- Inefficient Investment Waves, with Peter Kondor, 04/2013. Presenation Slides.
A simple contracting friction (idiosyncratic skill shocks are not contractible) leads to pecuniary externality, so that agents tend to overinvest in the relatively scarce goods. This implies too much investment in booms and too little investment in recessions, relative to the constrained efficient economy.
- Endogenous Liquidity and Defaultable Bonds, with Konstantin Milbradt, 05/2013. Presentation Slides.
Best Paper Award for Utah Winter Finance Conference 2013
Over-the-counter search friction in corporate bonds market affects the firm's default decision via the rollover channel, leading to a positive spiral between bond illiquidity and default risk.
- A Macroeconomic Framework for Quantifying Systemic Risk, with Arvind Krishnamurthy, 11/2012.
Winner of Swiss Finance Institute Outstanding Paper Award 2012
Systemic risk arises when shocks lead to states where a disruption in financial intermediation adversely affects the economy and feeds back into further disrupting financial intermediation. We calibrate our model and use it to match the systemic risk apparent during the 2007/2008 financial crisis.
- Debt and Creative Destruction: Why Could Subsidizing Corporate
Debt Be Optimal? with Matvos Gregor, 07/2012. Presentation Slides.
Subsidizing corporate debt allieviates the negative externality between firms' delayed exit decisions in declining industries.
- Information Acquisition in Rumor-based Bank Runs, with Asaf Manela, 02/2013. Presentation Slides.
Rumors (information without discernible origin) about bank liquidity trigger bank runs with gradual withdrawal. We show that a full capital reserve is not required to prevent bank runs.
- Optimal Long-term Contracting with Learning, with Bin Wei and Jianfeng Yu, 03/2013.
With uncertain profitablity in dynamic agency relationship, the agent has incentive to shirk to manipulate the principal's future belief, giving rise to a long-lasting hidden information problem. The optimal contract implements time-decreasing effort, and has a feature of "stock options" in that incentive goes up after good performance.
- Quantifying Liquidity and Default Risks of Corporate Bonds over the Business Cycle, with Hui Chen, Rui Cui, and Konstantin Milbradt, 05/2013.
We explain both non-default and default components of corporate bonds by introducing over-the-counter search frictions into a structural model with time varying macroeconomic and procyclical secondary market liquidity conditions. We match the total credit spreads and default probabilities, as well as Bond-CDS spreads and bid-ask spreads, across different rating classes. We proposed a novel model-based decomposition scheme that captures the interaction between liquidity frictions and corporate default decisions via the rollover channel.
- Optimal Contracting
- Optimal Executive Compensation when Firm Size Follows Geometric Brownian Motion, 2009, Review of Financial Studies 22, pp. 859-892.
- A Model of Dynamic Compensation and Capital Structure, 2011, Journal of Financial Economics 100, pp. 351-366.
working paper version.
- Dynamic Agency and q Theory of Investment, 2012, with Peter DeMarzo, Michael Fishman, and Neng Wang, Journal of Finance 67, pp. 2295-2340.
- Dynamic Compensation Contracts with Private Savings, 2012, Review of Financial Studies 25: pp. 1494-1549. Presentation Slides.
- Delegated Asset Management, Investment Mandates, and Capital Immobility, 2013, with Wei Xiong, Journal of Financial Economics 107, pp. 239-258. Lead article.
(previously titled "Multi-market Delegated Asset Management")
- Uncertainty, Risk, and Incentives: Theory and Evidence, with Si Li, Bin Wei, and Jianfeng Yu, 02/2013. Forthcoming in Management Science.
Winner of The Chinese Financial Association 2012 Best Paper Award
In contast to a negative risk-incentive relation predicted by standard agency theory, the learning-by-doing effect may lead to a positive uncertainty-incentive relation. We present empirical evidience that is consistent with this prediction.
- Agency Frictions in Financial Markets and Macroeconomics
- The Sale of Multiple Assets with Private Information. 2009, Review of Financial Studies 22, pp. 4787-4820.
- Balance Sheet Adjustment in the 2008 Crisis, with In Gu Khang and Arvind Krishnamurthy, 2010, IMF Economic Review 1, pp. 118-156.
- A Model of Capital and Crises, 2012, with Arvind Krishnamurthy, Review of Economic Studies 79(2): pp. 735-777.
- Intermediary Asset Pricing, 2013, with Arvind Krishnamurthy, American Economic Review 103(2), pp. 732-770. Presentation Slides.
Financial Sector Leverage Data: Both Restud and AER papers predict that leverage of the financial sector in general equilibrium rises during crises, rather than falls as would be consistent with a deleveraging model. The difference is market leverage versus book leverage. This short note presents empirical evidence consistent with our model. It also explains the empirical deleveraging pattern that other models have focused on.
- Debt Maturity and Its Implications
- A Theory of Debt Maturity: The Long and Short of Debt Overhang, with Douglas Diamond, 04/2013, forthcoming in Journal of Finance. Presentation Slides.
Controling leverage, short-term debt may lead to stronger overhang than long-term debt does, when there are 1) future investment opportunities, 2) conditional volatility, and/or 3) endogenous default.
- Rollover Risk and Credit Risk, with Wei Xiong, 2012, Journal of Finance 67, pp. 391-429. Lead article. Presentation Slides.
Winner of Smith-Breeden First Prize, 2012
- Dynamic Debt Runs, with Wei Xiong, 2012, Review of Financial Studies 25, pp. 1799-1843. Presentation Slides.
- Debt Financing in Asset Markets, with Wei Xiong, 2012, American Economic Review, P&P 102, pp. 88-94. Online Appendix. (previously titled "Equilibrium Debt Financing")