State Dependence and Alternative Explanations for Consumer Inertia

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Abstract

For many consumer packaged goods products, researchers have documented inertia in brand choice, a form of persistence whereby consumers have a higher probability of choosing a product that they have purchased in the past. Using data on margarine and refrigerated orange juice purchases, we show that the finding of inertia is robust to flexible controls for preference heterogeneity and not due to autocorrelated taste shocks. Thus, the inertia is at least partly due to structural, not spurious state dependence. We explore three economic explanations for the observed structural state dependence: preference changes due to past purchases or consumption experiences which induce a form of loyalty, search, and learning. Our data are consistent with loyalty, but not with search or learning. Properly distinguishing among the different sources of inertia is important for policy analysis, because the alternative sources of inertia imply qualitative differences in firm’s pricing incentives and lead to quantitatively different equilibrium pricing outcomes.

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# Introduction

Researchers in both marketing and economics have documented a form of persistence in consumer choice data whereby consumers have a higher probability of choosing products that they have purchased in the past. We call this form of persistence *inertia* in brand choice. Such behavior was first documented by Frank (1962) and Massy (1966); for recent examples see Keane (1997) and Seetharaman, Ainslie, and Chintagunta (1999). There are two conceptually distinct explanations for the source of inertia in brand choice. One is that past purchases directly influence the consumer’s choice probabilities for different brands. Following Heckman (1981), we call this explanation *structural state dependence* in choice. Another explanation is that consumers differ along some serially correlated unobserved propensity to make purchase decisions. Heckman (1981) refers to this explanation as *spurious state dependence* because the relationship between past purchases and current choice probabilities only arises if unobserved consumer differences are not properly accounted for. The distinction between the different sources of inertia is important from the point of view of evaluating optimal firm policies such as pricing.

In this paper, we document inertia in brand choices using household panel data on purchases of consumer packaged goods (refrigerated orange juice and margarine). We measure inertia using a discrete choice model that incorporates a consumer’s previous brand choice as a covariate. We show that the finding of inertia is robust to controls for unobserved consumer differences, and thus we find evidence for structural state dependence. We then explore three different economic explanations that can give rise to structural state dependence: preference changes due to past purchases (psychological switching costs) which induce a form of loyalty, search, and learning. The patterns in the data are consistent with preference changes, but inconsistent with search and learning.

A standard explanation for the measured inertia is misspecification of the distribution of consumer heterogeneity in preferences. It is difficult to distinguish empirically between structural state dependence and heterogeneity, in particular if the entire set of preference parameters is consumer-specific. The extant empirical literature on state dependence in brand choices assumes a normal distribution of heterogeneity.\(^1\) However, a normal distribution may not capture the full extent of heterogeneity. For example, the distribution of brand intercepts

\(^1\)See, for example, Keane (1997), Seetharaman, Ainslie, and Chintagunta (1999), and Osborne (2007). Shum (2004) uses a discrete distribution of heterogeneity.
could be multimodal, corresponding to different relative brand preferences across groups (or “segments”) of consumers. Any misspecification of the distribution of heterogeneity could still lead us to conclude spuriously that consumer choices exhibit structural state dependence. We resolve the potential misspecification problem by using a very flexible, semi-parametric heterogeneity specification consisting of a mixture of multivariate normal distributions. We estimate the corresponding choice model using a Bayesian MCMC algorithm which makes inference in a model with such a flexible heterogeneity distribution feasible. We find that past purchases influence current choices, even after controlling for heterogeneity. To confirm that we adequately control for heterogeneity, we re-estimate the model based on a reshuffled sequence of brand choices for each household. We no longer find evidence of state dependence with the reshuffled sequence, suggesting there is no remaining unobserved heterogeneity.

A related explanation for inertia is that the choice model errors are autocorrelated, such that a past purchase proxies for a large random utility draw. Following Chamberlain (1985), we first show that past prices predict current choices in a model without a lagged choice variable, which is evidence in favor of structural state dependence. We then exploit the frequent incidence of promotional price discounts in our data. If a past purchase was due to a price discount, the expected random utility draw at the time of the purchase should be smaller than if the purchase was made at a regular price. Therefore, brand choices should exhibit less inertia if the past purchase was initiated by a price discount rather than by a regular price. However, we find no moderating effect of past price discounts on the measured inertia.

Based on our estimates and the tests for unobserved heterogeneity and autocorrelated errors we conclude that the measured inertia is due to structural state dependence, i.e. past choices directly influence current purchase behavior. Unlike most of the past empirical research on inertia in brand choice, we seek to understand the behavioral mechanism that generates structural state dependence. We consider three alternative explanations. A common explanation is that a past purchase or consumption instance alters the current utility derived from the consumption of the product, such that consumers face a form of psychological switching cost in changing brands (Farrell and Klemperer (2007)). We consider this model as our baseline explanation, and refer to this form of structural state dependence as loyalty in brand choice. Alternatively, inertia may arise if consumers face search costs and thus do not consider brands which they have not recently bought when making a purchase in the product category. To test for a search explanation for inertia, we exploit the availability of
in-store display advertising which reduces search costs. We find that display advertising does not moderate the loyalty effect, and thus conclude that search costs are not the main source of state dependence. Another explanation for structural state dependence is based on consumer learning behavior (see for example, Osborne (2007) and Moshkin and Shachar (2002)). A generic implication of learning models is that choice behavior will be non-stationary even when consumers face a stationary store environment. As consumers obtain more experience with the products in a category, the amount of learning declines and their posterior beliefs on product quality converge to a degenerate distribution. Correspondingly, their choice behavior will converge to the predictions from a static brand choice model. On the other hand, if structural state dependence is due to loyalty, there will be no such change in choice behavior over time. We implement a test that exploits this key difference in the predictions of a learning and a loyalty model, and find little evidence in favor of learning. We conclude that the form of structural state dependence in our data is consistent with loyalty, but not with search or learning.

To illustrate the economic significance of distinguishing between inertia as loyalty and spurious state dependence in the form of unobserved heterogeneity or autocorrelated taste shocks, we compare the respective pricing motives and consequences for equilibrium price outcomes. If inertia is due to loyalty, firms can control the evolution of consumer preferences and, thus, face dynamic pricing incentives. In contrast, if inertia is due to unobserved heterogeneity or autocorrelated taste shocks, there are no such dynamic pricing incentives. Thus, the alternative sources of inertia imply qualitative differences in firm’s pricing incentives, and, as we show using a simulation exercise, also lead to quantitatively different equilibrium pricing outcomes. In a companion paper (Dubé, Hitsch, and Rossi (2009)), we provide a detailed analysis of equilibrium pricing if the inertia in brand choice are due to loyalty.

2 Model and Econometric Specification

Our baseline model consists of households making discrete choices among \( J \) products in a category and an outside option each time they go to the supermarket. The timing and incidence of trips to the supermarket, indexed by \( t \), are assumed to be exogenous. To capture inertia we let the previous product choice affect current utilities.

Household \( h \)'s utility index from product \( j \) during the shopping occasion \( t \) is
where \( p_{jt} \) is the product price and \( \epsilon_{jt}^h \) is a standard iid error term used in most choice models.

In the model given by (2.1), the brand intercepts represent a persistent form of vertical product differentiation that captures the household’s intrinsic brand preferences. The household’s state variable \( s_t^h \in \{1, \ldots, J\} \) summarizes the history of past purchases. If a household buys product \( k \) during the previous shopping occasion, \( t-1 \), then \( s_t^h = k \). If the household chooses the outside option, then \( s_t^h \) remains unchanged: \( s_t^h = s_{t-1}^h \). The specification in (2.1) induces a first-order Markov process on choices. While the use of the last purchase as a summary of the whole purchase history is frequently used in empirical work, it is not the only possible specification. For example, Seetharaman (2004) considers various distributed lags of past purchases, giving rise to a higher-order Markov process.

If \( \gamma^h > 0 \), then the model in (2.1) predicts inertia in brand choices. If a household switches to brand \( k \), the probability of a repeat purchase of brand \( k \) is higher than prior to this purchase: the conditional choice probability of repeat-purchasing exceeds the marginal choice probability. We refer to \( \gamma^h \) as the state dependence coefficient, and we call \( \mathbb{I}\{s_t^h = j\} \) the state dependence term. To avoid any confusion in our terminology, note that statistical evidence that the state dependence coefficient is positive, \( \gamma^h > 0 \), need not imply that the brand choices exhibit structural state dependence. Rather, \( \gamma^h > 0 \) may simply indicate spurious state dependence, for example if our econometric specification does not fully account for the distribution of preference parameters across consumers or if \( \epsilon_{jt}^h \) is serially correlated.

### 2.1 Econometric Specification

Assuming that the random utility term, \( \epsilon_{jt}^h \), is Type I extreme value distributed, household choices are given by a multinomial logit model:

\[
\Pr\{j|p, s\} = \frac{\exp \left( \alpha_j^h + \eta_j^h p_j + \gamma^h \mathbb{I}\{s = j\} \right)}{1 + \sum_{k=1}^{J} \exp \left( \alpha_k^h + \eta_k^h p_k + \gamma^h \mathbb{I}\{s = k\} \right)}.
\]

Here, we assume that the mean utility of the outside good is zero, \( u_{0h} = 0 \).

We denote the vector of household-level parameters by \( \theta^h = (\alpha_1^h, \ldots, \alpha_J^h, \eta_j^h, \gamma^h) \). Preference heterogeneity across household types can be accommodated by assuming that \( \theta^h \) is drawn from a common distribution. In the extant empirical literature on state dependent demand,
a normal distribution is often assumed, $\theta^h \sim N(\bar{\theta}, V_\theta)$. Frequently, further restrictions are placed on $V_\theta$ such as a diagonal structure (see, for example, Osborne (2007)). Other authors restrict the heterogeneity to only a subset of the $\theta$ vector. The use of restricted normal models is due, in part, to the limitations of existing methods for estimating random coefficient logit models.

