Instituting organizations, cultural categories and structured inequality: The World Heritage Committee and the creation of outstanding universal value

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Abstract

How do “instituting” organizations develop and deploy the categories that they use to make institutional realities happen? This question has received limited attention in the literature with schools having been the primary focus of empirical attention. In this paper we turn to a different sort of instituting organization: a transnational organization with the mission of defining and “consecrating” the cultural heritage of humanity: UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee. We describe the historical emergence of the WHC as well as the origins of the system of categories that it deploys to make the notion of a universal cultural heritage an institutional reality in the natural and cultural realms. We show that—as has been argued in the case of education—the implicit assumptions that go into defining the criteria for “institution” create the conditions for the development of “ascriptive” advantage that dictate (even under the best of intentions) that certain actors will disproportionately benefit. However, we also show that when the institutional conditions are present for the fostering and enforcement of “universalistic” criteria, then the ascriptive effect is greatly attenuated and the instituting action of the organization lives up to its democratic intentions.

1 Introduction

The institutional analysis of organizations has been characterized by an attention to processes of institutionalization, with the latter being defined mainly as the gradual spread among a population of organizational actors of some set of socially constructed assumptions, rules, structures, and taken-for-granted cultural models (Scott 2008, Tolbert and Zucker 1996). These include the diffusion of alternative ways of delineating the structure of state and for-profit corporations (Tolbert and Zucker 1983, Fligstein 1985), novel regulatory systems governing personnel selection and the relationship between workers and employers within organizations (Edelman 1992, Dobbin et al. 1993, Sutton et al. 1994), emergent discourses that radically change the moral valence of certain forms of economic

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activity (Haveman and Rao 1997), or the gradual acceptance of the power of new organi-
izational roles staffed by professional authorities endowed with specific credentials and
claims to expertise (Fligstein 1987; Zorn 2004).

This analytic tradition has produced many insights into the genesis and dynamics of
institutions within organizations and the role of formally organized actors in the creation,
destruction and reinvigoration of institutional patterns (DiMaggio 1988; Zucker 1988; Scott
2008). However this research program has traded on a rather narrow operational definition
of the term institution, one that defocalizes the notion of institution as an activity that
has direct effects on the world. Instead the dominant sense of institution in this research
program is one that focuses on the subsidiary process through which a given procedure
for the creation of new institutional realities (e.g. declaring a given collectivity to be an
“organization” which follows a given blueprint for organizing) becomes an institution,
conceptualized as a final steady state (Zucker 1988). The term institution has in this
way come to denote a cultural or cognitive condition shared by all members of a given
organizational population, and not as something that is actively done by those members.
This is usually seen in the fact that some sort of cultural model comes to be generalized
within an organizational population and thus comes to be taken as the dominant way in
which to do things.

But in its original sense in Philosophy, Political Theory, and Ritual Studies to institute
is an action through which certain (collectively empowered) actors come to consequentially
alter a certain facet of the physical or social worlds. For example an instituting actor may
fix the category that a given entity is supposed to be fitted into, or provide that entity
with a given special status, either exalted or degraded (Searle 1995, 2007, 2008; Bourdieu
1991a,b, 1996). In this alternative (active) sense, to institute is a (collectively recognized)
power or capacity. The ability to institute thus refers to the fact that a given actor is
given the social privilege—or unilaterally abrogates such a privilege—to be able to change
a person, thing or entity by altering the way in which other relevant actors think about it.
Essentially to institute in this sense is to create a new (social) reality through some sort
of linguistic or cultural mechanism (Meyer 1977; Searle 1995; Bourdieu 1991a). Meyer
(1977: 56) in discussing the role of schools as “instituting” organizations in this sense,
notes that their action

\[ \ldots \text{involve[s]} \text{ large scale public classification systems, defining new roles and} \]
\[ \text{statuses for both elites and members. These classifications are new construc-} \]
\[ \text{tions in that the newly defined persons are expected (and entitled) to behave,} \]
\[ \text{and to be treated by others, in new ways. Not only new types of persons but} \]
\[ \text{also new competencies are authoritatively created.} \]

For instance, during the ritual of graduation, or upon the clearing of some institution-
ally specified academic hurdle a persons is instituted as a college graduate or as the
legitimate possessor of a given specialized degree and thus comes to enjoy the rights and
privileges that are reserved for that position (Meyer 1977; Bourdieu 1991e). This is
why Bourdieu (1996) uses the metaphor of “ordination” to refer to these types of rites
of passage for the sons and daughters of the French elite within the educational system.
Ordination is of course a prototypical example of an “instituting” action that changes the
person in a consequential way. Insofar as the “priest” is the prototypical (and historically first) “professional,” then some form of ordination underlies the capacity of Professions to monopolize cultural authority in modern societies (Weber 1993).

This sort of institutional process—and the role of organizations as institutional actors as active institutional agents in this sense—has been under-theorized and under-researched in the sociology of organizations. This is in spite of the fact that one of the key signatures of post-traditional societies is that the authority to institute new realities by performatively declaring to be the case comes to increasingly be delegated away from charismatically recognized individuals—e.g. the Pope, or the Monarch—and towards more anonymous (due to bureaucratic organization) organizational actors (Meyer et al. 1994).

In this paper we aim to bring back the focus to organizations as institutional agents in this sense, while paying special attention to the consequences of instituting activity for cultural inequality outside of the well-worn case of education. We thus reserve our attention on a very particular sort of organizational action: that which acts on the world by creating new institutional realities. This occurs mainly through the deployment of collectively agreed-upon procedures by which certain objects, persons or entities come to be declared to possess a certain status or to be endowed with certain (collectively recognized) properties that they did not have before.

A moment’s reflection reveals that a large swath of organizations and a big portion of organizational activity are dedicated to processing persons, things and places in this sense (Meyer 1977). Thus, certification arms of national states have as their main object to declare that certain products meet the definitional criteria to belong to such and such category or have passed a given legal hurdle and can thus enter the market. Certification boards declare members of certain occupations as legitimate wielders of the capacity to engage in certain types of action (and thus to monopolize the legal right to perform those duties, thus excluding now “uncertified” performers). Within culture-production fields, organizations that are in charge of giving awards or other forms of “consecration” engage in a analogous type of action, declaring certain producers or certain cultural products to belong to a special category worthy of special attention or recognition.

