The Anatomy of a Credit Crisis: The Boom and Bust in Farm Land Prices in the United States in the 1920s

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Does credit availability exacerbate asset price inflation? Are there long-run consequences? During the farm land price boom and bust before the Great Depression, we find that credit availability directly inflated land prices. Credit also amplified the relationship between positive fundamentals and land prices, leading to greater indebtedness. When fundamentals soured, areas with higher credit availability suffered a greater fall in land prices and had more bank failures. Land prices and credit availability also remained disproportionately low for decades in these areas, suggesting that leverage might render temporary credit-induced booms and busts persistent. We draw lessons for regulatory policy. (JEL E31, G21, G28, N22, N52, Q12, Q14)

Asset price booms and busts often center around changes in credit availability (see, for example, the descriptions in Minsky 1986 and Kindleberger and Aliber 2005; theories such as Geanakoplos 2010; and the evidence in Borio and Lowe 2002, Mian and Sufi 2008, and Schularick and Taylor 2009). Some economists, however, claim that the availability of credit plays little role in asset price movements (e.g., see Glaeser, Gottlieb, and Gyourko 2010). In this paper, we examine the boom (and bust) of farm land prices in the United States in the early twentieth century, using the variation in credit availability across counties in the United States to tease out the short- and long-run effects of the availability of credit on asset prices.

The usual difficulty in drawing general lessons from episodes of booms and busts in different countries is that each crisis is sui generis, driven by differences in a broad range of hard-to-control-for factors. The advantage of focusing on farm lending in the United States in the early twentieth century is that lending was local. So in effect, we have a large number of distinctive sub-economies, specifically, counties...
within each state, with some common (and thus constant) broad influences such as monetary policy and federal fiscal policy. Ceteris paribus, the more the banks in a county, the greater is the competition for depositor funds as well as the competition to offer credit, and closer is any bank to a potential customer, hence greater is the potential supply of intermediated funds. So our proxy for credit availability, through much of the paper, will be the log number of banks in a county. We rely on differences in bank regulations across states and Federal Reserve districts to allow us to isolate exogenous differences in credit availability.

In addition, we have an exogenous boom and bust in agricultural commodity prices in the years 1917–1920, to which counties were differentially exposed. The reasons for the commodity price rise are well documented. The emergence of the United States as an economic power helped foster a worldwide boom in commodities in the early twentieth century. The boom, especially in the prices of wheat and other grains, accelerated as World War I disrupted European agriculture, even while demand in the United States was strong. The Russian Revolution in 1917 further exacerbated the uncertainty about supply, and intensified the commodity price boom. However, European agricultural production resumed faster than expected after the war’s sudden end, and desperate for hard currency, the new Russian government soon recommenced wheat and other commodity exports. As a result, agricultural commodity prices plummeted starting in 1920 and declined through much of the 1920s (Yergin 1992; Blattman, Hwang, and Williamson 2007).

Because different counties differed in the kind of crops they were most suited to produce, and each crop was affected to a different extent by the events in Europe, we have county by county variation in the perceived shock to fundamentals. Correcting for differences in the positive shock to fundamentals, we can tease out the effect of the availability of credit on land prices in 1920 (the peak of the boom). We find that both fundamentals and credit availability mattered, but there was also a positive interaction effect; the shock generally boosted land prices even more in counties that had greater credit availability. We also explore the channels through which credit might have operated—whether it allowed marginal land to be brought into operation, facilitated the more intensive use of existing land, allowed more investment in machinery, improved crop yields, or facilitated more leverage. Credit availability seems to be primarily associated with higher leverage at the peak of the boom.

The post-1920 collapse in commodity prices, induced by the resumption of European production, also allows us to examine the aftermath of the boom. Importantly, agricultural incomes fell, but only to levels before the acceleration in commodity price growth that started in 1917. This allows us to focus on the role of the financial leverage—both at the farm level and at the bank level—that built up in the boom years. If the role of credit is relatively benign—borrowers simply sell the assets they had bought and repay credit—we should see relatively little independent effect of the prior availability of credit on asset prices, other than what rises the most falls the most. But if purchased assets are illiquid and hard to sell, and leverage cannot be brought down easily, we should see prices fall even more in areas that had easy access to credit. Also, distress, as evidenced in bank failures, should be more pronounced.

1 The price of a bushel of wheat fell from $3.08 in May 1920 to $1.68 in December; corn fell from $2.00 to $0.76 over the same period (Benner 1925).
This is indeed what we find—bank failures were significantly greater in areas that had greater credit availability during the commodity price boom. Perhaps most important, we find that the credit-fueled boom and bust is associated with lower land prices, fewer banks, and a more concentrated banking system decades after the episode, suggesting that the role of leverage and financial institutional distress is substantial and long-lasting indeed.

Our evidence clearly suggests that greater credit availability tends to make the system more sensitive to all shocks, whether temporary or permanent, rational or otherwise. Prudent risk management might then suggest regulators should “lean against the wind” in areas where the perceived changes to fundamentals as well as credit availability are seen to be extreme, so as to avoid the long-drawn fallout if the shock happens to be temporary.

More broadly, in-state variation in the number of banks in a county represents variations in the financial development of local credit markets. At the same time, within a state these markets had common levels of regulation and supervision. The greater susceptibility of more developed credit markets, given a level of supervision, to booms and busts fueled by leverage suggests perhaps rethinking any residual confidence we may have (after the financial crises that started in 2007) in market self-correction. More developed credit markets need better regulation and supervision. As industrial countries recover from the leverage built up before the crises, and recognize that the effects will be borne by future generations, this implication from history may be worth taking seriously.

Finally, why history? Obviously, the long-run consequences of financial disaster can only be investigated for episodes from the distant past. Equally important, history offers regulatory peculiarities (for example, the prohibition on interstate banking) that allow us to identify the effects of credit availability. Finally, the commodity price boom and bust toward the end of World War I offers an exogenous temporary (and fully reversed) shock to fundamentals that allows us to see what the consequences of financial leverage built up in the interim might be. Clearly, the lessons from this episode are relevant today.

The rest of the paper is as follows. In Section I, we provide an overview of the theoretical literature and the main predictions, the historical episode we focus on, and the data we use. In Section II, we describe the basic tests on the importance of credit availability for land prices during the boom. In Section III, we identify the causal effect of credit availability using the variation provided by banking regulation. In Section IV we examine both the dynamics of the effects of credit availability and the commodity price run up, their interaction, as well as the other channels through which credit mattered. In Section V we focus on the collapse in commodity prices, the consequent banking sector distress, and the long-run effect on land prices and credit availability. We conclude in Section VI.

I. Theories, Historical Background, and Data

A. Theories

Land purchases are large-ticket items. Purchasers typically require credit, which makes the demand for land, and its price, dependent on credit availability (Stein 1995).
Greater credit availability could also increase fundamental value; the productivity of land, and hence its value, may increase if more people can borrow to buy land. For instance, land ownership could migrate to the more skilled rather than the merely rich, as the skilled become better able to finance purchases. Also, tenants or farm workers could buy land off landlords, eliminating the agency costs associated with tenancy or employment. The distribution of land holdings could become more efficient with more widespread credit availability if there were other sources of scale diseconomies in farming such as intensive farming technologies. Finally, greater credit availability makes it easier to resell the asset, rendering the land market more liquid, and embedding a liquidity premium in the price of land in those areas (Williamson 1988; Shleifer and Vishny 1992; also the evidence in Rajan and Ramcharan forthcoming a).

It is reasonable to expect that the positive association between any exogenous improvement in perceived fundamentals and land prices would be enhanced in areas with greater credit availability. For one, when credit is more freely available, potential buyers can borrow against more of the value of the underlying collateral (that is, loan-to-value ratios are higher). An increase in fundamental values then translates into higher land prices in areas where credit is more available.\(^2\)

There are also reasons why greater credit availability could push land prices even above fundamentals, when expectations are shocked upward. Geanakoplos (2010) suggests that buyers tend to be the optimists in the population, restrained in their enthusiasm for buying only by the funds they can access; greater credit availability allows them to pay even more for the asset.

The nature of land markets may exacerbate these effects. Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) argue that low transaction costs and a ban on short sales play a central role in allowing disagreement over fundamentals and overconfidence to lead to speculative trading: investors bid up the price of land beyond their own assessment of its fundamental value in the hope of a future sale to someone with a more optimistic valuation. Transaction costs (of borrowing and buying) are likely to have been lower in areas with greater access to credit, while nationwide, short selling in the land market was extremely difficult during this period. The trading gains from these transactions, as well as expectations of further gains, could have pushed prices above fundamentals during periods of positive sentiment.

The above theories focus on buyer sentiment. Other theories focus on lender behavior. Rajan (1994) models the competitive interaction between banks in an environment where credit is expanding. Banks care about how their actions reveal information about their ability. In good times, they are reluctant to stop “ever-greening” bad loans or generating new loans, for they might risk revealing a lack of lending opportunities, and consequently their lower ability. Therefore good times lead to excess credit. Since credit-worthy lending opportunities are widely known to be limited in bad times, all banks have an incentive to take advantage of the more forgiving informational environment to cut back on credit. Thus credit tends to follow

\(^2\) Consider, for example, a situation where sellers sell only for liquidity reasons, so they take what competitive buyers will pay. In that case, the price of land will be determined by how much buyers can borrow. The better the credit availability, the more the price will reflect the fundamental value. Hence the price of land varies more with fundamentals in areas with higher credit availability (see, for example, Kiyotaki and Moore 1997 or Adrian and Shin 2008).
cycles that amplify real shocks, both positive and negative, especially in areas where banks are more competitive.

Collateral-based lending and theories of debt deflation (see the theory in Fisher 1933; Bernanke and Gertler 1989; and Kiyotaki and Moore 1997 as well as the evidence in Adrian and Shin 2008) also result in credit cycles that tend to amplify real shocks. An initial shock to land prices leads to more borrower net worth, a greater ability to borrow, and thus an amplification of the demand for land. On the way down, lower land prices mean lower net worth, lower ability to borrow, and a significant contraction in demand for land, further amplifying the price decline as fire sales push down prices. Finally, borrower over-indebtedness could also work through an institutional channel—by causing lending banks to fail, it could lead to a hard-to-overcome loss of institutional and informational capital. It may be hard to set up new institutions with equally efficient internal procedures and tacit information. If the information and experience the new institution’s workers have of existing clients and lending is inadequate, the loss of credit intermediation could cause more persistent economic damage.