To allow for a flexible, potentially non-normal distribution of preference heterogeneity, we employ a Bayesian approach and specify a hierarchical prior with a mixture of normals as the first stage prior (see, for example, section 5.2 of Rossi, Allenby, and McCulloch (2005)). The hierarchical prior provides a convenient way of specifying an informative prior which, in turn, avoids the problem of overfitting even with a large number of normal components. The first stage consists of a mixture of $K$ multivariate normal distributions and the second stage consists of priors on the parameters of the mixture of normals:

$$p(\theta^h | \pi, \{\mu_k, \Sigma_k\}) = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \pi_k \phi(\theta^h | \mu_k, \Sigma_k)$$

(2.3)

$$\pi, \{\mu_k, \Sigma_k\} \mid b$$

(2.4)

Here the notation $\cdot \mid \cdot$ indicates a conditional distribution and $b$ represents the hyper-parameters of the priors on the mixing probabilities and the parameters governing each mixture component. Mixture of normals models are very flexible and can accommodate deviations from normality such as thick tails, skewness, and multimodality. We illustrate this point in Appendix A by simulating data from a model without choice inertia and with a non-normal distribution of heterogeneity. We find that the normal model for heterogeneity fits a density of the state dependence parameter that is centered away from zero. In contrast, a mixture-of-normals model fits a density that is centered at zero.

A useful alternative representation of the model described by (2.3) and (2.4) can be obtained by introducing the latent variables $ind_h \in \{1, \ldots, K\}$ that indicate the mixture component from which each consumer’s preference parameter vector is drawn:

$$\theta^h \mid ind_h, \{\mu_k, \Sigma_k\} \sim \phi(\theta^h | \mu_{ind_h}, \Sigma_{ind_h})$$

$$ind_h \sim MN(\pi)$$

$$\pi, \{\mu_k, \Sigma_k\} \mid b$$

(2.5)

$ind_h$ is a discrete random variable with outcome probabilities $\pi = (\pi_1, \ldots, \pi_K)$. This repre-
sentation is precisely that which would be used to simulate data from a mixture of normals, but it is also the same idea used in the MCMC method for Bayesian inference in this model, as detailed in the appendix. Viewed as a prior, (2.5) puts positive prior probability on mixtures with different numbers of components, including mixtures with a smaller number of components than \( K \). For example, consider a model that is specified with five components, \( K = 5 \). A priori, there is a positive probability that \( \text{ind}_h \) takes any of the values \( 1, \ldots, 5 \).

A posteriori, it is possible that some mixture components are “shut down” in the sense that they have very low probability and are never visited during the navigation of the posterior.

Appendix B provides details on the MCMC algorithm and prior settings used to estimate the mixture of normals model (2.3). We refer the reader to Rossi, Allenby, and McCulloch (2005) for a more thorough discussion.

The MCMC algorithm provides draws of the mixture probabilities as well as the normal component parameters. Thus, each MCMC draw of the mixture parameters provides a draw of the entire multivariate density of household parameters. We can average these densities to provide a Bayes estimate of the household parameter density. We can also construct Bayesian posterior credibility regions\(^2\) for any given density ordinate to gauge the level of uncertainty in the estimation of the household distribution using the simulation draws. That is, for any given ordinate, we can estimate the density of the distribution of either all or a subset of the parameters. A single draw of the ordinate of the marginal density for the \( i^{th} \) element of \( \theta \) can be constructed as follows:

\[
p_{\theta_i} (\xi) = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \pi_k \phi_i (\xi | \mu_k, \Sigma_k).
\]

\( \phi_i (\xi | \mu_k, \Sigma_k) \) is the univariate marginal density for the \( i^{th} \) component of the multivariate normal distribution, \( \mathcal{N}(\mu_k, \Sigma_k) \).

To obtain a truly non-parametric estimate using the mixture of normals model requires that the number of mixture components (\( K \)) increases with the sample size (Escobar and West (1995)). Our approach is to fit models with successively larger numbers of components and to gauge the adequacy of the number of components by examining the fitted density as well as the Bayes factor (see the model selection discussion in Section 2.2) associated with each number of components. What is important to note is that our improved MCMC algorithm is capable of fitting models with a large number of components at relatively low computational

\(^2\)The Bayesian posterior credibility region is the Bayesian analogue of a confidence interval. The 95 percent posterior credibility region is an interval which has .95 probability under the posterior. We compute equal-tailed estimates of the posterior credibility region by using quantiles from the MCMC draws.
2.2 Posterior Model Probabilities

To establish that the inertia we observe in the data can be interpreted as structural state dependence, we will compare a variety of different model specifications. Most of the specifications considered will be heterogeneous in that a prior distribution or random coefficients specification will be assumed for all utility parameters. This poses a problem in model comparison as we are comparing different and heterogeneous models. As a simple example, consider a model with and without the lagged choice term. This is not simply a hypothesis about a given fixed-dimensional parameter, \( H_0 : \gamma = 0 \), but a hypothesis about a set of household level parameters. The Bayesian solution to this problem is to compute posterior model probabilities and to compare models on this basis. A posterior model probability is computed by integrating out the set of model parameters to form what is termed the marginal likelihood of the data. Consider the computation of the posterior probability of model \( M_i \):

\[
p(M_i | D) = \int p(D | \Theta, M_i) p(\Theta | M_i) \, d\Theta \times p(M_i)
\]

where \( D \) denotes the observed data, \( \Theta \) represents the set of model parameters, \( p(D | \Theta, M_i) \) is the likelihood of the data for \( M_i \), and \( p(M_i) \) is the prior probability of model \( i \). The first term in (2.7) is the marginal likelihood for \( M_i \).

\[
p(D | M_i) = \int p(D | \Theta, M_i) p(\Theta | M_i) \, d\Theta
\]

The marginal likelihood can be computed by reusing the simulation draws for all model parameters that are generated by the MCMC algorithm using the method of Newton and Raftery (1994).

\[
\hat{p}(D | M_i) = \left( \frac{1}{R} \sum_{r=1}^{R} \frac{1}{p(D | \Theta^r, M_i)} \right)^{-1}
\]

\( p(D | \Theta, M_i) \) is the likelihood of the entire panel for model \( i \). In order to minimize overflow problems, we report the log of the trimmed Newton-Raftery MCMC estimate of the marginal likelihood. Assuming equal prior model probabilities, Bayesian model comparison can be done on the basis of the marginal likelihood (assuming equal prior model probabilities).

Posterior model probabilities can be shown to have an automatic adjustment for the effec-
tive parameter dimension. That is, larger models do not automatically have higher marginal likelihood as the dimension of the problem is one aspect of the prior that always matters. While we do not use asymptotic approximations to the posterior model probabilities, the asymptotic approximation to the marginal likelihood illustrates the implicit penalty for larger models (see, for example, Rossi, McCulloch, and Allenby (1996)).

\[
\log(p(D|M_i)) \approx \log(p(D|\hat{\Theta}_{MLE}, M_i)) - \frac{p_i}{2} \log(n)
\] (2.10)

\(p_i\) is the effective parameter size for \(M_i\) and \(n\) is the sample size. Thus, a model with the same fit or likelihood value but a larger number of parameters will be “penalized” in marginal likelihood terms. Choosing models on the basis of the marginal likelihood can be shown to be consistent in model selection in the sense that the true model will be selected with probability converging to one as the sample size becomes infinite (e.g. Dawid (1992)).

3 Data

We estimate the logit demand model described above using household panel data containing information on purchases in the refrigerated orange juice and the 16 oz tub margarine consumer packaged goods (CPG) categories. The panel data were collected by AC Nielsen for 2,100 households in a large Midwestern city between 1993 and 1995. In each category, we focus only on those households that purchase a brand at least twice during our sample period. We use 355 households to estimate orange juice demand and 429 households to estimate margarine demand. We also use AC Nielsen’s store-level data for the same market to obtain the weekly prices and point-of-purchase marketing variables for each of the products that were not purchased on a given shopping trip.

Table 1 lists the products considered in each category as well as the product purchase and no-purchase shares and average prices. We define the outside good in each category as follows. In the refrigerated orange juice category, we define the outside good as any fresh or canned juice product purchase other than the brands of orange juice considered. In the tub margarine category, we define the outside good as any trip during which another margarine or butter product was purchased.\(^3\) In Table 1, we see a no-purchase share of 23.8% in refrigerated

\(^3\)Although not reported, our findings in the margarine category are qualitatively similar if we use a broader definition of the outside option based on any spreadable product (jams, jellies, margarine, butter, peanut butter, etc.)
orange juice and 40.8% in tub margarine. Using these definitions of the outside good, we model only those shopping trips where purchases in the product category are considered.

In our econometric specification, we will be careful to control for heterogeneity as flexibly as possible to avoid confounding structural state dependence with unobserved heterogeneity. Even with these controls in place, it is still important to ask which patterns in our consumer shopping panel help us to identify state dependence effects. In Table 2, we show that the marginal purchase probability is considerably smaller than the conditional re-purchase probability for each of the products considered. Thus, we observe inertia in the raw data. But, the raw data alone are inadequate to distinguish between structural state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity in consumer tastes. The identification of state dependence in our context is aided by the frequent temporary price changes typically observed in supermarket scanner data. If there is sufficient price variation, we will observe consumers switching away from their preferred products. The detection of state dependence relies on spells during which the consumer purchases these less-preferred alternatives on successive visits, even after prices return to their “typical” levels.