### 1.1 Instituting organizations and inequality

Early research on the cultural and ritual role of educational organizations in institutional theory argued that their main (latent) function was a form of institutional action in the sense that we have outlined—declaring persons to have a certain status in society—and not the (manifest) function of imparting certain functional skills (Kamens 1977; Meyer 1977). But to “institute” in this sense is also to categorize, thus the study of organizations that process persons or things by endowing with distinct properties converges with the study of the role of organizations in developing and establishing categorical systems that come to acquire widespread cultural authority. In order to perform their “institutional” function certification organizations must first determine whether individuals or things belong to the categories of those things which should potentially be invested with these special properties.

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1Rituals of expulsion or degradation produce the opposite effect: the destitution or the removal of a special privilege and the attachment of a new negative state to the object, person or thing so affected (Douglas 1966; Garfinkel 1956).
in the first place (Bourdieu 1996). Thus, instituting organizations engage categories in two distinct ways: first to select the potential pool of agents and objects that could be the recipient of the act of institution, and second to determine which actors or objects within this select pool meet the criteria for being transformed through the institutional act.

The linkage between broadly shared cultural categories and the criteria used by instituting organizations to select the objects worthy of being potential recipients of the exalted statuses that the instituting organization is socially mandated to confer connects organizational action to the structuring of inequality in the larger social field (Meyer 1977; Bourdieu 1996, 1991b). It is precisely because instituting organizations cannot draw on “neutral” categorical criteria for selection and for “ordination,” that certain groups will benefit when valued social statuses are conferred by instituting organizations. This will happen because members of certain status groups will be more likely to be selected as potential recipients in the first place; and once selected they will be more likely to naturally “fit” into the ordination criteria used by the organization.

This case has been more clearly developed in the case of the instituting action of educational organizations, and secondarily in the case of the instituting action of powerful actors in culture-production fields (such as critics) or organizations that exist with the sole purpose of selecting cultural objects thought to be endowed with enduring “excellence” (such as museums or conservatories) (Bourdieu and Darbel 1991; DiMaggio 2000; Alexander 1996). In both cases, as noted by Bourdieu (1984) the general mechanism is the same, and has the familiar structure of the self-fulfilling prophecy (thus constituting a cultural reproduction process). In for-profit fields, organizations may compete for the privilege of having their products “certified” as possessing certain special qualities by the designated authorities, where the certifying body has been traditionally the state, with non-state agents having recently joined as producers of “certifiable” criteria and thus as “instituting” organizations in our sense (Bartley 2007).

The key point from a perspective that highlights the inherent embeddedness of the cultural categories used by organizational actors in the wider society is that one predictable consequence of the iterative application of socially “loaded” criteria of institution is the gradual accumulation of advantage by the persons, objects or groups that are exogenously predisposed to fit—normally due to the fact that they form the original template—or “prototype”—for the development of the criteria in the first place. Thus, instituting organizations emerge as “strategic research sites” (Merton 1987) from which to study the emergence of categorical systems of inequality and the gradual accumulation of advantage (Tilly 1998; DiPrete and Eirich 2006).

In our empirical setting, we will see how a definition of “humanity’s” cultural heritage as being composed of overwhelmingly European cultural objects and sites has been the gradual result of the iterative application of categorical criteria that “load the dice” in favor of a particular definition of excellence and “outstanding” cultural value. We will also see that when those cultural categories are not activated—in the case of “ecological” definitions of cultural value more closely tied to the explicit definitions of “natural value” developed from the perspective of modern ecological science—categorical inequality fails

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2This is the so-called “allocation” theory of education, which Meyer (1977) shows is a special case of the more general institutional theory.
to emerge with the same clarity and force.

2 The Empirical Setting: UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee

The establishment of the World Heritage Convention and the World Heritage List has been marked by disagreement over how cultural and natural properties around the world should be evaluated, the definition of universal value, and the implications of creating a system that compares properties across cultures and time. The following sections describe how development of the Convention and List were influenced by international tourism, economic growth and development, and natural disaster. Also discussed is the development of the criteria for evaluating sites inscribed to the list and how these criteria have shaped the List over the years, resulting in what some critics claim is a biased view of the world’s cultural history.

2.1 The years before ratification

The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was founded in 1946 with the goal of creating a “genuine culture of peace” that could prevent another world war (http://www.UNESCO.org). In addition to promoting the improvement of education worldwide, the protection and responsible management of natural resources, and human rights, UNESCO also made a goal of promoting cultural diversity and preserving the “specificity of each culture” (Heritage 2009).

In 1951 efforts to preserve this specificity of culture lead to talks of establishing a fund for the preservation of monuments and museums located within UN states. Three different methods for raising the funds needed were proposed: a tourist tax, a tourist “card” that would allow for free entry into designated museums or monuments, and a mix of compulsory and voluntary donations. Debate waged over the need for a fund and its potential structure and limitations, and the issue was turned over to the UNESCO General Conference to decide (Unesco 1951, 1952).

During the Eighth General Conference in 1954, the proposal was reviewed by a small working party of state representatives. Deemed to lack supporting research, the proposal was declined in favor of plan to establish an international study center, which resulted in the creation of the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM), now an advising body to the World Heritage Committee (ICCROM 2009). Despite declining the proposal in 1954, the working party did state that the fund could be useful and should remain as a possibility for the future (?)..

2.1.1 The Nubian Campaign And Its Successors

While talk of forming a fund to support the preservation and maintenance of monuments and museums was on hold, action was being taken to save over 20 historic temples and monuments at risk of destruction due to the construction of the Aswan High Dam (Sewell 1975). The Aswan High Dam, constructed from January 1960 to January 1971 in Egypt,
stands 180 meters high and 5 kilometers long and has provided many benefits to the people of the region, including increased access to drinking water, improved river navigation, and an increase in crop production and the fish population. These benefits did come with costs, however; the rising water levels caused by the dam threatened to destroy several cultural monuments (Hassan 2007; Unesco 1970).

