CENTRAL BANKING, POLITICAL PRESSURE, AND ITS UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

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The proper role of central banks, the frameworks they use, and the range of tools they believe they can legitimately employ, have changed considerably over the last two decades. Interestingly, this has come after perhaps their greatest triumph, taming inflation. What led to this rethinking? And what are its consequences, some possibly unintended. What have been the effects on financial stability? These are the questions this article examines.

To preview my answers, central bankers escaped lightly from the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), getting little of the blame, but acquiring an aura of possessing extraordinary powers as they helped resolve the crisis. One consequence, however, may have been more pressure on central banks to deliver for Main Street. As they subsequently and continuously undershot their inflation target, the pressure on them to aid economic activity increased. Perhaps tinged somewhat with hubris, central banks did not reject these pressures and make the case that there are limits to what central banks can properly do. Instead, they embraced the challenge and embarked on a much broader set of interventions, including direct interventions in asset and credit markets that they eschewed in the past. Arguably, these interventions have not helped

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central banks measurably in achieving their inflation targets. Instead, they have left them poorly positioned for an environment where fiscal spending has ramped up and inflation, not disinflation, is the key problem. Furthermore, central banks have continued underemphasizing
financial stability throughout this time, which also leaves the world poorly positioned for future shocks, including from the changing climate. In trying to do too much, central banks have not just compromised on their fundamental responsibility, monetary stability, they have added to financial instability. In sum, this article is a call for central banks to go back to the knitting, and reassess both their goals as well as their use of tools.

A Short History of the Recent Evolution of Central Banking Thought

The actions of the Federal Reserve, no doubt influenced by developments in academia and by the actions of other central banks, have broadly framed the consensus in central bank thinking. After all, it was Paul Volker’s determination to push short-term nominal interest rates really high, and hold them there until inflation came down, that broke the back of U.S. inflation, raised the Fed’s credibility as an inflation fighter, and contributed to decades of falling nominal interest rates. Kydland and Prescott’s (1977) theory of time inconsistency of policy and the need for commitment, and Rogoff’s (1985) arguments on how to achieve that commitment through an independent, inflation-minded central bank made the case for central bank independence. The Bank of New Zealand, in turn, became the first central bank to formally adopt inflation targeting in 1990, and this spread across the world. Meanwhile, John Taylor (1993) described central bank behavior with a simple model that then became the standard for evaluating whether a central bank was ahead or behind the curve in its fight against inflation. Indeed, so remarkable was the worldwide fall in inflation that Rogoff (2004) suggested that it could not just be attributed to central bank independence and policy, and conjectured that global competition must also have helped.
Be that as it may, with inflation quiescent over long periods, central banks no longer had to raise interest rates periodically. As Borio (2012) notes, this allowed the financial cycle—the unholy correlated increases in asset prices and leverage—to play out over longer periods and with greater amplitude. In this article, I argue there are many channels through which more accommodative monetary policy can initiate and propagate such a cycle. For instance, as interest rates fall, long-term expectations of growth account for a larger and larger share in asset valuations. Given there is little to anchor such expectations, a wide distribution of valuations are possible. The more optimistic among potential buyers buy more long-dated assets financed with borrowing (see Geanakoplos (2010) for a related model). Their wealth is further enhanced by falling rates, allowing them to exercise more of an influence in setting asset prices. Sustained periods of low and falling inflation could thus be accompanied by optimistic asset prices, leverage, and risks to financial stability when prices and leverage correct.

In late 1996, Fed chairman Alan Greenspan came as close as a central banker can to saying he thought stock prices were overvalued, and that the Fed would potentially take that into account in setting monetary policy (Greenspan (1996)). Yet, his speech warning of “irrational exuberance,” at the American Enterprise Institute on December 5th, was shrugged off by markets— and markets were right. The Fed did not act, perhaps warned off by the vociferous political reaction to his speech. The Fed watched while stock prices continued rising during the internet boom, and even cut rates following the Russian debt default in 1998 and the collapse of hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management.

