1. Questions

The questions to answer are straightforward: What do we learn about bond return or yield change predictability? In particular, do macro variables or yield information past 3 principal components help to forecast bond returns and/or yield changes? And, the point of the paper: what do we learn about econometric or empirical pitfalls from this case, lessons that may be more generally useful?

I’ll focus on the Joslin, Priebsch, Singleton (2014) regressions. These are forecasting regressions, for example

\[ r_{x,t+1} = a + b_1' PC_t + b_2' [GRO_t \ INF_t] + b_3' \text{(more yields}_t\)+ \epsilon_{t+1} \]

where \( r_x \) is a bond excess return, PC are the three first principal components of bond yields, GRO is a measure of economic growth, and INF is a measure of inflation.

The question is whether growth and inflation, or information in yields past the first three principal components, are useful additional forecasters. Joslin, Priebsch, Singleton famously concluded that macro variables are important in addition to yields for describing bond risk premiums. Bauer and Hamilton question that finding. Let’s dig in.

The questions are broader. This sort of regression is also used to forecast changes in yields,

\[ y_{t+1} - y_t = a + b_1'PC_t + b_2'[GRO_t \times INF_t] + b_3'(\text{more yields}_t) + \varepsilon_{t+1} \]

By standard identities, return forecast and yield change forecast regressions are basically the same thing. The presence of inflation and growth as macro variables suggests a tantalizing link to Taylor rules,

\[ y_{t+1} - y_t = a + \phi_y \times GRO_{t+1} + \phi_{\pi} \times INF_{t+1} + (\text{+ yields?}) + \varepsilon_{t+1} \]

2. Facts

So, do macro variables help? I noticed quickly Bauer and Hamilton's Table 4:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Original sample: 1985-2008</th>
<th>Later sample: 1985-2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( R^2_1 )</td>
<td>( R^2_2 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Two-year bond</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple bootstrap</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC bootstrap</td>
<td>(0.06, 0.58)</td>
<td>(0.11, 0.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07, 0.72)</td>
<td>(0.13, 0.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ten-year bond</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple bootstrap</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC bootstrap</td>
<td>(0.07, 0.48)</td>
<td>(0.12, 0.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06, 0.50)</td>
<td>(0.12, 0.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average two- through ten-year bonds</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple bootstrap</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC bootstrap</td>
<td>(0.08, 0.50)</td>
<td>(0.12, 0.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06, 0.55)</td>
<td>(0.13, 0.61)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are two lessons here: First, the Joslin, Priesch and Singleton macro variable estimates are greatly reduced out of sample. That’s an empirical, not an econometric issue.

Second, and Bauer and Hamilton’s focus, the remaining rise in \( R^2 \) when we add macro variables is now statistically insignificant.

Bauer and Hamilton kindly provided me with the data, so I was able to investigate
more deeply – to provide an “empirical” rather than just “econometric” analysis of the facts. Table 1 presents the results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PC1</th>
<th>PC2</th>
<th>PC3</th>
<th>GRO</th>
<th>INF</th>
<th>trend</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t</td>
<td>(1.14)</td>
<td>(2.35)</td>
<td>(0.56)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.99</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.56)</td>
<td>(0.68)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>-3.77</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t</td>
<td>(2.25)</td>
<td>(3.38)</td>
<td>(1.23)</td>
<td>(-0.32)</td>
<td>(-2.17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-1.62</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t</td>
<td>(8.40)</td>
<td>(8.99)</td>
<td>(1.44)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(-1.18)</td>
<td>(9.81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t</td>
<td>(11.81)</td>
<td>(8.81)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Forecasting regression of the average (across maturity) bond excess return $\frac{1}{10} \sum_{n=1}^{N} r_{x(t+1)}^{(n)}$ on indicated right hand variables at time $t$. The return is at a one year horizon, using overlapping data from 1985 to 2013, in excess of the one year rate. Standard errors correct for overlap with the Hansen-Hodrick correction. The underlying data are 1-10 year Treasury zeros constructed by Joslin, Priebsch and Singleton. PC are the first three principal components of yields. GRO is their measure of GDP growth, and INF their measure of inflation. Trend is time.