We use the orange juice category to illustrate the source of identification of state dependence in our data. We classify each product’s weekly price as either “regular” or “discount,” where the latter implies a temporary price decrease of at least 5%. Conditional on a purchase, we observe 1889 repeat-purchases (spells) out of our total 3328 purchases in the category. In many cases, the spell is initiated by a discount price. For instance, nearly 60% of the cases where a household purchases something other than its favorite brand, the product chosen is offering a temporary price discount. We compare the repeat-purchase rate for spells initiated by a price discount (i.e. a household repeat-buys a product that was on discount when previously purchased) to the marginal probability of a purchase in Table 2. In this manner, the initial switch may not merely reflect heterogeneity in tastes. For all brands of Minute Maid orange juice, the sample repurchase probability conditional on a purchase initiated by a discount is .74, which exceeds the marginal purchase probability of .43. The same is true for Tropicana brand products with the conditional repurchase probability of .83 compared to the marginal purchase probability of .57. These patterns are suggestive of a structural relationship between current and past purchase behavior, as opposed to persistent, household-specific differences.

Inertia in brand choices is one possible form of dependence in shopping behavior over time. Another frequently cited source of non-zero-order purchase behavior is household inventory
holdings or stockpiling (see, for example, Erdem, Imai, and Keane (2003) and Hendel and Nevo (2005)). Households that engage in stockpiling change the timing of their purchases and the quantities they purchase (i.e. pantry-loading) based on their current product inventories, current prices, and their expectations of future price changes. While stockpiling has clear implications for purchase timing, it does not predict a link between past and current brand choices, i.e. inertia.

4 Inertia as Structural State Dependence versus Spurious State Dependence

4.1 Heterogeneity and State Dependence

It is well known that structural state dependence and heterogeneity can be confounded (Heckman (1981)). We have argued that frequent price discounts or sales provide a source of brand switching that allows us to separate structural state dependence in choices from persistent heterogeneity in household preferences. However, it is an empirical question as to whether or not state dependence is an important force in our data. With a normal distribution of heterogeneity, a number of authors have documented that positive state dependence is present in CPG panel data (see, for example, Seetharaman, Ainslie, and Chintagunta (1999)). However, there is still the possibility that these results are not robust to controls for heterogeneity using a flexible or non-parametric distribution of preferences. Our approach consists of fitting models with and without an inertia term and with various forms of heterogeneity. Our mixture of normals approach nests the normal model in the literature.

Table 3 provides log marginal likelihood results that facilitate assessment of the statistical importance of heterogeneity and state dependence. All log marginal likelihoods are estimated using a Newton-Raftery style estimator that has been trimmed of the top and bottom 1 per cent of likelihood values as is recommended in the literature (Lopes and Gammerman (2006)). We compare models without heterogeneity to a normal model (a one component mixture) and to a five component mixture model.

As is often the case with consumer panel data (Allenby and Rossi (1999)), there is pronounced heterogeneity. Recall that if two models have equal prior probability, the difference
in log marginal likelihoods is related to the ratio of posterior model probabilities:

\[
\log \left( \frac{p(M_1|D)}{p(M_2|D)} \right) = \log (p(D|M_1)) - \log (p(D|M_2))
\]

(4.1)

Table 3 shows that in a model specification including a state dependence term the introduction of normal heterogeneity improves the log marginal likelihood by about 2700 points for margarine and about 1700 points for refrigerated orange juice. Therefore, the ratio of posterior probabilities is about \(\exp(2700)\) in margarine and about \(\exp(1700)\) in orange juice, providing overwhelming evidence in favor of a model with heterogeneity in both product categories.

The normal model of heterogeneity does not appear to be adequate for our data as the log marginal likelihood improves substantially when a five component mixture model is used. In a model including a state dependence term, moving from one to five normal components increases the log marginal likelihood by 45 points (from -4906 to -4861) for margarine products and 52 points for orange juice. Remember that the Bayesian approach automatically adjusts for effective parameter size (see section 2.2) such that the differences in log marginal likelihoods documented in Table 3 represent a meaningful improvement in model fit.

Figures 1-4 illustrate the importance of a flexible heterogeneity distribution. Each figure plots the estimated marginal distribution of the intercept, price\(^4\), and state dependence coefficients\(^5\) from the five component mixture model (we display the posterior mean as the Bayes estimate of each density value). The shaded envelope enclosing the marginal densities is a 90 percent pointwise posterior credibility region. The graphs also display the corresponding coefficient distributions from a one component model of heterogeneity. Several of the parameters exhibit a dramatic departure from normality. For example, in the margarine category the Shedd’s and Parkay brand intercepts (Figure 1) have a noticeably bimodal marginal distribution. For the Shedd’s brand, one mode is centered on a positive value, indicating a strong brand preference for Shedd’s. The other mode is centered on a negative value, reflecting consumers who view Shedd’s as inferior to the outside good. The price coefficients (Figures 2 and 4) are also non-normal, exhibiting pronounced bimodality in the margarine category and

\(^4\)A potential concern is that we do not constrain the price coefficient to be negative and, accordingly, the population-level marginal distribution for this coefficient places mass on positive values. However, when we compute the posterior mean price coefficients for each household, we get a positive coefficient in only 10 of the 429 cases (2%), for margarine, and 5 of the 355 cases (1%), for orange juice.

\(^5\)The fitted density of the state dependence coefficient, while centered above zero, does place some mass on negative values in both categories. If we compute each household’s posterior mean coefficient, we find a negative value in 98 of the 429 cases, for margarine, and in 28 of the 355 cases, for orange juice. One interpretation of the negative coefficient is that some households seek variety in their brand choices over time.
left skewness in the orange juice category.

Thus, in our data, the findings indicate that there is good reason to doubt the appropriateness of the standard normal assumption for many of the choice model parameters. This opens the possibility that the findings in the previous literature documenting structural state dependence are influenced, at least in part, by incorrect distributional assumptions. However, in our data we find evidence for state dependence even when a flexible five component normal model of heterogeneity is specified. The log marginal likelihood increases from -4922 to -4861 when a state dependence term is added to a five component model for margarine and from -4528 to -4434 for refrigerated orange juice. While not definitive evidence, this result suggests that the findings of state dependence in the literature are not artifacts of the normality assumption commonly used. Figures 2 and 4 show the marginal distribution of the state dependence parameter, which is well approximated by a normal distribution for these two product categories.

The five component normal mixture is a very flexible model for the joint density of the choice model parameters. However, before we can make a more generic “semi-parametric” claim that our results are not dependent on the functional form of the heterogeneity distribution, we must provide evidence of the adequacy of the five component model. Our approach is to fit a ten component model, which is a very highly parametrized specification. In the margarine category, for example, the ten component model has 449 parameters (the coefficient vector is eight-dimensional\(^6\)). Although not reported in the tables, the log marginal likelihood remains nearly unchanged as we move from five to ten components; from -4843 to -4842 for margarine and -4434 to -4435 for orange juice. These results indicate no value from increasing the model flexibility beyond five components. The posterior model probability results and the high flexibility of the models under consideration justify the conclusion that we have accommodated heterogeneity of an unknown form.

4.2 Robustness Checks

4.2.1 State Dependence or a Misspecified Distribution of Heterogeneity?

We perform a simple additional check to test for the possibility that the lagged choice coefficient proxies for a misspecification of the distribution of heterogeneity. Suppose there is

\(^6\)There are 36 \(\times\) 10 = 360 unique variance-covariance parameters plus 10 \(\times\) 8 = 80 mean parameters plus 9 mixture probabilities.
no structural state dependence and that the coefficient on the lagged choice picks up taste
differences across households that are not accounted for by the assumed functional form of
heterogeneity. Then, if we randomly reshuffle the order of shopping trips, the coefficient on the
lagged choice will not change and still provide misleading evidence for state dependence. In
Table 3, we show the median, 2.5\textsuperscript{th} percentile and 97.5\textsuperscript{th} percentile values of the log marginal
likelihoods for a five component model with a state dependence term, which we fitted to thirty
randomly reshuffled purchase sequences. A 95 percent interval of the log marginal likelihoods
based on the reshuffled purchase sequences contains the log marginal likelihood pertaining
to the model that does not include a state dependence term. Furthermore, the 95 percent
interval is strictly below the marginal likelihood pertaining to the model that includes a state
dependence term based on the correct choice sequence. We thus find additional strong evi-
dence against the possibility that the lagged choice proxies for a misspecified heterogeneity
distribution.

4.2.2 State Dependence or Autocorrelation?

While the randomized sequence test gives us confidence that we have found evidence of a
non-zero order choice process, it does not help us to distinguish between structural state
dependence and a model with autocorrelated choice errors. If the choice model errors are
autocorrelated, a past purchase will proxy for a large past and hence also large current random
utility draw. Thus, a past purchase will predict current choice behavior. A model with both
state dependence and autocorrelated errors is considered in Keane (1997). Using a normal
distribution of heterogeneity and a different estimation method, he finds that the estimated
degree of state dependence remains largely unchanged if autocorrelated random utility terms
are allowed for. The economic implications of the two models are markedly different. If
state dependence represents a form of state dependent utility or loyalty, firms can influence
the loyalty state of the customer and this has, for example, long-run pricing implications.
However, the autocorrelated errors model does not allow for interventions to induce loyalty
to a specific brand. We will discuss these points in Section 6.2.

In order to distinguish between a model with a state dependence term and a model with
autocorrelated errors, we implement the suggestion of Chamberlain (1985). We consider a
model with a five component normal mixture for heterogeneity, no state dependence term, but
including lagged prices defined as the prices at the last purchase occasion. In a model with
structural state dependence, the product price can influence the consumer’s state variable and this will affect subsequent choices. In contrast, in a model with autocorrelated errors, prices do not influence the persistence in choices over time. In Table 3, we compare the log marginal likelihood of a model without a state dependence term and a five component normal mixture with the log marginal likelihood of the same model including lagged prices. The addition of lagged prices improves the log marginal likelihood by 93 points for margarine and by 139 points for refrigerated orange juice. This is strong evidence in favor of structural state dependence specification over autocorrelation in random utility terms.