When the stock market eventually crashed in 2000, the Fed responded by cutting rates, ensuring the recession was mild even if subsequent job growth was tepid. In a 2002 speech at the Kansas City’s Jackson Hole Conference, Alan Greenspan argued that, while the Fed could not
recognize or prevent asset price booms, it could “mitigate the fallout when it occurs and, hopefully, ease the transition to the next expansion” (Greenspan 2002). His speech seemed to be a post-facto rationalization of why he had not acted more forcefully on his prescient 1996 intuition. He was now saying the Fed should not intervene when it thought asset prices were too high, but that the Fed could recognize a bust when it happened and would pick up the pieces. Given that inflation was quiescent, the resulting monetary policy was asymmetrical. The recipe was to take little action, other than a normalization of interest rates, when the economy was booming; but to take increasingly aggressive actions to support the economy when activity (and, not coincidentally) asset prices were down. Effectively, the Fed offered traders and bankers a “put option,” whereby if they collectively gambled on similar things, the Fed would not limit the upside; but if their bets turned sour, the Fed would limit the downside.

Clearly, no central bank wants such asymmetric incentives, yet with one interest rate tool, central banks believed they could not simultaneously achieve both monetary and financial stability. Therefore, it was left to an often poorly defined set of macroprudential policies to curb risk taking. It was convenient for the powerful, monetary policy setting, arms of central banks to delegate this messy task to someone else. It was also dangerous for the system. First, as Kohn and Kerr (2015) pointed out, even today the Fed has no central body with macroprudential responsibility. This is particularly problematic since macroprudential regulation has the politically difficult task of constraining risk taking just when the risktakers have tasted success, and are more influential. When responsibility is diffused, it is all too easy to leave action to someone else. Second, as Stein (2013) points out, vast areas of the financial system are regulated lightly, if at all. Macroprudential regulation has little bite there. The value of monetary action is that “it gets into all the cracks.”
Be that as it may, the Great Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 was evidence that the system of fractured responsibilities did not work. No doubt, bank regulation has increased considerably since then, and banks are much better supervised, capitalized, and incentivized than before the GFC. Yet the nonbank periphery of the financial system, also termed the “shadow financial system,” continues to have considerably less oversight or regulation, and risks tend to migrate there, periodically coming back to ensnare the banking system—as evidenced by recent blowups such as Archegos or Greensill. With the rise of cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, and decentralized finance, the size and complexity of the unregulated shadow system has only grown.

Further offsetting the post-GFC increased bank regulation is the fact that, post-GFC, central banks have not been achieving their inflation targets, and therefore have come under greater pressure to be aggressively accommodative on monetary policy. For instance, in the United States, personal consumption expenditure (PCE) inflation, the Fed’s preferred measure, averaged about 1.4 percent from 2012 to 2020, below the 2 percent target. That policy interest rates were at the zero lower bound seemed to be no defense. From the political side, pressure on the central bank mounted in a time of low growth. If the central bank is not meeting its target, there must be some stimulus it is not delivering, or so the thinking went. Pressure on central banks also came from a potentially appreciating exchange rate, as the European Central Bank (ECB) realized over 2010–2013, as other central banks found new, innovative, ways of easing financing conditions. But central bankers did not also reject their own responsibility for excessively low inflation, perhaps because they were worried about losing credibility if they claimed they had done all they could. They always seemed to suggest they had more tools to push inflation up, even after repeated failures. Indeed one can discern a hint of smugness in their lament that fiscal policy and reforms were not working, and monetary policy was the “only game
in town.” But while Volker had taught central banks how to bring down inflation, there was no obvious playbook for reflating an economy, especially when nominal rates were already at zero, and fiscal policy limited.

How Did Monetary Policy Change after the GFC?

Following the Global Financial Crisis, with interest rates at zero, further unconventional monetary interventions took three broad forms: repairing markets, altering asset prices, and direct credit programs. At the core of all these was a greater willingness of the central bank to intervene in markets.

*Repairing Markets*

A number of financial markets had broken down during the GFC. Some of this was due to lack of confidence, some to lack of liquidity, and some because key players were undercapitalized. Of course, there was also a possibility that some of the financial claims being traded were worthless because the issuers were insolvent. Nevertheless, central banks attempted to alter perceptions and engender a virtuous circle by intervening. The hope was that restoring public confidence through the central bank’s support of financial markets, coupled with the liquidity injected through purchases, would recapitalize market players, increase their participation, and restore values and volume to asset markets. In its first round of quantitative easing (QE1), the Fed invested in the disrupted mortgage-backed securities (MBS) market while the ECB, through its misleadingly named “ordinary monetary transactions” (OMT) policy, backed sovereign bonds of periphery governments.\(^1\) Whether the central bank changed

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\(^1\) As Mario Draghi (2012), the then ECB president put it, “Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough.” Indeed, just this statement seemed to be enough, and no OMT actions were actually undertaken.
perceptions of market fundamentals or whether it merely made explicit put options that it had written for these markets is hard to tell. Regardless, the interventions seem to have restored transaction volumes and prices to more normal levels, ensuring their place in future toolkits.