The first row of Table 1 shows that the slope of the term structure has some ability to forecast bond excess returns, a standard result, with an 0.18 $R^2$, a standard value.

In the second row, growth and inflation on their own do absolutely nothing to forecast returns.

In the third row of Table 1, however, the multiple regression seems to improve on the three principal components. INF is now individually significant. Moreover, its presence raises the coefficients and t statistics of the first two principal components. The $R^2$ rises from 0.18 to 0.26. Bauer and Hamilton may complain about significance, but that’s still attractive to empiricists.

But how do variables that are useless on their own do so much to raise predictability
in a multiple regression? Let’s look at the data. Figures 1, 2 and 3 present the data on yields, their first three principal components, and the macro data respectively.

![Figure 1: Joslin, Priebsch and Singleton 1-10 year zero coupon yields](image)

Yes, the forecasters are serially correlated, so Bauer and Hamilton’s econometric focus is relevant. Not only is there a business cycle pattern, so effectively “only” 3 or 4 data points, the first principal component and inflation have a trend, in this “short” data set.

On the hunch that inflation is just contributing a trend, the last two rows of Table 1 include a linear trend. The last row is a spectacular success. Adding a linear trend, but dropping the third principal component and both macro variables, I win the $R^2$ contest by a long mile, with an 0.62 value, and unheard-of t statistics.

So, inflation was largely just proxying (and poorly) for detrending of the level and slope factors. (It’s helping slope as well, so the story is also about cleaning up cyclical components, not just trends.) Allowing that detrending, we get an apparently spectacularly good predictor.

(Related, Cieslak and Povala (2015) include a moving average of inflation as a right hand variable, finding an $R^2$ of 0.52 in a much longer sample. They view the long run
Figure 2: Joslin, Priebsch and Singleton principal components of yields

Figure 3: Joslin, Priebsch and Singleton growth and inflation.
movements in the level factor as arising from inflation, so adding inflation to the regression removes low frequency nominal movements from the level factor, leaving the real movements that correspond to changing risk premiums. The point is not whether a trend or long-run inflation is the “right” forecaster. The point is that inflation helps yields to forecast returns by removing a very slowly moving component of yields.)

Perhaps this result is just due to a few data points? Another good empirical check is a plot of forecast and actual, to make sure any pattern is regular over the span of data. Figure 4 presents ex-post returns together with their forecast. On the top left, we see that the principal components do forecast returns. On the top right, we see that GRO and INF by themselves do essentially nothing. On the bottom left, we see the improved forecasts including both principal components and macro data.

But on the bottom right, we see the spectacular performance of the first two principal components plus the trend. The forecast is not matching a trend in returns – that’s a cheap way to get high $R^2$. The forecast really is cleaning up a higher frequency variation of PC1 and PC2. The improvement is consistent over episodes.

(You may worry a bit about standard error corrections for serial correlation due to overlap. It’s well known that the Hansen-Hodrick or Newey-West nonparametric corrections sometimes behave poorly. For a while I thought that’s what Bauer and Hamilton were about. But that really isn’t the issue. In this case, I ran all the regressions from January to January. I also did Jan-Jan, Feb-Feb, etc. regressions and present the average of these results. These nonoverlapping regressions are a bit less efficient, but the standard errors can be computed using only OLS formulas.

Table 2 shows the first row of Table 1 redone this way, and you can see the results are unaffected. The same holds for the other rows.)

3. Econometrics

Now, how do we interpret these results? Is the trend forecast a proof that macro variables really don’t matter, because they can be driven out by a simple trend? Is the result thus a reductio ad absurdum? Is the result a brilliant demonstration that information in yields, beyond the first three principal components, can help significantly to forecast yields – that time-filtered principal components are the hot forecasters?
Figure 4: Forecast $a + bx_t$ and actual $r_{t+1}$ returns
Table 2: Comparison of January-January nonoverlapping forecasts, average of all month-month nonoverlapping forecasts, and overlapping forecasts with Hansen-Hodrick correction. "av.mo" gives the average $R^2$ in month-to-month regressions, “same b” gives the $R^2$ forcing each month to use the same value of $b$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>PC1</th>
<th>PC2</th>
<th>PC3</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan-Jan</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>t</td>
<td>(1.71)</td>
<td>(2.16)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Av Mo.</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>t</td>
<td>(1.71)</td>
<td>(2.16)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overlap</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>t</td>
<td>(1.14)</td>
<td>(2.35)</td>
<td>(0.56)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Or, is the result a first-order econometric goof? Surely if forecasting with persistent but stationary variables causes problems, forecasting in-sample trends with near-unit roots floating around should raise fire alarms! That's what Bauer and Hamilton's paper is about. So let's see what the paper has to say.