B. Historical Description

Historians argue that the boom in land prices up to 1920 had its roots in optimism that “...European producers would need a very long time to restore their pre-war agricultural capacity...” (Johnson 1973, p. 178). The national average of farmland values was 68 percent higher in 1920 compared to 1914, and 22 percent higher compared to 1919. However, the rapid agricultural recovery in Europe and elsewhere led to a collapse in commodity prices and farm incomes. Farm incomes fell 60 percent from their peak in 1919 to their depth in 1921. Farm incomes did recover steadily after that. Indeed, by 1922, farm incomes were back to the level they reached in 1916 and by 1929 were 45 percent higher still (though still short of their 1919 levels). So the “depression” in agricultural incomes was only relative to the heady levels reached in the period 1917–1920 (Johnson 1973; Alston, Grove, and Wheelock 1994).

Credit was widely available during the boom, as local banks as well as life insurance companies and joint stock land banks competed in some areas to provide credit (Alston 1983a,b). Land speculation was rampant in many areas, and land prices doubled in some places over the course of a few months at the height of the frenzy in 1918–1919 (Boyle 1928). Indeed, concerned about the speculative boom in land prices and the build-up of leverage, the Federal Farm Loan Board, which supervised the newly created federal land banks, placed stringent limits on land appraisals and lending standards in 1919, forcing appraisers to judge the “earning power” or dividend yield of the land based on its historical average rather than “upon a war-time basis of prices for products.” As the speculative frenzy intensified, the Board took the additional step of directly limiting leverage, preventing its banks from lending more than $100 per acre on agricultural land in some areas, even if the last sale price was upward of $400 per acre.3

Unfortunately, the conservatism at the federal land banks was not widespread across the banking system, and farmers took on substantial amounts of debt as they expanded acreage in the boom times. Mortgage debt per acre increased 135 percent from 1910 to 1920, approximately the same rate of increase as the per acre value of the ten leading crops (Alston, Grove, and Wheelock 1994, citing Federal Reserve documents). Borrowers often had to put down only 10 percent of the amount, obtaining 50 percent from a bank, and getting a second or junior mortgage for the remainder (Johnson 1973). Loan repayments were typically bullet payments due only at maturity, so borrowers had to make only interest payments until maturity. And as long as refinancing was easy, borrowers did not worry about principal repayment. The long history of rising land prices gave lenders confidence that they would be able to sell repossessed land easily if the borrower could not pay, so they lent and refinanced willingly. Debt mounted until the collapse in commodity prices put an end to the credit boom.

Thus we have here a perceived, largely exogenous, shock to fundamentals that reversed itself. This allows us to document the longer term effects of the build-up of debt on land prices and on bank failures, correcting for underlying fundamentals. But we can also examine the more persistent effects of the failure of institutions and the loss of organizational capital.

C. Data

How Important Were Banks in Farm Lending in 1920?—Informal sources of agricultural credit remained dominant in the United States even as late as 1920, as farmers selling highly appreciated farm land often also provided credit—for instance, a junior mortgage at favorable rates—to facilitate the sale. Credit from merchants and local landlords was also significant. Even so, commercial banks were the single largest formal source of mortgage credit, originating about 52 percent of all farm mortgage credit from institutions in the United States (and 17 percent of overall mortgage credit).

The need for credit in agriculture extended well beyond land purchases. Because incremental unfarmed land was limited, and labor was increasingly scarce as workers migrated to cities, farmers during this period relied increasingly on newly available capital-intensive technologies such as tractors and other mechanized tools in order to raise productivity (Benner 1926). Local banks were a key source of capital for these new investments, while remaining major providers of the traditional seasonal credit associated with the agricultural cycle. Table 1B shows that these personal loans, either uncollateralized, or collateralized using livestock and other personal property and termed chattel mortgages, were over thrice the size of the real estate mortgage credit originated by banks. This type of lending also grew dramatically as the farm boom.

4 In dollar terms, mortgage debt on farms operated by owners increased from $2.3 billion in 1910 to $5.4 billion in 1920. The average interest rate on this debt was around 6.1 percent, resulting in an annual debt service burden of $193 million (Boyle 1928).

5 There was also considerable debate at the time about the role of tight monetary policy in amplifying the impact of the price collapse on the banking sector. To counter the speculative frenzy of 1919, and the sharp rise in inflation during the war years, the Federal Reserve raised interest rates early in 1920 to 7 percent—the highest level in its history to that point. However, once commodity prices collapsed in 1920, the Fed kept the discount rate unchanged from its historic high, even as liquidity dried up in the country side amid a wave of bank failures (Davis 1921; Benner 1925; and Wicker 1966).
intensified, as both loans secured by real estate as well as personal and collateral loans doubled from 1914 to 1920. Banks therefore were important lenders in rural areas.

**Local Credit Markets.**—The banking system’s aggregate exposure to the agricultural sector was largely driven by local banks lending within the community (see, for example, Garlock 1932). Detailed case studies based on surveys of banks as well as farmers across disparate agricultural regions such as the grain counties of Iowa and the cotton areas of Jefferson County, Arkansas suggest that local country banks—largely located in the same county as the surveyed farmers—as well as local merchants and landlords were the primary sources of working capital on many farms. For example, commercial banks and merchants, the latter often relending credit obtained from the former, accounted for about 53 percent of the new mortgage lending in one randomly surveyed township in Arkansas (Gile and Moore 1928). Also, short-term seasonal credit, typically lasting about seven months, was almost exclusively supplied by local banks and merchants.

Representatives from life insurance companies and other centralized credit sources did criss-cross certain regions, originating real estate loans. But to reduce information costs, centralized lenders tended to operate in areas where farming methods and land were relatively homogeneous. And while commercial banks and other geographically proximate local lenders tended to concentrate on information intensive real estate loan origination and the provision of farm investment and seasonal credit, centralized lenders tended to focus on refinancing and other secondary lending activities (Horton, Larsen, and Wall 1942).

The local nature of rural credit reflects in part the fact that most real estate mortgages and other types of farm loans were of a relatively short maturity, and farmers typically expected the local banker to base loan renewal in part on the banker’s

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6 Data from Gile and Moore (1928) suggest that large plantation owners in Arkansas obtained about 80 percent of their credit from local banks, while small cash and share tenants obtained most of their capital from these landowners and merchants, who indirectly channeled bank credit at a mark-up.
knowledge of local conditions. In addition, high transport costs made it costly for farmers to build credit relationships with banks located more than a few miles away and for small rural banks to monitor borrowers carefully at a distance.

Of course, the automobile, new roads, and the telephone had even then begun to allow for longer physical distances between the banker and farmer. However, this was most pertinent for wealthier and larger farmers, who could now travel more easily to, or call, towns to access credit more cheaply (Benner 1926). Indeed, even in the modern era with much lower transport costs, there is evidence that physical distance continues to determine credit intermediation for small borrowers (Petersen and Rajan 2002).

Credit Availability.—We use a county as the relevant local market for credit. By focusing on counties, we can correct for state fixed effects, which enables us to remove the confounding effects of myriad state banking regulations.

From 1920 onward, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) provides data in electronic form on the total number of banks (a multi-branch bank counts as a single bank) and the quantity of deposits in each county within both the state and national banking systems. We supplement these data, hand-collecting information on the number of state and national banks in each county for 1900 and 1910 from the Rand McNally Bankers Directory and the Bankers Register for those respective years. We also hand-collected data from the US agricultural census of 1920 on the average interest rate charged on farm loans as well as on mortgage debt in 1910 and 1920.

Ceteris paribus, the more the banks in a county, the greater is the competition for depositor funds, as well as the competition to offer credit, and hence greater is the potential supply of intermediated funds. Also, given county area, more banks imply that on average any potential borrower or saver is closer to a bank, making it easier for the bank to monitor them, as well as for the borrower to conduct frequent (and informative) transactions. So our proxy for credit availability, through much of the paper, will be the log number of banks in a county, or the number of banks scaled by either land area or population within a county (see, for example, Evanoff 1988 for prior use of such measures in the literature).

Before we go further, it may be useful to recognize concerns about whether indeed there were local credit markets, as well as concerns about our proxy for credit availability. Davis (1965) and Eichengreen (1984) suggest that the market for credit was largely national by the late 1800s. Specifically, Eichengreen (1984, p. 1013) finds that “once the effects of risk and of statutory interest rate ceilings both have been purged from the data, no significant differential remains [in mortgage interest rates] between the eastern states and the rest of the country.” However, the unit of Eichengreen’s analysis is the state, which combines a variety of local banking markets. The averaging of interest rates across local markets within a state may make it hard to discern local effects. In contrast, our focus in this paper is on the county, after correcting for state effects. Moreover, Eichengreen uses land values to purge out the effects of risk and thus may purge out the very effects we are interested in.

In 1992, the median distance between a household and the bank in which the household maintained a checking account was just 2 miles. The distance between the household and its mortgage credit provider was 9 miles. Reflecting the significant technological changes over this period, in 2004 the median distance between a household and its mortgage credit supplier widened to 25 miles; the median checking account distance remained constant (Amel, Kennickell, and Moore 2008).
Turning next to our proxy for credit, the number of banks, we plot average mortgage interest rates in a county in 1920 against the number of banks in the county in 1920 in Figure 1. The slope is strongly negative (the correlation coefficient between the average interest rate in 1920 and the log number of banks in 1920 is $-0.31$ ($p$-value = 0.01)). In an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of average mortgage interest rates in a county in 1920 on the number of banks in the county and state fixed effects, we get a negative and statistically significant coefficient estimate on the number of banks indicating a 1 standard deviation increase in the number of banks is associated with a fall in the average mortgage interest rate in the county by 0.07 percentage points, which is 0.09 of the standard deviation in cross-county interest rates. The number of banks in a county is also significantly positively associated with the average debt per acre in 1920, as well as the increase in debt per acre between 1910 and 1920.

