a transaction where the date of last listing is in the month of the deed transfer request or in the prior three months. I then match unmatched listings to a transaction where the date of last listing is in the three months after the deed transfer request (if the property was left on the MLS after the request, presumably by accident). I then repeat the process for unmatched listings for four to 12 months prior and four to 12 months subsequent. Most matches have listings within three months of the last listing.

For matched transactions, I generate two measures of whether a house sold within a given time frame. The first, used in the main text, is the time between the date of first listing and the date of filing of the deed transfer request. The second, used in robustness checks in Appendix C, is the time between date of first listing and the first of the last listing date or the transfer request.

Figure 13 shows the fraction of all single-family transactions of existing homes for which my data accounts in each of the three metropolitan areas over time. Because the match rates start low in October 2007, I do not start my analysis until April 2008, except in San Diego where almost all listings have no listed address until August 2008. Besides that, the match rates are fairly stable, except for a small dip in San Diego in mid-2009 and early 2012 and a large fall off in the San Francisco Bay area after June 2012. I consequently end the analysis for the San Francisco Bay area at June 2012. Figures 14, 15, and 16 show match rates by ZIP code. One can see that the match rate is consistently high in the core of each metropolitan area and falls off in the outlying areas, such as western San Diego county and Escondido in San Diego, Santa Clarita in Los Angeles, and Brentwood and Pleasanton in the San Francisco Bay area.

### A.2.3 Construction of House Price Indices

I construct house price indices largely following Case and Shiller (1989) and follow sample restrictions imposed in the construction of the Case-Shiller and Federal Housing Finance Administration (FHFA) house price indices.

For the repeat sale indices, I drop all non-repeat sales, all sales pairs with less than six months between sales, and all sales pairs where a first stage regression on year dummies shows a property has appreciated by 100 percent more or 100 percent less than the average house in the MSA. I
Figure 15: Match Rates by ZIP Code: Los Angeles

Figure 16: Match Rates by ZIP Code: San Diego
estimate an interval-corrected geometric repeat-sales index at the ZIP code level. This involves estimating a first stage regression:

\[ p_{ht} = \xi_{ht} + \phi_t + \varepsilon_{ht}, \]

where \( p \) is the log price of a house \( h \) in location \( \ell \) at time \( t \), \( \xi_{ht} \) is a sales pair fixed effect, \( \phi_t \) is a time fixed effect, and \( \varepsilon_{ht} \) is an error term.

I follow Case and Shiller (1989) by using a GLS interval-weighted estimator to account for the fact that longer time intervals tend to have a larger variance in the error of (27). This is typically implemented by regressing the square of the error term \( \varepsilon^2_{ht} \) on a linear (Case-Shiller index) or quadratic (FHFA) function of the time interval between the two sales. The regression coefficients are then used to construct weights corresponding to \( \frac{1}{\sqrt{\varepsilon^2_{ht}}} \) where \( \hat{\varepsilon}^2_{ht} \) is a predicted value from the interval regression. I find that the variance of the error of (27) is non-monotonic: it is very high for sales that occur quickly, falls to its lowest level for sales that occur approximately three years after the first sale, and then rises slowly over time. This is likely due to flippers who upgrade a house and sell it without the upgrade showing up in the data. Consequently, I follow a non-parametric approach by binning the data into deciles of the time interval between the two sales, calculate the average \( \hat{\varepsilon}^2_{ht} \) for the decile \( \hat{\varepsilon}^2_{ht} \), and weight by \( \frac{1}{\sqrt{\hat{\varepsilon}^2_{ht}}} \). The results are nearly identical using a linear interval weighting.

\( \exp(\phi_t) \) is then a geometric house price index. The resulting indices can be quite noisy. Consequently, I smooth the index using a 3-month moving average, which produced the lowest prediction error of several different window widths. The resulting indices at the MSA level are very comparable to published indices by Case-Shiller, the FHFA, and CoreLogic.

The log predicted value of a house at time \( t \), \( \hat{p}_t \), that sold originally at time \( \tau \) for \( P_\tau \) is:

\[ \hat{p}_t = \log \left( \frac{\exp(\phi_t)}{\exp(\phi_\tau)} \right) P_\tau. \]

For the hedonic house price indices, I use all sales and estimate:

\[ p_{itt} = \phi_t + \beta X_i + \varepsilon_{itt}, \]

where \( X_i \) is a vector of third-order polynomials in four housing characteristics: age, bathrooms, bedrooms, and \( \log \) (square feet), all of which are winsorized at the one percent level by county for all properties in a county, not just those that trade. Recall that these characteristics are all recorded as a single snapshot in 2013, so \( X_i \) is not time dependent. I do not include a characteristic if over 25 percent of the houses in a given geography are missing data for a particular characteristic. Again \( \exp(\phi_t) \) is a house price index, which I smooth using a 3-month moving average. The log predicted price of a house is

\[ \hat{p}_{it} = \hat{\beta} X_i + \hat{\phi}_i. \]

For homes that are missing characteristics included in an area’s house price index calculation, I replace the characteristic with its average value in a given ZIP code.

For robustness I calculate both indices for the full sample and a non-distressed sample, where a repeat-sales pair counts as distressed if either sale is an REO sale, a foreclosure auction sale, or a short sale. For my analysis, I use a ZIP code level index, but all results are robust to alternatively using a house price index for all homes within one mile of the centroid of a home’s seven-digit ZIP code (roughly a few square blocks). I do not calculate a house price index if the area has fewer than
Table 11: Share of Sample Accounted For By Each MSA and Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Prior Trans</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Prior Trans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All Transactions</td>
<td></td>
<td>All Transactions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF Bay</td>
<td>26.98%</td>
<td>26.68%</td>
<td>28.03%</td>
<td>27.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>58.81%</td>
<td>59.47%</td>
<td>57.37%</td>
<td>58.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>14.22%</td>
<td>13.85%</td>
<td>14.59%</td>
<td>14.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>18.18%</td>
<td>19.87%</td>
<td>16.42%</td>
<td>17.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>20.70%</td>
<td>21.26%</td>
<td>21.19%</td>
<td>21.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>23.88%</td>
<td>23.59%</td>
<td>23.48%</td>
<td>23.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>21.07%</td>
<td>20.36%</td>
<td>21.64%</td>
<td>20.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>14.86%</td>
<td>13.75%</td>
<td>15.93%</td>
<td>14.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1.30%</td>
<td>1.17%</td>
<td>1.34%</td>
<td>1.24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Each cell indicates the percentage of each sample accounted for by each MSA (above the line) or by each year of first listing (below the line).

500 sales since 1988. This rules out about 5% of transactions, typically in low-density areas far from the core of the MSA. For each ZIP code, I calculate the standard deviation of the prediction error of the house price index from 1988 to 2013 and weight most specifications by the reciprocal of the standard deviation.

A.2.4 Construction of the Final Analysis Samples

I drop listings that satisfy one of several criteria:

1. If the list price is less than $10,000;
2. If the assessed structure value is less than five percent of the assessed overall value;
3. If the data shows the property was built after the sale date or there has been “significant improvement” since the sale date;
4. If there is a previous sale within 90 days.

Each observation is a listing, regardless of whether it is withdrawn or ends in a transaction. The outcome variable is sold within 13 weeks, where withdrawn listings are counted as not transacting. The price variable is the initial list price. The predicted prices are calculated for the week of first listing by interpolation. The sample is summarized in Table 2 in the main text, and the fraction of the sample accounted for by each MSA and year are summarized in Table 11.

A.3 List Prices Relative to Transaction Prices

As mentioned in the main text, the modal house sells at its list price at the time of sale and the average and median house sell within 0.01 log points of their list price. To illustrate this, Figure 17 shows a histogram of the difference between the log list price at sale and the log transaction price in the Altos-DataQuick merged data. One can see that nearly 18 percent of transactions sell at list price, and the mean of the list price distribution is 0.01 log points below the transaction price.

Table 12 reinforces these findings by showing mean log difference for each of the three MSAs in each year. The mean does not fluctuate by more than 0.03 log points across years and MSAs.
Figure 17: Histogram of the Difference Between Log Transaction Price and Log List Price

Notes: The figure shows a histogram of the difference between log transaction price at the time of sale and log list price for all homes in the San Francisco Bay, Los Angeles, and San Diego areas that were listed between April 2008 and February 2013 that are matched to a transaction and have a previous observed listing. The 1st and 99th percentiles are dropped from the histogram. N = 303,731.

Table 12: Mean Difference Between Log Transaction Price and Log List Price

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>SF Bay</th>
<th>Los Angeles</th>
<th>San Diego</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-3</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Each cell shows the mean difference between the log transaction price and log list price in the indicated MSA-year cell. N = 303,731

B Housing Market Facts

B.1 Momentum

To assess the robustness of the facts about house price momentum presented in Section 2, Table 13 shows several measures of momentum for five different national price indices. The indices are the CoreLogic National repeat-sales house price index discussed in the main text, the Case-Shiller Composite Ten, the FHFA expanded repeat-sales house price index, the National Association of Realtors’ national median price for single-family homes, and CoreLogic’s national median price for all transactions. The first column shows the coefficient on an AR(1) in log annual price change run at quarterly frequency as in equation (1). \(^{46}\) The next two columns show the one- and two-

\(^{46}\)Case and Shiller (1989) worry that the same house selling twice may induce correlated errors that generate artificial momentum in regression (1) and use \(\Delta p_{t,t-4}\) from one half of their sample and \(\Delta p_{t-4,t-8}\) from the other. I
Table 13: The Robustness of Momentum Across Price Measures and Metrics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Price Measure</th>
<th>Annual AR(1) Coefficient</th>
<th>1 Year Lagged Autocorr of Quarterly Δp</th>
<th>2 Year Lagged Autocorr of Quarterly Δp</th>
<th>Lag in Which Autocorr is First &lt; 0</th>
<th>Quarter of Peak of AR(5) IRF</th>
<th>Quarter of Peak Value of Lo-MacKinlay Variance Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CoreLogic Repeat Sales HPI, 1976-2013</td>
<td>0.665 (0.081)</td>
<td>0.516</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case-Shiller Comp 10, 1987-2013</td>
<td>0.67 (0.088)</td>
<td>0.578</td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHFA Expanded HPI, 1991-2013</td>
<td>0.699 (0.089)</td>
<td>0.585</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAR Median Price, 1968-2013</td>
<td>0.458 (0.103)</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoreLogic Median Price, 1976-2013</td>
<td>0.473 (0.082)</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Each row shows six measures of momentum for each of the five house price indices, which are detailed in Appendix A. The first row shows the AR(1) coefficient for a regression of the annual change in log price on a one-year lag of itself estimated on quarterly data, as in equation (1), with robust standard errors in parenthesis. The second and third columns show the one and two year lagged autocorrelations of the quarterly change in log price. The fourth column shows the quarterly lag in which the impulse response function estimated from an AR(5), as in Section 2, reaches its peak. Finally, the last column shows the quarterly lag for which the Lo-MacKinlay variance ratio computed as in equation (29) reaches its peak.

Table 14: Testing For Asymmetry in Momentum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Annual Change in Log Price Index at CBSA Level</th>
<th>Specification With Interaction</th>
<th>Without Interaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient on Year-Lagged Annual Change in Log Price</td>
<td>0.614*** (0.011)</td>
<td>0.591*** (0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient on Interaction With Positive Lagged Change CBSA Fixed Effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBSAs</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>13,188</td>
<td>13,188</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *** p<0.001. Each column shows a regression of the annual change in log price on a one-year lag of itself and CBSA fixed effects. In column two, the interaction between the lag of annual change in log price with an indicator for whether the lag of the annual change in log price is also included as in equation (30). The regressions are estimated on the panel of 103 CBSAs repeat-sales price indices described in Appendix A. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
year lagged autocorrelations of the quarterly change in log price. The fourth column shows the quarterly lag in which the autocorrelation of the quarterly change in log price is first negative. The fifth column shows the quarter subsequent to a shock in which the impulse response from an estimated AR(5) estimated in log levels, as in Section 2, reaches its peak value. Finally, the sixth column shows the quarterly lag in which the Lo-MacKinlay variance ratio statistic reaches its peak value. This statistic is equal to,

\[ V(k) = \frac{\text{var}\left(\sum_{t=1}^{t=k+1} r_{t-k+1}\right)}{\text{var}(r_t)} = \frac{\text{var}(\log(p_t) - \log(p_{t-k}))}{\text{var}(\log(p_t) - \log(p_{t-1}))}, \]

where \( r_t = \log(p_t) - \log(p_{t-1}) \) is the one-period return. If this statistic is equal to one, then there is no momentum, and several papers have used the maximized period of the statistic as a measure of the duration of momentum.

Table 13 shows evidence of significant momentum for all price measures and all measures of momentum. The two median price series exhibit less momentum as the IRFs peak at just under two years and the two-year-lagged autocorrelation is much closer to zero.

Table 14 tests for asymmetry in momentum. Many papers describe prices as being primarily sticky on the downside (e.g., Leamer, 2007; Case, 2008). To assess whether this is the case, I turn to the panel of 103 CBSA repeat-sales price indices described in Appendix A, which allows for a more powerful test of asymmetry than using a single national data series. I estimate a quarterly AR(1) regression of the form:

\[ \Delta_{t-4,t-8} \ln p_c = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta_{t-4,t-8} \ln p_c + \beta_2 \Delta_{t-4,t-8} \ln p_c \times 1 \left[ \Delta_{t-4,t-8} \ln p_c > 0 \right] + \phi_c + \varepsilon, \]

where \( c \) is a city. If momentum is stronger on the downside, the interaction coefficient \( \beta_2 \) should be negative. However, Table 14 shows that the coefficient is insignificant and positive. Thus momentum appears equally strong on the upside and downside when measured using a repeat-sales index.

B.1.1 Across Countries

Table 15 shows annual AR(1) regressions as in equation (1) run on quarterly non-inflation-adjusted data for ten countries. The data come from the Bank for International Settlements, which compiles house price indices from central banks and national statistical agencies. The data and details can be found online at http://www.bis.org/statistics/pp.htm. I select ten countries from the BIS database that include at least 15 years of data and have a series for single-family detached homes or all homes. Countries with per-square-foot indices are excluded. With the exception of Norway, which shows no momentum, and the Netherlands, which shows anomalously high momentum, all of the AR(1) coefficients are significant and between 0.2 and 0.6. Price momentum thus appears to show up across countries as well as within the United States and across U.S. metropolitan areas.