A limitation of the Chamberlain suggestion (as noted by both Chamberlain himself and Erdem and Sun (2001)) is that consumer expectations regarding prices (and other right hand side variables) might influence current choice decisions. Lagged prices might simply proxy for expectations even in the absence of structural state dependence. Thus, the importance of lagged prices as measured by the log marginal likelihood is suggestive but not definitive.

As another comparison between a model with autocorrelated errors and a model with structural state dependence, we exploit the price discounts or sales in our data. Since autocorrelated errors are independent across households and independent of the price discounts, we can differentiate between state dependent and autocorrelated error models by examining the impact of price discounts on measured state dependence. Suppose that a household chooses product $j$ at the shopping occasion $t$, denoted by $d_{jt} = 1$. $\epsilon_{jt}$ is the random utility term of product $j$, which may be autocorrelated or independent across time. Given that the household chooses product $j$ and given any price vector $p_t$, the random utility term $\epsilon_{jt}$ must be larger than the population average, $E(\epsilon_{jt}|p_t, d_{jt} = 1) > E(\epsilon_{jt})$. Therefore, under autocorrelation it is also true that $E(\epsilon_{j\tau}|p_\tau, d_{jt} = 1) > E(\epsilon_{j\tau})$ at a subsequent shopping occasion $\tau > t$ and, hence, we would find spurious state dependence if we included lagged choices in the choice model. Our test for autocorrelation exploits the fact that, if the incidence of price discounts is independent across products\textsuperscript{7}, $E(\epsilon_{jt}|p^R_j, d_{jt} = 1) > E(\epsilon_{jt}|p^D_j, d_{jt} = 1)$, where $p^R_j$ is a regular price and $p^D_j < p^R_j$ is a discounted price. For Type I extreme value distributed random utility terms this follows from the expression $E(\epsilon_j|p, d_j = 1) = e - \log(Pr\{j|p\})$, where $e$ is Euler’s constant, and Appendix C shows that the statement is also true for more general distributions of $\epsilon$. Therefore, under autocorrelated random utility terms, the correlation between the past purchase state and the current product choice should be lower if the loyalty state was initiated.

\textsuperscript{7}We rarely see more than one brand in a category on sale at the same time. In the margarine category, for instance, less than 2% of the trips have 2 or more products on sale at the same time.
by a price discount rather than by a regular price.

To implement this test, we estimate the following model:

\[ u_{jt} = \alpha_j + \eta_j p_{jt} + \gamma_1 \mathbb{I}\{s_t = j\} + \gamma_2 \mathbb{I}\{s_t = j\} \cdot \mathbb{I}\{\text{discount}_{s_t} = j\} + \epsilon_{jt} \]  

(4.2)

The term \( \text{discount}_{s_t} \) indicates whether the brand corresponding to the customer’s current state was on discount when it was last purchased. In a model with autocorrelated errors, the magnitude of the spurious state dependence effect should be lower for states generated by discounts, i.e. \( \gamma_2 < 0 \). On the other hand, if the errors are independent across time and if the past product choice directly affects the current purchase probability for the same brand, then \( \gamma_1 > 0 \) and \( \gamma_2 = 0 \).

Table 3 reports the log marginal likelihood for model (4.2). Adding the interaction with the discount variable to the original five component model improves the model fit by a modest 7 points for margarine and 15 points for orange juice. Figure 5 displays the fitted marginal distribution of the state dependence parameter, \( \gamma_1 \), and the interaction term of state dependence with price discounts, \( \gamma_2 \). Recall that we allow for an entire distribution of parameters across the population of consumers so that we cannot provide the Bayesian analogue of a point estimate and a confidence interval for \( \gamma_1 \) and \( \gamma_2 \). The distribution of the main effect of state dependence, \( \gamma_1 \), is centered at a positive value for both categories. Also, comparing Figure 5 to Figures 4 and 2, we see that the estimated distribution of \( \gamma_1 \) changes little if the additional interaction term is included in the model. The distribution of \( \gamma_2 \) is centered at zero for margarine. For orange juice, \( \gamma_2 \) is centered on a slightly negative value; however, the 95% posterior credibility region of the population mean of \( \gamma_2 \) contains zero. Combining the evidence from this test with the results from the Chamberlain test reported above, we conclude that overall there is scant evidence that the measured state dependence is due to autocorrelated errors.

4.2.3 Fixed Store Effects and Price Endogeneity

As in much of the demand estimation literature, the potential endogeneity of supply-side variables could bias our parameter estimates. A bias towards zero in the estimated price coefficient could also spuriously indicate state dependence. For instance, if a consumer begins purchasing a product repeatedly due to low prices and the price parameter is underestimated, this behavior could be misattributed to state dependence. In our current context, we pool
trips across 40 stores in the two largest supermarket chains in the market. It is possible
that unobserved (to the researcher) store-specific factors, such as shelf space and/or store
configuration, could differentially influence a consumer’s propensity to purchase across stores.
Endogeneity bias might arise if retailers condition on these store-level factors when they set
their prices, creating a correlation between the observed shelf prices and the unobserved store
effects. Empirically, most of the price variation in our data is across brands, a dimension
that we control for with brand intercepts in the choice model. Thus, while endogeneity is a
possibility, in our data only 2% of the variance in prices is explained by store effects, and only
1% is explained by chain effects.

To control for this potential source of endogeneity, we re-estimate demand with a complete
set of store-specific intercepts. Household \( h \)'s utility index from product \( j \) during the shopping
occasion \( t \) at store \( k \) is

\[
u^h_{jtk} = \alpha_j^h + \eta^h p_{jt} + \gamma^h I\{s_t^h = j\} + \xi_k^h + \epsilon^h_{jt}\]

(4.3)

where \( \xi_k^h \) is common across all consumers and shopping occasions. \( \xi_k^h \) does not enter the utility
of the outside good. For estimation, we assume the following prior structure on each \( \xi_k^h \):

\[
\xi_k^h \sim N(\bar{\xi}, A^{-1}_\xi) .
\]

We use the prior settings \( \bar{\xi} = 0 \) and \( A^{-1}_\xi = .01 \).

We fit the state dependence model with fixed store effects to the margarine data. This
model places a heavy burden on our estimator as it adds 38 additional parameters\(^8\). While
store effects improve fit substantially for the homogeneous specification (the marginal likeli-
hood increases from \(-7618\) to \(-7494\)), the improvement in fit is modest for the heterogeneous,
five component specification (the marginal likelihood increases from \(-4861\) to \(-4853\)).

In Figure 6, we plot the price and state dependence coefficients for a five component
mixture-of-normals specification both with and without controls for store effects. The fitted
density for state dependence is identical in the two cases. The fitted density for the price
coefficient looks different if store effects are included in the model (e.g. unimodal as opposed
to bi-modal). However, these differences may simply be due to sampling error, a factor we
can assess by noting the high degree of overlap in the 95% posterior credibility regions. In

\(^8\)We pool three of the stores in the smaller chain into one group since none of them has more than twenty
observed trips in our data.
summary, our main finding is that our estimates of structural state dependence are not affected by price endogeneity due to unobserved, store-specific effects.

4.2.4 Brand-Specific State Dependence

In the basic utility specification (2.1), state dependence is captured by a parameter that is constrained to be identical across brands. Several authors have found the measurement of state dependence to be difficult (see, for example, Keane (1997), Seetharaman, Ainslie, and Chintagunta (1999), Erdem and Sun (2001)) even with a one component normal model for heterogeneity. The reason for imposing one state dependence parameter could simply be a need for greater efficiency in estimation. However, it would be misleading to report state dependence effects if these are limited to, for example, only one brand in a set of products. It also might be expected that some brands with unique packaging or trade-marks might display more state dependence than others. It is also possible that the formulation of some products may induce more state dependence via some mild form of “addiction” in that some tastes are more habit-forming than others. For these reasons, we consider an alternative formulation of the model with brand-specific state dependence parameters. Our Bayesian methods have a natural advantage for highly parametrized models in the sense that if a model is weakly identified from the data, the prior keeps the posterior well defined and regular.

A five component mixture of normals model with brand specific state dependence fits the data with a higher log marginal likelihood for both categories. The log marginal likelihood increases from -4861 to -4822 for margarine and -4434 to -4364 for orange juice. However, there is a difference between substantive and statistical significance. For this reason, we plot the fitted marginal densities for the state dependence parameters for each brand in Figures 7 and 8 and compare them to the state dependence distributions from the baseline model. In the margarine category, all four distributions are centered close to the baseline, constrained specification. In the orange juice category, the two largest 96 oz brands shown have higher inertia than the two largest 64 oz brands. The prior distribution on the state dependence parameters is centered at zero and very diffuse. This means that the data has moved us to a posterior which is much tighter than the prior and moved the center of mass away from zero.

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9It should be noted that, as detailed in the appendix, our prior is a prior on the parameters of the mixture of normals—the mixing probabilities and each component mean vector and covariance matrix. This induces a prior on the distribution over parameters and the resultant marginal densities. While this is of no known analytic form, the fact that our priors on each component parameters are diffuse mean that the prior on the distributions is also diffuse.
Thus, our results are not simply due to the prior specification but are the result of evidence in our data.

The main conclusion is that allowing for brand-specific state dependence parameters does not reduce the importance of state dependence nor restrict these effects to a small subset of brands.

