Prof. Zhiguo He


  • Working papers
  • Intermediary Asset Pricing: New Evidence from Many Asset Classes, with Bryan Kelly and Asaf Manela, 01/2016.
    The market equity capital ratio factor of NY Fed's primary dealers not only prices equity portfolios but also other more sophisticated asset classes like fixed income, detivatives, commodities, and currencies.
    Download data from here
  • A Model of Safe Asset Determination, with Arvind Krishnarthy and Konstantin Milbradt, 02/2016.
    The safe asset tends to be the bonds issued by a relatively strong country. Large debt size helps the safety status given a high global demand for safe asset (previously circulated under the title of "A model of reserve asset.")
  • Leverage Dynamics without Commitment, with Peter DeMarzo, 12/2014, coming soon.
    Firms who cannot commit to their future leverages will issue debt but never repurchase at any point of time. With finite maturity debt which naturally retires, the firm's leverage follows an endogenous mean-reverting process.
  • A Macroeconomic Framework for Quantifying Systemic Risk, with Arvind Krishnamurthy, 06/2014. Presentation Slides, Matlab code.
    Winner of Swiss Finance Institute Outstanding Paper Award 2012
    Systemic risk arises when shocks lead to states where a disruption in financial intermediation adversely affects the economy and feeds back into further disrupting financial intermediation. We calibrate our model and use it to match the systemic risk apparent during the 2007/2008 financial crisis.
  • Quantifying Liquidity and Default Risks of Corporate Bonds over the Business Cycle, with Hui Chen, Rui Cui, and Konstantin Milbradt, 07/2015.
    We generate both non-default and default components of corporate bonds by introducing over-the-counter search frictions into a structural model with time varying macroeconomic conditions. We match the credit spreads, default probabilities, and bid-ask spreads across business cycles and different rating classes. Through a novel model-based decomposition scheme that captures the interaction between default and liquidity, we find the interaction terms account for about 10%~24% of observed credit spreads.
  • Optimal Long-term Contracting with Learning, with Bin Wei, Jianfeng Yu, and Feng Gao, 10/2014. Presentation Slides.
    With uncertain profitablity in dynamic agency relationship, the agent has incentive to shirk to manipulate the principal's future belief, giving rise to a long-lasting hidden information problem. The optimal contract implements time-decreasing effort, and has a feature of "stock options" in that incentive goes up after good performance.
  • Publications
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