State-level data on national bank loans (Flood 1998) further suggest that the number of banks might be a proxy for the availability of credit. There is a positive and significant association between the log number of banks in a state and the log value of national bank loans (results available on request). A 10 percent increase in the number of national banks is associated with a 5 percent increase in the stock of outstanding national bank credit in a state. And consistent with the idea that the number of banks might increase competition and the supply of credit at the extensive margin, the state level data suggests that more banks are associated with lower loan rates, and reduced bank profitability. All this suggests that the number of banks might be a proxy for credit availability.
What we cannot tell as yet is whether the number of banks measures credit availability directly or whether it proxies for a third factor such as lower risk or greater local creditworthiness. We will offer evidence that it is not just a proxy for a third factor. Of course, we will then need to explain why credit availability, especially as measured by the number of banks, is exogenous and not simply a response to local demand. A number of authors have argued that credit availability will be driven by local political economy (see, for example, Ransom and Sutch 1972; Rajan and Zingales 2003; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004; Galor, Moav, and Vollrath 2009; Rajan and Ramcharan 2011). One strand in this literature suggests that the constituencies for and against finance are shaped by economic conditions such as the distribution of farm size (see Engerman and Sokolof 2002), which varies with climatic and soil conditions. These constituencies then drive bank regulation (see, for example, Rajan and Ramcharan forthcoming b) including capital requirements, branching regulations, and deposit insurance, which then determines bank entry and credit availability. Some of these components of credit availability could, in fact, be plausibly exogenous to local economic conditions.

We summarize our proxies for credit availability in Table 2A and report their correlations in Table 2B. Counties in western states were generally larger and less populated than other regions, but the number of banks scaled by area and population are positively correlated in the cross section. Figure 2 indicates that counties with lower interest rates were typically in the upper Midwest; credit was costliest in the South.

**Land Prices.**—The decennial census provides survey data on the average price of farm land per acre for roughly 3,000 counties in the continental United States over the period 1900–1930. The census data are self-reported. As a check on the survey data, we use hand collected data from the Department of Agriculture (DOA) on actual market transactions of farm land for an unbalanced panel of counties observed annually from 1907 to 1936.

Table 3 summarizes the land price data from the two data sources. In nominal terms, the census data suggest that the average price per acre of land increased by about 60 percent from 1910 to 1920, but declined by about 22 percent from 1920 to 1930.8 The DOA market transactions data suggest greater gyrations, with prices rising by 80 percent during the 1910s, and declining by over 43 percent during the 1920s. That said, as Table 3 indicates, the cross section in both series is similar: the correlation coefficients of prices drawn from both sources in 1910, 1920, and 1930 are 0.97, 0.96, and 0.83, respectively. We will use the more widely available census data in much of this study.

Figure 3, using the census data, shows that at the peak of the boom in 1920, the price per acre of farm land was typically highest in the Midwestern grain regions, especially in those counties around the Great Lakes. Prices were also high in parts of the cotton belt in the South along the Mississippi River flood plain. The price level generally was lower in those Southern counties further removed from the Mississippi River, and in the more arid Southwest.

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Agricultural Commodity Prices.—To track the connection between county level land prices and world agricultural commodity prices, we construct a simple index of each county’s “agricultural produce deflator” over the period 1910–1930 using the 1910 agricultural census and world commodity prices from Blattman, Hwang,
The census lists the total acreage in each county devoted to the production of specific agricultural commodities. The index is constructed by weighting the annual change in each commodity’s price over the relevant period by the share of agricultural land devoted to that commodity’s production in each county in 1910. The index consists of the seven commodities for which world prices are consistently available during this period: cotton, fruits, corn, tobacco, rice, sugar, and wheat. We should expect that if the index contains information about the “dividend yield” from land for most US counties, a rising index would generally portend a higher “dividend yield” from the underlying land, and should be associated with higher land prices. The change in the index is likely to be small, though, for those counties with little acreage devoted to the commodities covered by the index.

Figure 4 plots the annual average change in the index, as well as the average annual change in the price of land from the DOA series over the period 1910–1930. It suggests a positive association between the index and the price of US agricultural land. The index spiked up with the outbreak of WWI, and land prices rose soon thereafter after

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<th>Table 3—Land Price per Acre, 1910–1930, Summary Statistics</th>
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Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the two sources of land price data from 1910–1930. The column entitled “Correlation” reports the correlation coefficient for land prices between the census and Department of Agriculture in the 1910, 1920, and 1930 cross section.

Figure 3. Land Price per Acre across US Counties, 1920 US Census
the resumption of trans-Atlantic shipping circa 1915 allowed US exports to Europe.
The index peaked around 1920 and started falling after Russian and European grain
and oil reentered world markets. There is a concomitant collapse in the price of agricu-
lar land, with deflation setting in for the rest of the decade.

There is also evidence that the county-level variation in exposure to the com-
modity boom is positively associated with the growth in land prices. The commod-
ity boom was most pronounced from 1917 to 1920, and Figure 5 plots the change
in land prices from 1910 and 1920 against the growth in the index from 1917
1920, after adjusting for state-fixed effects. The point estimate suggests that a
1 standard deviation increase in the index is associated with a 5.7 percentage point
or 0.18 standard deviation increase in land prices. Both the aggregate time series
and county-level cross-section evidence suggest then that the increase in a county’s
land prices may be related to the county’s exposure to the commodity boom. We
will use the county-specific change in the commodity price index from 1917 to
1920 as a measure of the fundamental shock throughout the paper; its correlation
with the shock between 1910 and 1920 is 0.98 and with the shock between 1914
and 1920 is 0.98.

II. Land Prices and Credit Availability

The theoretical arguments outlined earlier suggest that in the cross section of
counties in 1920, land prices should be higher in counties with higher credit avail-
ability. We will first test this cross-sectional prediction. We turn in the next section
to variations in regulations governing banks to provide the most powerful evidence
that the availability of credit did influence land prices.

9 To exclude predominantly manufacturing counties, where the index is largely unchanged, we drop counties
with a share of value added in manufacturing greater than the ninety-fifth percentile of the cross section in plotting
the graph.
A. Land Prices and Credit Availability: The Basic Regressions

We want to see if differences in credit availability can help explain the variation across counties in the level of (log) land price per acre in a county in 1920, correcting for obvious explanatory variables. As described earlier, we use the log of the number of banks (state plus national) in the county as our measure of credit availability, but will use other proxies such as the number of banks per capita or banks per square mile whenever appropriate.

Summary statistics are in Table 4, while the regression estimates are in Table 5A. In column 1 of Table 5A, we include state fixed effects as the only controls. The coefficient estimate for log number of banks is significant at the 1 percent level. A 1 standard deviation increase in the log number of banks in a county is associated with a 0.56 standard deviation increase in the log price level per acre. To put this elasticity in context, moving from a county with the number of banks at the twenty-fifth percentile level to one at the seventy-fifth percentile in the cross section is associated with a 41 percent increase in the land price level. This is obviously a likely upper bound to the true effect.

In column 2 we include, in addition to the log number of banks and state fixed effects, a number of variables that account for the economic conditions of the county.

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Figure 5. Changes in Land Price in 1910–1920 vs. Change in Commodity Index, 1917–1920

Notes: Figure 5 shows the regression coefficient from a regression of the change in the price per acre of land over 1910–1920 on the change in the commodity index 1917–1920 for US counties. State fixed effects are the only other controls. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
These include the log of the average value of crops per acre in the county (which helps account for the current income the land produces) as well as the share of value added in the county that comes from manufacturing (to account for land that is more urban).

We also include a number of variables that account for climatic and geographic factors. Areas with higher average, but less volatile, rainfall may have more productive agriculture, leading to both higher prices and a greater demand for banking services in the cross section (Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1993). Therefore, we include both the mean as well as the standard deviation of rainfall in the county. Waterways were a major source of transportation and irrigation, so we also include the log of distance from major waterways, which, as Figure 3 suggests, could enhance the value of land. We include the log area of the county, as well as a number of demographic variables (log total population, the log Black population, the log urban population, the log illiterate population, and the log population that is 5–17 years old).

The explanatory variables are a veritable kitchen sink of variables that should help explain land prices. Some are truly exogenous (e.g., rainfall), yet others are likely to be driven by credit availability (e.g., the value of crops may be enhanced by access to fertilizers, which may depend on credit availability). So this regression is primarily an attempt to check that our proxy for credit availability matters correcting for the usual suspects, and what its independent effect might be. The magnitudes are unlikely to represent the true, all-in effect of credit availability on prices, given the various channels through which credit availability could work, and we are probably overcorrecting.

The coefficient on the number of banks falls to about 40 percent of its value estimated in column 1 when we include these various explanatory variables, but the coefficient estimate remains significant at the 1 percent level (see column 2). The other controls themselves also enter with intuitive signs. For example, a 1 standard deviation increase in agricultural income per acre is associated with a 0.49 standard deviation increase in land prices. Similarly, wetter, more fertile areas tend to have
higher land prices; likewise, prices are higher in those areas with many people, but lower in counties with more land.