In 1959 the Egyptian Minister of Culture, Tharwat Okasha, met with Rene Maheu, then the assistant Director-General of UNESCO, to formally request assistance with the development of a preservation plan and funds to save the monuments, ultimately resulting in the formation of an International Action Committee to run the campaign for funding, services, and equipment to preserve the Nubian monuments (Hassan 2007; Heritage). The appeal was accepted, and shortly after construction of the dam began Vittorino Veronese, the acting Director-General of UNESCO, called on governments, institutions, and “men of goodwill” to assist in the effort, claiming “Wondrous structures, ranking among the most magnificent on earth, are in danger of disappearing beneath the waters. . . . These monuments . . . do not belong solely to the countries who hold them in trust. The whole world has the right to see them endure,” (Unesco 1970: 40).

By late in 1963 forty five member states had contributed approximately $17 million in U.S. dollars to aid the efforts, and over the course of 9 years 22 temples and monuments were documented and relocated for preservation, including the iconic temples of Ramesses II at Abu Simbel (Hassan 2007; Unesco 1970). The media coverage surrounding the Nubian Campaign, combined with the improved river navigation created by the Aswan High Dam lead to a tourism boom as well as a general increase of interest in Egyptian civilization (Hassan 2007). The success of the partnership between Egypt and UNESCO along with the economic benefits of cultural preservation led to similar a campaign to rescue museums, sites, and works of art ravaged by intense flooding in both Venice and Florence, Italy that occurred on November 4, 1966 (Hassan 2007; Sewell 1975; Unesco 1970). Over one thousand works of art had been damaged or destroyed in Florence alone, and so on November 14, 1966 the General Conference, meeting in Paris for their 14th session, made an urgent appeal “to the spirit of fellowship of Member States to assist, to the fullest extent of their means, the efforts of the Italian people and authorities to preserve and restore cultural property that has been or is in danger of being damaged” (Unesco 1966: 66). Aid came in the form of funds, supplies, and the time and skill of experts (Unesco 1970).

In 1968 the efforts to restore Florence and Venice were still ongoing and would require several more years of “sustained effort,” and Director General Rene Maheu urged that these efforts take the context of the cities into consideration, stating that “not merely a matter of safeguarding a heritage of artistic and historical monuments but of maintaining Venice as a city with its own individual life.” (Unesco 1968 general conference section 1017). Maheu also highlighted the exceptional nature of the preservation efforts in Egypt and Italy, stating that such efforts could not become regular practice “despite the increasing number of requests for action submitted to it by Member States,” and promoted the establishment of an autonomous organization within UNESCO to answer such calls for assistance (Unesco 1969a: 243).

Dialogue resumed in 1964, though little had changed in the 12 years that had passed;
member states still struggled to agree on the goals, limitations, structure, and income strategy for the fund (Unesco 1964: 10). Documents state that that the funding for preservation would be limited to those sites which “form an essential part of the cultural heritage of mankind,” (Unesco 1964: 7), but Germany opposed this statement, arguing that because so few sites existed a special fund was not needed. Furthermore, Germany highlighted the difficulty that such criteria would cause, as “there does not exist a standardized international classification scheme for artistic and historic monuments and sites...” (Unesco 1964: 13). New Zealand shared this sentiment, stating that “there would probably be difficulty in deciding which monuments were of international significance.” (Unesco 1964: 19), and Syria raised concerns that the proposal would harm a holistic view of cultural heritage: “The cultural heritage of any one country is a complete whole, and it is very dangerous to break this up by putting forward international standards which give preference exclusively to safeguarding masterpieces” (Unesco 1964: 22).

Concerns over selection criteria and their effect on views of cultural heritage were further complicated by the methods of fund raising and fund distribution initially proposed. Two out of the three suggestions relied upon income from tourism. This raised particular issues for Australia, a state with few museums or sites marketed toward tourists and whose cultural heritage requires the restriction of tourism as a method of preservation (Unesco 1964: 10). Finland’s concerns were more specific; they feared the creation of a tourism card that garnered the holder free entry to museums and sites of international significance would create a system that put international interests over national interests. It was the dispersion of funds for preservation that created a stumbling block for Poland, who argued that restricting payouts to fifty percent of the cost of the preservation project would make such undertakings prohibitively expensive for states in Latin America, Central Africa, and Asia which “…possess cultural treasures which could be preserved only through international efforts.” (Unesco 1964:21).

2.2 The creation of the initial WHC template

In 1968 a meeting of experts was convened to address the concerns raised in the state party responses to the original proposal. The primary foci of the meeting were the “legal, scientific and practical implications” (Unesco 1969b) of when and in what way such an international organization should intervene, and in what form the aid should come. Also discussed in detail was the need for carefully selected, standardized language for defining not only the possible categories that sites might fall into, such as walled cities or mixed sites, but also the scientific criteria on which sites would be evaluated.

While no binding decisions were made by the committee, they recommended that UNESCO continue to work toward the establishment of a fund for the preservation and restoration of monuments, sites, groups, and areas of “universal value and interest.” Additional meetings were held later that same year to further discuss legal complications and organizational logistics, and a final report was issued in November of 1969 recommending that Rene Maheu, Director-General of UNESCO, “prepare an international convention...favoring the establishment of an international system for the protection of monuments, groups of buildings and sites of universal interest.” (Unesco 1969c: 38).

A draft was prepared, and in Paris on April 4, 1972, Maheu addressed a special com-
mittee, charging them with reviewing the draft of the convention. The draft went through several revisions before being adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO on November 16, 1972. The final document, entitled *The Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and National Heritage*, established an intergovernmental committee known as *The World Heritage Committee* (WHC). The Convention calls for the establishment of the “World Heritage List”, a list of “properties forming part of the cultural heritage and natural heritage [of humanity]” to be updated every two years, as well as a “List of World Heritage in Danger.” Additionally, the Convention called for representatives of three advisory bodies: the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM), the International Council of Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), and the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN).

This division of labor joined the categorical division between a “natural” and a “cultural” heritage with pre-existing organizational elements within UNESCO. Each of these elements then acquired jurisdiction over each of the two realms in accordance with their established expertise.

### 2.3 The structure and process of defining a World Heritage

#### 2.3.1 The World Heritage Committee and its advisory bodies

The World Heritage Committee is comprised of 21 members elected by representatives of the member states. The Committee members meet at least once annually, and serve a term of six years, though some members voluntarily reduce their term to four years in an effort to provide an opportunity for greater state party representation. In addition to reduced terms, members are also discouraged from seeking consecutive terms in office, and some seats on the committee may be reserved for a representative from a state party that does not have a site inscribed on the World Heritage List.