*Altering Asset Prices*

Monetary policy works, in part, by signaling the path of short-term interest rates, and therefore affecting long-term interest rates. With policy rates at zero, and with little room to cut them further, central banks looked for other ways to affect long-term rates more directly. One way was to expand central bank balance sheets through an announced program of buying long-term government bonds, with the intent of depressing long-term interest rates. Whether this worked by taking long-term assets out of private hands and forcing private portfolios to rebalance by buying more long-term assets (Tobin 1969), or by committing that policy rates would not be raised so long as the central bank is buying long-term assets (see Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgenssen (2011)), is unclear. Indeed, whether it had much sustained effect on long rates (Cochrane 2018; Greenlaw et al. 2018) is also a matter of debate. Other central banks such as the Bank of Japan practiced “yield curve control,” where they sought to keep the yield of a specific bond such as the 10-year bond at a targeted level through direct central bank purchases or sales of the bond. While the effects of such interventions on long-term rates were much clearer, there was no clear sign that those efforts helped enhance real investment or economic activity.

Of course, there were parallels between various forms of QE and the discredited past direct financing of governments by their captive central banks. Monetary economists frowned on this practice because the central bank essentially gave the government a “soft budget constraint,” which proved to be inflationary. Central bank independence required them to stop financing
governments directly. What distinguished the new central bank asset purchase programs from the discredited programs of the past was a fig leaf and circumstances. The fig leaf was that the central bank typically purchased in the secondary market, not directly from the government, though once the program was announced, markets anticipated such purchases, and this was a distinction without a difference. However, after the GFC, the circumstances were different from the typical situation where central bank financing of government debt is problematic. Interest rates were at the zero lower bound and developed country governments were typically not strapped for cash, so central bank financing was not critical for their budgets.

I say “typically” because European periphery countries were indeed strapped. With the onset of the pandemic, this has become the case with more governments, and central banks have become central players in bridging government financing gaps.

*Directed Credit Programs*

Another element in the new toolkit was central bank participation in providing cheap refinancing for any bank credit that met specific conditions—loans to small and medium firms, households, or sometimes even any loan expansion at all. Once again, this cheap financing for bank credit revived old practices abandoned by central banks, who had argued that *directed credit* distorted the working of the capital markets and could lead to political rather than market allocation of resources. Worries about distortions and politicization seemed minor when set against the enormity of the post-GFC economic downturn. One again, direct credited programs were revived and expanded following the onset of Covid-19, in March 2020.

**Did These Policies Work?**
At a narrow level, some of these unconventional policies seemed to work in that some of the stated intent was met. For instance, the MBS market recovered. De Maggio, Kermani, and Palmer (2020) show that Fed MBS purchases in QE1 led to an increase in refinancing, a reduction in mortgage payments, and an associated increase in consumption. Once again, whether the MBS market recovered because the central bank restored confidence (good), or because it offered the market a long-term put option (less good), is less clear.

Central bank actions did not always work as intended. Acharya et al. (2019) show that banks that held more European periphery sovereign bonds, when Draghi boosted their value by announcing OMT, lent more. The effective recapitalization they obtained seemed to release constraints on lending. However, Acharya et al. argue that a number of the additional loans went to economically unviable “zombie” firms, whose continued financing and survival may have held back the recovery of industry. Central bank activism also “worked” at second or third remove, even when support was targeted. For instance, Grosse-Rueschkamp, Steffen, and Streitz (2019) show that ECB purchases of corporate bonds reduced yields for eligible firms, allowing them to repay bank debt with bond issuances—enabling banks to lend to riskier firms.

Of course, there is also evidence that central bank actions worked as intended. Foley-Fisher, Ramcharan, and Yu (2016), for example, offer evidence that the Fed’s maturity extension program (also known as “Operation Twist”) allowed firms dependent on long-term debt to issue more of it, expanding employment and investment.