We identify outliers (using Cook’s D method: results available from authors), which turn out to be largely counties with a predominant share of value added from manufacturing. Omitting outliers does not change the results qualitatively, but given that areas dominated by manufacturing may be different, in column 3 we retain only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>No controls</th>
<th>Controls</th>
<th>Manufacturing &lt; 95 percent</th>
<th>Banks per square mile</th>
<th>Banks per capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log number of banks, 1920</td>
<td>0.603*** (0.0351)</td>
<td>0.234*** (0.0387)</td>
<td>0.213*** (0.0384)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average rainfall</td>
<td>0.000674 (0.00191)</td>
<td>8.77e-05 (0.00196)</td>
<td>0.000316 (0.00197)</td>
<td>0.000910 (0.00198)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation, rainfall</td>
<td>0.0126** (0.00596)</td>
<td>0.0131** (0.00607)</td>
<td>0.0113* (0.00623)</td>
<td>0.0130** (0.00613)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area, log</td>
<td>-0.277*** (0.0434)</td>
<td>-0.269*** (0.0501)</td>
<td>-0.185*** (0.0482)</td>
<td>-0.262*** (0.0492)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi distance, log</td>
<td>0.0357 (0.0334)</td>
<td>0.0350 (0.0329)</td>
<td>0.0310 (0.0332)</td>
<td>0.0332 (0.0309)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic distance, log</td>
<td>0.0602* (0.0337)</td>
<td>0.0719* (0.0368)</td>
<td>0.0734* (0.0393)</td>
<td>0.0707* (0.0371)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Lakes distance, log</td>
<td>-0.0758* (0.0429)</td>
<td>-0.0924* (0.0485)</td>
<td>-0.0905* (0.0489)</td>
<td>-0.0936* (0.0479)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific distance, log</td>
<td>0.00638 (0.0693)</td>
<td>0.00618 (0.0722)</td>
<td>0.00125 (0.0680)</td>
<td>0.0154 (0.0738)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black population, log</td>
<td>-0.00269 (0.0124)</td>
<td>-0.00161 (0.0118)</td>
<td>-0.000387 (0.0124)</td>
<td>-0.00127 (0.0122)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population, log</td>
<td>0.00174 (0.00147)</td>
<td>0.00133 (0.00154)</td>
<td>0.00190 (0.00158)</td>
<td>0.00227 (0.00162)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate population, log</td>
<td>-0.0313 (0.0228)</td>
<td>-0.0247 (0.0228)</td>
<td>-0.0443* (0.0224)</td>
<td>-0.0276 (0.0220)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population 5–17 years, log</td>
<td>-1.009*** (0.265)</td>
<td>-1.126*** (0.273)</td>
<td>-1.053*** (0.286)</td>
<td>-1.161*** (0.280)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population, log</td>
<td>1.169*** (0.239)</td>
<td>1.281*** (0.244)</td>
<td>1.312*** (0.264)</td>
<td>1.488*** (0.263)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing share</td>
<td>-0.251*** (0.0534)</td>
<td>-0.263*** (0.0486)</td>
<td>-0.337*** (0.0616)</td>
<td>-0.267*** (0.0520)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of crops per acre</td>
<td>0.0335*** (0.00265)</td>
<td>0.0342*** (0.00268)</td>
<td>0.0340*** (0.00277)</td>
<td>0.0349*** (0.00270)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of banks, 1920, scaled by land area</td>
<td>18.63*** (4.403)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of banks, 1920, scaled by population</td>
<td>332.2*** (57.99)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>3,008</td>
<td>2,744</td>
<td>2,584</td>
<td>2,584</td>
<td>2,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.612</td>
<td>0.845</td>
<td>0.855</td>
<td>0.852</td>
<td>0.854</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variable is the log price per acre in 1920. All standard errors clustered at the state level. All columns include state fixed effects. All variables are measured at the county level. In column 2, we exclude counties with a manufacturing share larger than 95 percent; in columns 4 and 5, we scale the number of banks by area and population respectively.

*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
the observations for counties where the share of value added in manufacturing is at or below the ninety-fifth percentile of its share across counties. The magnitude of the coefficient estimate on the number of banks continues to be significant at the 1 percent level. Given that our interest is in rural counties, in what follows we will drop counties with the share of value added in manufacturing above the ninety-fifth percentile for all counties. None of the results are qualitatively dependent on dropping these counties.

In columns 4 and 5 of Table 5A, we substitute the log number of banks with the number of banks per area and number of banks per capita, respectively. These proxies essentially normalize the number of banks by different measures of the potential demand for their services. Across both specifications, the coefficient on the number of banks is positive, statistically significant, and has similar implied magnitudes. A 1 standard deviation increase in bank density, as defined in columns 4 and 5, is associated with a 0.12 and 0.15 standard deviation increase in the price per acre respectively.

### B. Land Prices and Credit Availability: Robustness

An immediate question is whether the number of banks proxies for the quantity of available credit, for the proximity of banks, or for competition between banks, all of which should influence credit availability. While we do not have the aggregate lending by banks locally, we do have the total amount deposited in banks in the county. This should be a good proxy for local liquidity and the lending capacity of local banks. When we introduce the log of the amount deposited as an explanatory variable, we find that the coefficient on the number of banks is somewhat larger (one would expect a smaller coefficient if the number of banks was primarily a proxy for the quantity of lending), and remains statistically significant at the 1 percent level (results available from authors). This suggests the number of banks proxies for something other than simply the quantity of available credit—for example, proximity or competition—but we cannot say much more here.

Another concern is that our results may be driven by a specific region. So we estimate the regression separately for the South, the East North Central, and the West North Central, which together account for 72 percent of the observations. The coefficient on the log number of banks is statistically significant and is of a similar order of magnitude in all three regions (estimates available from authors).

Yet another concern with the cross-sectional analysis is that there may be some fundamental omitted attribute of a county, such as the richness of the soil, which is correlated with both land prices as well as, through local wealth, the number of banks. This fundamental attribute may be driving land prices, and the number of banks proxies for it in the basic cross-sectional regression. One way to correct for the existence of some omitted fixed factor is to examine panel data covering counties in the years 1900, 1910, and 1920, when land prices were rising. In column 1 of Table 5B, we regress log land prices over time on our proxies for demographic and economic fundamentals, including county fixed effects as well. County fixed effects absorb any time invariant omitted factors, including the previous geographic controls.

The positive and significant coefficient estimate on the number of banks suggests that the growth in land prices over time is correlated with changes in the number of banks, after taking out the effect of changes in proxies for geographic, demographic,
and economic fundamentals, as well as any time invariant attributes of a county such as soil quality. The coefficient estimate is, however, smaller in magnitude than the estimate in the cross-sectional regression. Of course, we lose any fixed components of credit availability also in a fixed effects regression, such as the cultural propensity to trust and be trustworthy in a particular county, so this is not entirely surprising.

While the positive significant coefficient estimate on the number of banks in the fixed effects estimate is reassuring, it is not sufficient to conclude that credit availability affects land prices—it should only be seen as suggestive. Banks themselves might have entered counties that had booming land prices—the number of US banks expanded substantially in the years prior to 1920, from 22,030 in 1914 (White 1982) to 28,885 in 1920 (Alston, Grove, and Wheelock 1994). In other words, the causality could run from higher prices to credit rather than the other way round.

Perhaps we could correct for this possibility with measures of credit availability that predate the boom. In the baseline cross-sectional regression, we substitute the number of banks in 1920 with the number of banks in 1910, before the war-induced boom in land prices. As the coefficient estimates in column 2 of Table 5B indicate, the log number of banks in 1910 continues to explain land prices in 1920. We could also use banks in 1910 as an instrument for banks in 1920. In column 3 of Table 5B, we present the second-stage estimates, instrumenting the number of banks in 1920 with the number of banks in 1910. The coefficient estimate of the instrumented number of banks goes up in magnitude suggesting that the persistent component of credit availability has a large effect on land prices. All this suggests that higher land prices are “caused,” in part, by a persistent factor, for which, the number of banks might proxy.

We do not, however, know that the persistent factor that the number of banks proxies for is related to the supply of credit, rather than, for example, demand. To establish the former, we turn now to regulation. Intuitively, if known regulatory differences in the availability of credit correlate positively with differences in the estimated strength of our proxy, we provide greater support to the view that the number of banks proxies for the supply of credit.

### Table 5B—Log Land Price per Acre and Banks: Robustness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>County and year fixed effects</th>
<th>1920 cross-section OLS</th>
<th>1920 cross-section IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log banks</td>
<td>0.0925***</td>
<td>0.277***</td>
<td>0.587***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0373)</td>
<td>(0.0379)</td>
<td>(0.0775)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>8,137</td>
<td>2,478</td>
<td>2,464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.954</td>
<td>0.742</td>
<td>0.752</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variable is the log price per acre. All standard errors clustered at the state level. Column 1 is based on a panel of counties from 1900–1920, and includes county and year fixed effects, along with the demographic variables used in column 2 of Table 5A. Column 2 regresses the 1920 price per acre (log) on the log number of banks in the county in 1910, along with the controls in column 2 of Table 5A cross section. Column 3 estimates column 2 of Table 5A using log number of banks in 1910 as an instrument for the log number of banks in 1920.

***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
III. Identification through Regulation

A. State Borders and Lending

In 1920, regulatory prohibitions on interstate bank branching prevented in-state banks from opening branches across state lines in order to originate out-of-state loans. To prevent bankers from simply seeking a bank charter across state lines to gain out-of-state business, some states, such as Florida, also imposed residency requirements on the directorate of banks (The Bankers Encyclopedia 1920). Concerned about the illiquidity of real estate collateral, states also severely restricted the types of mortgage-related transactions that their banks could engage in across state lines, imposing limits for example on the types of properties that could be used as collateral, aggregate limits on out-of-state exposures, as well as more general limits on the size and duration of the mortgage portfolio (Weldon 1910; Barnett 1911).

State laws also typically required the recording of both real estate and chattel mortgages in both the county in which the property was located, as well as in the county of loan origination. For any bank seeking to originate credit across state lines, these requirements significantly increased origination costs. Moreover, seizing collateral in the case of non-repayment required these often small rural banks to be familiar with judicial practices across state lines, and to retain lawyers able to practice across state lines (The Bankers Encyclopedia 1920). These judicial practices differed dramatically across states, largely for idiosyncratic historical reasons (Ghent 2013). For instance, narratives around this period observed that the cross-state variation in foreclosure costs significantly limited the flow of mortgage credit across state borders (Bridewell 1938).

The additional difficulty for banks in lending across state lines suggests a way to check our hypothesis. Counties on either side of a county or state border tend to have similar geographic fundamentals. If the number of banks primarily reflects persistent unobserved factors associated with the fundamentals of land rather than credit availability, then the number of banks in neighboring counties should affect land prices in a county the same way, regardless of whether the neighboring counties are within the state or out of state. If, however, the number of banks reflects the availability of credit, then banks in neighboring counties within-state should affect land prices much more (because they can lend more easily across the county border) than banks in equally close neighboring counties that are outside the state. Also, the influence of within-state banks should diminish with distance, since it is unlikely that banks in more distant within-state counties would be lending to buyers in the county of interest.

While we do not know where a bank is located, we do know the distance from the centroid of the county in which it is located to the centroid of the county of interest. Assuming that all banks in a neighboring county are located at that county’s

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11 Florida, for example, required 60 percent of a bank’s board to have been state residents the previous year.
12 These legal and other impediments to the flow of credit across state lines often had strong political motives. For example, even in the midst of the wave of Depression-era banking reforms, a bill introduced by Carter Glass allowing national banks to branch in all states, and to be able to branch up to 50 miles across the state boundary line was defeated in 1932, with the opposite led by the famous populist Huey Long (Westerfield 1939).
13 For counties along a state border, the correlation coefficient between rainfall in border counties and counties located in the same state up to 100 miles away is 0.94. The correlation coefficient between rainfall in border counties and rainfall in counties up to 100 miles away across state lines is 0.92.
centroid, we can ask if they have an effect on land prices in the county of interest. Again, if the number of banks is a proxy for credit availability, the coefficient on the number of banks in nearby in-state counties should be positive and greater than the coefficient on the number of banks in nearby out-of-state counties. Moreover, the coefficients should become smaller for distant in-state counties, because the scope for lending from banks in those distant counties becomes small.