The Committee is charged with enforcing the convention and distributing funds to state parties requesting financial assistance with restoration or preservation of a site. The committee also reviews the periodic reports provided by the advisory bodies and retains the ability to take action should a property be mismanaged. The committee is regulated by two major documents, the Convention, and the Operational Guidelines. The Convention outlines the responsibilities of state parties in regards to identifying, preserving, and protecting their cultural and natural heritage, and explains how funds should be managed and dispersed. While the Convention has remained unchanged since its inception in 1972, the Operational Guidelines have changed over time to “accommodate pertinent developments on the concept of heritage value or significance for the implementation of the World Heritage Convention.” ([Unesco](https://www.unesco.org) 2005: 3). The Operational Guidelines provide detailed information on the nomination process, criteria for evaluation, and other organizational processes.

Three advisory bodies are named in the 1972 World Heritage Convention. The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) advises the World Heritage Committee in several capacities. The IUCN is responsible for the evaluation of all applications of natural heritage sites, as well as sites with a “mixed” (cultural and natural) classifica-
tion. Additionally, the IUCN monitors conservation efforts of natural sites on the World Heritage List and provides technical expertise and training for site conservation (IUCN 2009).

Similarly, the International Council of Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) assists the World Heritage Committee through the evaluation of all cultural properties nominated by states parties to the List. ICOMOS also participates in preservation and restoration efforts, and provides training and guidance to conservation specialists on a world wide scale (?). Like ICOMOS, the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM) deals solely with cultural heritage matters. Unlike ICOMOS, ICCROM does not participate in the evaluation of nominations, but instead focuses energy on periodic reporting, the development of a global training strategy, and providing assistance with revisions to the Operational Guidelines (ICCROM 2009).

2.3.2 Nominating a site to the world heritage list

UNESCO promotes the collaboration of state parties with local communities, regional governments, NGOs, and other groups in the preparation of nomination documents, but official nominations must be made by the central government of the state party in which the site is located (Labadi 2007; Cleere 2001). Furthermore, only countries that have signed and ratified the World Heritage Convention are permitted to submit nominations (Heritage 2009). Completed nominations are then evaluated by the appropriate advisory body; ICOMOS evaluates cultural properties while IUCN evaluates natural properties. Those properties falling into both categories—known as mixed sites—are evaluated by both ICOMOS and UCN.

These advisory bodies then provide feedback to the World Heritage Committee, suggesting possible revisions to the criteria used to justify the inscription of the site or requesting additional information from the nominating country, and finally suggesting that the site be inscribed, deferred, referred back to the state party, or rejected entirely (UNESCO 2009b). The information required in the nomination dossier has changed over time. The recommendation of the advisory body is most often accepted by the committee, though at times there has been disagreement. As Jokilehto et al. (2008: 39) note, “In the case of a disagreement, ICOMOS has been invited to revise the text of the criteria following the decision by the Committee... The changes have often meant that not all the criteria proposed by the State Party have been considered applicable or it has been considered necessary to recommend other criteria.”

2.4 The Development of The Selection Criteria

The criteria used to evaluate and justify cultural and natural sites inscribed on the World Heritage list have undergone numerous revisions since the 1976 draft of the World Heritage Committee Operation Guidelines. These changes have influenced how the criteria were applied, in turn shaping the List itself. There are ten criteria used to justify the inscription of a site to the World Heritage List. These are listed in Table 1. Once separated into six criteria for cultural sites and four criteria for natural sites, all ten criteria were combined in 2004 to create one list (Unesco 2009b). Unlike the World Heritage Convention, the
Operational Guidelines of the World Heritage Committee are more easily and frequently adapted, and so the changes made to these criteria provide insight into how the concept of Outstanding Universal Value, so vaguely defined in the Convention, is understood and applied over the years (Unesco 2005).

From the first draft in 1976 to the 2005 operational guidelines, criterion (ii) was changed from requiring that the site nominated “have exerted considerable influence, over a span of time or within a cultural area of the world, on subsequent developments in architecture, monumental sculpture, garden and landscape design, related arts, or human settlements.” to having to “exhibit an important interchange of human values, over a span of time or within a cultural area of the world, on developments in architecture of technology, monumental arts, town planning, or landscape design.” The change happened in 1995, and while the reason for the change is not made explicit in the meeting notes, Jokilehto et al. (2008) suggest that the greater debate exhibited concern over the nomination of cultural landscapes and living cultures, and that these concerns influenced the change.

The use of criterion (ii) to justify inscriptions has increased over time, some years as often as 80% of the time. Additionally, criterion (ii) is commonly linked with criterion (i). This frequent association with criterion (i) may indicate that “an increasing number of the nominated properties are no longer great masterpieces but rather the results of influences often from varied sources, which have given an incentive for a new and innovative interpretation reflecting the cultural specificity of a particular region” (Jokilehto et al. 2008: 23). Jokilehto et al. (2008) also draws attention to how the criterion has been applied, noting that a large number of sites using criterion (ii) are employing it to refer to aesthetics, the history of art and architecture, or technology.

Criterion (vi) has been perhaps the most debated criterion of the convention (Jokilehto et al. 2008: 32) and has gone through several changes that, while minor in appearance, have drastically changed its meaning. The original criterion from the 1977 Operational Guidelines states that a site justified under criterion (vi) must be “most importantly associated with ideas of beliefs, with events or with persons, of outstanding historical importance or significance.” In 1980 reference to persons of historical significance was removed, and a caveat was added that “the committee considered that this criterion should justify inclusion in the list only in exceptional circumstances or in conjunction with other criteria.”