B.2 Housing Cycle Facts

B.2.1 Relative Volatilities

To assess the robustness the relative volatilities of price, volume, and inventory summarized by Fact 2, Table 16 shows the standard deviation of annual log changes for four additional measures.
Table 15: Momentum Across Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country, Time Period</th>
<th>AR(1) Coefficient</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Country, Time Period</th>
<th>AR(1) Coefficient</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia, 1986-2013</td>
<td>0.217*</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Netherlands, 1995-2013</td>
<td>0.951***</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium, 1973-2013</td>
<td>0.231**</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>Norway, 1992-2013</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark, 1992-2013</td>
<td>0.412***</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>New Zealand, 1979-2013</td>
<td>0.507***</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France, 1996-2013</td>
<td>0.597***</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>Sweden, 1986-2013</td>
<td>0.520***</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain, 1968-2013</td>
<td>0.467***</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>Switzerland, 1970-2013</td>
<td>0.619***</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.082)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Each row shows the AR(1) coefficient for a regression of the annual change in log price on an annual lag of itself, as in equation (1), estimated on quarterly, non-inflation-adjusted data from the indicated country for the indicated time period. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and N indicates the number of quarters in the sample. The BIS identifiers and series descriptions are listed for each country. Australia: Q:AU:4:3:0:1:0:0, residential property for all detached houses, eight cities. Belgium Q:BE:0:3:0:0:0:0, residential property all detached houses. Denmark: Q:DK:0:2:0:1:0:0, residential all single-family houses. France: Q:FR:0:1:6:0, residential property prices of existing dwellings. Great Britain: Q:GB:0:1:0:1:0:0, residential property prices all dwellings from the Office of National Statistics. Netherlands: Q:NL:0:2:1:6:0, residential existing houses. Norway: Q:NO:0:3:0:1:0:0, Residential detached houses. New Zealand: Q:NZ:0:1:0:3:0:0, residential all dwellings. Sweden: Q:SE:0:2:0:1:0:0, owner-occupied detached houses. Switzerland: Q:CH:0:2:0:2:0:0, owner-occupied single-family houses.

of price and two additional measures of inventory discussed in Appendix A. The series all have different time coverages, and the standard deviation is calculated for the period over which data is available. The first three rows show various house price indices. With the exception of the Case-Shiller Composite Ten, which is known to be volatile given that it follows ten cities with relatively inelastic housing supplies, the standard deviation of annual log changes are close to the 0.065 figure for the national CoreLogic house price index presented in the main text, although the two median price series are slightly less volatile. The last two rows show two measures of inventory. The first is houses listed for sale rather than months of supply. This is about half as volatile as months of supply because it is not divided by volume. The second is a separate months of supply measure from the NAR, which is only slightly less volatile than the measure in the main text that combines Census and NAR data. I was not able to find another national volume series with long enough coverage to reliably calculate volatility. Overall, Table 16 supports the conclusion that price is less volatile than inventory and volume, regardless of how each is measured.

### B.2.2 Housing Phillips Curve

To assess the robustness of the “housing Phillips curve” relationship between price changes and inventory levels (Fact 3), Table 17 shows regression coefficients and R-squareds for regressions of the annual change in log price on log inventory levels, as in equation (26), for five different house price indices and three different measures of inventory. The strong negative relationship is present across all 15 combinations of price and inventory measures.
### Table 16: Robustness of Relative Volatilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>$\sigma_{\log x_t - \log x_{t-4}}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case-Shiller Composite 10, 1986-2013</td>
<td>0.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHFA Expanded, 1991-2013</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAR Median Price, 1968-2013</td>
<td>0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoreLogic Median Price, 1976-2013</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Census For Sale Inventory, 1968-2013</td>
<td>0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAR Months of Supply, 1982-2013</td>
<td>0.170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All series are 1976-2013 at a quarterly frequency. The first column shows the standard deviation of annual changes. Data is described in Appendix A.

### Table 17: Robustness of Housing Phillips Curve Relationship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Months of Supply, 1968-2013</td>
<td>$\beta$ = -0.140***</td>
<td>-0.232***</td>
<td>-0.147***</td>
<td>-0.089***</td>
<td>-0.095***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Census &amp; NAR $R^2$</td>
<td>0.530</td>
<td>0.630</td>
<td>0.804</td>
<td>0.406</td>
<td>0.283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homes For Sale, 1968-2013</td>
<td>$\beta$ = -0.283***</td>
<td>-0.385***</td>
<td>-0.273***</td>
<td>-0.148***</td>
<td>-0.235***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Census $R^2$</td>
<td>0.404</td>
<td>0.407</td>
<td>0.619</td>
<td>0.310</td>
<td>0.319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Months of Supply, 1982-2013</td>
<td>$\beta$ = -0.130***</td>
<td>-0.237***</td>
<td>-0.170***</td>
<td>-0.088***</td>
<td>-0.083***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From NAR $R^2$</td>
<td>0.367</td>
<td>0.597</td>
<td>0.792</td>
<td>0.283</td>
<td>0.191</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Each cell shows a regression of the annual change in log price on log inventory levels measured at the midpoint of the year over which changes are calculated, as in equation (26). Each column uses a different measure of price, and each row uses a different measure of inventory. For prices, the measures used are the CoreLogic national repeat-sales HPI from 1976-2013 as in the main text, the Case-Shiller Composite 10 repeat-sales HPI from 1987 to 2013, the FHFA expanded repeat-sales HPI from 1991 to 2013, the NAR median price index for single-family existing homes from 1968 to 2013, and the CoreLogic national median price index for all sales from 1976 to 2013. For inventory, the first row uses months of supply created by dividing homes vacant for sale from the Census Vacancy Survey by volume for single-family existing homes from the NAR. The second row just uses only the numerator, homes listed for sale from the Census Vacancy Survey, and adjusts the data for a linear time trend. The third row uses months of supply from 1982 to 2013 from the NAR. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

Two things in particular are of note. First, the relationship is stronger for repeat-sales house price indices, which display more momentum, than it is for median price indices. Second, the middle row shows that the result is robust to measuring inventory as homes listed for sale (adjusted for a linear time trend) instead of as months of supply. The importance of homes listed for sale, the numerator of months of supply, suggests that the price-volume relationship, which affects the denominator of months of supply, is not driving the negative relationship between price changes and inventory levels in the data.
Notes: The figures show orthogonalized impulse response functions to a months of supply shock from a two-lag vector autoregression model and vector error correction model of log months of supply, log price, and log sales volume. Price is the CoreLogic national HPI, sales is from the NAR single-family existing home sales series, and months of supply is from the Census Vacancy Survey and NAR, all from 1976-2013. All data are seasonally adjusted. The OIRFs are computed using a Cholesky decomposition with the variables ordered so that months of supply is assumed to not depend contemporaneously on shocks to price or volume and price is assumed to not depend contemporaneously on shocks to volume. The results are robust as long as months of supply is prior to volume in the Cholesky ordering. The blue line is the OIRF, and for the VAR the grey bands indicate 95% confidence intervals.

B.2.3 Price, Volume, and Inventory VAR and VEC

In the main text, I estimate a panel vector autoregression model on log price, log volume, and log inventory on a panel of 42 cities. The model for the panel VAR is:

\[ x_{ct} = \Gamma_0 + \Gamma_1 x_{c,t-1} + \Gamma_2 x_{c,t-2} + \varphi_c + \varepsilon_t \]
Notes: Volume is raw data from the National Association of Realtors of sales of existing single-family homes at a seasonally-adjusted annual rate. The top panel shows seller entry using the stock of sellers measured by the Census Vacancy Survey, while the bottom panel shows the stock of sellers measured by the National Association of Realtors. Seller entry is computed as $Entrant_{t} = Seller_{t} - Seller_{t-1} + Sales_{t}$. Buyer entry is computed similarly, but since there is not a raw data series for the stock of buyers it is imputed using a simple Cobb-Douglas matching function $\frac{Sales}{S} = \xi \left( \frac{B}{S} \right)^{-8}$ with the 0.8 elasticity from Genesove and Han (2012). In this figure, $\xi = 1$ in the top panel so that in a steady state there is 3 months of supply. Because the NAR series reports more homes listed for sale, $\xi = 0.5$ in the bottom panel to fit the same average market tightness as the Census series. All three series are smoothed using a three-quarter moving average in both figures.
### Table 18: Cross-City Facts on Momentum, Inventory Volatility, and the Housing Phillips Curve

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Var</th>
<th>SD of Annual Log Change in Months of Supply</th>
<th>Log Price Changes on Log Inventory Levels Regression Coefficient</th>
<th>Log Price Changes on Log Inventory Levels Regression R-Squared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annual Δ log (p)</td>
<td>0.201*</td>
<td>-0.159**</td>
<td>0.920***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR(1) Coefficient</td>
<td>(0.099)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.258)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Each column shows a regression of the indicated dependent variable calculated at the MSA level on the AR(1) coefficient from a regression of the annual change in log price on a one-year lag of itself, as in equation (1). These regressions thus show how the dependent variable varies across cities based on the degree of momentum the cities exhibit. The data used is the merged National Association of Realtors and CoreLogic data for 42 cities used in the panel VAR and described in Appendix A. Months of supply is directly from the NAR. The regression of the annual log change in price on log inventory levels is as in Equation (26). Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

where \( c \) represents an MSA, \( x_{c,t} \) is the vector of log months of supply, log price, and log sales volume in city \( c \) at time \( t \), and \( \varphi_c \) is a city fixed effect. I use a Cholesky decomposition with the variables ordered so that months of supply is assumed to not depend contemporaneously on shocks to price or volume and price is assumed not to depend contemporaneously on shocks to volume. The results are robust as long as months of supply does not depend contemporaneously on volume.

To show the robustness of these result, Figure 18 estimates a two-lag vector autoregression model and a two-lag vector error correction (VEC) model on the national data sets used in the main text. The Cholesky ordering and VAR are the same as for the panel VAR except there is a single time series. The results look similar, although months of supply does not mean revert as quickly. Furthermore, the VEC model looks similar to the VAR model, which is reassuring if one is worried about the variables being cointegrated.

#### B.2.4 Buyer and Seller Entry

To show the robustness of Fact 4, which shows that entrants and sales move in opposite directions at peaks and troughs, Figure 19 shows the full data series calculated using the Census’ homes for sale measure from 1968-2013 as well as the 2003 to 2013 period for months of supply from the National Association of Realtors. Although the patterns in previous cycles are not as dramatic, one can still see the same pattern. Furthermore, the pattern is clearly visible for the 2000s boom and bust in the NAR data.

#### B.2.5 Cross-City Facts

Table 18 tests two of the model’s predictions about the housing cycle facts in the cross-section of 42 cities used in the panel VAR analysis and described in Appendix A. Each column shows a regression in which the independent variable is a city-level measure of momentum: the AR(1) coefficient of the annual change in log price regressed on an annual lag of itself in quarterly CoreLogic data, as in equation (1). The first column shows that momentum co-varies positively with the standard deviation of the annual change in log months of supply, which comes from a separate data set from the National Association of Realtors. In the model, more momentum causes more re-timing of purchases and more inventory volatility. The second and third columns show the relationship
between momentum and the regression coefficient and R-squared, respectively, from a regression of
the annual change in log price on log months of supply at the midpoint of the year as in equation
(26). Recall that in the data the coefficient is negative. Table 18 shows that the correlation
between price changes and inventory levels is more negative and stronger the greater the degree of
momentum in the city. This is consistent with the model, in which the housing Phillips curve arises
due to the rapid adjustment of inventory and gradual adjustment of price in light of momentum.

C  Micro Evidence For Concave Demand

C.1  Binned Scatter Plots

Throughout the analysis I use binned scatter plots to visualize the structural relationship between
list price relative to the reference list price and probability of sale. This section briefly describes
how they are produced.

Recall that my econometric model is:

\[ d_{ht} = g(p_{ht} - \tilde{p}_{ht}) + \psi_{t} + \varepsilon_{ht} \]  

(31)

where \( p_{ht} - \tilde{p}_{ht} \) is equal to \( f(z_{ht}) \) in:

\[ p_{ht} = f(z_{ht}) + \beta X_{ht} + \xi_{ht} + u_{ht}. \]  

(32)

To create the IV binned scatter plots. I first estimate \( f(z_{ht}) \) by \( (32) \) and let \( p_{ht} - \tilde{p}_{ht} = f(z_{ht}) \).
I drop the 1st and 99th percentiles of \( p_{ht} - \tilde{p}_{ht} \) and ZIP-quarter cells with a single observation
and create 25 indicator variables \( \zeta_{b} \) corresponding to 25 bins \( q \) of \( p_{ht} - \tilde{p}_{ht} \). I project sale within
13 weeks \( d_{ht} \) on fixed effects and the indicator variables:

\[ d_{ht} = \psi_{t} + \zeta_{b} + \nu_{ht/q} \]  

(33)

I visualize \( g(\cdot) \) by plotting the average \( p_{ht} - \tilde{p}_{ht} \) for each bin against the average \( d_{ht} - \psi_{t} \) for
each bin, which is equivalent to \( \zeta_{b} \).

C.2  Proof of Lemma 2

Recall that the Lemma assumes that:

\[ z_{ht} \perp (u_{ht}, \varepsilon_{ht}), \]

\[ p_{ht} = f(z_{ht}) + \xi_{ht} + \tilde{p}_{ht}, \]

\( \zeta_{ht} \perp f(z_{ht}) \), and that the true regression function \( g(\cdot) \) is a third-order polynomial. Because
of the fixed effect \( \xi_{ht} \) in \( \tilde{p}_{ht}, \zeta_{ht} \) can be normalized to be mean zero. Using the third-order
polynomial assumption, the true regression function is:

\[ g(p_{ht} - \tilde{p}_{ht}) = E[d_{ht/q}|f(z_{ht}) + \zeta_{ht}, \psi_{t}] = \beta_{1}f(z_{ht}) + \beta_{2}(z_{ht}) + \beta_{3}(f(z_{ht}) + \zeta_{ht})^{3}. \]

However, \( \zeta_{ht} \) is unobserved, so I instead estimate:

\[ E[d_{ht/q}|f(z_{ht}), \psi_{t}] = \beta_{1}f(z_{ht}) + \beta_{2}(z_{ht})^{2} + \beta_{3}(z_{ht})^{3} \]

\[ + \beta_{1}E[\zeta_{ht}|f(z_{ht})] + 2\beta_{2}E[f(z_{ht})\zeta_{ht}] + \beta_{2}E[\zeta_{ht}^{2}|f] \]

\[ + 3\beta_{3}f(z_{ht}) E[\zeta_{ht}^{3}|f] + 3\beta_{3}f(z_{ht}) E[\zeta_{ht}|f] + \beta_{3}E[\zeta_{ht}^{3}|f]. \]
Figure 20: Reduced-Form Relationship Between the Instrument and the Outcome Variable

Notes: This figure shows the reduced-form relationship between the instrument on the x-axis and the probability of sale within 13 weeks on the y-axis. Both are residualized against quarter x ZIP fixed effects and the repeat-sales and hedonic predicted prices and the means are added back in. This is the basic concave relationship that the IV approach uses, although the downward-sloping first stage flips the x-axis.

However, because $\zeta_{ht} \perp f(z_{ht}),\ E[\zeta_{ht}\mid f(z_{ht})] = 0,\ E[f(z_{ht})\zeta_{ht}] = 0,$ and $E[\zeta_{ht}^2\mid f]$ and $E[\zeta_{ht}^3\mid f]$ are constants. The $\beta_2 E[\zeta_{ht}^2\mid f]$ and $\beta_3 E[\zeta_{ht}^3\mid f]$ terms will be absorbed by the fixed effects $\psi_{it}$, leaving:

$$E[d_{htq}\mid f(z_{ht}),\psi_{it}] = \beta_1 f(z_{ht}) + \beta_2 f(z_{ht})^2 + \beta_3 f(z_{ht})^3 + 3\beta_3 f(z_{ht}) E[\zeta_{ht}^2\mid f]$$

Thus when one estimates $g(\cdot)$ by a cubic polynomial of $f(z_{ht})$,

$$d_{htq} = \gamma_1 f(z_{ht}) + \gamma_2 f(z_{ht})^2 + \gamma_3 f(z_{ht})^3 + \psi_{it} + \varepsilon_{ht},$$

one recovers $\gamma_1 = \beta_1 + 3\beta_3 E[\zeta_{ht}^2\mid f],\ \gamma_2 = \beta_2,$ and $\gamma_3 = \beta_3,$ so the true second- and third-order terms are recovered.