What are, really, the dangers of forecasting with highly serially correlated right hand variables?

Consider the system

\[
\begin{align*}
    r_{t+1} &= b_1 x_t + b_2 y_t + \varepsilon^r_{t+1} \\
    x_{t+1} &= \rho_x x_t + \varepsilon^x_{t+1} \\
    y_{t+1} &= \rho_y x_t + \varepsilon^y_{t+1}
\end{align*}
\]

(I suppress constants for simplicity.) The null hypothesis is that $b_2 = 0$, and that returns are not forecastable from anything, in particular they are uncorrelated over time, $\text{cov}(\varepsilon^r_{t+1}, \text{anything}_t) = 0$.

Now, it's very intuitive that slow-moving forecasters cause trouble. If there are only a few business cycles or zero crossings in $y_t$, it seems that there are really few data points, and we really don't know that much. But econometrics reminds us of a hard fact:

For fixed $x$ and $y$, OLS is BLUE, and OLS standard errors are correct. Deeply, OLS
does not care about the ordering of right hand variables. OLS and its standard errors are exactly the same if we reshuffle random variables in any order. Distribution theory revolves around the correlation properties of the error term, not those of the right hand variable.

You’re probably still queasy about regressions on trends or highly correlated right hand variables. In cross-sectional regressions, you are queasy if you discover that a right hand variable in a county-level regression is all positive on the west of the Mississippi and negative on the east – strong cross-sectional correlation. But if the errors are uncorrelated, OLS does not care. You should be queasy, but we’ll have to look elsewhere to understand why.

With stochastic x and y – with a distribution theory that resamples x and y, not just the errors – this theorem is no longer true. The coefficients are consistent, but not necessarily unbiased, and the OLS standard errors are asymptotically valid, but not in finite sample.

And there is a well-known finite sample problem: If the forecaster error \( \varepsilon^y \) and the return error \( \varepsilon^r \) are strongly negatively correlated, then the coefficient \( b_2 \) on \( y \) is biased up. This is the famous Stambaugh bias. The intuition is straightforward: With a near-unit root, the autocorrelation coefficient \( \rho_y \) is downward biased. This means that \( y_t \) and \( \varepsilon^y_{t+1} \) are negatively correlated. In turn, if the errors \( \varepsilon^y \varepsilon^r \) are negatively correlated, then \( y_t \) and \( \varepsilon^r_{t+1} \) are positively correlated, resulting in upward bias of the return-forecast coefficient.

That correlation may hold for price variables. When returns are unexpectedly high, prices are unexpectedly low, so the needed negative correlation is often there. So far the consensus (well, my consensus, see Cochrane (2008)!) has been that the effect is not strong enough to overturn the evidence for price-dividend ratio based stock market predictability. But the bias is there.

But macro variables do not have errors that are strongly negatively correlated with returns. So Stambaugh bias does not apply. Bauer and Hamilton’s paper is explicitly not about Stambaugh bias:

... the problem with hypothesis tests of \( \beta_2 = 0 \) does not arise from Stambaugh bias as traditionally understood. Instead of coefficient bias, the reason for the size distortions of these tests is the fact that the OLS standard
errors substantially underestimate the sampling variability of both $b_1$ and $b_2$.

The paper is about the distribution of a macro variable, whose errors are uncorrelated with return errors, in the presence of a price variable, whose errors are so correlated. The setup is $\text{corr}(\varepsilon_{t+1}^r, \varepsilon_{t+1}^y) = 0$, but $\text{corr}(\varepsilon_{t+1}^r, \varepsilon_{t+1}^y) < 0$. Then, apparently, $b_2$ remains unbiased, but its standard errors are too small, and thus $R^2$ can be too big – we see unexpectedly many large $b_2$ in both directions.