Another important change concerning criterion (vi) occurred in 1994, when the criterion was significantly expanded, stating that a site must be “directly or tangibly associated with events or living traditions, with ideas, or with beliefs, with artistic and literary works of outstanding universal significance (the committee considered that this criterion should justify inclusion in the list only in exceptional circumstances or in conjunction with other criteria.” And again in 2005, when the caveat was relaxed to state that the criterion would “preferably be used in conjunction with other criteria” instead of requiring it to be. Criterion (vi) is not used frequently, but is important for the justification of religious and political sites, such as The Tombs of the Buganda Kings at Kasubi in Uganda, Independence Hall in Philadelphia, and the Hiroshima Peace Memorial in Japan.
2.5 Critiques of the World Heritage List

The World Heritage List has not been without critique, with the most frequent being bias within the List. Over the years critics have claimed that the list presents a skewed view of history, emphasizing sites that are representative of a Christian, Western European Heritage which excludes marginalized cultures and groups [Van Gorp and Renes 2007; Labadi 2007; Strasser 2002; Stovel 1994]. As we will see below, the empirical evidence suggests that this is in fact the case. This bias toward European sites may be due in part to the way the selection criteria, which favors 'immovable' structures and thereby disadvantages whole regions that rely more heavily on other forms of expression such as dance or oral tradition, as well as regions that lack an economy to support new construction and development [Van Gorp and Renes 2007; Strasser 2002].

The creation of a 'desired history' is illustrated by the case of Old Havana. Plaza Vieja, a portion of Old Havana and its Fortifications (inscribed in 1982), was deteriorating. In need of assistance with restoration efforts, Cuba acquired funding from the World Heritage Convention. The restoration of the area was controlled by a small group of architects and art historians, who rebuilt the square to depict a cohesive architectural story, and in doing so selected a particular moment in history to represent the area. This process included the construction of a fountain, which some art historians claim was never part of the square. The restoration process created a desired representation of a specific point in Cuba’s history. While the style of the construction and renovations may be accurate for the time period, they are not representative of the actual space as it once was [Hill 2007].

In addition to presenting a selective view of history, critics assert that the inscription of properties to the World Heritage List has excluded and even displaced some groups of marginalized people [Creighton 2007; Labadi 2007]. Labadi (2007) argues that sites nominated, regardless of their geographic or cultural location, have been selected based on similar values which have been used to construct images of the past. In doing so many groups have been excluded such as women, those of lower SES, and local communities. Labadi (2007) acknowledges that Unesco does encourage the collaboration of state parties with local communities or groups during the nomination process, but points out that reporting of collaboration is not required for inscription, and so the suggestion goes unheeded. Creighton (2007) highlights a more direct effect on marginalized populations, as inscription on the list can be contingent upon agreement to remove structures that obscure the view or detract from the site. In the case of walled cities this has meant the removal of entire communities that were built up over time near the walls or between inner and outer walls.

Other concerns over bias include the imbalance of cultural and natural sites inscribed on the list, with cultural properties being inscribed with much greater frequency than natural properties. Cleere (1996) argues that this imbalance is due to both the conceptualization of Outstanding Universal Value, and differences in how the advising bodies evaluate cultural and natural sites. Cleere states that ‘outstanding universal value’ is ill-defined and also in conflict with definitions of some categories of world heritage, such as continuing landscapes, as they are “non-universal in character” due to ties to a regional, national, or local way of life. Cleere (1996) also indicates that the selection process for cultural sites is not selective enough or systematic enough, offering that the relaxed stan-
dards and procedures of ICOMOS are responsible for the rapid growth of the cultural site list and that the more stringent and objective procedures used by IUCN to select natural sites should be modified and used by ICOMOS.

3 The emergence of structured inequality in evolution of the world heritage regime

3.1 Trends in the cross-national spread of the world-heritage regime

We begin by describing the gradual diffusion of the world-heritage regimes across countries. A good indicator of the increasing consensus around the World Heritage Committee project is the extent to which different National Members ratify the WHC declaration. Figure 1(a) shows the yearly number of ratifications since the WHC declaration was drafted in 1973. The figure shows that the declaration has been ratified by a non-negligible number of national actors every year, with spikes occurring on the first year (1974), in 1988, right after the dissolution of the Soviet Block in the early 1990s, and with the final spike occurring in 1998. Today about 160 national actors have ratified the WHC declaration. This represents almost all of the independent states in the world today.

The cumulative number of ratifications is shown in Figure 1(b). The figure reveals the pattern of gradual (approximately linear in time) growth of the World Heritage regime, with the number of ratifying countries reaching (an expected) plateau in the early years of the 21st century. Figure 1(c) shows the cumulative number of ratifications this time broken-up by region. This figure reveals three basic findings. First, the spread of ratifications across national states has exhibits remarkable cross-regional homogeneity, with countries in Europe (and the European offshoots of Canada and the United States) displaying the same over-time levels of ratification as the Asia-Pacific region, Latin America and Africa, especially since the mid 1980s. The two regional exceptions are the Arab States, most of which are early ratifiers (their ratification rates plateau in the early 1980s and remain flat since) and the Former Socialist States, all of which naturally ratify after 1989. This homogeneity in the spread of the WHC regime across regions means that cross-regional heterogeneity in the number of sites deemed to be part of the World Heritage cannot be explained by pointing to cross-regional heterogeneity in the extent of participation by individual state-actors.

3.2 Cross-national trends in inscriptions

Figure 2 shows the regional breakdown in the number of World Heritage sites by region. The figure displays a startling pattern of European/North-American advantage which begins in the early 1980s and which grows dramatically over time. Today Europe has in excess of 200 more inscriptions than its next regional competitor (the Asia/Pacific region), while the difference between this last region and the next national cluster (Latin America and the Caribbean) is only about 50 sites. Thus, Europe today displays an overwhelming advantage in having been bestowed recognition as a representative of the cultural heritage of humanity.
As we outlined above, a key institutional feature of the World Heritage project since its inception concerns the development and organizational deployment of the nature/culture binary as a master key to differentiate between different types of sites and to channel these sites along the bipartite organizational structure that governs the WHC selection process. Figure 3 shows the cumulative number of sites inscribed under each master status. The figure shows that Cultural inscriptions have grown at a much faster rate than natural inscriptions, with the difference between the total number of cultural sites inscribed versus the total number natural sites inscribed growing steadily over time. Today there are almost 500 more cultural inscriptions than there are natural inscriptions. This accords well with the impressions of WHC authorities and the critics of the relatively broad and ill-defined criteria that are used to make “cultural” selections.