At first pass, we consider “nearby” counties to be counties with a centroid less than 40 miles away from the centroid of the county of interest. We start with the basic regression from column 2 of Table 5A and include, in addition, the log number of banks for in-state and out-of-state counties that are less than 40 miles, as well as the log number of banks that are in-state and between 40–80 miles distant. The sample consists of those counties whose nearest neighbor is no further than 80 miles, centroid to centroid.

These results are reported in column 1 of Table 6. The relationship between the number of banks within the county and the log of land prices continues to be positive and significant. And consistent with the idea that the number of banks proxies for credit availability, the coefficient estimate on the log number of banks within 40 miles of the county and in the same state is positive, statistically significant, and about four times greater than the coefficient estimate for log number of banks in counties at the same distance but across state lines. A 1 standard deviation increase in the number of in-state banks located within 40 miles of the reference county is associated with a 0.14 standard deviation increase in the log price of land in the reference county. But a similar increase in the number of out-of-state banks within 40 miles of the reference county is associated with only a 0.04 standard deviation increase in land prices.

As expected, the point estimate for in-state banks 40–80 miles is also significantly smaller than for banks 0–40 miles distant, consistent with more distant banks being unable to lend because mortgage markets are local. A similar pattern emerges when using 50-mile increments based on a sample of counties within 100 miles of a state border (column 2). We also decrease the increments (0–30, 30–60, 60–90) in column 3 with qualitatively similar results.

B. National versus State, Unit versus Branching, and Federal Reserve District Borders

Banks could be nationally chartered or chartered by a state. The precise rights of national banks to make real estate loans, including making them across state borders, is a matter of some debate (see Sylla 1969 and Keehn and Smiley 1977). These banks had only gained the right to make some types of real estate loans in 1914, and they accounted for a relatively small share of the mortgage market in 1920.
By 1921 national banks had originated $161 million in farm mortgages or about 11 percent of all commercial bank real estate loans in the United States (Wall 1937).

A second regulatory difference is between banks in states that allowed only unit banks and banks in states that allowed banks to open branches. In unit banking states, all credit intermediation occurred at a bank’s single physical location. Banks would tend to locate near centers of economic activity (at the extreme, clustering in the main towns), leaving some borrowers more distance to cover. By contrast, in branch banking states, even if banks located their head office near centers of economic activity, they could more easily establish branches near smaller areas of

### Table 6—Banks, Borders, and Distance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>All banks 40 miles</th>
<th>All banks 50 miles</th>
<th>All banks 30 miles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>log number of banks, 1920</td>
<td>0.202*** (0.0372)</td>
<td>0.187*** (0.0365)</td>
<td>0.192*** (0.0378)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-state banks, 0–40 miles</td>
<td>0.107*** (0.0210)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-state banks, 40–80 miles</td>
<td>0.0129 (0.0419)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-of-state banks, 0–40 miles</td>
<td>0.0234*** (0.00741)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-state banks, 0–50 miles</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.117*** (0.0295)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-state banks, 50–100 miles</td>
<td>0.00694 (0.0440)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-of-state banks, 0–50 miles</td>
<td>0.0240*** (0.00788)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-state banks, 0–30 miles</td>
<td>0.0576*** (0.0158)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-state banks, 30–60 miles</td>
<td>0.0833** (0.0342)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-state banks, 60–90 miles</td>
<td>−0.0145 (0.0355)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-of-state banks, 0–30 miles</td>
<td>0.0168*** (0.00714)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-of-state banks, 30–60 miles</td>
<td>0.0158* (0.00802)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Observations* | 1,962 | 2,226 | 2,122 |
*R²* | 0.866 | 0.865 | 0.867 |
*F-test: x = 0* | 18.08 | 11.58 | 6.741 |
*Prob > F* | 0.000109 | 0.00143 | 0.0128 |

**Notes:** The dependent variable is the log price per acre in 1920. All standard errors clustered at the state level. All columns include state fixed effects, and the baseline controls in column 2 of Table 5A. The F-test assesses whether the nearest within-state and out-of-state counties are statistically different at conventional levels. Column 1 includes only those counties whose nearest out of state neighbor is less than 80 miles away—centroid to centroid. Columns 2 and 3 restrict the sample to border windows of 100 and 90 miles, respectively. “In-state banks 0–x miles” refers to the average log number of banks in in-state counties whose centroid is less than x miles from the centroid of the county of interest. “Out-of-state banks 0–x miles” refers to the average log number of banks in out-of-state counties whose centroid is less than x miles from the centroid of the county of interest.

***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
potential credit demand within the county of interest in order to overcome intermediation frictions resulting from distance.\footnote{In many branching states, banks did have to raise additional capital to open new branches, but this was often far less than the amount required to acquire a new bank charter (Southworth 1928). Also, we would expect the number of unit banks to increase as the demand for credit increased, but even the new entrants would have an incentive to cluster around population centers. Banks in branching states may have had a better ability to cover potential borrowers through an expansion in branches. The average number of state banks in a branching county barely rose from 4.4 to 4.8 over the period 1910–1920, while unit banking counties saw an increase in the average number from 4.5 to 6.5. However, in 1910, there were 320 branches in those states allowing some form of branching; by 1920, the number had risen to 1,052 (Federal Reserve Committee 1931).}

Importantly, in 1920, national banks were not allowed to open branches even if state banks were allowed to do so.\footnote{More precisely, the National Bank Act did allow those state banks that converted to national banks to keep their extant branches, and an amendment in 1918 also permitted a national bank to retain the branches of any state bank it acquired by merger. Some national banks did use this device to acquire branches, but most did not (Westerfield 1939).}

Finally, nationally chartered banks had different capital requirements from state banks, and as a result were typically larger than state banks (see Wheelock 1995).\footnote{In unit banking states, the average size of deposits per national bank was $545,000, while the average in state unit banks was $275,000. In branching states, national banks were larger, perhaps to compete with the more empowered state banks, and had an average size of deposits of $800,000, while state banks had average size of $340,000. Overall, in 1920, the average assets held by a national bank was around $2.9 million, while the average state bank had assets of around $1.1 million (Federal Reserve Committee 1931).}

Taking all these regulatory differences into account, we might expect:

(i) Potential borrowers in unit banking states were likely to be some distance from local banks and would be more likely to be willing to borrow from banks in nearby in-state counties. So banks in nearby in-state counties should affect local land prices positively in a unit banking state, and more so than do banks in nearby out-of-state counties.

(ii) Potential borrowers in branch banking states would more likely be close to a local branch office and would therefore be less likely to borrow from banks in nearby in-state counties. So banks in nearby in-state counties should affect local land prices less in a branch banking state than in a unit banking state. Of course, banks in nearby out-of-state counties should continue to have muted effects on local land prices.

(iii) National banks could not branch in either kind of state. If they had a specific clientele (e.g., larger borrowers who banked with larger banks), we should expect a similar pattern to that experienced by unit banks—some cross-county border lending from in-state counties regardless of state branching regulation.

In column 1 of Table 7A, we present estimates for the model in column 1 of Table 6 but including the log number of state banks and log number of national banks separately. We present estimates for the baseline 0–40–80 distances only for reasons of space. Both the number of state banks and national banks in the county seem to be associated with higher land prices. Moreover, banks in neighboring in-state counties, whether state or national, seem to be associated with higher land prices, and banks in equidistant out-of-state counties much less so. Interestingly, the influence of banks in neighboring in-state counties seems to fall off less with distance for national banks...
than for state banks. This is consistent with national banks being larger, possibly having larger and wealthier borrowers who had lower transactions costs of transport and communication, thus allowing national banks to have influence over greater distance. Finally, national banks in out-of-state neighboring counties seem to have a limited effect on land prices. This suggests that some of the same difficulties for state banks in lending across state borders may have also extended to national banks.

We are especially interested in how these estimates vary across unit banking and branching states. So in column 2 of Table 7A, we estimate the regression in column 1 but restrict the data only to counties in unit banking states, and in column 3 of Table 7A we restrict the data to counties in branch banking states. The estimates are very different. State banks in neighboring in-state counties do have an influence on county land prices in unit banking states but not in branch banking states. This is consistent with our conjecture that state banks are better able to stay close to credit demand through branches in states that allow branch banking, and therefore we should see less borrowing across county borders.

By contrast, national banks (which could not open branches even if state banks could open them) in neighboring in-state counties have an influence on land prices regardless of the state’s branching regulation. We would expect this result if national banks catered to a somewhat different clientele than state banks. Consistent with the pattern of state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>National and state banks</th>
<th>National and state banks</th>
<th>National and state banks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log of number of national banks</td>
<td>0.0965***</td>
<td>0.0847***</td>
<td>0.0854*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in county</td>
<td>(0.0209)</td>
<td>(0.0190)</td>
<td>(0.0415)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log of number of state banks</td>
<td>0.145***</td>
<td>0.130***</td>
<td>0.136***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in county</td>
<td>(0.0245)</td>
<td>(0.0234)</td>
<td>(0.0348)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-state state banks, 0–40 miles</td>
<td>0.0447**</td>
<td>0.0565***</td>
<td>0.00982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0196)</td>
<td>(0.0198)</td>
<td>(0.0286)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-state state banks, 40–80 miles</td>
<td>−0.0520</td>
<td>−0.0249</td>
<td>−0.0870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0509)</td>
<td>(0.0492)</td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-of-state state banks, 0–40 miles</td>
<td>0.0127</td>
<td>0.0124</td>
<td>0.00532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0157)</td>
<td>(0.0168)</td>
<td>(0.0277)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-state national banks, 0–40 miles</td>
<td>0.0871***</td>
<td>0.0589**</td>
<td>0.107**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0226)</td>
<td>(0.0253)</td>
<td>(0.0377)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-state national banks, 40–80 miles</td>
<td>0.0807*</td>
<td>0.112**</td>
<td>−0.0299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0454)</td>
<td>(0.0476)</td>
<td>(0.0937)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-of-state national banks, 0–40 miles</td>
<td>0.0232</td>
<td>0.0303</td>
<td>−0.00999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0189)</td>
<td>(0.0247)</td>
<td>(0.00929)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,963</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.871</td>
<td>0.894</td>
<td>0.782</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variable is the log price per acre in 1920. All standard errors clustered at the state level. All columns include state fixed effects, and the baseline controls in column 2 of Table 5A. All columns include those counties whose nearest out-of-state neighbor is less than 80 miles away—centroid to centroid. “In-state banks 0–x miles” refers to the average log number of banks in in-state counties whose centroid is less than x miles from the centroid of the county of interest. “Out-of-state banks 0–x miles” refers to the average log number of banks in out-of-state counties whose centroid is less than x miles from the centroid of the county of interest. “National banks” denotes banks with a national charter, while “state banks” denote banks with a state charter.