I don’t have intuition for this result, as I presented for the Stambaugh bias. I presume it’s something about near unit root large non-normal errors in $\varepsilon_{t+1}^x, \varepsilon_{t+1}^y$ feed into $\varepsilon_{t+1}^r$.

But how big is this effect? Is this enough to unwind the 8.0 $t$ statistics and make a fool of my trend-based forecasts? I did my own little Monte Carlo, more attuned to the return-forecasting question than the simulations in Bauer and Hamilton’s paper, and Figure 5 presents the results.

![Figure 5: Monte Carlo distribution of return-forecasting coefficient](image-url)
I simulate the following system, for 30 periods:

\[
    r_{t+1} = b_1 x_t + b_2 y_t + \varepsilon^r_{t+1}
\]
\[
    x_{t+1} = 0.95 x_t + \varepsilon^x_{t+1}
\]
\[
    y_{t+1} = 0.95 y_t + \varepsilon^y_{t+1}
\]

I set \(b_1 = b_2 = 0\) to simulate, and then estimate the regressions in simulated data, with constants.

First, I set the correlation of all the errors to zero. The blue line of Figure 5 gives the distribution of \(b_2\) in this case. (It’s the same as the distribution of \(b_1\).) You see it’s unbiased and nicely normal.

Next, I raise the (negative) correlation between return and price-variable shocks, \(\text{corr}(\varepsilon^r, \varepsilon^x)\) to \(-0.9\). The red line graphs the resulting distribution of the x coefficient \(b_1\). Here you see the quite serious Stambaugh bias. The mode of the distribution is about \(b_1 = 0.1\), around one standard error above zero. And the distribution is spread out as well. This variable would have spuriously large \(R^2\) as well as spuriously large regression coefficients.

But our issue is the distribution of \(b_2\), the coefficient on an additional variable, also serially correlated, but whose errors are not correlated with those of returns or of prices. This distribution is shown in the magenta line of Figure 5. Yes, the distribution is a bit wider. But the effect is very small. And -0.9 error correlation, with 0.95 serial correlation and 30 years of data seem like a pretty trying environment.

Figure 6 shows the worst-case scenario: both forecasters x and y are random walks, and the correlation between return and x innovations is -1. I still am not finding a huge distortion, or anything near the effects of Stambaugh bias.

So, I remain to be persuaded just what this effect is, and that it is quantitatively significant for addressing the issues raised in bond-return forecasting regressions.

### 3.1. Fear of serially correlated forecasters

Why are we then so rightly suspicious of forecasters that are highly serially correlated, even if the errors are not serially correlated? (Both in the time series and in the cross section.) As a hypothetical, suppose you see return data as shown in Figure 7, which I
Figure 6: Monte Carlo distribution of return-forecasting coefficient, with random walk forecasters and perfect residual correlation
generated from $r_{t+1} = a + bt + \varepsilon_{t+1}$.

Figure 7: Simulated return data

Suppose I run a forecasting regression using a variable $y_t$, and find

$$r_{t+1} = a - 0.38 \times y_t + \varepsilon_{t+1}^r$$

On graphing, you find the variable $y_t$ happens to be a linear trend. How can you complain?

On an econometric basis, you really can’t. The errors are uncorrelated, and we’re not going to overcome a 6.7 t statistic with the kinds of considerations in Bauer and Hamilton’s paper.

What’s the problem? Well, clearly, lots of other variables have trends. If this is a pre-2000 vs. post-2000 variable, we can think of hundreds of other variables that are larger pre-2000 and post-2000. In my east and west of the Mississippi example, we can think of lots of other variables that have that pattern.

A variable that moves more frequently has a more distinct pattern. One can be more sure that this variable, and only this variable, could have entered correctly on the right
hand side.

However, that’s still not a satisfactory answer in this case. For structural work, yes, we may not have the “real” causal variable. But here, we don’t care about real causes. We only care about forecasting. Already, we include bond factors, knowing those factors proxy for, and reveal, the real variables. So if we have proxy variables already, is serial correlation really a problem?