C.3 Instrumental Variable Robustness and Specification Tests

This section provides robustness and specification tests for the IV estimates described in Section 3.

Figure 20 shows the reduced-form relationship between the instrument and outcome variable when both are residualized against fixed effects and the repeat-sales and hedonic predicted price. The estimates presented in the main text rescale the instrument axis into price (and in the process flip the x-axis), but the basic concave relationship between probability of sale and appreciation since purchase is visible in the reduced form.

Figure 21 shows IV binned scatter plots when the y-axis is rescaled to a logarithmic scale so that the slope represents the elasticity of demand, which does not alter the finding of concavity.

Tables 19, 20, 21, and 22 present various robustness and specification tests of the main IV specification in Panel B of Table 3. Each row in the tables represents a separate regression, with the specifications described in the main text. Coefficients for a three-segment spline in the log relative markup, the difference between the highest and lowest tercile coefficients, and a bootstrapped 95
Figure 21: Instrumental Variable Estimates With Probability of Sale Axis in Logs

Notes: The figure shows a binned scatter plot of the probability of sale within 13 weeks net of fixed effects (with the average probability of sale within 13 weeks added in) against the estimated log relative markup. It also shows an overlaid cubic fit of the relationship, as in equation (3). To create the figure, a first stage regression of the log list price on a third-order polynomial in the instrument, fixed effects at the ZIP x first quarter of listing level, and repeat sales and hedonic log predicted prices, as in (6), is estimated by OLS. The predicted value of the polynomial of the instrument is used as the relative markup. The figure splits the data into 25 equally-sized bins of this estimated relative markup and plots the mean of the estimated relative markup against the mean of the probability of sale within 13 weeks net of fixed effects for each bin. The y-axis is rescaled into logs after means are calculated and the cubic fit is estimated because the outcome variable is binary. Before binning, the 1st and 99th percentiles of the log sale price residual and any observations fully absorbed by fixed effects are dropped. The entire procedure is weighted by the reciprocal of the standard deviation of the prediction error in the repeat-sales house price index in the observation’s ZIP code from 1988 to 2013. The sample is limited to the IV subsample of homes that are not sales of foreclosures or short sales, sales of homes with negative appreciation since the seller purchased, or sales by investors who previously purchased with all cash. N = 111,293 observations prior to dropping the 1st and 99th percentiles and unique zip-quarter cells.

percent confidence interval for the difference are reported. In some specifications the bootstrapped confidence intervals widen when the sample size is reduced to the point that the results are no longer significant, and the middle tercile slope can be sensitive because the middle third of the data tends to correspond to a very small range of log relative markups and is thus noisily estimated. Nonetheless, the robustness and specification checks show evidence of significant concavity.

Table 19 evaluates the exclusion restriction that unobserved quality is independent of when a seller purchased. The first two specifications add a linear trend in date of purchase or time since purchase in \( X_{h,t} \) along with the two predicted prices, thus accounting for any variation in unobserved quality that varies linearly in date of purchase or time since purchase. The next three rows limit the sample to homes purchased before the bust (before 2005), after 1994, and in a window from 1995 to 2004. Finally, the last two rows add linear time trends to the purchased before 2005 sample. In all cases, the bootstrapped 95 percent confidence intervals continue to show significant concavity.

Table 20 shows various specification checks. The first set of regressions limit the analysis to ZIP-quarter cells with at least 15 and 20 observations to evaluate whether small sample bias in the estimated fixed effect \( \xi_{h,t} \) could be affecting the results. In both cases, the results appear similar.
### Table 19: IV Robustness 1: Controls for Time Since Purchase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specification</th>
<th>Tercile Spline Coefficients</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Bootstrapped 95% CI</th>
<th>Obs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lowest</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Highest</td>
<td>High - Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear Trend in Date of Purchase</td>
<td>-0.391</td>
<td>1.009</td>
<td>-2.826***</td>
<td>-2.435**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear Trend in Time Since Purchase</td>
<td>-0.396</td>
<td>1.109</td>
<td>-2.849***</td>
<td>-2.453**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchased Pre 2005</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
<td>-0.357</td>
<td>-4.11</td>
<td>-4.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchased Post 1994</td>
<td>-0.702</td>
<td>-0.095</td>
<td>-2.503***</td>
<td>-1.800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchased 1995-2004</td>
<td>-0.407</td>
<td>-0.816</td>
<td>-4.252</td>
<td>-3.845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre 2005 With Trend in Date of Purchase</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>-0.152</td>
<td>-3.183</td>
<td>-3.140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre 2005 With Trend in Time Since Purchase</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>-0.156</td>
<td>-3.21</td>
<td>-3.168</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Each row shows regression coefficients when g(.) in equation (3) is approximated using a three-segment linear spline with an equal fraction of the data in each segment. A first stage regression of log list price on a third-order polynomial in the instrument, fixed effects at the ZIP x first quarter of listing level, and log predicted price using both a repeat-sales and a hedonic methodology, as in (6), is estimated by OLS. The predicted value of the polynomial of the instrument is computed is used as the relative markup in equation (3), which is estimated by OLS. The sample is restricted to non-REOs, non-short sales, properties with positive appreciation since purchase, and properties not previously purchased with all cash (investors). The entire procedure weighted by the reciprocal of the standard deviation of the prediction error in the repeat-sales house price index in the observation’s ZIP code from 1988 to 2013. Before creating the spline, the 99th and 1st percentiles of the relative markup are dropped, as are any observations fully absorbed by fixed effects. In addition to the regression coefficients, the difference between the highest and lowest tercile of the spline is reported. Standard errors and the 95 percent confidence interval for the difference between the first and third terciles are computed by block bootstrapping the entire procedure on 35 ZIP-3 clusters. The number of observations listed is prior to dropping observations that are unique to a ZIP-quarter cell and the 1st and 99th percentiles. The appendix text details each specification.

To the full sample and the bootstrapped confidence interval shows a significant difference between the highest and lowest terciles, which suggests that bias in the estimation of the fixed effects is not driving the results. The second set introduces $X_{hdt}$, the vector of house characteristics that includes the repeat-sales and hedonic predicted prices, as a quadratic and cubic function instead of linearly. It does not appear that assumed linearity of these characteristics is driving the results. Finally, the third set considers different specifications for the flexible function of the instrument $f(z_{hdt})$ in the first stage. Again, changing the order of $f(\cdot)$ does not appear to have a significant effect on concavity.

Table 21 shows various robustness checks. These include:

- **House Characteristic Controls:** Includes a third-order polynomial in age, log square feet, bedrooms, and bathrooms in $X_{hdt}$.
- **Alternate Time To Sale Definition:** Instead of measuring time to sale as first listing to the
Table 20: IV Robustness 2: Specification Checks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speciation</th>
<th>Tercile Spline Coefficients</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Bootstrapped 95% CI</th>
<th>Obs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dependent Var: Sell Within 13 Weeks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Details In Text)</td>
<td>Lowest</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Highest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only FE Cells With</td>
<td>-0.068</td>
<td>-0.295</td>
<td>-2.575***</td>
<td>-2.507***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At Least 15 Obs</td>
<td>(0.455)</td>
<td>(2.731)</td>
<td>(0.705)</td>
<td>(0.667)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At Least 20 Obs</td>
<td>(1.052)</td>
<td>(4.378)</td>
<td>(1.192)</td>
<td>(1.480)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predicted Prices</td>
<td>-0.225</td>
<td>-0.425</td>
<td>-2.248***</td>
<td>-2.023***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduced as Quadratic</td>
<td>(0.353)</td>
<td>(2.154)</td>
<td>(0.503)</td>
<td>(0.534)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predicted Prices</td>
<td>-0.228</td>
<td>-0.361</td>
<td>-2.314***</td>
<td>-2.086***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduced as Cubic</td>
<td>(0.355)</td>
<td>(2.014)</td>
<td>(0.500)</td>
<td>(0.532)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear Fn of Instrument</td>
<td>-0.440</td>
<td>0.260</td>
<td>-4.511***</td>
<td>-4.071***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quadratic Fn of Instrument</td>
<td>-0.466</td>
<td>0.262</td>
<td>-4.301**</td>
<td>-3.835**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartic Fn of Instrument</td>
<td>-0.279</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>-2.171***</td>
<td>-1.893***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quintic Fn of Instrument</td>
<td>-0.235</td>
<td>-0.560</td>
<td>-2.120***</td>
<td>-1.885***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Each row shows regression coefficients when g(.) in equation (3) is approximated using a three-segment linear spline with an equal fraction of the data in each segment. A first stage regression of log list price on a third-order polynomial in the instrument, fixed effects at the ZIP x first quarter of listing level, and log predicted price using both a repeat-sales and a hedonic methodology, as in (6), is estimated by OLS. The predicted value of the polynomial of the instrument is computed is used as the relative markup in equation (3), which is estimated by OLS. The sample is restricted to non-REOs, non-short sales, properties with positive appreciation since purchase, and properties not previously purchased with all cash (investors). The entire procedure weighted by the reciprocal of the standard deviation of the prediction error in the repeat-sales house price index in the observation’s ZIP code from 1988 to 2013. Before creating the spline, the 99th and 1st percentiles of the relative markup are dropped, as are any observations fully absorbed by fixed effects. In addition to the regression coefficients, the difference between the highest and lowest tercile of the spline is reported. Standard errors and the 95 percent confidence interval for the difference between the first and third terciles are computed by block bootstrapping the entire procedure on 35 ZIP-3 clusters. The number of observations listed is prior to dropping observations that are unique to a ZIP-quarter cell and the 1st and 99th percentiles. The Appendix text details each specification.

filing of the deed transfer request, this specification measures time to sale as first listing to the first of the deed transfer request or the last listing.

- 18 and 10 Weeks to Sale: Tests the robustness to the horizon for having sold.
- Non-REO House Price Index for Predicted Price: Uses house price indices for the predicted price that does not include REOs.
- No Weights: Does not weight observations by the inverse standard deviation of the repeat-sales house price index prediction error at the ZIP level.
- No Possibly Problematic Observations: A small number of listings are matched to multiple
Table 21: IV Robustness 3: Other Robustness Tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specification</th>
<th>Tercile Spline Coefficients</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Bootstrapped 95% CI</th>
<th>Obs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lowest</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Highest</td>
<td>High - Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House Characteristic Controls</td>
<td>-0.366</td>
<td>0.350</td>
<td>-2.804***</td>
<td>-2.438***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.359)</td>
<td>(1.953)</td>
<td>(0.589)</td>
<td>(0.593)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternate Time to Sale Defn</td>
<td>-0.587</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>-2.104***</td>
<td>-1.516**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.357)</td>
<td>(1.772)</td>
<td>(0.506)</td>
<td>(0.561)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dep Var: 18 Weeks</td>
<td>-0.240</td>
<td>-0.974</td>
<td>-2.140***</td>
<td>-1.900***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.339)</td>
<td>(1.685)</td>
<td>(0.524)</td>
<td>(0.537)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dep Var: 10 Weeks</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
<td>0.611</td>
<td>-2.302***</td>
<td>-2.252***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.413)</td>
<td>(1.842)</td>
<td>(0.549)</td>
<td>(0.588)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No REO HPI For Predicted Price</td>
<td>-0.139</td>
<td>0.391</td>
<td>-1.248***</td>
<td>-1.110*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.505)</td>
<td>(2.549)</td>
<td>(0.253)</td>
<td>(0.541)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Weights</td>
<td>-0.153</td>
<td>1.109</td>
<td>-2.046***</td>
<td>-1.892***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.399)</td>
<td>(1.394)</td>
<td>(0.511)</td>
<td>(0.505)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Poss Problematic Obs</td>
<td>-0.280</td>
<td>0.246</td>
<td>-2.355***</td>
<td>-2.075***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.325)</td>
<td>(1.768)</td>
<td>(0.588)</td>
<td>(0.551)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.507)</td>
<td>(4.533)</td>
<td>(0.766)</td>
<td>(0.902)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.907)</td>
<td>(1.429)</td>
<td>(0.894)</td>
<td>(1.150)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bay Area</td>
<td>-0.324</td>
<td>1.292</td>
<td>-4.430</td>
<td>-4.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.348)</td>
<td>(2.284)</td>
<td>(2.786)</td>
<td>(2.892)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td>-2.172**</td>
<td>-2.325**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.656)</td>
<td>(2.542)</td>
<td>(0.688)</td>
<td>(0.813)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>-3.344</td>
<td>1.068</td>
<td>-2.683</td>
<td>0.661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11.060)</td>
<td>(2.741)</td>
<td>(9.616)</td>
<td>(20.092)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Each row shows regression coefficients when g(.) in equation (3) is approximated using a three-segment linear spline with an equal fraction of the data in each segment. A first stage regression of log list price on a third-order polynomial in the instrument, fixed effects at the ZIP x first quarter of listing level, and log predicted price using both a repeat-sales and a hedonic methodology, as in (6), is estimated by OLS. The predicted value of the polynomial of the instrument is computed as the relative markup in equation (3), which is estimated by OLS. The sample is restricted to non-REOs, non-short sales, properties with positive appreciation since purchase, and properties not previously purchased with all cash (investors). The entire procedure weighted by the reciprocal of the standard deviation of the prediction error in the repeat-sales house price index in the observation’s ZIP code from 1988 to 2013. Before creating the spline, the 99th and 1st percentiles of the relative markup are dropped, as are any observations fully absorbed by fixed effects. In addition to the regression coefficients, the difference between the highest and lowest tercile of the spline is reported. Standard errors and the 95 percent confidence interval for the difference between the first and third terciles are computed by block bootstrapping the entire procedure on 35 ZIP-3 clusters. The number of observations listed is prior to dropping observations that are unique to a ZIP-quarter cell and the 1st and 99th percentiles. The Appendix text details each specification.
Table 22: IV Robustness 4: Transactions Only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Tercile Spline Coefficients</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Bootstrapped 95% CI</th>
<th>Obs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Details In Text)</td>
<td>Lowest</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Highest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sell Within 13 Weeks</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>4.376</td>
<td>-2.169***</td>
<td>-2.423**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.778</td>
<td>-2.500</td>
<td>-0.486</td>
<td>-0.923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weeks on Market</td>
<td>(25.263)</td>
<td>-102.910*</td>
<td>62.734***</td>
<td>87.996***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-20.157</td>
<td>-50.969</td>
<td>-11.02</td>
<td>-19.655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternate Defn</td>
<td>(18.203)</td>
<td>-126.848*</td>
<td>56.316***</td>
<td>74.519***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-16.871</td>
<td>-58.846</td>
<td>-10.94</td>
<td>-15.106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Each row shows regression coefficients when g(.) in equation (3) is approximated using a three-segment linear spline with an equal fraction of the data in each segment. A first stage regression of log list price on a third-order polynomial in the instrument, fixed effects at the ZIP x first quarter of listing level, and log predicted price using both a repeat-sales and a hedonic methodology, as in (6), is estimated by OLS. The predicted value of the polynomial of the instrument is computed as the relative markup in equation (3), which is estimated by OLS. The sample is restricted to non-REOs, non-short sales, properties with positive appreciation since purchase, and properties not previously purchased with all cash (investors). The entire procedure weighted by the reciprocal of the standard deviation of the prediction error in the repeat-sales house price index in the observation’s ZIP code from 1988 to 2013. Before creating the spline, the 99th and 1st percentiles of the relative markup are dropped, as are any observations fully absorbed by fixed effects. In addition to the regression coefficients, the difference between the highest and lowest tercile of the spline is reported. Standard errors and the 95 percent confidence interval for the difference between the first and third terciles are computed by block bootstrapping the entire procedure on 35 ZIP-3 clusters. The number of observations listed is prior to dropping observations that are unique to a ZIP-quarter cell and the 1st and 99th percentiles. The Appendix text details each specification.

property IDs and I use an algorithm described in Appendix A to guess of which is the relevant property ID. Additionally, there are spikes in the number of listings in the Altos data for a few dates, which I have largely eliminated by dropping listings that do not match to a DataQuick property ID. Despite the fact that these two issues affect a very small number of observations, this specification drops both types of potentially problematic observations to show that they do not affect results.