As shown in Figure 4(a), the regional Euro-American advantage is solely concentrated in the cultural realm. While the Euro-American region today has more that 300 cultural sites to its name the next region (Asia/Pacific) only has about 128. The figure shows that the cumulative result is that in the World Heritage accounting, the bulk of what is deemed humanity’s cultural heritage separates Europe—as its primary contributors—from the rest. It is important to note that this European advantage is essentially a continental advantage, as most of the sites inscribed in the U.S. and Canada are in the natural category. Figure 4(b) shows that Europe has not developed a cumulative edge under the “natural” definition of humanity’s cultural heritage. Here the honor goes to the Asia/Pacific region, with Europe coming in second and being essentially tied with Africa. Thus, the European advantage is clearly and advantage tied to how WHC has institutionally defined the category of “Universal Value” within the “cultural” and not within the “natural” realm.

3.3 Random-Effects Models

The apparent European advantage in World Heritage inscriptions observed in Figures 4(a) and 4(b) could be a spurious by-product of a number of factors. In this section we ascertain how robust is the Regional advantage of Europe to the inclusion of various statistical controls in the context of a multivariate regression model. In the model we take the country-year to be the unit of analysis, and we specify the expected number of inscriptions as the dependent variable. The data are thus arranged in the standard cross-sectional time-series format, with each country entering the sample at the year in which they ratify the WHC convention (and are thus at risk of experiencing the inscription events). Because repeated observations within country obviously do not meet the standard regression assumptions of independence we specify the following random-effects regression model:

\[ y_{it} = \alpha + \theta_1 REGION + \theta_2 YEAR + \sum_{j=1}^{J} \beta_j x_{ijt} + \mu_i + \epsilon_{it} \]  

(1)

Where \( y_{it} \) is the expected number of inscriptions for country \( i \) at time \( t \) (\( t = 1973, 1974, \ldots, 2005 \)), \( REGION \) is a dummy variable that equals one for European countries and zero otherwise, \( YEAR \) is a linear time trend (ranging from 1973 to 2005), \( x_{ijt} \) is a matrix
of time varying confounders (with each entry in the matrix containing the value of variable \( j \) for country \( i \) at time \( t \)), \( \mu_i \) is a country specific error term which varies across countries but is constant over time (thus accounting for unobserved time-invariant, country-specific factors) and \( \epsilon_{it} \) is a classical error term (varies across countries and across time). The main hypothesis to be tested is that \( \theta_1 > 0 \) (there is an European advantage effect). We also test the hypothesis that this regional advantage is not constant across time, but that as suggested by the previous analysis, the European advantage is increasing over time by including an additional interaction term between region and time (\( \theta_3(\text{REGION} \times \text{YEAR}) \)). If this hypothesis is correct we should expect that \( \theta_3 > 0 \). Finally, we should also expect the European regional advantage to be concentrated among cultural inscriptions and to be largely null for natural inscriptions. Because our dependent variable is a non-negative count, we obtain the coefficient estimates using a maximum likelihood random-effects Poisson regression.

### 3.4 Results

Table 2 shows the regression results for country-year models predicting the number of inscriptions for the period 1973-2005. In the first model we include only the regional effect and a linear time trend as predictors. The results support the impression obtained by visual inspection: There is a strong and statistically significant net European advantage in overall inscriptions. Being located in Europe increases the chances that a country will have a site inscribed by the WHC in any give observation year in comparison to being located outside of Europe.\(^3\)

This European regional advantage can be due to several factors. Perhaps European states have been part of the WHC for a longer period of time and being a long-time member increases the chances that a state will have a site inscribed in a given year. In addition, there are organizational reasons why European states may be more likely to have a site inscribed. Since the WHC uses a revolving-membership committee system, it is possible that the European representatives who are members of the committee at the time that a site is nominated push for the inscription of their national sites. Thus, it is important to hold constant the European representation in both the WHC “bureau” and the WHC inscription committee (a state may be represented in either one or both in any given year).

In Model 2 of Table 2 we show the results obtained when we re-estimate the model by including controls for length of membership and state-representation in both the WHC bureau and the WHC selection committee. We find that the effect of length of membership is negative: the longer a state has been a WHC member, the less likely it is to have a site inscribed in the future. This suggests that selection committees display a bias toward newer members in favor of older members, which is consistent with the archival evidence

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\(^3\)The coefficient estimate for the effect of time however suggests that, on average, any country has a more difficult time getting a site inscribed in more recent times than in the early years of the WHC. This effect is what should be expected, since as the number of countries has increased over time (and the number of yearly inscriptions displays a null trend—with some fluctuation—as shown in Figure 1(a)), the competition for inscription has also increased, thus lowering the probability of inscriptions for all countries.
and the secondary literature on the WHC. In addition we find that state representation in the WHC selection personnel results in a (predictable) advantage for that state-member; when a state is represented in either the WHC bureau or committee, the expected number of inscriptions for that country increases, with the effect of committee membership being about four times as strong as the effect of bureau membership. Thus, the WHC appears to be no different from most other organizations: when actors hold positions of power and influence in the structure of the organization, they are able to generate outcomes that are favorable to their constituents [Salancik and Pfeffer 1974].

The key result in model 2 however is that the inclusion of these controls while reducing the regional effect by about one-fourth, does not make it disappear. Thus, the European regional advantage cannot be attributed (entirely) to either European over-representation in the WHC power-structure, nor can it be tied to the greater longevity of European membership (this factor would count against European states since the WHC appears to display a bias toward newcomers as we saw above).

In Model 3 of Table 1 we test the hypothesis that the European regional advantage has actually grown over-time. We do this by including an interaction term between the linear time trend and the Regional dummy. The results support the hypothesis of increasing European advantage over time (t = 3.30). This is consistent with the pattern of cumulative differentiation between Europe and all other world regions shown in Figure 4(a), which suggests that the gap between Europe and the rest has grown discontinuously.

Figure 4(b) however, suggests that these results should be primarily concentrated among cultural inscriptions and be largely null for natural inscriptions. The results presented in Models 4 and 5 of Table 1 are consistent with these expectations. When the analysis is restricted to inscriptions of sites ultimately classified as “cultural” the pattern of overall and time-varying European advantage is strong and significant, with the magnitude of the interaction between region and year being essentially indistinguishable from that estimated for all sites in Model 3. When the analysis is restricted to inscriptions of sites classified as either “natural” or “mixed” the results are starkly different. The main effect of region is negative and does not reach statistical significance (t = -0.89), and there is no discernible interaction between region and time (t = 0.77).