***Significant at the 1 percent level.

**Significant at the 5 percent level.

*Significant at the 10 percent level.
banks in unit banking states, the prohibition on national bank branching placed some potential clientele at great distance from the bank. They probably found it easier to borrow from national banks in neighboring in-state counties. Thus the pattern of estimates for national banks resembles the pattern for state banks in unit bank states.\(^{20}\)

There is yet another useful way of cutting the data based on regulations. Federal Reserve district borders sometimes divided states (Figure 6). National banks could not lend across Federal Reserve district borders.\(^{21}\) Therefore, if indeed the positive association between banks and land prices is driven by credit, then for two counties in the same state separated by a Federal Reserve district border, the number of national banks across the district border should not influence land prices in counties on the other side of the border. Because the restriction on cross-district lending within the same state did not apply to state banks, we would still expect a positive association for nearby in-state state banks located in the same Federal Reserve district. Moreover, by using this within state segmentation induced by these

\(^{20}\)We have argued thus far that to the extent that bank density proxies for credit availability, counties with more banks would be expected to have higher average land prices. Also, for neighbors that are sufficiently close, geographic fundamentals like soil fertility and the types of crops grown are likely to be similar, as are other unobservable fundamentals. So land price differences across county borders should be related to the difference in bank density across the border. Furthermore, since banks are less likely to be able to lend across state borders to equalize credit conditions, we should find a given difference in number of banks has a greater effect on land prices across state borders than across in-state county borders, especially for unit banking counties. We find results consistent with this intuition (available upon request).

\(^{21}\)More precisely: “The Federal Reserve Act permitted national banks for the first time to make loans on real estate. This power was restricted to banks not in central reserve cities. Authority was given to make loans on improved farm land situated within the Reserve district, the amount lent not to exceed 50 percent of the actual value, and the aggregate of such loans not to exceed 25 percent of capital and surplus, or one third of deposits. Loans were not to run longer than five years. In 1916, national banks were given permission to make loans on real estate (non-farm land) situated within 100 miles of the bank’s domicile, the maturity of such loans not exceed one year.” (Bremer 1935, p. 97).
restrictions, we can further dispel concerns about biased estimates driven by any cross-state variation in latent regulatory and economic factors.

For the full sample of counties, we modify the basic distance-state border regression to allow for segmentation by Federal Reserve district borders in column 1 of Table 7B. For every county, we include the log number of in-district state or national banks located in in-state counties up to 40 miles away, as well as 40–80 miles away,
measured from the centroid of the county of interest. Using the same distance increments, we also include the corresponding number of state banks or national located in out-of-district but in-state counties. We also include the same distance-border bank variables as in Table 7A.

The evidence suggests that district borders were barriers to national bank credit flows. While the number of national banks in in-district counties up to 40 miles are significantly associated with the price per acre in the county of interest, the point estimate on equidistant national banks in counties separated by a district border, but in the same state, is insignificant and negative. In contrast, the impact of the number of in-state state banks on land prices appears unaffected by whether these banks are located in a different Federal Reserve district than the county of interest or not.

Column 2 of Table 7A examines further the segmentation induced by Federal Reserve district lines. Both national and state banks faced impediments when operating across state lines, but state borders that coincided with a Federal Reserve district border were an explicit barrier for national bank real estate lending, as these banks were prohibited from lending across district lines. Therefore, while nearby out-of-state national banks might still influence prices across state lines, especially given the relative size of national banks, if this association is driven by credit, then the effect should not be present when the state border also coincides with a Federal Reserve district border. This is indeed what we find in column 2. That the number of neighboring banks matters only when that bank type is allowed to lend across the relevant border is the most compelling evidence thus far that the number of banks reflects credit availability, and that credit availability affects land prices.

C. Deposit Insurance

Several states experimented with deposit insurance before the commodity boom. Well-known arguments suggest that poorly designed deposit insurance schemes can induce moral hazard, prompting banks to finance riskier investments and extend credit more widely, especially in those areas where banks face plentiful local competition (see, for example, Benston et al. 1986). Some have argued that states with deposit insurance had higher bank failure rates in the 1920s (Calomiris 1990, Wheelock and Wilson 1995). Therefore, we might expect that if the correlation between the number of banks and land prices reflects credit availability, then the relationship between the number of banks and land price should be significantly larger when banks operate under deposit insurance (because each bank is a greater source of indiscriminate credit, and competition between banks expands credit even more strongly).

In 1920, eight states had in place some kind of deposit insurance scheme. These states had more banks on average, as these schemes generally encouraged the entry of smaller banks. But as Table 8 indicates, holding constant the number of banks, the relationship between banks and land price was significantly larger in those counties located in deposit insurance states. Column 1 includes the number

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23 See White (1981). The mean log number of banks in deposit insurance counties is about 20 percent higher than in counties without deposit insurance (p-value = 0.00).
of state banks (which benefited directly from insurance) and the number of state banks interacted with an indicator if the state had deposit insurance. The estimated coefficient on state banks is about 50 percent larger for counties in states covered by deposit insurance than otherwise.

Although national banks operated outside the remit of state deposit insurance schemes, they competed directly with state banks for business, and the presence of these regulations may have also affected the lending behavior of national banks. In column 2 of Table 8, the estimated relationship between the number of national banks and prices is almost twice as large in deposit insurance counties, but remains lower in magnitude than state banks. Deposit insurance, through competition, must have affected the incentives of both types of banks, and column 3 includes both types of banks. This evidence suggests deposit insurance regulations amplified the relationship between banks and land prices.

Of the eight states with deposit insurance, three adopted these regulations during the boom. This timing raises the possibility that, at least among these late adopters, the passage of deposit insurance regulations may have been in response to the effects of the agricultural boom on the banking system. Of course, relative to the other states which had deposit insurance schemes in place for over a decade before 1920, a sample that includes these late adopters may understate the impact of deposit insurance in amplifying the relationship between banks and land prices.

Column 4 of Table 8 addresses these concerns by classifying as deposit insurance states only those five states that had introduced insurance before 1910. In column 4, the deposit insurance interaction term is now significant at the 1 percent level. It is also 56 percent larger than the previous estimates in column 3, suggesting that the impact of deposit insurance on credit availability, and thence on land prices, may have been more pronounced the longer the insurance was in place.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>log number of state banks</td>
<td>0.131***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0255)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log state banks × deposit insurance</td>
<td>0.0771**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0364)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log number of national banks</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0644***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0227)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log national banks × deposit insurance</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0625*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0323)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log number of banks</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.218***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0411)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log banks × deposit insurance</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0865**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0406)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2,743</td>
<td>2,743</td>
<td>2,743</td>
<td>2,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.843</td>
<td>0.839</td>
<td>0.846</td>
<td>0.846</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variable is the log price per acre in 1920. All standard errors clustered at the state level. All columns include state fixed effects, and the baseline controls in column 2 of Table 5A. The “Deposit Insurance” indicator variable in columns 1–3 equal 1 for counties in the 8 states that had deposit insurance in 1920. In column 4, the indicator variable equals 1 only for counties in the 5 states with deposit insurance before 1914.

***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
D. Summary

Variations in regulation have allowed us to identify the supply side effect more plausibly—land prices were higher in areas with more banks. In the process of working through the identification, we obtain some implications about the extent to which banks in branch banking and unit banking covered their clientele. For instance, borrowers may have been more distant on average from their banks in unit banking states, leading to greater costs of exchanging information and of building a strong relationship, which may have also led to poorer loan quality, and eventually weaker loan performance. How much this, and how much the lack of diversification, led to greater bank failures in unit banking states (see Wheelock 1995 for example) is left for future research.

Estimating the magnitude of the supply side effect is more difficult than verifying its existence. We can, however, surmise it might have been large. For instance, the estimates in column 4 of Table 8 suggest that for two otherwise similar counties having the mean number of banks in the sample, land prices would have been about 1.6 times higher in the county located in a deposit insurance state than in the county across the border in a non-deposit insurance state. To the extent that the primary effect of deposit insurance is to augment the flow of credit from banks, this effect is large.

IV. Dynamics and Channels

Taken together, the results in the previous section suggest the number of banks is a good proxy for credit availability, and does affect land prices. In what follows, we want to delve into the details of the price build-up between 1910 and 1920 to understand how credit availability and the fundamental shock interacted, and what the consequences were.

A. Land Price, Commodity Shock, and Credit Availability in 1920

In column 1 of Table 9, the dependent variable is the change in the price per acre computed over the decade 1910–1920. As explanatory variables, we include the log number of banks in 1920 linearly and as a squared term to capture the possible non-linear association of credit availability with the change in land price; we also include the change in the commodity index to capture the change in the “dividend” yield. To capture any interactions between credit availability and the change in fundamentals, we include the log number of banks in 1920 interacted with the change in the index; to capture any change in availability, we include the change in the number of banks from 1910–1920; we also include the standard demographic and economic controls; finally, to capture any permanent unobservable components that may affect land price, we include the log price per acre in 1910. To the extent that there are any permanent components of credit availability (such as a propensity to trust and be trustworthy in the area), these will get subsumed.

The estimates in column 1 of Table 9 suggest credit availability as proxied for by the number of banks has a direct effect on the growth in land prices, which is attenuated somewhat as credit availability increases (the squared log banks term is negative). The estimates in column 1 imply that evaluated at the mean level of the commodity index, the marginal impact of credit availability on the growth in
farm land prices is positive up to the ninety-fifth percentile in the distribution of log banks. The change in the number of banks is also positively significantly associated with the change in prices. But this effect is small, as a 1 standard deviation increase in the change in the number of banks over 1910–1920 is associated with a 0.06 standard deviation increase in the change in prices over the same period.