- By Time Period: I split the data into two time periods, February 2008 to June 2010 and July 2010 to February 2013.
- By MSA: Separate regressions for the San Francisco Bay, Los Angeles, and San Diego areas.

The results continue to show concavity, although in some specifications it is weakened by the smaller sample size and no longer significant. In particular, in San Diego the confidence intervals are so wide that nothing can be inferred. Additionally, both when predicted prices are computed using non-REO house price indices (which are much noisier) and in the second half of the sample, the result is slightly weakened and no longer significant.

Finally, Table 22 shows results for the subset of homes that transact for three different outcome variables. First, it shows the main sale within 13 weeks outcome, for which the concavity is still significant. The second two specifications show results using weeks on the market as the outcome variable, and so concavity is indicated by a positive difference between the highest and lowest terciles. For both the baseline and alternate weeks on the market definitions, there is significant
concavity in the IV specifications that indicates that increasing the list price by one percent increases time on the market by 1.1 to 1.5 weeks.

C.4 Ordinary Least Squares

An alternative to IV is to assume that there is no unobserved quality and thus no need for an instrument. This ordinary least squares approach implies that:

\[
\hat{p}_{ht} = \xi_{lt} + \beta X_{ht}
\]

and so \( p_{ht} - \hat{p}_{ht} \) is equal to the regression residual \( \eta_{ht} \) in:

\[
p_{ht} = \xi_{lt} + \beta X_{ht} + \eta_{ht},
\]

which can be estimated in a first stage and plugged into the second stage equation:

\[
d_{ht} = g(\eta_{ht}) + \psi_{lt} + \varepsilon_{ht}.
\]

Given the importance of unobserved quality, this is likely to provide significantly biased results, but it is worth considering as a benchmark as discussed in the main text. This section provides additional OLS results to show that the findings in Panel A of Table 3 are robust.

Because the OLS sample may include distressed sales, I take a conservative approach and include fixed effects at the ZIP \( \times \) quarter \( \times \) distress status level. Distressed status is defined as either non-distressed, REO, or a short sale (or withdrawn listing subsequently foreclosed upon). The results would look similar if ZIP \( \times \) quarter fixed effects were used and an additive categorical control for distressed status were included in \( X_{ht} \).

First, Figure 22 shows binned scatter plots for OLS for all listings, transactions only, and the IV subsample. In each, a clear pattern of concavity is visible, but as discussed in the main text, the upward slope on the left indicates the presence of substantial unobserved quality—particularly among homes that do not sell—and thus the need for an instrument.47

Table 23 shows a number of robustness and specification checks. Those different from the IV specification checks described previously are:

- House Characteristic Controls: As with IV, this includes a third-order polynomial in age, log square feet, bedrooms, and bathrooms, but it also includes additive fixed effects for quintiles of the time since purchase distribution in \( X_{ht} \).

- Hedonic predicted price only: Drops the repeat-sales house price index from \( X_{ht} \). This expands the sample to all listings in the data rather than only those with a prior observed sale.

- Low REO ZIPs: Only includes ZIP codes with less than 20 percent REO sale shares from 2008 to 2013. (REO is a sale of a foreclosed property.)

- Low Short ZIPs: Only includes ZIP codes with less than 20 percent short sale shares from 2008 to 2013. (A short sale occurs when a homeowner sells their house for less than their outstanding mortgage balance and must negotiate the sale with their lender.)

\[\text{An alternative explanation is that in the later years of my sample I do not have follow-up data on foreclosures, so some withdrawn short sales are counted as non-distressed. This may explain some of the upward slope, as the upward slope is concentrated in non-withdrawn properties, high short sale ZIP codes, and the later years of my sample.}\]

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Table 23: Ordinary Least Squares Robustness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specification (Details In Text)</th>
<th>Tercile Spline Coefficients</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Bootstrapped 95% CI</th>
<th>Obs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House Characteristic Controls</td>
<td>0.155*** -0.293*** -0.553***</td>
<td>-0.708***</td>
<td>[-0.835, -0.616]</td>
<td>414,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternate Time to Sale Defn</td>
<td>0.143*** -0.529*** -0.496***</td>
<td>-0.639***</td>
<td>[-0.762, -0.533]</td>
<td>431,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dep Var: 18 Weeks</td>
<td>0.195*** -0.419*** -0.496***</td>
<td>-0.692***</td>
<td>[-0.802, -0.59]</td>
<td>431,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dep Var: 10 Weeks</td>
<td>0.122*** -0.536*** -0.453***</td>
<td>-0.575***</td>
<td>[-0.692, -0.473]</td>
<td>431,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonic Predicted Price Only</td>
<td>0.128*** -0.255*** -0.458***</td>
<td>-0.587***</td>
<td>[-0.724, -0.427]</td>
<td>665,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low REO ZIPs</td>
<td>0.152** -0.943*** -0.465***</td>
<td>-0.618***</td>
<td>[-0.847, -0.513]</td>
<td>180,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Short Sale ZIPs</td>
<td>0.060 -1.063*** -0.405***</td>
<td>-0.465**</td>
<td>[-0.773, -0.272]</td>
<td>113,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No REO or Short Sale</td>
<td>0.322*** -0.738*** -0.525***</td>
<td>-0.846***</td>
<td>[-1.052, -0.684]</td>
<td>221,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transactions Only</td>
<td>0.012 -0.419*** -0.510***</td>
<td>-0.522***</td>
<td>[-0.607, -0.46]</td>
<td>318,842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Subsample</td>
<td>0.322*** -1.110*** -0.533***</td>
<td>-0.854***</td>
<td>[-1.141, -0.65]</td>
<td>111,293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only FE Cells With At Least 20 Obs</td>
<td>0.156*** -0.610*** -0.496***</td>
<td>-0.652***</td>
<td>[-0.819, -0.563]</td>
<td>273,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predicted Prices</td>
<td>0.144*** -0.405*** -0.534***</td>
<td>-0.679***</td>
<td>[-0.777, -0.588]</td>
<td>431,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduced as Cubic</td>
<td>0.322*** -1.110*** -0.533***</td>
<td>-0.854***</td>
<td>[-1.141, -0.65]</td>
<td>111,293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Listed 2008-7/2010</td>
<td>0.046 -0.616*** -0.522***</td>
<td>-0.567***</td>
<td>[-0.685, -0.467]</td>
<td>233,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Listed 7/2010-2013</td>
<td>0.317*** -0.375*** -0.415***</td>
<td>-0.731***</td>
<td>[-0.873, -0.642]</td>
<td>198,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bay Area</td>
<td>0.170** -0.421*** -0.565***</td>
<td>-0.735***</td>
<td>[-0.879, -0.571]</td>
<td>115,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>0.186*** -0.555*** -0.440***</td>
<td>-0.626***</td>
<td>[-0.79, -0.479]</td>
<td>256,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>0.133*** -0.275* -0.578***</td>
<td>-0.710***</td>
<td>[-0.748, -0.65]</td>
<td>59,791</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Each row shows regression coefficients when g(.) in equation (3) is approximated using a three-segment linear spline with an equal fraction of the data in each segment. OLS estimates the relative markup based on a first stage, equation (34), and plugs in the estimate relative markup into equation (3). The fixed effects at the quarter of initial listing x ZIP x distress status level. Distress status corresponds to three groups: normal sales, REOs (sales of foreclosed homes and foreclosure auctions), and short sales (cases where the transaction was less than the amount outstanding on the loan and withdrawals that are subsequently foreclosed on in the next two years). Both procedures are weighted by the reciprocal of the standard deviation of the prediction error in the repeat-sales house price index in the observation’s ZIP code from 1988 to 2013. Before creating the spline, the 99th and 1st percentiles of the relative markup are dropped, as are any observations fully absorbed by fixed effects. In addition to the regression coefficients, the difference between the highest and lowest tercile of the spline is reported. Standard errors and the 95 percent confidence interval for the difference between the first and third terciles are computed by block bootstrapping the entire procedure on 35 ZIP-3 clusters. The number of observations listed is prior to dropping observations that are unique to a ZIP-quarter cell and the 1st and 99th percentiles. The Appendix text details each specification.
Figure 22: The Effect of List Price on Probability of Sale: Ordinary Least Squares

Notes: Each panel shows a binned scatter plot of the probability of sale within 13 weeks against the log relative markup. OLS assumes no unobserved quality. To create the figure, a first stage regression of log list price on fixed effects at the ZIP x first quarter of listing level x seller distress status level and repeat sales and hedonic log predicted prices, as in (34), is estimated by OLS. The residual is used as the relative markup in equation (3), which is estimated by OLS. The figure splits the data into 25 equally-sized bins of the estimated relative markup and plots the mean of the estimated relative markup against the log of the mean of the probability of sale within 13 weeks net of fixed effects for each bin. Before binning, the 1st and 99th percentiles of the log sale price residual and any observations fully absorbed by fixed effects are dropped. The entire procedure is weighted by the reciprocal of the standard deviation of the prediction error in the repeat-sales house price index in the observation’s ZIP code from 1988 to 2013. Observation counts prior to dropping the 1st and 99th percentiles are 431,830 for panel A (all listings with a prior observed sale), 318,832 for panel B (listings with a prior observed sale that lead to transactions), and 111,293 for panel C (IV sample).

- No REO or Short Sale: Drops REOs, short sales, and withdrawn sales subsequently foreclosed upon homes, thus only leaving non-distressed sales.
- Transactions only: Drops houses withdrawn from the market.
- IV Subsample: Drops homes with negative appreciation since purchase, REOs, and homes previously purchased with all cash.

All specifications show significant concavity.

D \hspace{1cm} \text{Model}

D.1 \hspace{1cm} \text{Laws of Motion and Value Functions}

This Appendix derives the probabilities of sale and value functions for a model with a general price distribution. It then provides the laws of motion and value functions not provided in the main text.

The \textit{ex-ante} probability of sale for a seller posting price $p_t$ with a price distribution of $\Omega_t$ and a functional market tightness of $\hat{\theta}_t$ is:

$$d \left( p_t, \Omega_t, \hat{\theta}_t \right) = q \left( \hat{\theta}_t \right) \left( 1 - G \left( p_t - E_{\Omega_t} [p_t] - \mu \right) \right) \left( 1 - F (\varepsilon_t) \right).$$
The functional market tightness is \( \hat{\theta}_t \equiv \frac{p_t}{s_{t|\text{stated}}} = \frac{\theta_t}{p_t} \), where \( \theta_t = \frac{p_t}{s_t} \) is the buyer-to-seller ratio. The probability of purchase for a buyer is the probability of a match times an integral over all sellers with the integrand equal to the probability of meeting any given seller times the probability of purchase from that seller:

\[
\Pr[\text{Buy} | \Omega_t, \hat{\theta}_t] = \frac{q(\hat{\theta}_t)}{\theta_t} \int \frac{1 - G (p_t - E_{\Omega} [p_t] - \mu)}{E_{\Omega}[1 - G (p_t - E_{\Omega} [p_t] - \mu)]} (1 - F (\varepsilon_t^* (p_t))) d\Omega(p_t)
\]

Note the probability distribution the buyer integrates over is the distribution of homes that satisfy \( p_t - \eta_{h,t} - E [p_t] \leq \mu \) but \( \Omega(p_t) \) applies to all posted prices. Multiplying by \( \frac{1 - G (p_t - E_{\Omega} [p_t] - \mu)}{E_{\Omega}[1 - G (p_t - E_{\Omega} [p_t] - \mu)]} \) converts the density \( \omega(p_t) \) from the distribution of posted prices to the distribution of non-overpriced posted prices. This probability can be simplified by noting that the \( E_{\Omega} [1 - G (p_t - E_{\Omega} [p_t] - \mu)] \) in the denominator of \( \hat{\theta}_t \) cancels with the same term in the integral:

\[
\Pr[\text{Buy}] = \frac{q(\hat{\theta}_t)}{\theta_t} \int (1 - G (p_t - E_{\Omega} [p_t] - \mu)) (1 - F (\varepsilon_t^* (p_t))) d\Omega(p_t)
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{\theta_t} \int d(p_t, \Omega_t, \hat{\theta}_t) d\Omega(p_t)
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{\theta_t} E_{\Omega} \left[ d(p_t, \Omega_t, \hat{\theta}_t) \right].
\]

With Cobb-Douglas matching, things simplify because,

\[
q(\hat{\theta}_t) = \xi \hat{\theta}_t^\gamma = \xi \frac{\theta_t^\gamma}{E_{\Omega}[(1 - G (p_t - E_{\Omega} [p_t] - \mu))]^\gamma}.
\]

The seller’s value function is:

\[
V_{t}^{s} = s + \beta E_t V_{t+1}^{s} + \max_{p_t} \left\{ d(p_t, \Omega_t, \theta_t) \left( p_t - s - \beta E_t V_{t+1}^{s} \right) \right\},
\]

where \( p_t \) is own price. For a staggered model, in period \( \tau = 0 \) when the seller is choosing price, the value function is:

\[
V_{t}^{s,0} = s + \beta E_t V_{t+1}^{s,1} + \max_{p_t^0} \left\{ d(p_t^0, \Omega_t, \theta_t) \left( p_t^0 - s - \beta E_t V_{t+1}^{s,1} \right) \right\},
\]

and in period \( \tau \neq 0 \) when price is fixed, the value function is:

\[
V_{t}^{s,\tau} = s + \beta E_t V_{t+1}^{s,\tau+1} + d(p_t^\tau, \Omega_t, \theta_t) \left( p_t^\tau - s - \beta E_t V_{t+1}^{s,\tau+1} \right).
\]

\( p_t^\tau = p_{t+1}^{\tau-1} \) and \( V_{t+1}^{s,\tau} = V_{t+1}^{s,0} \), so that \( V_{t+1}^{s,\tau+1} \) corresponds to \( V_{t+1}^{s,0} \) when \( \tau = N - 1 \).