Perhaps the reason why we observe a pattern of European advantage is because European countries nominated more sites than other countries. Thus, it is simply the larger supply of potential European sites and not a Euro-centric bias that explains the regional effect. To test the hypothesis that the European regional advantage is due to the number of nominations, in model 6 we re-estimate the model using the same specification as that shown in model 5, but including the (lagged by one year) number of nominations for that country. The results show that while indeed there is positive “supply-side” effect (countries which nominate more sites are more likely to experience more inscriptions) this does little to change the magnitude of the European regional advantage.

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4A model that includes an interaction effect between membership length and time (not shown), suggests that these “newcomer bias” has become weaker.

5The time trend is centered at the year 1989, which means that now the main effect of region should be interpreted as giving the magnitude of European advantage for that year (and not the average effect across years) [Friedrich 1982].
4 Discussion

In this paper we have shown that the iterative application of definitions of “universal” value that are in fact drawn from categories of thought of European origins result in patterns of “instituting action” on the part of an international organization that generate outcomes associated with a cumulative definition of cultural worth that benefits Europe. This is in spite of the best intentions of organizational actors to guard against ethnocentric definitions of cultural value and worth. Here the organization, in drawing on socially embedded systems of categories in order to select those objects to be instituted as representative of the “best exemplars” of cultural worth ends up disproportionately benefiting those cultural objects produced by a specific regional culture.

Our study suggests that in addition to the traditional macro-level mechanism of socially embedded category use on the part of instituting organizations, like those highlighted in the conflict-oriented analysis of instituting organizations such as schools, the gradual accumulation of advantage by given set of actors is facilitated by a number of meso-level processes. An important cultural-cognitive mechanism that emerges from our analysis is evident in the comparison between the different selection routines applied to “natural” and “cultural” sites. This is the relative “diffuseness” and specificity of the definition of value that is used to generate the inclusion and instituting criteria. When the definition of value that is applied are diffuse and non-specific, the result is more ascriptive inequality tied to ethnocentric definitions of cultural worth. When the criteria are objectified and specific—as they are in ecological science—the result is a less ethnocentric distribution of sites which does not benefit European sites over those located in other regions. In our setting, we argue that it is the highly contested and diffuse operation of the notion of “outstanding universal value” in the cultural realm that is partially responsible for this outcome. To substantiate this claim, we offer a brief historical overview of the development of this master-category within the WHC as well as the divergent pathways that the idea of Universal Value has taken—in practice—within the “cultural” and “natural” arms of the WHC.

4.1 Defining outstanding universal value

Prior to the formation of the WHC (1968) a group of experts convened to determine “principles and scientific, technical, and legal criteria” needed for the formation of a system for “protecting and exploiting monuments and sites.” (1968 meeting of experts line 3). It was noted that during these proceedings that although the concept of “universal importance” had been discussed frequently, a clear definition of what was of universal importance had not been agreed upon. Furthermore, it would be a challenge to objectively determine sites and monuments of universal importance as “each in any case is a whole constituted by its very variety and the multiplicity of its components, and it is the total contribution of all the successive generations established on a specific soil that gives each national heritage its universal value.” (1968 meeting of experts line 84).

The relativistic stance of the 1968 panel of experts is reflected several years later in the first draft of the official World Heritage Convention (WHC). Created in 1972 by a team of delegates representing Algeria, Brazil, Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon, Canada, Egypt,
France, India, Mexico, Spain, Ukrainian SSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the United Kingdom, and the United States, this draft marks one of the earliest appearances of the term “outstanding universal value,” where it appears within the definitions of cultural and natural heritage outlined in the first two articles. The draft offers little in way of a definition of the term, stating only that cultural sites should be of outstanding universal value in the view of science, history, or art, or aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point of view. Similarly, natural sites are to be of outstanding universal value in the view of science, aesthetics, conservation or natural beauty (Unesco 1972).

The authors of the draft do caution that sites should not be chosen based on “any specific canon or canons of aesthetics,” but instead “…include unique archaeological remains of past civilizations, the best specimens of a country’s architecture, grandiose groups that represent a decisive moment or period in an art or style, and so on.” (Unesco 1968:19). Despite critique by UNESCO’s general committee that ‘outstanding universal value,’ was not explicitly defined in the draft (Unesco 1972) no further attempt to clarify the language within the Convention was made. Clarification has been sought, however, by way of revisions to the Operational Guidelines. The first version of the World Heritage Committee Operational Guidelines, written in 1977, recognizes the vague nature of the term ‘outstanding universal value’ within the convention, and offers comment that “Some properties may not be recognized by all people, everywhere, to be of great importance and significance. Opinions may vary from one culture or period to another and the term universal must therefore be interpreted as referring to a property which is highly representative of the culture of which it forms part.” (Unesco 1977)

By 1980, however, this statement had been removed from the Operational Guidelines, and replaced with a set of six cultural criteria and four natural criteria to be used to determine if a site is of “outstanding universal value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological, or anthropological points of view,” for cultural properties, and of “outstanding universal value from the aesthetic or scientific point of view” for natural properties (Unesco 1980). These changes did not go without criticism. In 1996 an expert panel charged with evaluating the selection criteria for natural world heritage sites found the lack of clarity and consensus had lead to multiple interpretations and inconsistency in the judgment of sites. As a remedy, they called for a more regional interpretation of the term (Unesco 1966). Their request went unanswered however, and the definition of outstanding universal value remained constant until a revision to the Operational Guidelines is made in February of 2005 to add the following line: “Outstanding universal value means cultural and/or natural significance which is so exceptional as to transcend national boundaries and to be of common importance for present and future generations of all humanity” (Unesco 2005b:14), in spite of the fact that the new textual addition went against the recommendations of the 1996 panel of experts.

Shortly after this revision (2005) a panel of experts was assembled to deliberate on the meaning of ‘outstanding universal value’ as it is used in the Operational Guidelines. Essentially, the 2005 panel argues that the convention is difficult to change, so all changes related to the definition of outstanding universal value (OUV) must be made within the Operational Guidelines, and these changes (as well as the resulting inscriptions based on the definition) show how the understanding of OUV has changed over time. They

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take no issue with it and make no argument that the language has allowed for bias. A 2006 panel of experts (ICOMOS and IUCN) agrees that the different interpretations have shaped inscriptions over time, but do take issue with it. They note that “limiting assessment of outstanding universal value to superlatives could lead to the conclusion that one culture is in some way superior to another which is contrary to the purpose of the convention. ICOMOS fully accepts the concept of diversity of cultures, and of their particular manifestation, and makes all efforts to assess outstanding universal value in that context.”