Despite such positive micro-evidence, the broader macro-impacts, including on real activity, of these new central bank tools are harder to discern. Fabo et al. (2020) examine 54 studies on the effects of QE on output and inflation in the United States, United Kingdom, and the euro area. While the papers by central bankers typically report a statistically significant QE
effect on output, only half the academic papers do. Interestingly, studies by the Bundesbank, a rare central bank opposed to QE, finds even less effects of QE on output than the academic papers. While it is inappropriate to conclude that central bank research is necessarily biased, the fact that specific assumptions can drive conclusions suggests that the evidence is fairly noisy—that is, the new tools do not offer overwhelming evidence of effectiveness.

Why then did central banks embrace them? The nature of the tools suggests that post-GFC central banks had much less faith in the effective working of markets. Perhaps “irrational exuberance” was followed by irrational pessimism, with asset values significantly below true fundamentals. If so, central banks could put their balance sheets to work to correct misperceptions. Of course, there was always a danger that valuations would be altered not because the market recognized true fundamentals, but because the central bank intervention altered fundamentals. If true fundamentals eventually converged to central bank-altered fundamentals, the central bank might indeed be providing a valuable service. But if they did not converge, we would realize this only too late—when central banks have little room to expand their balance sheets to deliver on their contingent guarantees. Put differently, a key question today is have central banks induced market dependence with their new tools, and consequently tied their own actions to market performance?

Altering Frameworks

The Fed did more in the post-GFC low inflation environment than just adopt unconventional tools. It also set about changing its framework so as to alter public expectations. Essentially, by committing to be more tolerant of inflation in the medium term, the Fed would have greater credibility in signaling that interest rates would stay “lower for longer” even in the
face of higher inflation, and thus allow inflationary expectations to move higher. Put differently, the Fed had to erode some of its hard-won credibility for fighting high inflation in order to combat “low” inflation.

A key element of the Fed’s new framework (see Levy and Plosser 2020; Plosser 2021) is that it will no longer be preemptive in heading off inflation. Instead, it will be measured and reactive. The old Fed mantra, that if you are staring inflation in the eyeballs it is already too late, has been put to bed. Instead, the Fed will watch inflation rise until it has made up any shortfalls in past inflation, so that average inflation is around the target. Of course, since the period over which the average is taken is undefined, the Fed can allow higher inflation for a while and not be criticized for falling behind the curve. Monetary policy can be more discretionary, and can be used to meet a broader employment mandate, where unemployment should not only be low but employment broad-based and inclusive. Since minorities unfortunately are last to be hired, this means the Fed will potentially tolerate a tighter labor market than in the past. Finally, the Fed’s employment mandate has become more asymmetric: rather than minimize deviations from maximum employment, it worries only about shortfalls now, leaving it to the now-more-accommodative inflation mandate to react to an overly tight labor market.

Isn’t discretion good, especially for a professional apolitical organization? Possibly, but perhaps not when the environment changes in a way that was not envisaged by the framework, and becomes vastly more politically charged.

What Changed?

Central banks were only partly responsible for the low inflation environment over the last few decades. Part of the responsibility also lay with deeper structural forces affecting demand
and supply, such as globalization, population ageing, and rising income inequality within
developed countries. But these also were changing.

One important pre-pandemic development was growing impediments placed on global
trade and investment. Earlier, the rise of emerging markets, which were moving more workers
from low-productivity agriculture into industry and service jobs, created a truly global goods and
labor market. Greater competition reduced goods prices and wages, but a longer lasting effect
(which is what matters for inflation over the medium term) was, as Rogoff (2004) argues, greater
competition reduced central bank incentives to raise inflation to boost growth. However, with
growing protectionism, trade disruption, and investment disputes between the two biggest
economies in the world, borders are no longer as seamless as they once were. So even before the
pandemic, the conditions holding down inflation were turning.