The buyer’s value function integrates over each type of seller, multiplying the probability of purchase from that type of seller by the surplus obtained from purchasing from that type of seller:

\[
V_{t}^{b} = b + \beta E_t V_{t+1}^{b} + \frac{1}{\theta_t} \int d(p_t, \Omega_t, \hat{\theta}_t) \left( V_{t}^{b} - p_t^\tau - b - \beta V_{t+1}^{b} + \varepsilon_t^{s,\tau} (p_t^\tau) \right) + \max_{\varepsilon} \left( E \left[ \varepsilon - \varepsilon_t^{s,\tau} (p_t^\tau) \right] | \varepsilon > \varepsilon_t^{s,\tau} (p_t^\tau) \right) d\Omega(p_t).
\]
The purchase decisions from each type of seller are optimal, so
\[
\varepsilon_i^t (p_t^r) = p_t^r + b + \beta V_{t+1}^b - V_t^h.
\]
Plugging this into \( V_t^b \) gives:
\[
V_t^b = b + \beta E_t V_{t+1}^b + \frac{1}{\theta_t} \int d(p_t, \Omega_t, \bar{\theta}_t) \mathbb{E} [\varepsilon - \varepsilon_i^t (p_t^r) | \varepsilon > \varepsilon_i^t (p_t^r)] d\Omega (p_t)
\]
\[
= b + \beta E_t V_{t+1}^b + \frac{1}{\lambda \theta_t} \int d(p_t, \Omega_t, \bar{\theta}_t) d\Omega (p_t).
\]

Given the setup presented in the main text and summarized in Figure 6, the laws of motion for the value functions for homeowners and renters are,
\[
V_{t-1}^b = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ d(p_t, \Omega_t, \bar{\theta}_t) \right] V_{t-1}^b + \lambda (1 - C (c_{t-1}^r)) H_{t-1}.
\]
\[
V_t^h = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ d(p_t, \Omega_t, \bar{\theta}_t) \right] V_t^h + \lambda (1 - C (c_{t-1}^r)) H_{t-1}.
\]
\[
S_t^0 = \left(1 - d(p_t, \Omega_t, \bar{\theta}_t)\right) S_{t-1}^0 + \lambda (1 - C (c_{t-1}^r)) H_{t-1}.
\]
\[
S_t^r = \left(1 - d(p_t, \Omega_t, \bar{\theta}_t)\right) S_{t-1}^r + \lambda (1 - C (c_{t-1}^r)) H_{t-1}.
\]

For staggered pricing there are laws of motion for each \( S^\tau \):
\[
S_t^\tau = \left(1 - d(p_t, \Omega_t, \bar{\theta}_t)\right) S_{t-1}^{\tau \tau} \quad \forall \tau \neq 0
\]
\[
S_t^0 = \left(1 - d(p_t, \Omega_t, \bar{\theta}_t)\right) S_{t-1}^{0} + \lambda (1 - C (c_{t-1}^r)) H_{t-1}.
\]

The value functions for homeowners and renters are,
\[
V_t^h = h + \beta \left[ \lambda (1 - C (c_{t-1}^r)) E_t [V_{t+1}^r + LV^0 + (1 - L) V^h_{t+1}] \right.
\]
\[
- \lambda (1 - C (c_{t+1}^r)) E_t [k | c < c_t^r] \left(1 - C (c_{t+1}^r)) E_t V_{t+1}^h \right]
\]
\[
V_t^r = u + x_t + \beta \left[ \lambda (1 - K (k_{t+1}^r)) E_t V_{t+1}^h - \lambda (1 - K (k_{t+1}^r)) E_t V_{t+1}^r \right]
\]
\[
+ \lambda (1 - K (k_{t+1}^r)) E_t V_{t+1}^r \right],
\]
where \( x_t \) is the stochastic AR(1) shock to the flow utility of renting. In the staggered model \( V_{t+1}^h \)
is replaced by \( V_{t+1}^0 \). The value functions are standard with the exception of terms for the expected cost paid by a homeowner and renter if they decide not to enter the housing market, \( E [k | c < c_t^r] \) and \( E [k | k < k_t^r] \), respectively.

D.2 Proofs

D.2.1 Lemma 3: Optimal Flexible Price Setting

The seller’s value function is:
\[
V_t^s = s + \beta V_{t+1}^s + \max_p \left\{ d(p_t, \Omega_t, \bar{\theta}_t) (p_t - s - \beta V_{t+1}^s) \right\}.
\]
The seller’s optimal price is defined by the first order condition:

\[ p_t = s + \beta V_{t+1}^{s} - \frac{d \left( p_t, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right)}{\partial p_t} , \]

where \( d \left( p_t, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right) \) is defined in equation (12) and \( \varepsilon_t^* = b + \beta V_{t+1}^{h} + p_t - V_t^{h} \). The impact of an individual’s price on \( E_{\Omega} \left[ 1 - G \left( p_t - E_{\Omega} [p_t] - \mu \right) \right] \) is infinitesimal so,

\[ \frac{\partial d \left( p_t, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right)}{\partial p_t} = -d \left( p_t, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right) \left[ \frac{f \left( \varepsilon_t^* \right)}{1 - F \left( \varepsilon_t^* \right)} + \frac{g \left( (p_t - E_{\Omega} [p_t] - \mu) \right)}{1 - G \left( p_t - E_{\Omega} [p_t] - \mu \right)} \right] , \]

which gives:

\[ p = s + \beta V_{t+1}^{s} + \frac{1}{\sigma} \left( \frac{f \left( \varepsilon_t^* \right)}{1 - F \left( \varepsilon_t^* \right)} + \frac{g \left( (p_t - E_{\Omega} [p_t] - \mu) \right)}{1 - G \left( p_t - E_{\Omega} [p_t] - \mu \right)} \right) . \]

For uniqueness, the second order condition is:

\[ \frac{\partial^2 d \left( p_t, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right)}{\partial p_t^2} (p_t - s - \beta V_{t+1}^{s}) + 2 \frac{\partial d \left( p_t, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right)}{\partial p_t} < 0 , \]

or equivalently,

\[ \frac{\partial^2 d \left( p_t, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right)}{\partial p_t^2} < \left( \frac{\partial^2 d \left( p_t, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right)}{\partial p_t^2} \right)^2 . \]

This condition holds locally, as \( \frac{\partial^2 d \left( p_t, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right)}{\partial p_t^2} < 0 \) around the equilibrium price. However, \( d \left( p_t, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right) \) is not globally concave as illustrated by Figure 7. Because it is convex as \( p_t - E_{\Omega} [p_t] \rightarrow \infty \), the Lemma specifies that the optimal price is unique on an interval bounded away from \( p_t = \infty \). Intuitively, there may be an equilibrium with close to no trade due to the non-concavity, but this equilibrium is assumed away. Numerical simulations show that the local optimum is the global optimum for all parameter values considered.

**D.2.2 Lemma 4: Optimal Staggered Price Setting**

The price-setting seller’s value function is:

\[ V_{t}^{s,0} = \max_p \left\{ s + \beta V_{t+1}^{s,1} (p) + d \left( p_t, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right) \left( p - s - \beta V_{t+1}^{s,1} (p) \right) \right\} , \]

where

\[ V_{t}^{s,\tau} (p) = s + \beta V_{t+1}^{s,\tau+1} (p) + d \left( p_t, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right) \left( p - s - \beta V_{t+1}^{s,\tau+1} (p) \right) , \]

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and $V^N_t = V^0_t$. The first order condition is:

$$
\beta \left(1 - d \left( p, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right) \right) E_t \frac{\partial V^{s,1}_{t+1}}{\partial p} + d \left( p, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right) E_t \left[ 1 + \frac{\partial d \left( p, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right)}{d \left( p, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right)} \left( p - s - \beta V^{s,1}_{t+1} \left( p \right) \right) \right] = 0,
$$

where for $\tau < N - 1$,

$$
E_t \frac{\partial V^{s,\tau}_{t} \left( p \right)}{\partial p} = \beta \left(1 - d \left( p, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right) \right) E_t \frac{\partial V^{s,\tau+1}_{t+1} \left( p \right)}{\partial p} + d \left( p, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right) E_t \left[ 1 + \frac{\partial d \left( p, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right)}{d \left( p, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right)} \left( p - s - \beta V^{s,\tau+1}_{t+1} \left( p \right) \right) \right],
$$

and,

$$
E_t \frac{\partial V^{s,N-1}_{t} \left( p \right)}{\partial p} = d \left( p, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right) E_t \left[ 1 + \frac{\partial d \left( p, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right)}{d \left( p, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right)} \left( p - s - \beta^{s,0}_{t+1} \right) \right].
$$

Defining $D^\tau_t \left( p \right) = E_t \left[ \prod_{\tau=0}^{j-1} \left(1 - d^\tau \left( p, \Omega_{t+j}, \tilde{\theta}_{t+j} \right) \right) \right] d \left( p, \Omega_{t+j}, \tilde{\theta}_{t+j} \right)$ and substituting $\frac{\partial V^{s,1}_{t+1} \left( p \right)}{\partial p}, ..., \frac{\partial V^{s,N-1}_{t+1} \left( p \right)}{\partial p}$ into the first order condition gives:

$$
\sum_{\tau=0}^{N-1} \beta^\tau D^\tau_t \left( p \right) E_t \left[ 1 + \frac{\partial d \left( p, \Omega_{t+\tau}, \tilde{\theta}_{t+\tau} \right)}{d \left( p, \Omega_{t+\tau}, \tilde{\theta}_{t+\tau} \right)} \left( p - s - \beta V^{s,\tau+1}_{t+\tau+1} \left( p \right) \right) \right] = 0.
$$

Rearranging gives:

$$
p = \frac{\sum_{\tau=0}^{N-1} \beta^\tau D^\tau_t \left( p \right) E_t \left[ 1 + \frac{\partial d \left( p, \Omega_{t+\tau}, \tilde{\theta}_{t+\tau} \right)}{d \left( p, \Omega_{t+\tau}, \tilde{\theta}_{t+\tau} \right)} \left( s + \beta V^{s,\tau+1}_{t+\tau+1} \right) \right]}{\sum_{\tau=0}^{N-1} \beta^\tau D^\tau_t \left( p \right) E_t \left[ \frac{\partial d \left( p, \Omega_{t+\tau}, \tilde{\theta}_{t+\tau} \right)}{d \left( p, \Omega_{t+\tau}, \tilde{\theta}_{t+\tau} \right)} \right]},
$$

which, defining $\Psi^\tau_t = E_t \left[ \frac{\partial d \left( p, \Omega_{t+\tau}, \tilde{\theta}_{t+\tau} \right)}{d \left( p, \Omega_{t+\tau}, \tilde{\theta}_{t+\tau} \right)} \right]$ and $\pi^\tau_t = s + E_t V^{s,\tau+1}_{t+\tau+1} + \frac{1}{\Psi^\tau_t}$, simplifies to,

$$
p = \frac{\sum_{\tau=0}^{N-1} \beta^\tau D^\tau_t \left( p \right) \Psi^\tau_t \pi^\tau_t}{\sum_{\tau=0}^{N-1} \beta^\tau D^\tau_t \left( p \right) \Psi^\tau_t}.
$$

For uniqueness, that the second order condition is:

$$
E_t \left\{ \beta \left(1 - d \left( p, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right) \right) \frac{\partial^2 V^{s,1}_{t+1}}{\partial p^2} - 2\beta \frac{\partial d \left( p, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right)}{d \left( p, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right)} \frac{\partial V^{s,1}_{t+1}}{\partial p} \right\} < 0,
$$

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where

\[ E_t \frac{\partial V_{t+1}^{s,t}}{\partial p} = E_t \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \beta \left( 1 - d \left( p, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right) \right) \frac{\partial V_{t+1}^{s,t+1}}{\partial p} \\ + d \left( p, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right) + \frac{\partial d(p, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t)}{\partial p} \left( p - s - \beta V_{t+1}^{s,t+1} \right) \end{array} \right\} ^{\prime}, \]

\[ E_t \frac{\partial^2 V_{t+1}^{s,t}}{\partial p^2} = E_t \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \beta \left( 1 - d \left( p, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right) \right) \frac{\partial^2 V_{t+1}^{s,t+1}}{\partial p^2} - 2 \beta \frac{\partial^2 d(p, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t)}{\partial p^2} \left( p - s - \beta V_{t+1}^{s,t+1} \right) \\ + 2 \frac{\partial d(p, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t)}{\partial p} + \frac{\partial^2 d(p, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t)}{\partial p^2} \left( p - s - \beta V_{t+1}^{s,t+1} \right) \end{array} \right\} ^{\prime}, \]

and

\[ E_t \frac{\partial V_{t+1}^{s,N-1}}{\partial p} = E_t \left\{ d \left( p, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right) + \frac{\partial d(p, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t)}{\partial p} \left( p - s - \beta_{t+1} \right) \right\} + \frac{\partial^2 d(p, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t)}{\partial p^2} \left( p - s - \beta_{t+1} \right) \]

The second order condition can be rewritten as:

\[ \sum_{j=0}^{N-1} \beta^j \prod_{\tau=0}^{t} \left( 1 - d \left( p, \Omega_{t+j}, \tilde{\theta}_{t+j} \right) \right) \left\{ \begin{array}{c} 2 \frac{\partial d(p, \Omega_{t+j}, \tilde{\theta}_{t+j})}{\partial p} + \frac{\partial^2 d(p, \Omega_{t+j}, \tilde{\theta}_{t+j})}{\partial p^2} \left( p - s - \beta V_{t+j}^{s,t+1} \right) \\ - 2 \beta \frac{\partial^2 d(p, \Omega_{t+j}, \tilde{\theta}_{t+j})}{\partial p^2} \left( p - s - \beta V_{t+j}^{s,t+1} \right) \end{array} \right\} < 0, \]

where,

\[ E_t \frac{\partial V_{t+1}^{s,t}}{\partial p} = E_t \sum_{k=t+1}^{t+N-1} \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \beta^k \prod_{j=t+1}^{k} \left( 1 - d \left( p, \Omega_j, \tilde{\theta}_j \right) \right) d \left( p, \Omega_{t+k}, \tilde{\theta}_{t+k} \right) \\ \times \left( p - s - \beta V_{t+k}^{s,t+1} \right) \right\} \]

Combining gives

\[ E_t \sum_{\tau=0}^{N-1} \beta^\tau \prod_{j=0}^{t} \left( 1 - d \left( p, \Omega_{t+j}, \tilde{\theta}_{t+j} \right) \right) \left\{ \begin{array}{c} 2 \frac{\partial d(p, \Omega_{t+j}, \tilde{\theta}_{t+j})}{\partial p} + \frac{\partial^2 d(p, \Omega_{t+j}, \tilde{\theta}_{t+j})}{\partial p^2} \left( p - s - \beta V_{t+j}^{s,t+1} \right) \\ - 2 \beta \frac{\partial^2 d(p, \Omega_{t+j}, \tilde{\theta}_{t+j})}{\partial p^2} \left( p - s - \beta V_{t+j}^{s,t+1} \right) \end{array} \right\} \]

This condition must hold for uniqueness. As with the flexible case, \( d \left( p_r, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right) \) is concave locally but not globally, as illustrated by Figure 7. Because it is convex as \( p_t = E \left[ p_t \right] \to \infty \), the Lemma specifies the optimal price is unique on an interval bounded away from \( p_t = \infty \). Locally, the
left hand side of the final condition is negative, while the right hand side is indeterminate. In all simulations considered, this condition holds, and numerical simulations show that the local optimum is the global optimum for all parameter values considered.