The interaction effect between the commodity index shock and credit availability is positive, suggesting that land prices are more sensitive to the commodity index shock when more credit is available. For a county at the twenty-fifth percentile of banks, a 1 standard deviation increase in the commodity index is associated with a 0.12 standard deviation increase in the growth in land prices; but for a county at the seventy-fifth percentile of banks, an identical commodity shock suggests a 0.27 standard deviation increase in the growth in land prices. Interestingly, the direct effect of the commodity index shock is not significant (unlike what is suggested in Figure 5), even while the interaction effect remains strong—so the commodity shock’s effect on land prices is mediated through credit availability.

### B. Channels of Transmission

Next, let us examine some of the channels through which credit availability and the commodity shock might affect real and financial activity. Consider first the acreage devoted to agriculture. One of the effects of the commodity boom might have been to bring new land into cultivation. To be sure, by 1910, the median county already had 77 percent of county area cultivated, so the room for bringing...
marginal land into cultivation may have been small. Indeed, the mean and median change in the share of county land devoted to agriculture over the period 1910–1920 is essentially zero.

In column 2 of Table 9 we replicate the regression in column 1 of Table 9, replacing the dependent variable with the change in acres under cultivation over the period 1910–1920, (and including the log total acres under cultivation in 1910). The log level of banks in 1920, as well as the change in the number of banks over the period, are both positively associated with the increase in new land under cultivation. A 1 standard deviation increase in the log number of banks is associated with a 0.16 standard deviation increase in the growth of acres under cultivation. A similar increase in the change in number of banks is associated with a 0.11 standard deviation increase in the growth of acres under cultivation. The direct effect of the commodity shock on the growth of land under cultivation is also significantly positive. The interaction effect with credit availability is negative, however, suggesting that the room for expanding at the extensive margin in response to the commodity shock may have been smaller in counties with plentiful extant credit availability.

Within land that was already devoted to agricultural purposes, more land that was fallow, devoted to pasture, or otherwise unutilized, could have been brought into cultivation during the boom—the intensive margin could have increased. On average, there is indeed a 1 percentage point increase in the land under cultivation that is “improved” between 1910 and 1920—larger than the increase in extensive margin but not hugely so. In column 3 of Table 9, the dependent variable is the growth in improved acres from 1910–1920. The marginal impact of credit availability on changes in improved acres is positive up to the seventy-fifth percentile of banks. And evaluated at the median level of banks, a 1 standard deviation increase in the number of banks is associated with a 0.02 standard deviation increase in the growth of improved acres. Areas with a more positive commodity shock also had a greater expansion at the intensive margin.

We turn next to the use of farm implements and machinery. Perhaps farmers also used credit to buy more capital equipment. The total value of farm implements and machinery averaged across counties increased from around $850,000 in 1910 to $2.3 million in 1920—in current dollars. The dependent variable in column 4 of Table 9 is the change in the dollar value of farm implements and machinery over 1920–1910, where again we control for the log level in 1910.

Interestingly, the factors determining spending on machinery mirror the factors that we earlier found to determine land prices. The marginal impact of credit availability on spending on machinery is positive up through the ninety-fifth percentile of the distribution of the number of banks. The magnitudes are also economically large. Evaluated at the median number of banks, a 1 standard deviation increase in credit availability is associated with a 17.6 percentage point or 0.54 standard deviation increase in investment growth. Also, both the change in the number of banks over the decade as well as the local exposure to the commodity shock are positively associated with investment growth. A 1 standard deviation increase in the former is associated with a 0.09 standard deviation increase in investment growth, while a similar increase in the commodity index is associated with 0.24 standard deviation increase in the dependent variable.

Consistent with contemporary narratives, this evidence implies that farmers turned to the banking system in order to bring more new land under cultivation, use
existing land more intensively, and purchase capital equipment in order to expand output during the boom, perhaps raising the self-assessed price of land.\footnote{There is for example evidence—available upon request—that prices increased most sharply in those areas that also had the biggest growth in investment. And instrumenting the growth in investment with the number of banks yields estimates that are about twice as large as the baseline OLS estimates.}

Although there is evidence that the size distribution of farms became more concentrated in those areas that had more banks, as credit availability may have led to more buyouts, the net effect on yields is uncertain. The new land and the use of marginal land such as land that would otherwise be left fallow would tend to depress yields per acre, but increased mechanization and investment in the land would tend to elevate yields. We hand collected data from 1920 agricultural census on the yield per acre for eight different commodities grown predominantly in either the agricultural belt of the Midwest or the South: cereals, corn, oats, wheat, barley, rye, tobacco, and cotton. However, using a similar specification to that in Table 9, we found little consistent association across crops of credit availability with productivity (see online Appendix).

C. Debt Build-Up and Bank Failures

So what else changed significantly over the boom as prices, purchases, and investment increased? Debt did! The dependent variable in column 5 of Table 9 is the change in debt per acre between 1910 and 1920. Both credit availability and the commodity shock are strongly and independently positively associated with the increase in debt per acre. A 1 standard deviation increase in the log number of banks is associated with a 17.8 percentage point or 0.24 standard deviation increase in the change in debt per acre. A similar increase in the change in the commodity index suggests a 0.22 standard deviation increase in the change in debt per acre over the decade.

An increase in debt with no substantial increase in productivity would have left farmers exposed to difficulties when incomes retreated to pre-boom levels in the 1920s. And their inability to service their debt burden and other fixed costs once prices fell would then be expected to lead to local financial sector distress: about 5,000 banks failed between 1920 and 1929 or about 16 percent of the total number of existing banks in 1920.\footnote{The cost of farm labor did decline in the immediate aftermath of the commodity collapse—from $65.05 per month in 1920 to $45.58 in 1921, but then steadily increased as labor migrated to the cities. Transport costs however rose steadily during this period: a farmer shipping hay paid 10.4 pounds out of every 100 pounds for freight in 1919. This cost doubled in 1921. And of course, the interest cost of the debt remained constant in nominal terms over much of the collapse in land prices (Boyle 1928).} Did the lending during the boom lead to subsequent banking sector distress?

To investigate this hypothesis, we compute the average annual bank failure rate (number of bank failures in the county during the year divided by number of banks in the county at the beginning of the year) in the county between 1920 and 1929, as well as the average annual share of deposits of failed banks (which effectively weights failures by the share of their deposits). We examine in Table 10 how debt at the peak of the boom in 1920 affected the subsequent bank failure rate using these two different measures.

We include the explanatory variables we included in column 1 of Table 9, with debt per acre in 1920 replacing log number of banks in 1920 wherever the latter appears; we also include the change in debt per acre between 1920 and 1910. The
estimates suggest debt per acre in 1920 is significantly positively correlated with subsequent bank failures.

However, we are more interested in the effects of debt as induced by credit availability, and column 2 instruments debt per acre (in the various forms it appears) with log number of banks (in the various forms it appears). Interestingly, the coefficient estimate of debt per acre is an order of magnitude larger, suggesting that it is the accretion of debt driven by credit availability that seems to be particularly damaging for subsequent bank health. A 1 standard deviation increase in the change in debt over the 1910s is associated with a 0.70 standard deviation increase in the suspension rate over the 1920s. And when evaluated at the median level of debt per acre in 1920, a 1 standard deviation increase in the level of debt is associated with a 0.17 standard deviation increase in the suspension rate.

In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the average annual share of deposits of failed banks, and the pattern of results and economic magnitudes are similar. Financial sector distress is higher in counties that had higher debt levels fueled by credit availability. Interestingly, the change in the commodity index does not generally have a positive effect on subsequent bank failures, suggesting that the impact of exposure to the commodity boom on subsequent banking sector distress may have operated primarily through its effect on the debt build-up (see column 5 of Table 9).

One concern is that more banks may mean smaller, and hence more fragile banks, and not more credit. The only measure of aggregate bank size we have is aggregate county deposits per bank. When we regress this against the log number of banks, correcting for state fixed effects, we find a positive and significant coefficient on the log number of banks, suggesting that more banks does not automatically imply smaller banks (regression estimates reported in online Appendix).

### Table 10—Debt and Banking Sector Distress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OLS (1)</td>
<td>OLS (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV (2)</td>
<td>IV (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodity index, 1917</td>
<td>0.000131 (0.000914)</td>
<td>−0.00380 (0.00340)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>−0.000022 (0.000819)</td>
<td>−0.00259 (0.00308)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in mortgage debt per acre, 1920–1910</td>
<td>0.00221 (0.00215)</td>
<td>−0.00303** (0.0131)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.00204 (0.00206)</td>
<td>0.0194 (0.0125)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt per acre</td>
<td>0.000487** (0.000203)</td>
<td>0.000534** (0.000208)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.00454*** (0.00111)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt per acre, squared</td>
<td>−4.40e-06** (1.70e-06)</td>
<td>−4.56e-06*** (1.67e-06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>−5.10e-05*** (1.57e-05)</td>
<td>−3.58e-05*** (1.19e-05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt per acre × commodity index</td>
<td>−1.68e-06 (1.16e-05)</td>
<td>−1.36e-06 (1.15e-05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000103)</td>
<td>(8.94e-05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2,353</td>
<td>2,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R</strong>2</td>
<td>0.392</td>
<td>0.334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>−0.100</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All standard errors clustered at the state level. All columns include state fixed effects, and the baseline controls in column 2 of Table 5A. The instruments in columns 3 and 5 are the log number of banks in 1920, its squared term, interacted with the commodity index, and the change in the number of banks, 1910–1920.

***Significant at the 1 percent level.

**Significant at the 5 percent level.

*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Finally, are we merely picking up a “unit bank” effect? After all, we know that failures in unit bank states were more numerous. When we estimate columns 3 and 4 in Table 10 again, but allowing the slopes for branch banking states to differ, we find the coefficient estimates of the differences are small and statistically insignificant. So counties in branch banking states also suffered from debt build-up, especially counties with more banks in 1920.

To summarize then, the debt build-up appears to have been driven by credit availability, and is associated with subsequent bank failures, even though incomes quickly returned to pre-boom levels (bank failures increased over the 1920s, with only 816 failures in 1921–1923 when incomes were more depressed, and 2,486 failures in 1927–1929, when incomes had recovered significantly). It also seems that not all debt was equally problematic. An increase in debt per acre seemed particularly problematic for bank health in areas where banks were plentiful. This may be because more of the debt in areas where banks were plentiful was bank debt, and because more was lent relative to the inflated fundamentals at the peak, possibly because of greater interbank competition.