Really, the problem is, that we could have found so many other similar variables. If the data had a significant V shaped pattern, we could have found that. If they were higher on even vs. odd years, we would have found that. That’s the sense in which it is “easy” to find these results. This is really a specification problem, not an econometric problem.

Traditionally, the main guard against this kind of fishing has been an economic interpretation of the forecasting variable. But that discipline is dying out, with the result that we have hundreds of claimed forecasting variables.

4. Bigger dangers

I think this quest for statistical significance in a multiple regression sense also takes us away from the many empirical and econometric problems remain with forecasting regressions, that could use some econometric guidance.

Figure 8 presents the forward rates from the Joslin, Priebsch and Singleton data. You can see a lot of small high frequency up and down jumpiness. This data has either high frequency measurement error, or small high frequency idiosyncratic price movements that provide lovely near-arbitrage opportunities for traders.

Slicing the data horizontally, things get worse. Figure 9 shows the forward curve on selected dates. These forward curves jump all over the place, with the zig-zag pattern characteristic of idiosyncratic price measurement error – or arbitrage opportunity. The vertical line of figure 9 shows the limit of the Fama-Bliss (1986) procedure, and you can see why they chose to stop at 5 years. (My first stab at this discussion was to extend regressions of returns on forward rates, as in Cochrane-Piazzesi (2008). Figure 9 put a quick stop to that project.)

These small idiosyncratic price changes melt away quickly. Thus, if measurement
error, these small pricing errors induce spurious high-Sharpe-ratio short-run predictability, as emphasized by Figure 10. If arbitrage opportunities, they introduce features that arbitrage-free models cannot capture.

Empiricists employ a suite of ad-hoc procedures to deal with this measurement error problem: We estimate directly at a one-year horizon rather than estimate at the theoretically more efficient one-month horizon and raise results to the 12th power. We use moving averages or lags of yields to forecast, $r_{t+1} = a + b(y_t + y_{t-1}) + \varepsilon_{t+1}$, since moving averages smooth out the measurement error and lagged yields do not share a mismeasured endpoint with their return. We use splines or principal components to smooth the data, but risk throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

All of these are ad-hoc procedures though. Real help from real econometricians would be valuable! (Pancost 2015 estimates a yield curve model using the underlying coupon bond prices, allowing for measurement error, which is a pure, but complex, solution to these problems.)
Figure 9: JPS forward - spot (1 year) curve on selected dates. Vertical lines at 5 years, the Fama Bliss limit. The chosen dates have the 6 maximum values of \( \sum_{i=3}^{N} [(f_{s_i}^{(i)} - f_{s_i}^{(i-1)}) - (f_{s_i}^{(i-1)} - f_{s_i}^{(i-2)})^2] \).


5. **Bigger questions**

I think we are also focusing on the wrong questions. Here, the question is parsimony, measuring whether additional variables in a single asset’s return-forecasting equation are statistically significant. In

\[ r_{t+1} = a + bx_t + cy_t + \varepsilon_{t+1} \]

does \( y_t \) enter with statistical significance?

For forecasting, not structural purposes, though, this is a bit of an old-fashioned question. Since Sims (1980) introduced VARs, the fashion in forecasting has been to accept slightly overparameterized right hand variables, many of them with admitted t statistics well below the magic 2.0 values. Their coefficients will be small, and they typically don’t change forecasts that much. Sure, the in-sample \( R^2 \) will be overstated a bit. But just what harm lies in that fact?

Some of the habit, I think, goes back to efficient-markets debates from the 1970s and 1980s, when testing the null that returns are not at all predictable was interesting. But that debate is over. Returns are predictable. The issue now is characterizing that predictability.
5.1. Factor structure of expected returns

The first bigger question is the factor structure of expected returns. Figure 11 illustrates the issue. Here I plot the fitted value of the admittedly overparameterized JPS regression, for each of the 10 bonds, the right hand side of

\[ r_{xt}^{(n)} = a^{(n)} + b^{(n)}[PC1_t PC2_t PC3_t] + c^{(n)}[GRO_t INF_t] + \varepsilon_{t+1}^{(n)}. \] (1)

You can see the pattern. Despite 5 right hand variables, so potentially 5 different sources of movement, and despite an arguably overparameterized regression, there is a clear one-factor structure of expected returns. The expected returns on all maturities move in lockstep, with longer maturities moving more than shorter maturities. The regressions (1) (note plural) really want to be

\[ r_{xt}^{(n)} = \gamma^{(n)} \{ a + b[PC1_t PC2_t PC3_t] + c[GRO_t INF_t] \} + \varepsilon_{t+1}^{(n)}. \] (2)
This is a restriction *across maturities n*, across regressions being run at the same time, not a restriction on the identities of right hand side variables.