**D.3 Frictionless Model**

In the frictionless case ($N = 1$ for the staggered model, $\alpha = 1$ for the rule-of-thumb model), the definition of an equilibrium simplifies to:

**Definition 7** Equilibrium with flexible pricing is defined by a price $p_t$, purchase cutoffs $\varepsilon^*_t$, and seller, buyer, homeowner, and renter value functions $V^s_t$, $V^b_t$, $V^h_t$, and $V^r_t$, entry cutoffs $c^*_t$ and $k^*_t$, and stocks of each type of agent $B_t$, $S_t$, $H_t$, and $R_t$ satisfying:

1. **Optimal pricing** (15). All sellers set the same price so $p_t = E_\Omega [p_t]$
2. **Optimal purchasing decisions by buyers**: $\varepsilon^*_t = p_t + \beta V^b_{t+1} - V^h_t$
3. **Demand curve** (12) simplifies to $q(\theta_t) (1 - F(\varepsilon^*_t))$
4. **Optimal entry decisions by homeowners and renters who receive shocks** (9) and (10)
5. **The value functions for buyers** (13), sellers (14), renters (43), and homeowners (42)
6. **The laws of motion for all agents** (35), (38), (39), and (37).

For the reader’s convenience, the simplified general equilibrium system without a shock is reproduced below. Note that $d\left( p_t, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right) = \xi \theta^\gamma [1 - G(\mu)]^{1-\gamma} (1 - F(\varepsilon^*_t))$ is plugged in everywhere:

$$
B_t = \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\theta_{t-1}} \xi \theta^\gamma_{t-1} [1 - G(-\mu)]^{1-\gamma} (1 - F(\varepsilon^*_t)) \right) B_{t-1} \\
+ \lambda^r (1 - K(k^*_t)) R_{t-1} + (1 - L K(k^*)) \lambda^h (1 - C(c^*_t)) H_{t-1}
$$

$$
S_t = \left( 1 - \xi \theta^\gamma_{t-1} [1 - G(-\mu)]^{1-\gamma} (1 - F(\varepsilon^*_t)) \right) S_{t-1} + \lambda^h (1 - C(c^*_t)) H_{t-1}
$$

$$
H_t = \xi \theta^\gamma_{t-1} [1 - G(-\mu)]^{1-\gamma} (1 - F(\varepsilon^*_t)) S_{t-1} + \left( 1 - \lambda^h (1 - C(c^*_t)) \right) H_{t-1}
$$

$$
R_t = (1 - \lambda^r (1 - K(k^*_t))) R_{t-1} + L K(k^*) \lambda^h (1 - C(c^*_t)) H_{t-1}
$$

$$
V^h_t = b + \beta \left[ \frac{\lambda^r (1 - C(c^*_t))}{V^h_{t+1} + V^s_t + (1 - L) V^h_{t+1}} \right]
$$

$$
V^r_t = a + \beta \left[ \frac{\chi^r (1 - K(k^*_t))}{V^r_{t+1} + (1 - L) V^r_{t+1} + (1 - \lambda^r (1 - K(k^*_t))) V^r_{t+1}} \right]
$$

$$
V^b_t = b + \beta E_t V^h_{t+1} + \frac{\xi \theta^\gamma_t [1 - G(-\mu)]^{1-\gamma} (1 - F(\varepsilon^*_t))}{\sigma^2 \cdot 1 + \exp(\frac{\chi}{\sigma})} + \chi
$$

$$
V^s_t = s + \beta E_t V^s_{t+1} + \frac{1}{\sigma^2 \cdot 1 + \exp(\frac{\chi}{\sigma})} + \chi
$$

$$
\varepsilon^*_t = b + \beta E_t V^h_{t+1} + p_t - V^h_t
$$

$$
p_t = s + \beta E_t V^s_{t+1} + \frac{1}{\sigma^2 \cdot 1 + \exp(\frac{\chi}{\sigma})} + \chi
$$

$$
c^*_t = V^h_t - (V^s_t + (1 - L) V^h_t + V^s_t)
$$

$$
k^*_t = V^r_t - V^h_t
$$

$$
x_t = \rho x_{t+1} + \eta, \eta \sim N(0, \sigma^2_{\eta})
$$
D.4 Rule-of-Thumb Model

The equilibrium of the staggered pricing model is defined by Definition 6. For the reader’s convenience, the general equilibrium system is reproduced below.

Full Rule-of-Thumb Model

\[
B_t = \left(1 - \frac{1}{\theta_{t-1}} \left[ \alpha d \left(p_{t-1}^N, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_{t-1} \right) + (1 - \alpha) d \left(p_{t-1}^R, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_{t-1} \right) \right] \right) B_{t-1} + \lambda^b \left(1 - K \left(k_{t-1}^r \right) \right) R_{t-1} + (1 - LK \left(k_{t-1}^r \right)) \lambda^b \left(1 - C \left(c_{t-1}^s \right) \right) H_{t-1} \\
S_t = \left(1 - \alpha d \left(p_{t-1}^N, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_{t-1} \right) - (1 - \alpha) d \left(p_{t-1}^R, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_{t-1} \right) \right) S_{t-1} + \lambda^h \left(1 - C \left(c_{t-1}^s \right) \right) H_{t-1} \\
H_t = d \left(p_{t-1}^N, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_{t-1} \right) + d \left(p_{t-1}^R, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_{t-1} \right) (1 - \alpha) S_{t-1} + \left(\lambda^b \left(1 - C \left(c_{t-1}^s \right) \right) \right) H_{t-1} \\
R_t = (1 - \lambda^r \left(1 - K \left(k_{t-1}^r \right) \right) R_{t-1} + LK \left(k_{t-1}^r \right) \lambda^b \left(1 - C \left(c_{t-1}^s \right) \right) H_{t-1} \\
V_t^b = h + \beta \left[ \lambda^h \left(1 - C \left(c_{t+1}^s \right) \right) \left[V_t^{n,R} + LV_t^0 + (1 - L) V_t^b \right] \right] \\
V_t^r = u + x_t + \beta \left[ 1 - \lambda^r \left(k_{t+1}^r \right) \right] \left[V_t^{n,R} \right] - \lambda^r \left(k_{t+1}^r \right) \left[V_t^{n,R} \right] \left[k \left(k_{t+1}^r \right) \right] - (1 - \lambda^r \left(k_{t+1}^r \right) : V_t^{n,R} \right] \left[V_t^{n,R} \right] \\
\varepsilon_t = b + \beta E_t V_t^{n,R} + \frac{1}{\lambda^b} \left[ \alpha d \left(p_{t}^N, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_{t} \right) + (1 - \alpha) d \left(p_{t}^R, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_{t} \right) \right] \\
d \left(p_{t}^N, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_{t} \right) = q \left(\theta_t \right) \left[1 - F \left(\varepsilon_t \right) \right] \\
c_t^s = V_t^b - \left(V_t^s + (1 - L) V_t^b + LV_t^0 \right) \\
c_t^r = V_t^r - V_t^b \\
p_t^N = \frac{p_{t-2}^N + p_{t-3}^N + p_{t-4}^N}{3} + \phi \left(\frac{p_{t-2}^N + p_{t-3}^N + p_{t-4}^N}{3} - \frac{p_{t-5}^N + p_{t-6}^N + p_{t-7}^N}{3} \right) \\
p_t^R = s + \beta E_t V_t^{n,R} + \frac{1}{\lambda^b} \left[ 1 + \exp \left(\frac{-E_t \mu^R}{\delta} \right) \right] \left[ \alpha \exp \left(\frac{-E_t \mu^R}{\delta} \right) + (1 - \alpha) \exp \left(\frac{-E_t \mu^R}{\delta} \right) \right] \\
E \left[p_t \right] = \alpha p_t^N + (1 - \alpha) p_t^R \\
x_t = \rho x_{t+1} + \eta, \eta \sim N \left(0, \sigma_x^2 \right)
\]

D.5 Staggered Pricing Model

The equilibrium of the staggered pricing model is defined by Definition 5. For the reader’s convenience, the general equilibrium system for two alternating groups of sellers used for most of the simulations without a shock is reproduced below.
Full Staggered Price Model

\[ B_t = \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\theta_{t-1}} \left[ S_{t-1}^0 d \left( p_{t-1}^0, \Omega_{t-1}, \tilde{\theta}_{t-1} \right) + S_{t-1}^1 d \left( p_{t-1}^1, \Omega_{t-1}, \tilde{\theta}_{t-1} \right) \right] \right) B_{t-1} + \lambda^r (1 - K (k^*_t)) R_{t-1} + (1 - L K (k^*_t)) \lambda^b (1 - C (c^*_t))) H_{t-1} \]

\[ S_t^0 = \left( 1 - d \left( p_{t-1}^0, \Omega_{t-1}, \tilde{\theta}_{t-1} \right) \right) S_{t-1}^1 + \lambda^b (1 - C (c^*_t))) H_{t-1} \]

\[ S_t^1 = \left( 1 - d \left( p_{t-1}^1, \Omega_{t-1}, \tilde{\theta}_{t-1} \right) \right) S_{t-1}^0 \]

\[ S_t = S_t^0 + S_t^1 \]

\[ H_t = d \left( p_{t-1}^0, \Omega_{t-1}, \tilde{\theta}_{t-1} \right) S_{t-1}^0 + d \left( p_{t-1}^1, \Omega_{t-1}, \tilde{\theta}_{t-1} \right) S_{t-1}^1 + \left( 1 - \lambda^h (1 - C (c^*_t))) \right) H_{t-1} \]

\[ R_t = (1 - \lambda^r (1 - K (k^*_t))) R_{t-1} + L K (k^*_t) \lambda^b (1 - C (c^*_t))) H_{t-1} \]

\[ V_t^h = h + \beta \left[ \lambda^b (1 - C (c^*_t))) \left[ V_{t+1}^{s,0} + LV^0 + (1 - L) V_{t+1}^b \right] \right] \]

\[ V_t^f = u + x_t + \beta \left[ \lambda^r (1 - K (k^*_t))) V_{t+1}^b - \lambda^r K (k^*_t)) E \left[ c_t \mid c^*_t \right] + (1 - \lambda^r (1 - K (k^*_t))) \right) V_{t+1}^f \]

\[ V_t^h = b + \beta E_t V_{t+1}^h + \frac{1}{\lambda_t} \left[ \frac{S_{t-1}^0 d \left( p_{t-1}^0, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right) + S_{t-1}^1 d \left( p_{t-1}^1, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right)}{S_t} \right] \]

\[ V_t^{s,0} = s + \beta E_t V_{t+1}^{s,0} + \frac{1}{\lambda_t} \left[ \frac{S_{t-1}^0 d \left( p_{t-1}^0, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right) + S_{t-1}^1 d \left( p_{t-1}^1, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right)}{S_t} \right] \]

\[ V_t^{s,1} = s + \beta E_t V_{t+1}^{s,1} + \frac{1}{\lambda_t} \left[ \frac{S_{t-1}^0 d \left( p_{t-1}^0, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right) + S_{t-1}^1 d \left( p_{t-1}^1, \Omega_t, \tilde{\theta}_t \right)}{S_t} \right] \]

\[ \epsilon_t^s = b + \beta E_t V_{t+1}^b + p_t - V_t = \frac{1}{\exp \left( \frac{-p_t - E[p_t|\gamma]}{\sigma} \right) + \exp \left( \frac{-p_t - E[p_t|\gamma]}{\sigma} \right)} \]

\[ d \left( p_t^0, \Omega_t, \theta_t \right) = q(\theta_t) \left( 1 - F \left( \epsilon_t^s \right) \right) \]

\[ E[p] = \frac{S_t^0 p_t^0 + S_t^1 p_t^1}{S_t} \]

\[ p_t^1 = p_{t-1} \]

\[ d \left( p_t^0, \Omega_t, \theta_t \right) \left[ \frac{1}{\exp \left( \frac{-p_t - E[p_t|\gamma]}{\sigma} \right) + \exp \left( -\frac{p_t - E[p_t|\gamma]}{\sigma} \right)} \right] + \lambda^h (1 - K (k^*_t))) R_{t-1} + (1 - L K (k^*_t)) \lambda^b (1 - C (c^*_t))) H_{t-1} \]

\[ E_t d \left( p_t^0, \Omega_{t+1}, \theta_{t+1} \right) \left[ \frac{1}{\exp \left( \frac{-p_t - E[p_t|\gamma]}{\sigma} \right) + \exp \left( -\frac{p_t - E[p_t|\gamma]}{\sigma} \right)} \right] + \lambda^h (1 - K (k^*_t))) R_{t-1} + (1 - L K (k^*_t)) \lambda^b (1 - C (c^*_t))) H_{t-1} \]

\[ c_t^s = V_t^h - (V_t^f + (1 - L) V_t^b + LV_t^0) \]

\[ k_t^s = V_t^f - V_t^b \]

\[ x_t = \rho x_{t+1} + \eta, \eta \sim N \left( 0, \sigma_\eta^2 \right) \]
D.6  Steady State

All three variants of the model share a unique steady state that can be found by equating the value of the endogenous variables across time periods. Steady state values are denoted without $t$ subscripts. Using the fact that a fixed housing stock of mass one and a fixed population in steady state of mass $Pop$ imply:

$$H + S = 1$$
$$B + H + R = N.$$  

The laws of motion and $H + S = 1$ give:

$$H = \frac{q(\theta)[1 - G(-\mu)]^{1-\gamma}(1 - F(\varepsilon^*))}{q(\theta)[1 - G(-\mu)]^{1-\gamma}(1 - F(\varepsilon^*)) + \lambda^h(1 - C(\varepsilon^*))}$$
$$S = \frac{\lambda^h(1 - C(\varepsilon^*))}{q(\theta)[1 - G(-\mu)]^{1-\gamma}(1 - F(\varepsilon^*)) + \lambda^h(1 - C(\varepsilon^*))}.$$  

The laws of motion along with $B + H + R = Pop$ imply:

$$R = \frac{LK(k^*)\lambda^h(1 - C(\varepsilon^*))}{\lambda^r(1 - K(k^*))}H$$
$$B = \frac{\lambda^h(1 - C(\varepsilon^*))}{q(\theta)[1 - G(-\mu)]^{1-\gamma}(1 - F(\varepsilon^*))}H$$
$$\frac{LK(k^*)}{\lambda^r(1 - K(k^*))} = \frac{(Pop - 1)}{\lambda^h(1 - C(\varepsilon^*))} + \frac{(Pop - \theta)}{q(\theta)[1 - G(-\mu)]^{1-\gamma}(1 - F(\varepsilon^*))}.$$  

The steady state value functions are:

$$V^h = \frac{h + \beta\lambda^h(1 - C(\varepsilon^*))[V^s + LV^0 + (1 - L)V^b] - \beta\lambda^hC(\varepsilon^*)E[c|c < c^*]}{1 - \beta(1 - \lambda^h(1 - C(\varepsilon^*)))}$$
$$V^r = \frac{u + \beta\lambda^r(1 - K(k^*))V^b - \beta\lambda^rK(k^*)E[k|k < k^*]}{1 - \beta(1 - \lambda^r(1 - K(k^*))}$$
$$V^b = \frac{b + \frac{\theta}{\theta}[1 - G(-\mu)]^{1-\gamma}(1 - F(\varepsilon^*))}{\lambda^h s + q(\theta)[1 - G(-\mu)]^{1-\gamma}(1 - F(\varepsilon^*))} + \frac{1}{\frac{1}{1 + \exp(\frac{\beta}{\theta})} + \lambda}$$
$$V^s = \frac{1}{1 - \beta}.$$  

Finally optimal pricing, optimal purchase decisions, and optimal entry decisions imply:

$$\varepsilon^* = b + \beta V^b + p - V^h$$
$$p = s + \beta V^s + \frac{1}{\frac{1}{1 + \exp(\frac{\beta}{\theta})} + \lambda}$$
$$c^* = V^h - (V^s + (1 - L)V^b + LV^0)$$
$$k^* = V^r - V^b.$$  

One can plug these equations into those for $\varepsilon^*, c^*$, and $k^*$ to get a three equation system with three unknowns that has a unique solution.