5 Alternative Sources of Structural State Dependence

We have found evidence for structural state dependence in brand choice even after controlling for a very flexible distribution of preference heterogeneity. The estimated state dependence effects are unlikely to be the result of autocorrelated random utility shocks. In this section we explore different behavioral mechanisms that could give rise to the structural state dependence effects observed in the data. Our baseline explanation is that a past purchase or consumption of a brand directly changes a consumer’s preference for the brand. We refer to this form of structural state dependence as loyalty. Such loyalty can be controlled by firms using marketing variables such as the price. As we will discuss in detail in Section 6.2, the presence of loyalty has economic implications for firms’ pricing motives and equilibrium pricing outcomes. However, to make specific statements about how firms should set prices, we need to rule out that the structural state dependence effects in the data are due to some alternative form of consumer behavior. In this section, we consider the role of consumer search and product learning as possible alternative explanations. We do not postulate specific structural models of search or learning which would involve some strong structural assumptions on consumer behavior. Rather, we focus on aspects of consumer behavior that differentiate search or learning explanations from loyalty and that can be directly observed in our data.

5.1 Search

It is likely that consumers face search costs in the recall of the identities and the location of products in a store. Hoyer (1984) found that consumers spent, on average, only 13 seconds “from the time they entered the aisle to complete their in-store decision.” Furthermore, only 11% of consumers examined two or more products before making a choice in a given product category. Facing high search costs, consumers may purchase the products that they can easily recall or locate in the store. These products are likely to be the products which the consumer has purchased most recently. In this situation, consumers would display state dependence in
product choice as they may not be willing to pay the implicit search costs for investigating products other than those recently purchased.

In order to distinguish between state dependence due to loyalty and state dependence due to search costs, we exploit data on in-store advertising, sometimes termed display advertising. Retailers frequently add signs and even rearrange the products in the aisle to call attention to specific products. In the refrigerated orange juice category, 17.5% of the chosen items had an in-store display during the shopping trip (in the margarine category the incidence of displays is low)\(^{10}\). A display can be thought of as an intervention that reduces a consumer’s search cost.

In the marketing literature, it is sometimes assumed that consumers only choose among a subset of products in any given category, called the consideration set. Mehta, Rajiv, and Srinivasan (2003) construct a model for consideration set formation based on a fixed sample size search process. Using data for ketchup and laundry detergent products, they find that promotional activity, such as in-store displays, increase the likelihood that a product enters a consideration set. This work affirms the idea that in-store displays can reduce search costs.

If displays affect demand via search costs, we should expect that a display increases the probability of a purchase. In addition, if a consumer has purchased a specific product in the past \((s_t = j)\), then displays on other products should reduce the inertial effect or the tendency of the consumer to continue to purchase product \(j\). This can be implemented by adding a specific interaction term to the baseline utility model:

\[
 u_{jt} = \alpha_j + \eta p_{jt} + \gamma_1 I\{s_t = j\} + \gamma_2 I\{s_t \neq j\} \cdot I\{\text{display}_{jt} = 1\} + \lambda I\{\text{display}_{jt} = 1\} + \epsilon_{jt} \tag{5.1}
\]

To illustrate the coding of the interaction term in (5.1), consider the case of two brands and various display and purchase state conditions. If the consumer has purchased brand 1 in the past \((s_t = 1)\) and neither brand is on display, then the utility for brand 1 relative to brand 2 is increased by \(\gamma_1\). If brand 1 is on display, the utility difference increases by \(\lambda\). If brand 2 is also on display, the main effect of display, \(\lambda\), cancels out, and the interaction term turns on with the potential to offset the inertia effect. The difference between the utility for brand 1 and brand 2 due to state dependence and displays will be \(\gamma_1 - \gamma_2\). Thus, \(\gamma_2\) measures the extent to which displays moderate the state dependence effect of past purchases. If state

\(^{10}\)There is independent variation between displays and price discounts: no correlation between the display dummy variable and the level of prices exceeds 0.4 in absolute magnitude.
dependence entirely proxies for search costs and if search costs disappear in the presence of a display, then we expect that \( \gamma_1 = \gamma_2 \).

Figure 9 plots the estimated marginal distributions of \( \gamma_1 \) and \( \gamma_2 \) (we only show results for orange juice as we observe only few instances of displays in the margarine category). As before, the distribution of state dependence, \( \gamma_1 \), is centered at a positive value. However, the distribution of \( \gamma_2 \) is centered at zero. This result suggests that displays do not moderate the effect of past choices on current product purchases. We conclude that the measured state dependence is not merely a reduced-form effect that proxies for in-store search costs.

In spite of the lack of a moderating effect, the addition of a display main effect improves the model fit, increasing the log marginal likelihood from -4434 to -4360. Adding the interaction effect of displays and past purchase has a much smaller improvement on fit, increasing the log marginal likelihood from -4360 to -4339. Whatever the interpretation of the main effect of displays, it is unlikely that the estimated state dependence effect proxies for search behavior.

### 5.2 Learning

Consumers may have imperfect knowledge about the quality of products, in which case the consumption of a product may provide information about its true quality. Such learning about product quality may create inertia in choices over time. For example, suppose a consumer prefers brand B to brand A under perfect information. However, initially the consumer has only imperfect knowledge of the product’s quality, and expects that the utility from consuming A is larger than the utility from consuming B. We then observe the consumer buying brand A until she gains experience with brand B, for example if she tries B when the product is on promotion.

If learning drives our state dependence findings, we would expect that experienced consumers in the category would exhibit a lower degree of state dependence than inexperienced consumers. In a model with learning, a consumer’s choice process eventually converges to the predictions of a static choice model as the product uncertainty is resolved. To proxy for shopping experience, we introduce a dummy for whether the primary shopper in the household is over 35 years old. Let \( \theta^h \) be the vector of household parameters (including brand intercepts, price, and the inertia term). We partition \( \theta^h \) into a part associated with the experienced shopper dummy and into residual unobserved heterogeneity that follows the mixture
of normals distribution:

\[
\theta^h = \delta z^h + u^h, \hspace{1cm} (5.2)
\]

\[
u^h \sim N(\mu_{ind}, \Sigma_{ind}), \hspace{0.5cm} \text{ind} \sim MN(\pi).
\]

\(\delta\) is a vector which allows the means of all model coefficients to be altered by the experienced shopped dummy, \(z^h\).

We find that the model fit decreases slightly by the addition of the experienced shopper dummy (Table 3). The element of \(\delta\) that allows for the possibility of shifting the distribution of the state dependence coefficient is imprecisely estimated with a posterior credibility region that covers 0. For margarine, the posterior mean of this element is .17 with a 95 percent Bayesian credibility region of \((-0.25, 0.60)\). For orange juice the mean is .12 with a 95 percent Bayesian credibility region of \((-1.9, 1.75)\). We conclude that there is no evidence that the degree of state dependence differs across experienced and inexperienced shoppers.

A more powerful test of the learning hypothesis involves exploiting the fundamental difference between loyalty and learning models in terms of the implications for the behavior of the choice process. If structural state dependence reflects loyalty, then as long as the exogenous variables (price, in our case) follow a stationary process, the choice process will also be stationary. However, in any model where learning is achieved through purchase and consumption, the choice process will be non-stationary. The consumers’ posterior distributions of product quality will tighten as more consumption experience is obtained and consumers will exhibit a lower degree of state dependence over time. Eventually, consumers will behave in accordance with a standard choice model with no uncertainty.

We examine whether there is non-stationarity in the choice data, as would be implied by the learning model. Our panel is reasonably long and we expect that consumers will learn as they obtain more consumption experience with a brand. We define brand level consumption experience as the cumulative number of purchases of the brand, \(E_{jt}\). We can interact the state dependence variable with this new experience variable to provide a means of comparing the learning and loyalty models:

\[
u_{jt} = \alpha_j + \eta_j p_{jt} + \gamma_1 \mathbb{I}\{s_t = j\} + \gamma_2 \mathbb{I}\{s_t = j\} \cdot E_{jt} + \lambda E_{jt} + \epsilon_{jt}. \hspace{1cm} (5.3)
\]

Since the experience variable adds additional information to the choice model, we should
not directly compare the log marginal likelihood values of the interaction model (5.3) and the baseline model (2.1). The hypothesis that state dependence proxies for learning has implications for the interaction term in equation (5.3). Under learning, the interaction term should reduce state dependence as brand experience accumulates, i.e. $\gamma_2 < 0$. Table 3 provides the log marginal likelihood values for a model with the interaction term, $\gamma_2$, and a model containing only a main effect of brand experience, $\gamma_1$. The marginal likelihood values increase by fairly small amounts when the interaction is added, 34 points in the margarine category and 4 points in the refrigerated orange juice category. Figure 10 verifies that the interaction terms are centered at 0 and contribute little to the model.

Of course, learning may only be relevant in situations where consumers have little consumption experience. Substantial evidence for learning has been found for new products by Ackerberg (2003) and Osborne (2007). Moshkin and Shachar (2002) find that learning explains findings of state dependence for televisions programs, a product category with a very large and frequent number of new products. In our case, the same products have been in the market place for a considerable period of time. The households in the data might be expected to show little evidence of learning given their experience with the brands prior to their involvement in the panel. This underscores the importance of a flexible model of heterogeneity. As a number of authors have noted, it is hard to distinguish learning models with heterogeneous initial priors from a standard choice model with brand preference heterogeneity. Indeed, Shin, Misra, and Horsky (2007) fit a learning model to a product category populated by well-established products. Once they supplement their data with survey data on household priors over product qualities, they measure very little learning.