This one-factor structure of expected returns, not the presence of higher-order factors on the right hand side, or their tent-shaped coefficients, was the major message of Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005), (2008).

Most econometrics thinks about the regressions (1) one at a time, and asks about adding right hand variables. We need to ask a completely different question. We need to ask about the commonality of fitted values across 10 different left-hand variables that are being fit at the same time.

In words, rather than ask “what is the exact set of forecasting variables that we should use to forecast a given return,” we ask here “what is the linear combination of forecasting variables that captures common movement in expected returns across assets.”

Unconditional asset pricing did this in the 1970s and 1980s. Econometrics was based on one equation at a time, $y = a + xb + \varepsilon$. Finance thought about many assets at once. When finance researchers ran $R_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_i R_{em} + \varepsilon_i$, it turned out econometricians had never thought to characterize the joint distribution of regression intercepts $\alpha_i$ across regressions. So finance researchers stepped in, first Fama and MacBeth, then Gibbons Ross and Shanken, and then Hansen GMM.

Here we face conditional versions of the same issue. Here we are, thinking about forecasting one return at a time, not thinking about how expected returns of different assets move together. It’s time to move on!

We’re just beginning to understand this question. It looks so far like there is a dominant single factor for bond returns – risk premiums rise and fall together. Is that conclusion correct? Are there additional factors that move some expected returns one way and other expected returns another way? In fact, eigenvalue decomposing the right hand side of (1), the first two eigenvalues account for 97.14% and 2.59% of the variance respectively (this is the squared eigenvalue divided by the sum of squared eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of fitted values.) Cochrane and Piazzesi (2008) found more than 99% from the first factor, but did not have macro variables. Is there a second macro factor in expected returns? Or is that finding insignificant? This is a question on which I surely would like some econometric help!
Once we find the factor structure in bonds, what is the factor structure of expected returns across asset classes? Do stock expected returns and bond expected returns move one for one? Here, as in all factor analysis, parsimony really is important. How many factors do we really need?

5.2. Means and covariances

The second big question is, what are the factors, covariance with which drives variation in expected returns? What are the F in

\[ E_t(r_{t+1}^{(n)}) = \text{cov}(r_{t+1}^{(n)}, F_{t+1}) \lambda_t? \]

This is The Question of finance, really. We should answer it. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2008) concluded that there is a single factor model of expected returns, and that all expected returns results from covariance with shocks to the level factor. Is this right? How do macro variables fit in to this picture? What are the econometric issues in such an investigation? How do we do conditional Gibbons-Ross-Shanken or, better, GMM?

Estimates are easy and suggestive. I eigenvalue decompose the right hand side of (1), i.e.

\[ QAQ' = \text{eig} \left[ \text{cov} \left( \hat{\alpha}^{(n)} + \hat{\beta}^{(n)}[PC1_t PC2_t PC3_t] + \hat{c}^{(n)}[GRO_t INF_t] \right) \right]. \quad (3) \]

where the cov operator produces a 10 × 10 covariance matrix of expected returns.

Denote by \( q \) the 10 × 1 column of \( Q \) corresponding to the largest eigenvalue. I form the expected return factor as

\[ Er_t \equiv q' \left( \hat{\alpha}^{(n)} + \hat{\beta}^{(n)}[PC1_t PC2_t PC3_t] + \hat{c}^{(n)}[GRO_t INF_t] \right) \]

Then, I form the one-factor model of expected returns by running for each \( n, \)

\[ r_{x_t}^{(n)} = \gamma^{(n)} Er_t + \epsilon_{t+1}^{(n)}. \quad (4) \]

(One can also infer the \( \gamma^{(n)} \) coefficients, but it’s more intuitive to run the regression again.)
Figure 12 shows the fitted values of this one-factor model. You can see that they are nearly, but not exactly, the same as the unconstrained fitted values of Figure 11.