For staggered price variant of the model with $N$ staggered groups of list-price-setting sellers, there are a few more variables that require steady state values. Although each group has a different price, in steady state $p^\tau = p$, $\varepsilon^\tau = \varepsilon$, and $V^*_{\tau} = V^* \forall \tau$, where variables $\tau$ are the frictionless steady-state values. The only
difference between the two models’ steady states, then, is the $S^r$. One can show that:

$$S^r = \left[ \frac{1 - q(\theta) [1 - G(-\mu)]^{1 - \gamma} (1 - F(\varepsilon^*))}{\sum_{j=0}^{N-1} [1 - q(\theta) [1 - G(-\mu)]^{1 - \gamma} (1 - F(\varepsilon^*))]^{j}} \right] S_t,$$

where $S$ is the steady state mass of sellers for the frictionless model. Since all vintages of sellers post the same price in steady state, this does not affect the three equation system for the frictionless model, which continues to define the steady state for the staggered-pricing model.

For the rule-of-thumb variant of the model, the steady state of the model is identical to the frictionless case if $p^i = p$ and $\varepsilon^i = \varepsilon$, where $i = \{N, R\}$.

### D.7 Simulation Details

I present two main types of results: impulse response functions and stochastic simulations. For both, I report price, sales volume, months of supply, and buyer and seller entry. This section describes how these are computed.

Price is the average transaction price in the market. This is a weighted average of prices, where the weights are equal to the share of transactions accounted for by sellers with each price:

$$p_t = \frac{\int p^i d\left(p^i_t, \Omega_t, \hat{\theta}_t\right) d\Omega_t}{\int d\left(p^i_t, \Omega_t, \hat{\theta}_t\right) d\Omega_t}.$$

For a frictionless model, this is just the common price. For the rule-of-thumb model, this is equal to $p_t = \frac{\int p^i d\left(p^i_t, \Omega_t, \hat{\theta}_t\right) d\Omega_t}{\alpha d(p^*_{\Omega_t, \hat{\theta}_t}) p^* + (1 - \alpha) d(p^*_{\Omega_t, \hat{\theta}_t}) p^R}$. For the staggered model, this is equal to $p_t = \frac{\int p^i d\left(p^i_t, \Omega_t, \hat{\theta}_t\right) d\Omega_t}{\alpha d(p^*_{\Omega_t, \hat{\theta}_t}) p^* + (1 - \alpha) d(p^*_{\Omega_t, \hat{\theta}_t}) p^R + \frac{\beta}{s_t} d(p^i_{\Omega_t, \hat{\theta}_t}) p^0} + \frac{\beta}{s_t} d(p^i_{\Omega_t, \hat{\theta}_t}) p^0$.

Sales volume is the total amount of sales. This is equal to:

$$vol_t = E_{\Omega_t} \left[ d\left(p^*_t, \Omega_t, \hat{\theta}_t\right) \right] S_t,$$

and months of supply is equal to the mass ratio of the mass of sellers to sales volume:

$$MS_t = \frac{vol_t}{S_t} = E_{\Omega_t} \left[ d\left(p^*_t, \Omega_t, \hat{\theta}_t\right) \right] .$$

Buyer and seller entry come from the laws of motion (35) and (37) and are equal to:

- $BEnter_t = \lambda^R (1 - K(k^*_t)) R_t + (1 - LK(k^*_t)) \lambda^h (1 - C(c^*_t)) H_t$
- $SEnter_t = \lambda^h (1 - C(c^*_t)) H_t$.

Buyer entry has two terms reflecting the entry decisions of renters who receive shocks and new entrants to the metropolitan area.

For the impulse response functions, I use Dynare to compute the impulse response as the average difference between two sets of 100 simulations that use the same sequence of random shocks except for one period in which an additional standard deviation shock is added. For the entry simulation in Figure 12, I plot the above values at monthly frequencies form a selected simulation. For Table 8, I run 200 simulations of 500 years, collapse the data to quarterly frequency, then calculate the annual change in log price, log volume, and log inventory or estimate the price change on inventory levels regression for each of the 200 simulated series. I report the average values in the table.
D.8 Understanding Momentum Arising From Staggered Prices

The full dynamic intuition with staggered pricing is more nuanced than the static intuition presented in the main text because the seller has to weigh the costs and benefits of perturbing price across multiple periods. The intuition is clearest when one considers why a seller does not find it optimal to deviate from a slowly-adjusting price path by listing his or her house at a level closer to the new long-run price after a one-time permanent shock to fundamentals.

After a positive shock to prices, if prices are rising slowly why do sellers not list at a high price, sell at that high price in the off chance that a buyer really likes their house, and otherwise wait until prices are higher? Search is costly, so sellers do not want to set a very high price and sit on the market for a very long time. Over a shorter time horizon, the probability of sale and profit are very sensitive to perturbing price when a house’s price is relatively high but relatively insensitive to perturbing price when a house’s price is relatively low. This is the case for two reasons. First, despite the fact that the probability of sale is lower when a house’s price is relatively high, demand is much more elastic and so a seller weights that period’s low optimal price more heavily. Second, on the equilibrium path, prices converge to steady state at a decreasing rate, so the sellers lose more buyers today by setting a high price than they gain when they have a relatively low price tomorrow. Consequently, in a rising market sellers care about not having too high of a price when their price is high and do not deviate by raising prices when others are stuck at lower prices.

After a negative shock to prices, if prices are falling slowly and search is costly, why do sellers not deviate and cut their price today to raise their probability of sale and avoid search costs if selling tomorrow means selling at a lower price? Although the fact that the elasticity of demand is higher when relative price is higher makes the seller care more about not having too high of a relative price when their price is higher, there is a stronger countervailing effect. Because prices converge to steady state at a decreasing rate on the equilibrium path, sellers setting their price today will undercut sellers with fixed prices more than the sellers are undercut in the future. They thus gain relatively fewer buyers by having a low price when their price is relatively high and leave a considerable amount of money on the table by having a low price when their price is relatively low. On net, sellers care about not having too low of a price when they have the lower price and do not deviate from a path with slowly falling prices.

These intuitions in Figure 23, which shows simulation results for the \( N = 2 \) case that depict the weights placed the optimal flexible price in each period, the optimal flexible price in each period, and the reset price, equal to the weighted average of the optimal flexible prices. The solid blue line corresponds to the period in which the price is reset, in which the seller is in the higher priced group, and the dashed red line corresponds to the period after the price is reset, in which the seller is in the lower priced group. Panels A, B, and C are for an upward shock, while panels D, E, and F are for a downward shock. In Panel A, the weight is much larger on the reset period—and a lower optimal reset price—because the elasticity of demand is higher. The opposite is true in panel D, as the weighting effect works against momentum, which is why momentum in reset prices appears stronger on the upside in the staggered variant of the model. However, the weighting effect is more made up for by the speed of convergence to steady state, which can most clearly be seen in the asymmetry of the optimal reset price responses in panel E.

Another way of putting these intuitions is that the model features a trade-off between leaving money on the table when a seller has the relatively low price and gaining more buyers when a seller has the relatively high price. On the upside, since price resetters raise prices more than future price setters and since they care more about states with more elastic demand, the loss from losing buyers when a resetters have the relatively high price is stronger. On the downside, since price resetters cut prices more than future price resetters, the money left on the table by having a lower price when their prices are relatively low is stronger.

E Calibration Details and Robustness

E.1 Calibration Targets

The aggregate moments and parameters chosen from other papers are:

- A long-run homeownership rate of 65 percent. The homeownership hovered between 64 percent and 66 percent from the 1970s until the late 1990s before rising in the boom of the 2000s and falling afterwards.
Notes: Panels A, B and C show the impulse response to an upward shock and panels D, E, and F show the impulse response to a downward shock in response to a one-time surprise shock at time zero in a deterministic model solved in Dynare by Newton’s method. Panels C and F show the optimal reset prices. Because the optimal reset price is a weighted average of the optimal flexible prices that would prevail in the period the price is reset (period 0) and the period after (period 1), panels A and D show the weights and panels B and E show the optimal flexible prices for each period. Panels C and F are thus equal to the sum of the products of the blue lines and dotted red lines in the preceding two panels.

- $\gamma = 0.8$ from the median specification of Genesove and Han (2012). Anenberg and Bayer (2013) find a similar number.
- $L = 0.7$ from the approximate average internal mover share for Los Angeles of 0.3 from Anenberg and Bayer (2013), which is also roughly consistent with Wheaton and Lee’s (2009) analysis of the American Housing Survey.
- A median tenure for owner occupants of approximately nine years from American Housing Survey 1997 to 2005 (Table 3-9).
- The approximately equal time for buyers and sellers is from National Association of Realtors surveys (Head et al., 2012; Genesove and Han, 2012). This implies that a normal market is defined by a buyer to seller ratio of $\theta = 1$. I assume a time to sale in a normal market of four months for both buyers and sellers. There is no definitive number for the time to sale, and in the literature it is calibrated between 2.5 and six months. The lower numbers are usually based on real estate agent surveys (e.g., Genesove and Han, 2012), which have low response rates and are effectively marketing tools for real estate agents. The higher numbers are calibrated to match aggregate moments (Piazzesi
and Schneider, 2006). I choose four months, which is slightly higher than the realtor surveys but approximately average for the literature.

- Price is equal to $750,000. The average log price in the IV sample corresponds to a price of $632,000, so the $750,000 number implies that on average from 2008 to 2013 prices were 16 percent below their steady-state level. This is on the conservative side for coastal California where the bust was severe and appears to have overshot the long-run equilibrium. The results are not sensitive to using a slightly larger number.

- $\lambda^h$ and $\lambda^r$ are set so renters and homeowners experience a shock every 29 months. According to the American Housing Survey 1997 to 2005 (Table 4-9), approximately 41 percent of renters moved within the last year. That translates to a 29 month interval between moves, which I assume are the shocks that induce renters to consider owning. For homeowners, there is not similar data on considered moves, so I assume the same shock probability as renters. This means that homeowners stay in their homes when they receive a shock with higher probability than renters.

- $c^*$, the amount that the marginal homeowner in steady state would pay to avoid moving and stay in their current house, is set equal to the average transaction cost of selling a home from Haurin and Gill (2002). Haurin and Gill use variation in the length of time that one will stay in a location among members of the military for whom assignments to a base are known in advance to estimate moving costs of owner-occupancy in a user cost framework. Haurin and Gill’s preferred number is three percent of the home’s value and four percent of household earnings. However, I do not have household earnings so I use their alternate estimate of five percent of the home’s value. I apply this to the steady state price, $c^* = 0.05 \times 750,000 = 37,500$.

- $k^*$, the amount the marginal renter in steady state would pay to avoid moving and stay a renter, is set equal to -$20,000 from the imputed tax savings of owner occupancy from Poterba and Sinai (2008). They find that the average household with $125,000 to $250,000 in annual income (I choose this group because their houses are closest in value to average home in my sample) had an annual 2003 tax savings of $7,689 from homeownership ($2,703 from the mortgage interest deduction, $1,125 from property tax deduction, and $3,861 from exclusion of imputed rental income). The average renter in my sample rents for 29 months until the next time they decide to buy or rent, so the total capitalized value of tax savings is just over $18,500 in 2003 dollars, which I adjust to approximately $20,000 in 2008-2013.

- A seven percent annual discount rate corresponding to the mean estimated value for housing searchers in Carrillo (2012). The results are not substantially changed by using values between four and 10 percent.

There are several parameters I set to reasonable values that do not have an important effect on the dynamics:

- The probability a homeowner purchases a home they inspect in steady state is 0.5. This pins down $\xi$. This parameter does not affect the results unimportant and is set so that the probability of a match is on $[0,1]$ in the stochastic simulations (with the exception of a few extremely rare circumstances).

- $h$ is set so that the present discounted value of the flow utility of living in a home is approximately $2/3$ of its value in steady state, which implies $h = 7,500$ per month for a $750,000 house. This parameter is a normalization.

Three time series moments are used:

- The persistence of the shock $\rho = 0.99$ is chosen to match the persistence of local income shocks from Glaeser et al. (2013). They estimate an ARMA(1,1) process at the city level net of a city fixed effect and linear drift term to back out the shocks that drive housing cycles. Using BEA income data and Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data on the income of actual home buyers, they find an annual persistence of 0.89, which implies a monthly persistence of 0.99. Their estimated moving average coefficient is small.
Figure 24: Seller Entry Elasticity

![Graph showing the relationship between log real price and log seller entry.]

Price Elasticity of Seller Entry = 0.878, R-Squared .52

Notes: Seller entry is computed as $\text{Entrants}_t = \text{Sellers}_t - \text{Sellers}_{t-1} + \text{Sales}_t$, with the stock sellers from the Census Vacancy Survey and sales from the National Association of Realtors. Price is the CoreLogic national house price index adjusted for inflation using the CPI and adjusted for seasonality. All data is quarterly from 1976-2013. The regression coefficient of 0.878 is from a regression of log real price on log seller entry.

- A standard deviation of annual log price changes of 0.065 for the real CoreLogic national house price index from 1976 to 2013. This is set to match the standard deviation of aggregate prices for homes that transact collapsed to the quarterly level in stochastic simulations.

- A price elasticity of seller entry of 0.878 based on the CoreLogic, Census, and National Association of Realtors data from 1976 to 2013. As shown in Figure 24, this relationship is very strong in the data. As mentioned in footnote 36 in the main text, I use this moment as a target for both $c$ and $k$ because the stock of buyers is not observed.

Finally, in the calibration to the micro estimates, I use a target of $10,000 for per-period seller flow cost to determine the zero point, which is not precisely estimated in the data. This is based on two pieces of evidence from Genesove and Mayer (1997) and Levitt and Syverson (2008):

- Genesove and Mayer show that in their data for Boston condominiums, homes with low equity are listed four percent higher (on a base of $200,000) and are on the market for 15 percent longer at a 100 percent seller loan-to-value ratio relative to an 80 percent seller loan-to-value ratio. They do not report average time on the market, so I assume my average steady-state time on the market of four months. This implies a one month delay nets the seller $13,333.

- Levitt and Syverson show that realtors in Chicago sell their house for on average $7,600 more and remain on the market for 9.5 days longer. This implies that a one month delay nets the seller $23,000, although some of this may be due to harder work on the part of the realtor.\footnote{My estimates imply similar numbers—a one percent price increase on a base of $750,000 increases time on the market by about six to eleven days. My model, however, implies that a one month delay should require a slightly smaller price change than three times a 10 day delay.}

I average these two data points and account for discounting to find that the average seller gives up approximately $18,000 to sell one month sooner. Given that the flow utility of being a homeowner is set to $7,500,
I set the flow utility of being a seller to an even -$10,000. This translates in my calibration into a seller markup of $56,500, or roughly 7.5% of the steady-state sales price.

The 0.4 figure for the AR(1) coefficient in the rule-of-thumb model is described in the main text.

E.2 Estimation and Calibration Procedure

As described in the text, the estimation and calibration procedure proceeds in two steps. First, I calibrate to the micro estimates. Then I match the aggregate and time series moments.