6 The Economic Implications of State Dependence

So far we have established that there is robust evidence for structural state dependence in our data. Furthermore, the patterns of state dependence in the data are consistent with loyalty, a form of state dependence whereby the utility from a product changes due to a past purchase or consumption experience, but not with search or learning. In this section we explore the economic implications of loyalty.
6.1 The dollar value of loyalty

The inclusion of the outside option in the model enables us to assign money metric values to our model parameters by re-scaling them by the price parameter (i.e. the marginal utility of income). The ratio $-\gamma/\eta$ represents the dollar equivalent of the utility premium induced by loyalty. Note that, even though there are no monetary costs associated with switching among brands, this ratio can be interpreted as a switching cost. As such, structural state dependence in the form of loyalty is a special case of switching costs (Klemperer 1995, Farrell and Klemperer 2007). We elaborate on the economic implications of this point in the next subsection. In this subsection, we focus on the actual dollar amounts of the switching costs.

Table 4 displays selected quantiles from the distribution of the dollar loyalty premium across the population of households. Some of the values on which this distribution puts substantial mass are rather large, others are small. To provide some sense of the magnitudes of these values, we also compute the ratio of the dollar loyalty premium to the average price of the products. For margarine products, the median dollar value of loyalty is 12 percent of the average product price; for orange juice, the ratio is higher at 21 percent. However, there is a good deal of dispersion in the dollar loyalty value. At the 75th percentile of the distribution, the dollar loyalty value is 41 per cent of the purchase price for margarine and 42 per cent for orange juice. These are large values and of the order of many examples of standard economic (as opposed to psychologically derived) switching costs. For example, a cell phone termination penalty of $150 might be much less than total cell phone expenditures over the expected length of the contract. Another example of switching costs among packaged goods is razors and razor blades; a consumer needs to purchase a new razor when switching the type of razor blades. Here the monetary switching cost is small relative to razor blade prices (Hartmann and Nair (forthcoming)).

Figure 11 illustrates the economic importance of controlling adequately for heterogeneity in the empirical estimation of structural state dependence in the form of loyalty. The five component mixture-of-normals model generates a fitted density of the dollar value of loyalty or switching costs that is centered more closely to zero than the one component model. This finding implies that the usual normal heterogeneity specification may overstate the degree of loyalty.
### 6.2 The implications of structural state dependence for pricing

An important component of the empirical analysis herein is the distinction between inertia as loyalty, a particular form of structural state dependence, versus inertia as unobserved heterogeneity or autocorrelated taste shocks. This distinction has both qualitative and quantitative implications for firms’ pricing decisions on the supply side. The implications of brand choice inertia for firms’ pricing decisions and for equilibrium pricing outcomes differ depending on the source of the inertia. If inertia is due to autocorrelation in brand utilities or proxies for unobserved preference heterogeneity, firms cannot control the evolution of consumer preferences and, hence, there are no dynamic pricing incentives. In contrast, under loyalty, firms do face dynamic pricing incentives. Firms can use prices to influence current brand choices and, thus, influence future demand. Below, we compare the pricing incentives under each of these sources of inertia. We then conduct a simulation exercise to illustrate how, besides exhibiting qualitatively different pricing incentives, these alternative sources of inertia can lead to economically significant differences in equilibrium pricing outcomes.

To formalize the distinction in pricing incentives, consider a market with $J$ firms competing in prices over time, $t = 0, 1, \ldots$. The market is populated by a continuum of households characterized by the parameter vector $\theta \in \Theta$. $\phi(\theta)$ is the density of type $\theta$ households. Let $x_t(\theta) = (x_{1t}(\theta), \ldots, x_{Jt}(\theta))$ denote the fraction of type $\theta$ households who are loyal to each of the $J$ products. $\Pr\{j|\theta, p_t, s_t\}$ is the choice probability of household type $\theta$ for product $j$, given the price vector $p_t$ and the loyalty state $s_t \in \{1, \ldots, J\}$. Demand for product $j$ is then given by

$$d_j(p_t, x_t) = \int_\Theta \left( \sum_{k=1}^J x_{kt}(\theta) \Pr\{j|\theta, p_t, k\} \right) \phi(\theta) d\theta,$$  

(6.1)

where the mapping $x_t : \theta \to x_t(\theta)$ denotes the state of the market. The evolution of $x_t$ over time can easily be derived from the household choice probabilities. In particular, $x_{j,t+1}(\theta)$, the fraction of type $\theta$ households loyal to product $j$ in period $t + 1$, is given by all type $\theta$ households who either bought $j$ in period $t$ or were already loyal to $j$ in period $t$ and chose the outside option. Conditional on $p_t$, the evolution of $x_t$ is deterministic and can be denoted by $x_{t+1} = f(x_t, p_t)$.

Firms choose prices based on $x_t$, which contains all time-varying, payoff-relevant information about the market. Denote these pricing strategies by $\sigma_j : x \to p_j$. Conditional on $\sigma_{-j} = (\sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_{j-1}, \sigma_{j+1}, \ldots, \sigma_J)$, firm $j$’s present value, given that it chooses a dynamically
optimal pricing strategy, satisfies the Bellman equation

\[ V_j(x_t) = \sup_{p_{jt}} \{(p_{jt} - c_j)d_j(p_{jt}, \sigma_{-j}(x_t), x_t) + \beta V_j(x_{t+1})\}, \quad (6.2) \]

where \( x_{t+1} = f(x_t, p_{jt}, \sigma_{-j}(x_t)) \). Here, \( c_j \) is the marginal cost of firm \( j \) and \( \beta \) is the discount factor.

The characterization of the pricing problem in equation (6.2) shows that structural state dependence in the form of loyalty gives rise to a non-trivial dynamic pricing problem. The elasticity of demand decreases in the number of loyal customers, and hence firms have an incentive to raise current prices if the current loyalty state increases. However, higher prices also affect the future state of the market, \( x_{t+1} \). If firms lower their current price, \( x_{t+1} \) will increase and firms will thus face higher and less elastic demand in period \( t + 1 \). This dynamic pricing problem is a special case of pricing under switching costs, and the two opposing incentives are typically called the harvesting motive and the investment motive in the switching cost literature (see the discussion in Klemperer (1995) and Farrell and Klemperer (2007)). Dubé, Hitsch, and Rossi (2009) show that as the degree of state dependence increases, equilibrium prices either rise or fall depending on the relative strengths of the harvesting and investment motives.

In contrast, consider the pricing problem in the absence of loyalty. Household heterogeneity is still captured by the density \( \phi(\theta) \). The heterogeneity allows consumers to have strong preferences for specific brands and, hence, to exhibit high repeat-purchase behavior. However, because utility is not affected by past product choices, demand is not a function of the loyalty states, \( x_t \). Hence, current-period profits and the present value of each product or firm as described by the Bellman equation (6.2) do not depend on \( x_t \). Therefore, the optimal prices can be found by maximizing static, per-period profits, and the optimal prices do not vary over time.

Dynamic pricing incentives are also absent if the random utility components are autocorrelated. For example, suppose that the latent utility of product \( j \) contains the component \( \omega_{jt} = \rho \omega_{j,t-1} + \nu_{jt} \), where \( \nu_{jt} \sim N(0, \sigma^2_\nu) \) and \( \rho \) captures the degree of autocorrelation. By assumption, \( \nu_{jt} \) is independent of prices and i.i.d. across consumers and time. Therefore the stationary distribution of the autocorrelated utility components across consumers is normal with mean 0 and variance \( \sigma^2_\nu/(1 - \rho^2) \). Market demand can be obtained by integrating over this distribution for each household type, and thus, from the firm's point of view, au-
tocorrelation in utilities is simply another form of customer heterogeneity. The firms cannot control the distribution of the autocorrelated utility terms over time. Hence, as in the case of preference heterogeneity discussed above, the optimal prices maximize static profits and are time-invariant.

We now present an example that shows how, in addition to exhibiting different pricing incentives, the two sources of inertia can generate economically significant differences equilibrium pricing outcomes. Suppose an analyst observes consumer choice data in a market with two symmetric firms, estimates household preferences based on the data, and predicts equilibrium prices based on the demand estimates and cost information. Suppose also that consumer choices exhibit inertia due to autocorrelated taste shocks but no loyalty. The analyst, however, makes the false assumption that the observed inertia in choices are entirely due to loyalty and hence estimates household preferences using a model with a state dependence term. We compare the analyst’s prediction of equilibrium prices with the prices corresponding to the true model with autocorrelated errors. We obtain the equilibrium prices from a numerical solution of a Markov perfect equilibrium; see Dubé, Hitsch, and Rossi (2009) for the details. We conduct this comparison for several different degrees of inertia in the data as given by the autocorrelation parameter $\rho$. Figure 12 compares the true equilibrium prices and the analyst’s predictions for the different values of $\rho$. The loyalty model was estimated using a large data set such that we can ignore the tiny amount of parameter uncertainty in the price predictions. As discussed above, higher levels of $\rho$ are analogous to an increased dispersion of consumer brand preferences. This increase in preference heterogeneity softens price competition, and the true equilibrium prices rise monotonically in $\rho$. As $\rho$ increases, the analyst’s estimate of the coefficient on the loyalty state increases. The analyst believes that inertia is generated by loyalty and, therefore, that firms can control the future loyalty states. The downward pressure exerted through the investment motive causes the predicted equilibrium prices under the incorrect loyalty model to be smaller than the true equilibrium prices under autocorrelation. For small values of $\rho$, the predicted equilibrium prices under loyalty even fall relative to the case of no inertia. The difference in predicted prices is most pronounced for large values of $\rho$. For example, if $\rho = 0.9$, the true prices are 12.4 percent larger than the analyst’s prediction. In summary, incorrectly specifying the source of inertia

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11 The household choice data are generated using the parameter values $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = 1, \eta = -1,$ and $\sigma^2_\nu = 1.\sigma^2_\nu$ is known to the analyst, which corresponds to a scale normalization of the random utility terms. The firms’ unit cost of production is $c = 1$ and the discount factor is $\beta = 0.998$.