The pandemic further altered those conditions. Apart from the tragic and widespread loss
of lives and livelihoods, the pandemic has disrupted the market for goods, services, and labor.
The short-run disruptions will fade, and whether they will have lasting effects on the public’s
inflationary expectations is hard to tell. However, there are a number of channels through which
the pandemic may have longer-lasting influences. The pandemic certainly seems to have led to a
change in personal and public attitudes toward low-paying, low-benefit, precarious jobs. Such
jobs have typically been on the pandemic front line, involving high contact with people, long
hours, and little job flexibility. Not only are workers reluctant to return to such jobs, the public is
also more supportive of higher pay and benefits for such work. More generally, wage demands
are more likely to be accommodated in the post-pandemic environment.

The pandemic has also increased the public’s perception of the likelihood of tail events,
increasing the political will behind combating climate change. This will imply higher costs: of
new investments, fully pricing emissions, and compliance with stricter regulations. Of course, these measures are needed. But if firms pass through the higher costs, which will likely come as a steady stream rather than as a one-off, they will also contribute to inflationary impulses.

Perhaps the biggest change in the pandemic response, relative to the response to the GFC, has been on the fiscal side. There are many possible explanations for the dramatic opening of fiscal taps across the world, including: the need for policymakers to act quickly, to obtain consensus in a sharply divided polity by spreading the benefits around, and to exploit the change in attitudes toward fiscal deficits—driven perhaps by respectable economists whose convenient message (to politicians) seemed to be that developed countries could afford significantly more debt at current interest rates. Be that as it may, the consequence was a massive resource transfer to the private sector (i.e., to households, firms, and banks). In the United States, personal disposable income went up while bankruptcies fell, both firsts for what was ostensibly an economic downturn. Cash savings and pent-up demand have risen to extraordinary levels. With spending falling initially on goods, supply chains have become snarled. Of course, none of this need imply sustained inflation if the central bank acts according to its mandate. There are, however, reasons why central banks will not simply bring out the old Volkerian anti-inflation playbook.

Impediments to Policy Normalization

In the past, current levels of inflation would have prompted central bankers to square their shoulders, look determinedly into the TV cameras, and say, “We hate inflation, and we will kill it”—or words to that effect. But now they are more likely to make excuses for inflation, assuring the public that it will simply go away. Clearly, the prolonged period of low inflation
after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis has had a lasting impression on central bankers’ psyches. The obvious danger now is that they could be fighting the last war. Moreover, even if they do not fall into that trap, structural changes within central banks and in the broader policymaking environment will leave central bankers more reluctant to raise interest rates than they were in the past. Consider why, focusing on the Fed.

Framework Dominance

As argued earlier, the Fed changed its framework to allow itself to keep policies more accommodative for longer, believing it was in an era of structurally low demand and weak inflation. Ironically, the Fed may have given itself more flexibility just as the economic regime itself was changing.

But shouldn’t greater flexibility give decisionmakers more options? Not necessarily. In the current scenario, Congress has just spent trillions of dollars generating the best economic recovery that money can buy. Imagine the congressional wrath that would follow if the Fed now tanked the economy by hiking interest rates without using the full flexibility of its new framework. Put differently, one of the benefits of a clear inflation-targeting framework is that the central bank has political cover to react quickly to rising inflation. With the changed framework, that is no longer true. As a result, there will almost surely be more inflation for longer. Indeed, the new framework was adopted—during what now seems like a very different era—with precisely that outcome in mind.

Market Dominance

But it is not just the new framework that limits the effectiveness of the Fed’s actions. Anticipating loose monetary policy and financial conditions for the indefinite future, asset
markets have been on a tear, supported by heavy borrowing. Market participants, rightly or wrongly, believe that the Fed has their back and will retreat from a path of rate increases if asset prices fall.

This means that when the Fed moves, it may have to raise rates higher in order to normalize financial conditions, implying a higher risk of an adverse market reaction when market participants finally realize that the Fed means business. Once again, the downside risks, both to the economy and to the Fed’s reputation, of a path of rate hikes are considerable.

Fiscal Dominance

The original intent in making central banks independent of the government was to ensure that they could reliably combat inflation and not be pressured into either financing the government’s fiscal deficit directly or into keeping government borrowing costs low by slowing the pace of rate hikes. Yet the Fed now holds $5.6 trillion of government debt, financed by an equal amount of overnight borrowing from commercial banks.