V. The Long-Run Consequences

Commodity prices collapsed starting in 1920, as European production revived. The correlation between the commodity price index rise for a county between 1917–1920 and the subsequent fall in the commodity price index for that county between 1920 and 1929 is $-0.96$. So counties that experienced a greater run up also experienced a greater fall. But as we described earlier, by 1922 farm incomes had recovered to the levels they had before the 1917–1920 boom. So abstracting from the effects of debt build-up, farm distress should have been temporary, and the effects should not have been seen beyond 1922. We first document long-run adverse effects on land prices associated with credit availability in 1920, and then offer suggestive evidence on the sources of these long-run effects.

A. Long-Run Effects on Land Prices

Bank debt is not easily paid down, especially when loans are made against illiquid assets like farm land. In Table 11, we focus on whether credit availability had long-run effects on the price of farm land over time. The Census Bureau changed its estimate of land values to also include the value of buildings in 1940. To have the longest series possible, we calculate the value of this variable for each decade from 1920 to 1960—after 1960 the census ceased reporting land values. We then replace the dependent variable in the model estimated in column 1 of Table 9 with the change in the (augmented) land price, holding the explanatory variables the same, and controlling for the log level of prices in the base year.

As we see in column 1 of Table 11, evaluated at the mean level of the commodity index, the marginal impact of credit availability in 1920 on the change in land

\footnote{The escalating rate of bank of failures throughout the decade may have also been compounded by the rapid liquidation of failed bank assets—primarily land—by state and national regulators, leading to local fire sales that depressed local land prices further and engendered greater banking sector fragility (Upham and Lamke 1934).}
prices between 1920 and 1930 is now negative up to the ninety-fifth percentile in the distribution of log number of banks. Counties with greater credit availability in 1920 suffered a greater price decline in the subsequent decade, as did counties that experienced a greater commodity shock.

As we move to 1930–1940, we see that areas that had higher credit availability before 1920 experienced a faster decline in land prices during the 1930s also. A 1 standard deviation increase in the number of banks in 1920 is associated with a 0.26 standard deviation decline in land price growth during the period 1930–1940. The coefficient estimates for the commodity price shock is still large and negative but no longer statistically significant.

A similar pattern emerges in the 1940s. However, credit availability in 1920 is no longer associated with the growth in land prices between 1950 and 1960 (the point estimate is small and positive). But, when we look at price levels in 1960 (column 5) rather than changes in prices, the effects of credit availability at the peak of the boom in 1920 continue to be very strong. In 1960, land price in a county that was at the seventy-fifth percentile of credit availability in 1920 is about 30 percent lower than the land price in a county that was at the twenty-fifth percentile of credit availability in 1920.

### Table 11—Land Prices and Past Credit Availability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Change in prices:</th>
<th>Change in prices:</th>
<th>Change in prices:</th>
<th>Change in prices:</th>
<th>Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>log banks 1920</td>
<td>−0.235***</td>
<td>−0.145***</td>
<td>−0.532***</td>
<td>0.122*</td>
<td>−0.464***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0511)</td>
<td>(0.0499)</td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
<td>(0.0682)</td>
<td>(0.0639)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log banks 1920, squared</td>
<td>0.0287**</td>
<td>0.0187</td>
<td>0.105***</td>
<td>−0.00223</td>
<td>0.0823***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0136)</td>
<td>(0.0112)</td>
<td>(0.0299)</td>
<td>(0.0169)</td>
<td>(0.0173)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log banks 1920 × commodity index 1917</td>
<td>0.00958**</td>
<td>0.00428</td>
<td>0.0123</td>
<td>0.000698</td>
<td>0.00921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00443)</td>
<td>(0.00794)</td>
<td>(0.0134)</td>
<td>(0.00987)</td>
<td>(0.00863)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in banks, 1920–1910</td>
<td>−0.00631</td>
<td>0.00861</td>
<td>−0.0101</td>
<td>0.0262</td>
<td>0.0387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0207)</td>
<td>(0.0199)</td>
<td>(0.0344)</td>
<td>(0.0265)</td>
<td>(0.0310)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodity index, 1917</td>
<td>−0.0775***</td>
<td>−0.0315</td>
<td>−0.0142</td>
<td>0.0396</td>
<td>−0.0565***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0137)</td>
<td>(0.0239)</td>
<td>(0.0371)</td>
<td>(0.0293)</td>
<td>(0.0269)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price per acre, 1920, log</td>
<td>−0.0827**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0394)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price per acre, 1930, log</td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.169***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0295)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price per acre, 1940, log</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.317***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0679)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price per acre, 1950, log</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.468***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0314)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2,573</td>
<td>2,572</td>
<td>2,572</td>
<td>2,572</td>
<td>2,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.646</td>
<td>0.648</td>
<td>0.724</td>
<td>0.810</td>
<td>0.819</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All standard errors clustered at the state level. All columns include state fixed effects, and the baseline controls in column 2 of Table 5A.

***Significant at the 1 percent level.

**Significant at the 5 percent level.

*Significant at the 10 percent level.
B. Organizational Collapse

We have already seen that in addition to pushing up local prices and facilitating productive investment, credit availability led to a sizable debt build-up. And with the collapse of commodity prices and the means to service that debt, the boom-time build-up of leverage is also associated with financial sector distress. Where do the long-term price declines stem from, however?

One possibility is that areas that turned out to have too much debt suffered distress and persistent debt-deflation as debt was not written down. Long-term debt deflation may also have caused behavioral scars among borrowers and lenders that led to long-term local cultural aversion to debt (Malmendier, Tate, and Yan 2012). A not mutually exclusive possibility is that in areas with many banks, over-indebtedness caused financial distress, which in turn led to bank closures and a loss of organizational capital in the financial sector (see Bernanke 1983). Surviving incumbents may also have been better able to cartelize and keep out entry. Regardless of the reason, the loss in organizational capital may have kept land prices depressed over the long term.

In column 1 of Table 12, we consider the lost organizational capital hypothesis: the bank failures of the 1920s may have altered the local bank market structure, leaving a persistently smaller number of banks to support economic activity in the wake of the collapse. The dependent variable in column 1 is the log number of banks in 1920—the earliest date after 1937 for which we could find this information. Although the banking industry was already in flux by this time due to regulatory and technological changes (see Kroszner and Strahan 1999), the number of banks had not fully recovered from the distress of the 1920s even by the early 1970s: a 1 standard deviation increase in the failure rate in 1920–1929 is associated with a 4 percent or 0.07 standard deviation decline in the number of banks in 1972.

In 1972, when most banking was still local, the Herfindahl index based on deposits is likely a reasonable proxy for the concentration of credit availability inside a county. To understand better the long-run impact of these failures, we collected

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>log number of banks, 1972</th>
<th>Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 1972</th>
<th>price level, 1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3) (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank suspension rate, 1920–1929</td>
<td>−1.283***</td>
<td>0.328*</td>
<td>−1.485*** −8.126**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.414)</td>
<td>(0.187)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodity index, 1917</td>
<td>0.00345</td>
<td>−0.004</td>
<td>−0.0146 −0.0151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.00799)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2,470</td>
<td>2,464</td>
<td>2,458 2,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.732</td>
<td>0.552</td>
<td>0.805 0.750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All standard errors clustered at the state level. All columns include state fixed effects, and the baseline controls in column 2 of Table 5A. Columns 1 and 2 include the log number of banks in 1920, while columns 3 and 4 include the log price per acre in 1920. The instrument in column 4 is the log number of banks in 1920.

***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
additional data from the Survey of Consumer Deposits on the distribution of bank deposits across banks inside a county in 1972—the first year in which these data are available. We construct the Herfindahl index of banking competition in a county (computed by first squaring the market share of each bank, based on deposits in the county, and then taking the sum of these squares for each county). Lower values generally imply less concentration in the county’s banking market, while a value close to one would suggest a local banking monopoly.

From column 2 of Table 12, there is a significant positive association between the bank suspension rate in the 1920s and the Herfindahl index in 1972. A 1 standard deviation increase in the failure rate is associated with a 0.05 standard deviation increase in the 1972 Herfindahl index. This suggests that the crisis might have left less credit available in its wake.

Column 3 shows that these failures are also negatively associated with the land price level in 1960: a 1 standard deviation increase in the failure rate is associated with a 4.6 percent decline in the land price level in 1960. The instrumental variables estimate in column 4, where bank failures in 1920–1929 are instrumented with log number of banks in 1920, is an order of magnitude larger than its OLS counterpart, suggesting that as before, the collapse of the banking sector stemming from credit availability during the boom may have had especially pernicious long-run effects.

C. Discussion

The evidence when taken together suggests that the areas that had the highest credit availability in 1920 also endured persistent and disproportionate land price declines. They also had disproportionately lower credit availability in 1972, decades after the bust. The temporary boom and bust, when modulated by credit availability and debt build-up, had adverse long-run effects. Long-run effects play out across generations and are therefore hard for agents to internalize when lending decisions are made. This then may suggest a role for policy intervention.

VI. Conclusion

How important is the role of credit availability in inflating asset prices? Our evidence suggests it matters. Of course, the influence of credit availability on the asset price boom need not have implied it would exacerbate the bust. Continued easy availability of credit in an area could in fact have cushioned the bust. However, our evidence suggests that the rise in asset prices and the build-up in associated leverage were so substantial that bank failures (resulting from farm loan losses) were significantly more in areas with greater ex ante credit availability. Moreover, the areas that had greater credit availability during the commodity price boom had depressed land prices and lower credit availability many decades after the bust, probably because farm loan losses resulted in the failure of banks that lent to farmers, and altered banking market structure in subsequent decades.

The implication of our work is clear. Greater credit availability tends to make the economy sensitive to all fundamental shocks, whether temporary or permanent. Because the associated leverage build-up tends to project the effects through generations, not all effects are likely to be internalized by the agents negotiating the
leverage. Prudent risk management might suggest regulators could “lean against the wind” in areas where the perceived shocks to fundamentals are seen to be extreme, so as to dampen the long-run fallout if the shock happens to be temporary.

REFERENCES