12 The simulated data contains 2000 shopping trips for 2000 households.
can lead to quantitatively different predictions for equilibrium pricing behavior.

7 Conclusions

We find strong evidence that observed inertia in consumer choices for margarine and refrigerated orange juice is driven by structural state dependence, even after controlling for various forms of spurious state dependence. In particular, our findings of structural state dependence are robust to a semi-parametric mixture-of-normals specification for time-invariant preference heterogeneity. Our findings of structural state dependence are also robust to a test for autocorrelated taste shocks.

Unlike much of the previous empirical work, we explore the underlying source of inertia by comparing three potential economic explanations: loyalty, consumer search and learning. The structural interpretation of the loyalty model is that when a specific brand is purchased, it is accorded a utility premium on future choice occasions, much like a switching cost. In search models, consumers may persist in purchasing one brand if the costs of exploring other options are high. In learning models, what appears to be inertia can arise because of imperfect information about product quality. Products which a consumer has previously consumed have less uncertainty in quality evaluation and this may make consumers reluctant to switch to alternative products for which there is greater quality uncertainty. We find that the form of inertia in our data is consistent with loyalty, but not with search or learning.

In our model specification, we assume that consumers are myopic and do not consider the impact of current purchase decisions on future utility. We think of state dependence in the form of loyalty as a subconscious (or psychological) switching cost and we do not expect consumers to choose among brands in anticipation of future loyalty states. In contrast, other work in the empirical literature on consumer choice has considered forward-looking behavior in the presence of switching costs (e.g. Osborne (2007)) as well as in contexts such as stockpiling (e.g. Erdem, Imai, and Keane (2003) and Hendel and Nevo (2005)) or learning (e.g. Erdem and Keane (1996)).

Finally, we explore the economic implications of loyalty as the driving force of consumer inertia. First, we show that the magnitude of the underlying switching costs are economically large compared to typical shelf prices for the brands studied. Second, we show that the implications for pricing decisions and equilibrium pricing outcomes are markedly different when inertia arises due to loyalty as opposed to unobserved heterogeneity or autocorrelated
errors. Therefore, the empirical distinction between structural state dependence and spurious state dependence is important for policy analysis. In the companion pieces, Dubé, Hitsch, Rossi, and Vitorino (2008) and Dubé, Hitsch, and Rossi (2009), we explore the implications of the estimated switching costs from our loyalty model for dynamic pricing under multi-product monopoly and dynamic oligopoly respectively.
References


Appendix A: Non-Normal Heterogeneity and State Dependence

If there is a non-normal distribution of tastes for products and a normal model is specified, the specification error in the distribution of heterogeneity may create spurious state dependence. For simplicity, we assume there are two products, indexed by $j = 1, 2$, and ten time periods, indexed by $t = 1, ..., 10$. Each product has a characteristic that varies over time, $x_{jt}$. In addition, product $j = 1$ has a time-invariant characteristic. A consumer $h$ has a preference for product $j = 1$’s time-invariant characteristic denoted $\theta^h_1$. Consumer $h$ also has a preference for the time-varying characteristics denoted $\beta^h$.

We assume that the vector of preference parameters is distributed across households i.i.d. according to the following 2-component mixture-of-normals:

$$\begin{pmatrix} \theta^h_1 \\ \beta^h \end{pmatrix} \sim \begin{cases} N \left( \begin{bmatrix} -2 \\ -0.1 \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} 0.5 & 0 \\ 0 & 0.004 \end{bmatrix} \right), & \text{prob} = 0.5 \\ N \left( \begin{bmatrix} 2 \\ -0.1 \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} 0.5 & 0 \\ 0 & 0.004 \end{bmatrix} \right), & \text{prob} = 0.5 \end{cases}.$$ 

These settings induce a bi-modal marginal distribution on the parameter $\theta_1$, which symmetric around zero. If a normal model of heterogeneity is assumed for the $\theta_1$ parameter, then the resulting fitted normal distribution will be centered at zero. Given the symmetric form of the normal distribution, there will be households (from each mode) that will exhibit more extreme loyalty to one of the two brands than that accommodated by the normal distribution. Therefore, a state dependent variable will enter with a positive coefficient in order to approximate the observed patterns of repeat purchase and there can be a spurious finding of state dependence.

We also assume that the time-varying characteristic is distributed i.i.d. over time according to the following Uniform distribution:

$$x_{jt} \sim U (-1.5, 0).$$

Using the data, we estimate both the one and two-component normal models. However, we include the state dependence variable tracking each household’s lagged choice variable. The log marginal density is found to be higher for the two-component model, as one would
expect. In Figures 13 and 14, we plot the fitted densities for each of the estimated parameters. We see that the two-component model successfully recovers the bi-modality of the density for $\theta_1$. More importantly, the fitted density for the state dependence parameter is centered away from 0 for the one-component model. However, it is centered at 0 for the two-component model. This finding illustrates how unmeasured heterogeneity can continue to manifest itself into the state dependence effect when the normal heterogeneity model is used.

Appendix B: MCMC and Prior Settings

The MCMC method applied here is a hybrid method with a customized Metropolis chain for the draw of the household level parameters coupled with a standard Gibbs sampler for a mixture of normals conditional on the draws of household level parameters. That is, once the collection of household parameters are drawn, the MCMC algorithm treats these as “data” and conducts Bayesian inference for a mixture of normals. Thus, there are “two” stages in the algorithm.

$$\theta_h | y_h, X_h, ind_h, \mu_{ind_h}, \Sigma_{ind_h} \ h = 1, \ldots, H$$

(7.1)

$$ind, \pi, \{\mu_k, \Sigma_k\} | \Theta$$

(7.2)

$\Theta$ is matrix consisting of $H$ rows, each with the $\theta_h$ parameters for each household, $y_h$ is the vector choice observations for household $h$, and $X_h$ is the matrix of covariates. The first stage of the MCMC in (7.1) is a set of $H$ Metropolis algorithms tuned to each household MNL likelihood. The tuning is done automatically without any “pre-sampling” of draws and is done on the basis of a fractional likelihood that combines the household likelihood fractionally with the pooled MNL likelihood (for further details, see Rossi, Allenby, and McCulloch (2005), chapter 5). It should be noted that this tuning is just for the Metropolis proposal distribution. This procedure avoids the problem of undefined likelihoods for tuning purposes. The household likelihood used in the posterior computations is not altered.

The second stage (7.2) is a standard unconstrained Gibbs Sampler for a mixture of normals. The “label-switching” problem for identification in mixture of normals is not present in our application as we are interested in the posterior distribution of a quantity which is label-invariant, i.e. the mixture of normal density itself. The priors used are:

$$\pi \sim \text{Dirichlet} (a)$$
\[ \mu_k | \Sigma_k \sim N(\mu, a^{-1}_\mu \Sigma_k) \]
\[ \Sigma_k \sim IW(\nu, \nu I) \]

The prior hyperparameters were assessed to provide proper but diffuse distributions. \( a = (5/K, K), a_{\mu} = 1/16, \nu = \text{dim} (\theta_h) + 3 \). The Dirichlet prior on \( \pi \) warrants further comment. The Dirichlet distribution is conjugate to the multinomial. \( \sum a \) can be interpreted as the size of a prior sample of data for which the classification of \( \theta_h \) “observations” is known. The number of observations of each “type” or mixture component is given by the appropriate element of \( a \). Our prior says that each type is equally likely and that there is only a very small amount of information in the prior equal to a sample “size” of \( .5 \). As the number of normal components increases, we do not want to change how informative the prior is; this is why we scale the elements of the \( a \) vector by \( K \).

Our computer code for this model can be found in the contributed R package, \texttt{bayesm}, available on the CRAN network of mirror sites (see function \texttt{rhierMnlRwMixture}).

**Appendix C: The Conditional Expectation of \( \epsilon_j \) Given that Product \( j \) is the Optimal Choice**

Let \( u_j(x) \) be the non-random component of the latent utility from product \( j \), which depends on the variables in \( x \). A consumer chooses product \( j \) among all \( J \) options if and only if

\[ \epsilon_j \geq u_k(x) - u_j(x) + \epsilon_k \quad \text{for all } k \neq j. \]

Let \( \epsilon_{-j} \equiv (\epsilon_1, \ldots, \epsilon_{j-1}, \epsilon_{j+1}, \ldots, \epsilon_J) \) and define

\[ \psi_j(x, \epsilon_{-j}) \equiv \max_{k \neq j} \{u_k(x) - u_j(x) + \epsilon_k\}. \]

Then \( j \) is the optimal choice (denoted by \( d \)) if and only if \( \epsilon_j \geq \psi_j(x, \epsilon_{-j}) \). We assume that all \( \epsilon_j \)'s are independent with a density \( p_j \) that is positive everywhere on \( \mathbb{R}^J \). Therefore the conditional density of \( \epsilon_j \) is

\[ p_j(\epsilon_j | d = j, \epsilon_{-j}, x) = \frac{p_j(\epsilon_j)}{1 - \int_{-\infty}^{\psi_j(x, \epsilon_{-j})} p_j(\epsilon) d\epsilon} \]
for all $\epsilon_j \geq \psi_j(x, \epsilon_{j-})$, and $p(\epsilon_j|d = j, \epsilon_{j-}, x) = 0$ otherwise.