When rates move up, the Fed itself will have to start paying higher rates, reducing the dividend it pays the government and increasing the size of the fiscal deficit. Moreover, U.S. government debt is at around 125 percent of GDP, and a significant portion of it has a short-term maturity, which means that increases in interest rates will quickly start showing up in higher refinancing costs. An issue that the Fed did not have to pay much attention to in the past—the effects of rate hikes on the costs of financing government debt—will now be front and center.

Therefore, even as inflationary pressures rise, central banks are predisposed to waiting longer than in the past to see if they will simply go away. If the post-2008 scenario repeats, if new Covid variants undermine growth, or if China and other emerging markets send
disinflationary impulses across the global economy, waiting will have been the right decision. Otherwise, the present impediments to central bank action will mean more, and sustained, inflation, and a more prolonged fight to control it. The problem is that a long period of monetary accommodation, and diminished attention to financial stability while the problem of low inflation was being addressed, have accentuated the financial cycle and exacerbated the risks to financial stability from tighter money.

Risks from a Prolonged Period of Accommodation

The economic system has gotten used to a period of very easy money. What are the risks when central banks do overcome the impediments that we just discussed and embark on policy normalization?

Untested Financial Innovation

There has been substantial financial innovation since the Global Financial Crisis—indeed, the dominant cryptocurrency, bitcoin, was conceived as a substitute to fiat currencies after the failure of Lehman Brothers, since central bankers could not be trusted to avoid the temptation of inflating away currency value. Innovative products already have significant valuations and market shares but are untested through a serious downturn or through a normalization of monetary policy.

We will eventually learn answers to a number of questions. For instance, will credit be more available in a downturn because data substitutes for collateral, or will it become more skewed because everyone coordinates on the same data and similar algorithms to avoid difficult credits? Will stablecoins experience traditional bank runs in a period of higher anxiety about valuations? How will loan losses shape up and how easy will recoveries be on lending platforms
and buy-now-pay-later schemes in a serious downturn? How will high frequency trading affect prices then and who will provide market-making services? It is unlikely that all the answers will be comforting.

Financial innovations can also enhance the speed of capital flows and thus traditional sources of fragility. For instance, countries with weak macroeconomic indicators and banking systems may see significantly more capital outflows in a period of rising interest rates than in the past, with cryptocurrencies offering new, effective channels for bypassing capital controls.

The point is that the shadow financial system has only grown since the GFC, and regulators, still using spreadsheets and pdf files, have to make significant strides to both understand financial innovations as well as how to regulate them, including through the use of technology (see Coeure (2021)). The change in monetary environment may come before they are ready.

The High Level of Asset Prices

Periods of low rates inspire a search for yield from market participants with fixed nominal liabilities such as pension funds (Rajan (2006). Rising asset prices, especially for innovative “alternative” asset classes, can also induce a fear of missing out among asset managers. Narratives about future use value, especially those with little falsifiability today, can imbue certain long-dated assets with high values when discounted at low long-term rates. How, for instance, will the value of cryptocurrencies, essentially long-dated, zero coupon bonds priced on the hope they will dominate payments or be the new gold, adjust when interest rates move up? Given their value is cumulatively over $2.5 trillion on a good day, this is not an insignificant
concern. What of a tech company, scheduled to make losses for the foreseeable future, but priced at astronomical levels because, after all, Amazon made losses for a long time?

As argued earlier, the high level of asset prices can make the central bank’s task in removing accommodation more difficult. If markets believe that the central bank will pause or reverse itself if prices fall, they may simply ignore the threat of higher policy rates. However, the price reaction, once markets understand the central bank is determined to remove accommodation, can be larger.

The key to whether asset price volatility leads to magnified real-sector volatility has to do with financial leverage. And high levels of asset prices both cause, and are supported by, high degrees of leveraging.

Leverage

All manner of leverage—private, public, and market, explicit and implicit—has gone up since the GFC. As one example of disguised and implicit leverage, Archegos, a family office run by a convicted trader, was able to borrow about five times its size from multiple banks, all the while betting on a few equities such as Viacom.2 Not only were the targeted companies themselves leveraged, Archegos held total return swaps on the equities that were themselves funded by margin loans. Archegos blew up when Viacom decided to take advantage of its unrealistic equity price by issuing more shares, thereby tanking the equity price and prompting margin calls that Archegos could not meet, leading to further equity fire sales as banks sought to protect their positions. High asset prices and high leverage were clearly an unstable combination.