Our archival research thus indicates that the definition of the concept of universal value has been subject—as is to be expected—to all kinds of contestation within the WHC since its inception. In spite of the highly contested nature of this master-category, the WHC has gone on to attempt to develop objectified, documented and institutionalized definitions of Universal worth. We have seen that the deployment of these definitions in two of the sub-organizational units of the WHC has resulted in dramatically different outcomes. We argue that this is the case because the concept of Universal Value is subject to less effective standardization and more problematic commensuration and objectification in the cultural realm in comparison to the natural realm. This is consistent with practice-based theories of the role of culture in instituting organizations that argue that it is precisely when actors are not provided with well-delimited, objectively scaffolded resources with which to structure their choices, the implicit schemes of perception and judgment that are seldom brought to explicit awareness are more likely to be activated and are more likely to result in patterns of choices that benefit those actors upon whom the categorical criteria of selection are modeled in the first place.
References


Unesco. General conference. report on the possibility and advisability of adopting an international convention instituting a special tourist tax for the preservation of monuments and museums. 7C/PRG/6:1–5, 1952.


Unesco. Meeting of experts to establish an international system for the protection of monuments and sites of interest. international protection of monuments, groups of buildings, and sites of universal value and interest: Background and purposes. SHC/Conf.43/6: 1–6, 1969b.

Unesco. Meeting of experts to establish an international system for the protection of monuments, groups of buildings and sites of universal interest. final report. SHC/MD/4.: 1–41, 1969c.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i.</td>
<td>to represent a masterpiece of human creative genius;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii.</td>
<td>to exhibit an important interchange of human values, over a span of time or within a cultural area of the world, on developments in architecture or technology, monumental arts, town-planning or landscape design;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii.</td>
<td>to bear a unique or at least exceptional testimony to a cultural tradition or to a civilization which is living or which has disappeared;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv.</td>
<td>to be an outstanding example of a type of building, architectural or technological ensemble or landscape which illustrates (a) significant stage(s) in human history;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v.</td>
<td>to be an outstanding example of a traditional human settlement, land-use, or sea-use which is representative of a culture (or cultures), or human interaction with the environment especially when it has become vulnerable under the impact of irreversible change;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi.</td>
<td>to be directly or tangibly associated with events or living traditions, with ideas, or with beliefs, with artistic and literary works of outstanding universal significance;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vii.</td>
<td>to contain superlative natural phenomena or areas of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>viii.</td>
<td>to be outstanding examples representing major stages of earth’s history, including the record of life, significant on-going geological processes in the development of landforms, or significant geomorphic or physiographic features;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ix.</td>
<td>to be outstanding examples representing significant on-going ecological and biological processes in the evolution and development of terrestrial, fresh water, coastal and marine ecosystems and communities of plants and animals;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x.</td>
<td>to contain the most important and significant natural habitats for in-situ conservation of biological diversity, including those containing threatened species of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science or conservation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: World Heritage Committee Selection Criteria (2005)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All sites</td>
<td>All sites</td>
<td>All sites</td>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>Natural¹</td>
<td>Cultural</td>
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<tr>
<td>Region (Europe=1)</td>
<td>0.809*</td>
<td>0.601*</td>
<td>0.442*</td>
<td>0.636*</td>
<td>-0.239</td>
<td>0.616*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.06)</td>
<td>(3.97)</td>
<td>(2.78)</td>
<td>(3.25)</td>
<td>(-0.89)</td>
<td>(3.22)</td>
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<td>Year (Linear Trend)</td>
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<td>0.00340</td>
<td>-0.00693</td>
<td>0.00342</td>
<td>-0.0284+</td>
<td>0.00384</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(-3.90)</td>
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<td>(-0.68)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
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<td>Length of Membership</td>
<td>-0.0228*</td>
<td>-0.0242*</td>
<td>-0.0308*</td>
<td>-0.0113</td>
<td>-0.0387*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(-2.30)</td>
<td>(-2.41)</td>
<td>(-2.50)</td>
<td>(-0.67)</td>
<td>(-3.19)</td>
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<td>Member of Bureau at Nomination</td>
<td>0.420*</td>
<td>0.395*</td>
<td>0.454*</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>0.412*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(3.57)</td>
<td>(3.34)</td>
<td>(3.34)</td>
<td>(0.87)</td>
<td>(2.99)</td>
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<td>Member of WHC Committee at Nomination</td>
<td>1.813*</td>
<td>1.822*</td>
<td>1.690*</td>
<td>2.238*</td>
<td>1.626*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(17.73)</td>
<td>(17.84)</td>
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<td>Region X Year</td>
<td>0.0339*</td>
<td>0.0343*</td>
<td>0.0180</td>
<td>0.0333*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.30)</td>
<td>(2.95)</td>
<td>(0.77)</td>
<td>(2.77)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of sites nominated (t-1)</td>
<td>-1.542*</td>
<td>-1.999*</td>
<td>-1.966*</td>
<td>-2.345*</td>
<td>-3.169*</td>
<td>-2.332*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(-15.92)</td>
<td>(-21.63)</td>
<td>(-20.96)</td>
<td>(-19.73)</td>
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<td>ln[Var(μ_i)]</td>
<td>-0.171</td>
<td>-0.924*</td>
<td>-0.904*</td>
<td>-0.388*</td>
<td>-0.503+</td>
<td>-0.471*</td>
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+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05 (t-statistics in parentheses)

Table 2: Random-effects regression models of the number of World Heritage site inscriptions (all sites), by country 1973-2005
Figure 1:

(a) Number of Ratifying Countries

(b) Cumulative Number of Ratifying Countries

(c) Cumulative Number of Ratifying Countries by Region
Figure 2: Cumulative Number of World Heritage Sites by Year and Region

Figure 3: Cumulative Number of World Heritage Sites by Year and Status
Figure 4: Cumulative Number of World Heritage Sites by Year and Region