Consider two vectors $x_0$ and $x_1$ such that $\omega_0 \equiv \psi_j(x_0, \epsilon_{j-}) < \psi_j(x_1, \epsilon_{j-}) \equiv \omega_1$. Define $\pi \equiv \Pr\{\epsilon_j < \omega_1|d = j, \epsilon_{j-}, x_0\}$. Then

$$
\mathbb{E}[\epsilon_j|d = j, \epsilon_{j-}, x_0] = \pi \mathbb{E}[\epsilon_j|\epsilon_j < \omega_1, d = j, \epsilon_{j-}, x_0] + (1 - \pi) \mathbb{E}[\epsilon_j|\epsilon_j \geq \omega_1, d = j, \epsilon_{j-}, x_0]
< \pi \omega_1 + (1 - \pi) \mathbb{E}[\epsilon_j|\epsilon_j \geq \omega_1, d = j, \epsilon_{j-}, x_0]
= \pi \omega_1 + (1 - \pi) \mathbb{E}[\epsilon_j|d = j, \epsilon_{j-}, x_1]
< \mathbb{E}[\epsilon_j|d = j, \epsilon_{j-}, x_1].
$$

Both inequalities are strict because $p_j(\epsilon_j|d = j, \epsilon_{j-}, x_0) > 0$ for $\epsilon_j \in [\omega_0, \omega_1)$. By the law of iterated expectations,

$$
\mathbb{E}[\epsilon_j|d = j, x_0] = \mathbb{E}_{\epsilon_{j-}}[\mathbb{E}[\epsilon_j|d = j, \epsilon_{j-}, x_0]] < \mathbb{E}_{\epsilon_{j-}}[\mathbb{E}[\epsilon_j|d = j, \epsilon_{j-}, x_1]] = \mathbb{E}[\epsilon_j|d = j, x_1].
$$

Suppose $x_0$ and $x_1$ represent two marketing environments that are identical apart from the price of product $j$ which is discounted in $x_0$ but not in $x_1$. If the discounted price leads to a strictly higher utility from product $j$, then $\psi_j(x_0, \epsilon_{j-}) < \psi_j(x_1, \epsilon_{j-})$, and hence $\mathbb{E}[\epsilon_j|d = j, x_0] = \mathbb{E}[\epsilon_j|d = j, x_1]$. 

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Table 1: Data Description

### Margarine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Avg. price ($)</th>
<th>% trips</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promise</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parkay</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shedd’s</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Can’t Believe It’s Not Butter!</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No-purchase</td>
<td></td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| No. of households               | 429            |
| No. of trips per household      | 16.7           |
| No. of purchases per household  | 9.9            |

### Refrigerated orange juice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Avg. price ($)</th>
<th>% trips</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>64 oz Minute Maid</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premium 64 oz Minute Maid</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96 oz Minute Maid</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64 oz Tropicana</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premium 64 oz Tropicana</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premium 96 oz Tropicana</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No-purchase</td>
<td></td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| No. of households               | 355            |
| No. of trips per household      | 12.3           |
| No. of purchases per household  | 9.4            |
Table 2: Re-purchase Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Purchase frequency</th>
<th>Re-purchase frequency</th>
<th>Re-purchase frequency after discount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promise</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parkay</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shedd’s</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBINB</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Refrigerated orange juice</th>
<th>Purchase Frequency</th>
<th>Re-purchase Frequency</th>
<th>Re-purchase frequency after discount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minute Maid</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tropicana</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Log Marginal Likelihood Values for Different Model Specifications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models not allowing for state dependence</th>
<th>Margarine</th>
<th>Orange juice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homogeneous model</td>
<td>-10211</td>
<td>-7612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 normal components</td>
<td>-4922</td>
<td>-4528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 normal components, lagged prices</td>
<td>-4829</td>
<td>-4389</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models allowing for state dependence</th>
<th>Margarine</th>
<th>Orange juice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homogeneous model</td>
<td>-7618</td>
<td>-6297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 normal component</td>
<td>-4906</td>
<td>-4486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 normal components</td>
<td>-4861</td>
<td>-4434</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Randomized purchase sequence, 5 normal components (30 replications)</th>
<th>Margarine</th>
<th>Orange juice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>-4908</td>
<td>-4501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; percentile</td>
<td>-4924</td>
<td>-4533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97.5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; percentile</td>
<td>-4885</td>
<td>-4470</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Interaction with discount, 5 normal components                      | -4854     | -4419        |
| Brand-specific inertia, 5 normal components                         | -4822     | -4364        |

| Learning models, 5 normal components                               |           |              |
| Experienced shopper dummy                                          | -4884     | -4477        |
| Main effect of brand experience                                   | -4654     | -4297        |
| Main and interaction effects of brand experience                   | -4620     | -4293        |

Note: The models allowing for state dependence include the state variable indicating the last purchased product as a covariate, while the models not allowing for state dependence impose the restriction $\gamma^h = 0$. 
Table 4: Dollar Value of Loyalty

**Margarine**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantile</th>
<th>Dollar value</th>
<th>Dollar value/mean price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25%</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75%</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90%</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Orange juice**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantile</th>
<th>Dollar value</th>
<th>Dollar value/mean price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25%</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75%</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90%</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: Distribution of brand intercepts (margarine)

Note: The graphs display the pointwise posterior mean and 90% credibility region of the marginal density of margarine brand intercepts ($\alpha_{hj}$). The results are based on a five components mixture-of-normals heterogeneity specification. For comparison purposes, we also show the results from a one component heterogeneity specification.
Figure 2: Distribution of price and state dependence coefficients (margarine)

Note: The graphs display the pointwise posterior mean and 90% credibility region of the marginal density of the margarine price coefficient ($\eta^h$) and state dependence coefficient ($\gamma^h$). The results are based on a five components mixture-of-normals heterogeneity specification. For comparison purposes, we also show the results from a one component heterogeneity specification.
Figure 3: Distribution of brand intercepts (refrigerated orange juice)

Note: The graphs display the pointwise posterior mean and 90% credibility region of the marginal density of refrigerated orange juice brand intercepts ($\alpha_j^h$). The results are based on a five components mixture-of-normals heterogeneity specification. For comparison purposes, we also show the results from a one component heterogeneity specification.
Figure 4: Distribution of price and state dependence coefficients (refrigerated orange juice)

Note: The graphs display the pointwise posterior mean and 90% credibility region of the marginal density of the refrigerated orange juice price coefficient ($\eta^h$) and state dependence coefficient ($\gamma^h$). The results are based on a five components mixture-of-normals heterogeneity specification. For comparison purposes, we also show the results from a one component heterogeneity specification.
Figure 5: Testing for autocorrelation

Note: The graphs display the pointwise posterior mean and 90% credibility region of the marginal density of the coefficients $\gamma_1$ and $\gamma_2$ in model (4.2). $\gamma_1$ is the main state dependence coefficient, and $\gamma_2$ represents the effect of the interaction between the purchase state and the presence of a price discount when the product was last purchased. We expect that $\gamma_2 < 0$ under autocorrelated taste shocks. The results are based on a five components mixture-of-normals heterogeneity specification.
Figure 6: Distribution of price and state dependence coefficients with and without controlling for store effects (margarine)

Note: The graphs display the pointwise posterior mean and 90% credibility region of the marginal density of the margarine price coefficient ($\eta^h$) and state dependence coefficient ($\gamma^h$). The results are based on a five components mixture-of-normals heterogeneity specification and shown for model specifications with and without store effects.
Figure 7: Distribution of brand-specific state dependence coefficients (margarine)

Note: The graphs display the pointwise posterior mean and 90% credibility region of the marginal density of the state dependence coefficient ($\gamma^h$), based on a five components mixture-of-normals heterogeneity specification. We show the densities both for a model specification with a uniform (across brands) state dependence coefficient and for a specification allowing for brand-specific state dependence coefficients.
Figure 8: Distribution of brand-specific state dependence coefficients (refrigerated orange juice)

Note: The graphs display the pointwise posterior mean and 90% credibility region of the marginal density of the state dependence coefficient ($\gamma^h$), based on a five components mixture-of-normals heterogeneity specification. We show the densities both for a model specification with a uniform (across brands) state dependence coefficient and for a specification allowing for brand-specific state dependence coefficients (we show results for the four orange juice brands with the largest market shares).
Figure 9: Testing for search

Note: The graphs display the pointwise posterior mean and 90% credibility region of the marginal density of the coefficients $\gamma_1$ and $\gamma_2$ in model (5.1). $\gamma_1$ is the main state dependence coefficient, and $\gamma_2$ measures the extent to which displays moderate the state dependence effect of past purchases. We expect that $\gamma_1 = \gamma_2$ if state dependence entirely proxies for search costs and if search costs disappear in the presence of a display. The results are based on a five components mixture-of-normals heterogeneity specification. We only present results for refrigerated orange juice as the incidence of displays is low in the margarine category.
Figure 10: Testing for learning

Note: The graphs display the pointwise posterior mean and 90% credibility region of the marginal density of the coefficients $\gamma_1$ and $\gamma_2$ in model (5.3). $\gamma_1$ is the main state dependence coefficient, and $\gamma_2$ represents the effect of the interaction between the purchase state and brand consumption experience, defined as the cumulative number of purchases of the brand. We expect that $\gamma_2 < 0$ if state dependence proxies for learning. The results are based on a five components mixture-of-normals heterogeneity specification.
Figure 11: Distribution of the dollar value of loyalty (margarine)

Note: The graphs display the pointwise posterior mean and 90% credibility region of the marginal density of the dollar value of loyalty, defined as $-\gamma^h/\eta^h$. The results are based on a five components mixture-of-normals heterogeneity specification. For comparison purposes, we also show the results from a one component heterogeneity specification.
Figure 12: Equilibrium prices under state dependence and autocorrelation

Note: The graph displays the (symmetric) steady-state equilibrium prices from a model with autocorrelated random utility terms, and contrasts these “true” prices to the price predictions if the inertia in the brand choice data was attributed to structural state dependence in the form of loyalty.
Figure 13: Fitted Densities for the Normal Heterogeneity Specification
Figure 14: Fitted Densities for the Two-Component Mixture-of-Normals Heterogeneity Specification