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Debt that is supported by the cash flows generated by the borrowing entity is inherently safer, especially if the borrowing is long term. Debt that is supported by asset prices is inherently more fragile, yet quite widespread. In an economy with falling long-term interest rates stemming from accommodative policies, the rise in asset prices gives levered players more equity to support yet more borrowing. Moreover, the prospect that such players will be around to buy assets if a current borrower is unable to repay gives the borrower greater debt capacity. Debt capacity stems not from the cash flow the borrower generates, but from the lenders greater ability to sell the underlying assets to other players in the industry if the borrower defaults (Diamond, Hu, and Rajan (2020)). The cycle is virtuous: Greater debt capacity leads to higher bids for assets, which lead to greater equity among prospective buyers in the industry.

Of course, when rates rise, asset prices could fall, and the cycle could become a vicious one—prospective buyer equity falls, making them less able to buy at high prices, reducing the debt capacity of assets. The problem is compounded by the fact that, in times when borrowing based on prospective asset sale values is easy, both borrowers and lenders may neglect the underlying cash flows that will ultimately be needed to service debt when asset prices fall. The mortgage loans made prior to the GFC to borrowers with no income, no job, and no assets (“Ninja loans”) came back to haunt lenders when house prices plummeted, and it was no longer possible to sell repossessed houses easily to recover amounts loaned. It is not difficult to see parallel forces at work in the red hot market for private equity transactions today, raising concerns for the period when accommodation ends.

Liquidity Dependence
Central banks have been accommodative not just by keeping rates low but by expanding their balance sheets. The counterpart is an expansion in the central bank reserves held by commercial banks. Ordinarily, one would think that an expansion in the very liquid reserves should increase liquidity in the system. Yet the financial system has experienced severe liquidity shortages, both in September 2019 and March 2020, at times when reserves were four times what they were before the GFC.

The reality is that the supply of liquidity through reserves creates new demands for liquidity, sometimes exceeding the initial supply (Acharya and Rajan 2021). Specifically, commercial banks finance reserve holdings with wholesale deposits, which can turn into claims on liquidity in periods of stress. They also explicitly sell claims on liquidity such as committed credit lines. Regulators themselves want banks to set aside liquid assets to meet various regulatory ratios. Finally, if all these demands come due at the same time (and systemic stress tends to precipitate such correlated demands), some banks prefer to hoard liquidity, further exacerbating liquidity shortages. Of course, all this puts pressure on central banks to accommodate the stress by supplying yet more liquidity. To wean the system of such liquidity dependence is not easy, yet the alternative of an ever-expanding central bank balance sheet is also not feasible, in part because of the consequences for fiscal health.

**Balance Sheet Expansion and Fiscal Fragility**

When the central bank buys long-term government debt and issues reserves (for instance, when engaging in QE), it effectively shortens the duration of the debt held by the public on the consolidated central bank/government balance sheets. Here is why: the central bank finances those purchases by borrowing overnight reserves from commercial banks on which it pays interest (also termed “interest on excess reserves”). From the perspective of the consolidated
balance sheet of the government and the central bank (which, remember, is a wholly owned subsidiary of the government), the government has essentially swapped long-term debt for overnight debt with the public. QE thus drives a continuous shortening of effective government debt maturity and a corresponding increase in (consolidated) government and central-bank exposure to rising interest rates.

Does this matter? Consider the 15-year average maturity of U.K. government debt. The median maturity is shorter, at 11 years, and falls to just four years when one accounts for the QE-driven shortening because of the government debt held by the Bank of England. A 1 percentage point increase in interest rates would therefore boost the U.K. government’s debt interest payments by about 0.8 percent of GDP—which, the U.K. Office of Budget Responsibility notes, is about two-thirds of the medium-term fiscal tightening proposed over the same period. And, of course, rates could increase much more than 1 percentage point. In the case of the United States, not only is the outstanding government debt much shorter in maturity than that of the U.K., the Fed also owns one-quarter of it.

The broader point is that along with the expansion in public borrowing discussed earlier, the shortening of the duration of that borrowing exposes economies to the risk of fiscal fragility as rates move up.