![Expected returns from Er factor](image)

**Figure 12:** Fitted values of excess return-forecasting regressions for 1-10 year Treasury zeros. The regressions are \( r_{x_{t+1}}^{(n)} = \gamma^{(n)}E_{t} + \epsilon_{t+1}^{(n)} \) where \( E_{t} \) is the first principal component of expected returns.

Now, however, we can ask the Big Question of Finance: What are the factors, covariance with which drive time-varying expected returns?

Since the one factor model is

\[
E_t r x_{t+1}^{(n)} = \gamma^{(n)} E_{t},
\]

and, for now looking for a model with constant covariances and a time-varying market price of risk,

\[
E_t r x_{t+1}^{(n)} = \text{cov}(r x_{t+1}^{(n)}, F_{t+1}) \lambda_t
\]

we’re looking for

\[
\gamma^{(n)} E_{t} = \text{cov}(r x_{t+1}^{(n)}, F_{t+1}) \lambda_t. \tag{5}
\]

So, it comes down to a classic cross sectional regression of \( \gamma^{(n)} \) on \( \text{cov}(r x_{t+1}^{(n)}, F_{t+1}) \).
I run a first order VAR of the 5 Joslin, Priebsch and Singleton factors to generate shocks. Then, I calculate the covariance of each of the 1-10 year maturity bond excess returns with those factor shocks. This produces an estimate of the covariance of returns with the 5 factors $\text{cov}(r_{t+1}^{(n)}, F_{t+1})$.

Figure 13 plots these covariances on the x axis against the loading $\gamma^{(n)}$ of each return on the first expected return factor on the y axis. Through the eyes of (5) these are the “expected returns” which should line up with the “betas.”

Figure 13: Covariance of excess bond returns (maturity 1-10 years) with innovations in 5 JS factors, vs. loading $\gamma^{(n)}$ on the return-forecasting factor $E_{t+1}$.

Figure 13 has the same result as Cochrane and Piazzesi (2008): *Time-varying expected bond returns are earned entirely as compensation for level risk.*

One can put the same point in a multiple cross sectional regression. Table 3 presents the coefficients in a multiple regression of $\gamma^{(n)}$ on the covariances $\text{cov}(r_{t+1}^{(n)}, F_{t+1})$ of the 10 bond returns on the 5 factors. The table verifies the impression of the figure: only covariances with the level factor matter.

I won’t even try to assign standard errors or test statistics for the purpose of this discussion. Obviously, doing so correctly, including the in-sample factor analysis, is a
Table 3: Multiple regression coefficients of factor loadings on the expected return factor $\gamma^{(n)}$ against covariances of excess returns with shocks to factors. These cross sectional regressions are over 10 bond maturities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PC1</th>
<th>PC2</th>
<th>PC3</th>
<th>GRO</th>
<th>INF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.52</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

delicate undertaking. Which is my point. This is an issue on which we need serious econometric help!

All of this is input to practical analysis, such as decompositions of the yield curve into expectations and risk premium components. Such decompositions are routinely presented with no standard errors at all, and with many decimal points, which is how you know financial economists have a sense of humor. Obviously, there is an important econometric challenge.

These are simple, but suggestive calculations. I make them here to make the point – this is easy to do. Let’s time to do it. Let’s move on to these important questions, rather than stop at the the very first step, statistical significance of extra predictors in one-asset-at-a-time return forecasting regressions.

6. **Spanning**

Both papers address the “spanning” proposition that bond yields reflect all information that macro variables could possibly have for bond expected returns. This is one of the first tricks you learn in term structure modeling: Write down a model with latent (unobserved) state variables $X$, derive prices as functions $P(X)$ of the latent state variables, and then invert this function so that prices or yields become the state variables. While a neat trick, this property implies that although variables such as GRO and INF may be important structural determinants of expected returns or yield changes, they will always be at least equaled and likely dominated as reduced-form forecasters by bond yields themselves.