Calibration To Micro Estimates

The procedure to calibrate to the micro estimates is largely described in the main text. I start with the IV binned scatter plot \((p_b, d_b)\), which can be thought of as an approximation of the demand curve by 25 indicator functions after the top and bottom 2.5 percent of the price distribution is dropped. In Figure 5, the log relative markup \(p_b\) is in log deviations from the average, and I convert it to a dollar amount using the average log price in the IV sample. For each combination of \(\sigma, \chi,\) and \(\mu\), I use equation (25) to calculate the sum of squared errors:

\[
\sum_b w_b \left( d_b - d^{3 \text{ month}}(p_b) \right)^2.
\]

Because the data is in terms of probability of sale within 13 weeks, \(d^{3 \text{ month}}(p_b) = d(p_b) + (1 - d(p_b)) d(p_b) + (1 - d(p_b))^2 d(p_b)\) is the simulated probability a house sells within three months. For the weights \(w_q\), I use a normal kernel centered at the average \(p_b\) with standard deviation equal to the standard deviation of \(p_b\) to ensure I do not over-fit the outliers and consequently over-fit the curvature in the data. I also need to set \(\kappa_t\), the multiplicative constant. I do so by minimizing the same sum of squared errors for a given vector of the parameters \((\sigma, \chi, \mu)\). I then search over the parameter vector to find the \((\sigma, \chi, \mu)\) that minimizes the sum of squared errors, using 100 different random starting values.

As mentioned in the main text, I also choose the price that corresponds to the average price in the market \(E[p]\) to match a seller search cost of $10,000 per month. I do so because the zero point in the binned scatter plot is not precisely estimated. The seller surplus pins down the steady-state markup because in steady state:

\[
p = \frac{s}{1 - \beta} + \text{Markup} \left( \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \Pr[\text{Sell}] + 1 \right),
\]

so given the assumed steady-state values for \(p\) and \(\Pr[\text{sell}]\) a given \(s\) pins down the markup. I then find the relative price corresponding to \(E[p]\) so that the above calibration procedure matches the implied steady-state markup of $56,500.

Matching the Aggregate Targets

To match the aggregate targets in Table 6, I invert the steady state so that 16 parameters can be solved for in terms of 16 targets conditional on \((\sigma, \chi, \mu)\). I solve this system, defined below, conditional on the 14 steady-state targets and values for the final two target, \(\tilde{c} - \xi\) and \(\tilde{k} - \tilde{k}\), which are set equal as described above. I then select a value for the standard deviation of innovations to the AR(1) shock \(\sigma_q\), run 25 random simulations on 500 years of data, and calculate the standard deviation of annual log price changes and the entry elasticity in the simulated data. I adjust the target values for \(\tilde{c} - \xi\) and \(\sigma_q\) and recalibrate the remainder of the moments until I match the two time series moments. For the rule-of-thumb model, I repeat this procedure altering \(\alpha\) until the impulse response to the renter flow utility shock peaks after 36 months.

The calibration procedure is repeated separately for the staggered price and rule-of-thumb variants of the model. Although the results are similar, the \(\sigma_q\) needed to match the data is slightly larger in the rule-of-thumb model due to the additional momentum. While the calibrated values are not the same, although the differences are minor.

The 16 Equation System

Many variables can be found from just a few target values, and I reduce the 16 unknowns to a four equation and four unknown system. I assume there are \(Per\) periods per month for the calibration. The system is defined by:
\textbullet \ \beta, L, \gamma, \lambda^r, \lambda^h, \text{ and } V^0 \text{ to their assumed values. \ Note that } \beta, \lambda^r, \text{ and } \lambda^r \text{ are adjusted accordingly based on the number of periods in a month.} \\
\textbullet \ \theta = 1 \text{ from the equality of buyer and seller time on the market.} \\
\textbullet \ \text{The buyer purchases } 1/2 \text{ of the time, which implies } 1 - F(\varepsilon^*) = \frac{1}{2} \text{. Then using the definition of } d \text{ and } \theta = 1 \text{,} \nonumber \\
\xi = \frac{1}{4 \text{Per} \ (1 - G(-\mu))^{1-\gamma} (1 - F(\varepsilon^*))}.
\text{where } [1 - G(-\mu)]^{1-\gamma} \text{ can be found using the calibrated value of } \gamma \text{ and } (\sigma, \mu). \\
\textbullet \ \text{Given } \xi \text{, one can solve for } \varepsilon^* \text{ from } \Pr[\text{Sell}] = \xi \exp(-\chi \varepsilon^*) [1 - G(-\mu)]^{1-\gamma}. \\
\textbullet \ \text{The homeownership rate in the model, } \frac{H}{\pi + D + P} \text{, is matched to the target moment. Plugging in steady-state values gives:} \\
\text{Homeownership Rate} = \frac{\lambda^r (1 - K(k^*)) q(\theta) [1 - G(-\mu)]^{1-\gamma} (1 - F(\varepsilon^*))}{\lambda^r (1 - K(k^*)) q(\theta) [1 - G(-\mu)]^{1-\gamma} (1 - F(\varepsilon^*)) + \theta \lambda^h (1 - C(c^*)) \lambda^r (1 - K(k^*)) q(\theta) [1 - G(-\mu)]^{1-\gamma} (1 - F(\varepsilon^*))}.
\text{The exogenous target value for the probability a homeowner moves in steady state } \lambda^h (1 - C(c^*)) \text{ (which depends on } \text{Per}), \text{ the known value for } q(\theta) [1 - G(-\mu)]^{1-\gamma} (1 - F(\varepsilon^*)) \text{ from time to sale in steady state (which depends on } \text{Per}), \text{ and the target value for } \lambda^r \text{ can be used to solve for the value of } K^*(k) \text{ that matches the target homeownership rate } \text{Rate:} \\
K(k^*) = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{L \times \text{Rate} \lambda^h (1 - C(c^*)) q(\theta) [1 - G(-\mu)]^{1-\gamma} (1 - F(\varepsilon^*))}{\lambda^r (1 - K(k^*)) q(\theta) [1 - G(-\mu)]^{1-\gamma} (1 - F(\varepsilon^*)) + \theta \lambda^h (1 - C(c^*)) \lambda^r (1 - K(k^*)) q(\theta) [1 - G(-\mu)]^{1-\gamma} (1 - F(\varepsilon^*))}. \\
\text{The population } \text{Pop} \text{ can then be solved for from } \text{Pop} = H + B + R: \\
\text{Pop} = \frac{q(\theta) [1 - G(-\mu)]^{1-\gamma} (1 - F(\varepsilon^*))}{q(\theta) [1 - G(-\mu)]^{1-\gamma} (1 - F(\varepsilon^*)) + \lambda^h (1 - C(c^*))}
\times \left( 1 + \frac{L K(k^*) \lambda^h (1 - C(c^*))}{\lambda^r (1 - K(k^*))} + \frac{\lambda^h (1 - C(c^*))}{\frac{a(\theta)}{\beta} [1 - G(-\mu)]^{1-\gamma} (1 - F(\varepsilon^*))} \right). \\
\text{Again many of the steady-state probabilities depend on } \text{Per.} \\
\textbullet \ \text{(1} - C(c^*)\text{)} \text{ can be solved for from the assumed value for } \lambda^h \text{ and the probability a homeowner moves in steady state } \lambda^h (1 - C(c^*)). \\
\textbullet \ \text{Given targets for } K^*(k^*) \text{ and } C(c^*) \text{ and target values for } c^* \text{ and } k^* \text{ as well as } \bar{c} - \underline{c} \text{ and } \bar{k} - \underline{k}, \text{ the properties of the uniform distribution can be used to back out } \bar{c}, \underline{c}, \bar{k}, \text{ and } \underline{k}:
\xi = c^* - C(c^*) (\bar{c} - \underline{c}) \\
\underline{k} = k^* - K(k^*) (\bar{k} - \underline{k}).
\text{This leaves } h, u, b, \text{ and } s, \text{ which are solved for jointly to match the target price and satisfy three equilibrium conditions for steady state:} \\
\varepsilon^* = b + \beta V^b + p - V^h \\
p = s + \beta V^s + \frac{1}{\beta (1 + \exp(\frac{\beta}{2}))} + \chi \\
c^* = V^h - (V^s + (1 - L) V^b + LV^0) \\
k^* = V^r - V^b.
E.3 Additional Calibrated Values

The calibrated values for the rule-of-thumb model are in Table 7 in the main text. The values for the staggered model are listed in Table 24.

Table 24: Calibrated Parameter Values for Staggered Price Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>0.994</td>
<td>$k$</td>
<td>$407k$</td>
<td>$b$</td>
<td>-$92.4k$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma$</td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td>$\bar{k}$</td>
<td>-$1,160k$</td>
<td>$s$</td>
<td>-$9.8k$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\xi$</td>
<td>0.506</td>
<td>$Pop$</td>
<td>1.484</td>
<td>$\chi$</td>
<td>.0023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda^h$</td>
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<td>$L$</td>
<td>0.700</td>
<td>$\sigma$</td>
<td>3.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda^r$</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>$V^0$</td>
<td>$2,606k$</td>
<td>$\mu$</td>
<td>10.47</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\bar{c}$</td>
<td>$458k$</td>
<td>$h$</td>
<td>$7.5k$</td>
<td>$\sigma_\eta$</td>
<td>0.311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$c$</td>
<td>-$1,109k$</td>
<td>$u$</td>
<td>$3.6k$</td>
<td>$\rho$</td>
<td>0.990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F Additional Simulation Results

F.1 Non-Concave Benchmarks

In the main text, I report that without concavity, it would take between 78 and 93 percent rule-of-thumb sellers to generate a three year impulse response to the renter flow utility shock. To generate these numbers, I set $\mu = 300$ (in thousands of dollars) so that the concavity kicks in so far from any equilibrium that the demand curve is linear.

I consider two polar cases. In Figure 10 in the main text, I assume that $\chi$ —which is now the constant semi-elasticity of demand since there is no concavity—is equal to its value at the average steady-state price with concavity, $\frac{1}{56.5}$. Under this calibration, 78 percent rule-of-thumb sellers are needed for a 36-month impulse response to the renter flow utility shock. This calibration assumes that the variance of idiosyncratic preference is much smaller than I estimate it to be in my model based on the semi-elasticity of demand for relatively low-priced homes. I use this calibration for the non-concave 26.5 percent rule-of-thumb lines in Figures 10 and 25.

The opposite case I consider is to assume that $\chi$ is the same as I estimate in the data. This calibration implies seller markups are much higher but the distribution of buyer idiosyncratic preference is unchanged. Under this calibration, 93 percent rule-of-thumb sellers are needed for a 36-month impulse response to the renter flow utility shock.

Both of these numbers are under 100 percent because with all rule-of-thumb sellers, the impulse response increases without bound. As the fraction of rule-of-thumb sellers is reduced from 100 percent, mean reversion is introduced into the IRF. Consequently, any amount of momentum can be obtained by reducing the fraction of rule-of-thumb sellers from 100 percent.

F.2 Downward Shock

Figure 25 shows the impulse response to a downward shock directly analogous to Figure 10. For the 26.5-percent rule-of-thumb model in panel B of Figure 10, and the variants of the staggered model without momentum in panel A, the results look very similar to the upward shock. There is, however, a larger price drop on impact and less momentum for the staggered and concave model. This asymmetry between and upward shock and a downward shock occurs because in the staggered pricing model, groups of sellers leapfrog one another each period, as discussed in Appendix D.8. The optimal price is a weighted average of the optimal prices in each period, with the weights corresponding to the discounted probability of sale times the semi-elasticity of demand. The semi-elasticity of demand—and hence the weight on price—is higher in
Figure 25: Price Impulse Response Functions: Downward Shock

Notes: Panel A shows the impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock to the flow utility of renting in the frictionless model with concave demand, the staggered model with concave demand, and the staggered model without concave demand. For the model without concave demand, the threshold for being overpriced is raised to a level that is never reached, the slope of the demand curve is adjusted to the steady-state slope at the average price in the concave model, the model is recalibrated, and the standard deviation of the stochastic shock is adjusted so that the impulse response is even with the frictionless and concave impulse response after a year. Panel B shows the impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock to the flow utility of renting in the rule-of-thumb model with and without concavity. Simulated impulse responses are calculated by differencing two simulations of the model from periods 100 to 150, both of which use identical random shocks except in period 101 in which a one standard deviation negative draw is added to the random sequence and then computing the average difference over 100 simulations.

the period with a lower price, which helps momentum for an upward shock but works against momentum and causes the larger drop on impact in for a downward shock.

F.3 Impulse Responses For All Variables

In the main text, I only show impulse-responses for non-price variables for an upward shock in the 26.5 percent rule-of-thumb model in Figure 11. Figures 26, 27, and 28 show the same impulse responses for a downward shock in the 26.5 percent rule-of-thumb model and for an upward and downward shock in the staggered models.

The downward shock for the rule-of-thumb model looks close to the mirror image of the upward shock. The staggered model, however, looks somewhat different. While there is still a gradual price response and a shorter-lived but analogous buyer and seller entry response, volume and inventory both spike on impact. This is because prices change more rapidly, so buyers in the market when the shock occurs have a strong incentive to transact today for an upward shock or to wait to buy for a downward shock. While months of supply still overshoots, this effect is less substantial and the spike is more prominent.

F.4 Deterministic Impulse Responses For Staggered Model

To show that my results are not due to error in the log-cubic approximation pruning higher order terms used in the stochastic simulations, Figure 29 shows the impulse response to an upward and downward unexpected one-time deterministic shock solved exactly by Newton’s method for the staggered model. These impulse responses look similar to their stochastic counterparts.
Figure 26: Impulse Responses to Downward Shock in the Rule-of-Thumb Model

Notes: Each panel plots the indicated impulse response to a one standard deviation downward shock for the frictionless and rule-of-thumb variants of the model. The frictionless model uses the same calibration and shock as the 26.5 percent rule-of-thumb model with no rule-of-thumb sellers. Simulated impulse responses are calculated by differencing two simulations of the model from periods 100 to 150, both of which use identical random shocks except in period 101 in which a one standard deviation negative draw is added to the random sequence and then computing the average difference over 100 simulations.

Figure 27: Impulse Responses to Downward Shock in the Rule-of-Thumb Model

Notes: Each panel plots the indicated impulse response to a one standard deviation upward shock for the frictionless and staggered variants of the model. The frictionless model uses the same calibration and shock but all sellers set their price simultaneously. Simulated impulse responses are calculated by differencing two simulations of the model from periods 100 to 150, both of which use identical random shocks except in period 101 in which a one standard deviation negative draw is added to the random sequence and then computing the average difference over 100 simulations.
Figure 28: Impulse Responses to Downward Shock in the Rule-of-Thumb Model

Notes: Each panel plots the indicated impulse response to a one standard deviation downward shock for the frictionless and staggered variants of the model. The frictionless model uses the same calibration and shock but all sellers set their price simultaneously. Simulated impulse responses are calculated by differencing two simulations of the model from periods 100 to 150, both of which use identical random shocks except in period 101 in which a one standard deviation negative draw is added to the random sequence and then computing the average difference over 100 simulations.

Figure 29: Response to One-Time Deterministic Shock (Non-Approximated)

Notes: Each panel plots the value of the indicated variable divided by its initial steady-state value in response to a -.3 deterministic permanent shock to \( u \) (roughly consistent with one standard deviation stochastic shock) in the upward panel and a .3 deterministic shock in the downward panel. The frictionless model uses the same calibration and shock but all sellers set their price simultaneously. Both are solved exactly by Newton’s method assuming that the model returns to steady state in 500 years and use the same calibration as the stochastic staggered model, and the frictionless model includes no staggering.