Cross-Border Spillovers

Easy monetary policy in the core reserve countries leads to cross-border capital flows to periphery recipient countries. When the core countries tighten, capital flows back. The sensitivity of credit flows to U.S. monetary policy is much greater in emerging markets and developing countries, and is disproportionately focused on riskier emerging markets and riskier firms within
(Brauning and Ivashina 2018). To the extent that recipient countries are unprepared, given the phase of their business cycle or given the extent of borrowing, to accommodate outflows, stress spreads across borders. Since much has been written about both the monetary policy spillovers and the spillbacks (of reduced activity in recipient countries to core countries), I will confine myself to noting they could be sizeable and that we need to consider whether these should be incorporated into monetary policy settings (see Mishra and Rajan 2020).

The Way Forward

So where do central banks go from here, given the impediments to acting and the costs of acting aggressively in a system that has become dependent on continued accommodation? Clearly the temptation is to stay accommodative, hoping that inflationary pressures will die of their own accord. Yet inaction in the face of mounting evidence of the need for action will eventually be disruptive, perhaps even more so. Central banks have to recognize that the pandemic has changed the world in many ways, so they have to be data driven. At the same time, they do not have the luxury of waiting for certainty. They have to act firmly given their best interpretation of incomplete evidence, recognizing there are dangers of being aggressive as well as passive. The fragilities that have built up over the years of accommodative policy will not disappear, and will have to be navigated. But as the world moves on, central banks should ask how we got here.

Populism and the Central Bank
Populism implies distrust in elite institutions, their objectives, and their operational decisions. According to the populist demagogue, tough policy choices are an elite conspiracy, intended by the elite to feather their nest while imposing pain on the masses. Central banks are the most elite of institutions, staffed by pointy-headed economists from elite institutions, speaking in an argot that only a chosen few understand.

There are then at least two ways of looking at central bank actions in recent years. Their actions could be seen as a laudable response to a stubbornly disinflationary environment. The untried unconventional policies are brave attempts to deliver on their mandates. The neglect of financial stability is partly a consequence of a limited set of central bank tools and the greater importance of reviving growth. This is the interpretation that most central bankers buy into.

There is a different diagnosis, however, perhaps dating from chairman Greenspan’s failed attempt to talk down the market. It is that central banks have shied away whenever tough policies are required to deliver on their responsibility for monetary and financial stability, as they attempt to retain public approval in an increasingly fractured polity. While central banks are ostensibly independent, the resemblance of some of their policies to long-abandoned interventionist policies of the past is not coincidental. In this rendering, central banks have become more political, in line with the change in their societies. The truth probably lies in between.

Clearly, central bankers have made the economy even more dependent on their actions. However, only time will establish whether these new tools have aided macro-stability or created new sources of volatility. It certainly has made good central banking policy far more difficult, even as it has become far more critical for economic well-being. Perhaps that is the way central bankers want it!
What changes would I advocate? Almost surely, central banks have to pay more attention to financial stability. Clearly, they have to enhance their understanding here, as well as their supervisory and regulatory capabilities. If they were dozing when the risks to subprime lending build up, they have been in deep slumber as the cryptocurrency market has exploded. In the United States, macroprudential responsibility needs to be firmly allocated to one regulator, which should develop the capabilities to monitor and act or press relevant regulators to act.

The more difficult question is how should monetary policy change? My belief is that it can do more by being more realistic in public communication about the limits of monetary policy and the dangers of monetary policy overextension to financial stability. However, since it is an evolving area of debate, perhaps it is best to end this article with questions.

Questions That Need Answers

- What should the inflation mandate of central banks be? Should the mandate recognize that some aspects will be difficult to reach under certain conditions (e.g., higher inflation under disinflationary conditions)?
- What responsibility should the central bank have for financial stability? How should it choose when between price stability and financial stability when the objectives conflict, and macroprudential tools are likely to be ineffectual?
- Should central banks take on more responsibilities than just price and financial stability?
- Should central banks explain the limitations of their traditional tool box to the public, even at the risk of undermining faith in, and credibility of, central banks?
• What new tools are permissible? How much should central banks interfere in the functioning of markets beyond setting policy rates and auctioning liquidity? How much should their ability to intervene be constrained after every unprecedented intervention so that the market does not become dependent?

• How much should central banks nod to public opinion? How do they retain their ability to take actions that may be necessary for long-run growth and stability but might result in unpopular pain in the short run?

References