But while this is a neat trick, there is no reason in general that macro variables or small yield movements past the big principal components should not help to forecast
returns or yield changes. So, both papers address simple “fact” questions, with no deep theory at stake. The spanning property is an artifact of finite number of underlying state variables, an exact factor structure, and restrictions on market prices of risk.

Intuitively, like short-lasting changes in volatility, temporary variation in risk premiums $E_t(r_{t+1})$ contributes little to the level of prices $P_t$. The variance of expected returns is much smaller than the variance of ex-post returns.

More generally, there is no reason that factors which explain most of the variance of the predictors $\text{var}(y_t)$ should capture most of their predictive ability, $\text{var} E_t(r_{t+1}|y_t)$.

Here is a simple example, following Cochrane and Piazzesi (2008, p.9 ff). I leave out the constants which needlessly complicate the formulas.

The model: A vector of state variables $X_t$ follows a vector AR(1) with normal shocks,

\[ X_{t+1} = \phi X_t + v_{t+1}; E(v_{t+1} v_t') = V. \]

The discount factor is given by

\[ M_{t+1} = \exp \left( -\delta_0 - \delta_1' X_t - \frac{1}{2} \lambda_t' V \lambda_t - \lambda_t' v_{t+1} \right) \]

where the time-varying market price of risk is

\[ \lambda_t = \lambda_0 + \lambda_1 X_t. \]

From

\[ P_t^{(n)} = E_t(M_{t+n}), \]

forward rates then follow

\[ f_t^{(n)} = ... + \delta_1' \phi^{n-1} X_t \]

where the risk-neutral $\phi^*$ transition matrix is defined by

\[ \phi^* = \phi - V \lambda_1. \]

Expected bond returns follow

\[ E_t r x_{t+1}^{(n)} = ... + B'_{n-1}(\phi - \phi^*) X_t = ... + B'_{n-1} V \lambda_1 X_t \]
where
\[ B_n = -\delta'_1 \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} \phi^{*j}. \]

Now, here is an example of non-spanning in this setup. Let there be two state variables, suggestively labeled “level” \( l_t \) and “expected return” \( E_{rt} \),
\[ X_t = \begin{bmatrix} l_t \\ E_{rt} \end{bmatrix}. \]

The rest of the model is a simple reverse-engineering,
\[ V = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}; \delta_1 = \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}; \phi^* = \begin{bmatrix} \rho & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}; \lambda_1 = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & \lambda \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}. \]

With these ingredients, forward rates follow
\[ f_t^{(n)} = \delta'_1 \phi^{*n-1} X_t = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \rho^{n-1} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} l_t \\ E_{rt} \end{bmatrix} \]
\[ f_t^{(n)} = \rho^{n-1} l_t. \] (6)

The bond price coefficients in the expected return formula are
\[ B_n = -\delta'_1 \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} \phi^{*j} = -\left[ 1 \quad 1 \right] \begin{bmatrix} 1 - \rho^n & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \frac{1}{1 - \rho} \]
so expected returns follow
\[ E_{t+1} r_{x_t^{(n)}} = B_{n-1}' V_1 X_t = -\frac{1}{1 - \rho} \left[ 1 \quad 1 \right] \begin{bmatrix} 1 - \rho^{n-1} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 0 & \lambda \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} l_t \\ E_{rt} \end{bmatrix} \]
\[ E_t x^{(n)}_{t+1} = -\frac{(1 - \rho^{n-1})}{1 - \rho} \lambda E r_t. \] (7)

This little model exhibits pure non-spanning. From (6), the forward rates load exclusively on the \( l_t \) factor, and you cannot recover the \( E r_t \) factor from forward rates. From (7), expected returns are functions exclusively of the \( E r_t \) factor. If \( E r_t \) were an observable macro variable, you would need it to forecast returns.

The structure is not totally ad-hoc. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2008) find just this sort of market price of risk – variation in expected return corresponds exclusively to the single return-forecasting factor, \( E r_t \) here, so the columns of \( \lambda_1 \) except the last are zero. And the risk premium is earned exclusively for covariance with level shocks, so the rows of \( \lambda_1 \) other than the first are zero.
7. References


