Liquidity, Pledgeability, and the Nature of Lending

Douglas W. Diamond1     Yunzhi Hu     Raghuram G. Rajan

Chicago Booth and NBER    University of North Carolina    Chicago Booth and NBER

Abstract

We develop a theory of changes in the nature of corporate lending and intermediation based on fluctuations in the prospective net worth or liquidity of an industry as well as the internal governance or pledgeability of a firm. Variations in prospective liquidity can induce changes in the nature and quantity of loans that are made, the identity of the lender, and the extent to which the lender is leveraged. We offer predictions on how these might vary over the financial cycle.

1 Diamond and Rajan thank the Center for Research in Security Prices at Chicago Booth for research support. Rajan also thanks the Fama-Miller Center, the Stigler Center and IGM at Chicago Booth for research support. We are grateful to helpful comments from Ron Kaniel (the editor), the referee, Jason Roderick Donaldson, Ye Li, Arvind Krishnamurthy, S. "Vish" Viswanathan, Ming Yang, and participants at the 2019 AEA, FIFI, Chicago Booth, Columbia, SFS Cavalcade, FIRS, Rochester, and IMF. A previous version was titled “Liquidity and Securitization.”
The nature of lending in an economy changes over the financial cycle. Clearly, the quantity of debt a borrower can take on varies. The extent to which banks play an important role, or give way to more arm’s length lending also changes. So does the form of debt – whether it has many covenants or few, whether enforcement requires more direct intervention or whether the loan contract embeds performance pricing so that interest rates adjust to the borrower’s situation automatically. Finally, changes in the nature of lending also affect the capital structure of intermediaries like banks. A vast empirical literature examines various aspects of lending, but there is relatively little theory explaining when one might see some aspects particularly pronounced. In this paper, we present a parsimonious model that attempts to explain why and how the nature of lending changes with the environment in which lending takes place.

Since our focus is on the environment, we keep the nature of the borrowing firm that is financed and the cash flows it generates fixed, while altering financing conditions. Specifically, we alter prospective liquidity by which we mean the net worth of potential buyers for the firm’s assets (though we offer other interpretations later). We analyze how such changes in financing conditions affect the borrower’s incentives to improve the internal governance of the corporation, as well as how it alters the nature of lending. More specifically, we describe the types of lenders and debt contracts that are selected by borrowers and the types of actions (such as verifying or monitoring information) that will be undertaken by lenders as part of these contracts.

Let us elaborate. Consider an economy where expert managers bid for an asset producing cash flows, henceforth called the firm. Experts fund their bid with a loan against the firm. The winning bidder becomes the incumbent manager of the firm. The other agents in the model are investors and financial intermediaries, henceforth banks. Investors are individuals with some personal funds to lend, but who do not have the inclination or ability to engage closely with borrowing firms. Banks, in contrast, can intervene when a corporate loan goes off-track at a cost. We assume that there are plenty of investors around, so their ability to finance firms directly, or via banks, is unlimited. Neither investors nor banks can manage firms.

The size of the loan that an expert receives for their initial bid depends on the debt capacity the firm can support. The fundamental agency problem is limited enforcement, i.e., the expert is unwilling to repay if she can avoid it. When at arm’s length, lenders have two sorts of control

---

2 See, for example, Bradley and Roberts (2015), and Benmelech, Kumar, and Rajan (2020). For a description of the financial cycle, see Borio (2014).
rights, which allow them to be repaid and are the basis for the firm’s borrowing capacity. First, they have the right to repossess and sell the firm’s assets for going-concern value if payments are missed. This right only requires the frictionless enforcement of property rights in the economy, which we assume. It has especial value when there are a large number of potential buyers in the future, willing to pay a high price for the firm’s assets. Greater future wealth amongst experts outside the firm (that is, prospective expert liquidity, more practically, prospective corporate net worth of other firms in the industry) leads to higher prices for the firm in the resale market, with less of a fire-sale discount. This increases the availability of this asset-sale-based financing upfront, as in Shleifer and Vishny (1992). Clearly, this kind of control right is exogenous to the firm and depends on economic and financial conditions.

The second right is that lenders can obtain some of the cash flows generated by the asset directly. Unlike asset-based rights, which depend on enforcement of property rights, cash flow rights are more endogenous; they stem from the incumbent expert’s actions improving firm governance that increase the pledgeability of the firm’s cash flows so that they are more directly appropriable by creditors. Raising pledgeability might entail, for example, improving accounting quality or setting up a stronger board so that the expert cannot divert project cash flows into their own coffers. Higher pledgeability allows the incumbent to borrow more directly against the firm’s cash flows.

A key feature in our model is that the two rights interact. In general, both the higher prospective wealth of non-incumbent experts outside the firm (that is, prospective liquidity) as well as the higher amount of the firm’s future cash flow that a non-incumbent expert can borrow against (that is, higher future pledgeability of the firm’s cash flows) will increase their future bids for the firm. Higher prospective bids will increase debt repayments, and the willingness of creditors to lend up front. Higher prospective liquidity and pledgeability increase debt capacity.

We assume it takes time to raise pledgeability, and it is also semi-durable; improving accounting quality is not instantaneous because it requires adopting new systems and hiring reputable auditors. Equally, getting rid of a reputable accountant or changing accounting practices has to be done slowly, perhaps at the time the accountant’s term ends if it is not to be challenged. So the expert incumbent chooses pledgeability one period in advance, and it lasts a period.

Consider now the expert incumbent manager’s incentives while setting cash flow pledgeability for the next period, after buying the firm with borrowed money. For this to be an interesting decision, we assume she may have some likelihood of selling all or some of the firm
next period – either because she loses ability and is no longer capable of running it, or because she needs to raise finance for new investments.

If the incumbent had no debt claims outstanding, she would undoubtedly want to increase pledgeability, especially if the direct costs of doing so are small – this would simply increase the amount she would obtain by selling the firm to non-incumbent experts if she lost ability. However, when the incumbent expert has taken on debt, she will see enhancing cash flow pledgeability as a double-edged sword. The higher future bid from non-incumbent experts also enables the upfront lender to collect more payments if the incumbent stays in control because the lender has the right to seize assets and sell them when not paid in full. In such situations, the incumbent has to “buy” the firm from the lender by outbidding experts (or repaying the initial loan fully). The higher the probability the incumbent will retain ability and stay in control and the higher the outstanding debt, the lower her incentive to raise pledgeability. This means that when high pledgeability is needed for debt enforcement, outstanding debt cannot be very high.

Another way of seeing this is that any incumbent manager always has mixed motives in improving governance (that is, pledgeability) – it improves her access to new external finance but also make existing outside claims stronger. So higher the existing claims relative to new financing needs, lower her incentives to improve governance.

Now consider the effect of prospective liquidity on pledgeability choice. When prospective liquidity is not high, higher pledgeability, as we have seen, helps increase outside expert bids. However, experts will never pay more for the firm in the future than its fundamental value. Therefore, when future expert liquidity is very high, non-incumbent experts will have enough wealth to buy the firm at the full fundamental value without needing to borrow against the firm’s future cash flows. In this case, higher pledgeability has no effect on how much experts will bid to pay for the firm. In other words, high future liquidity crowds out the need for pledgeability in enhancing debt repayments. Therefore, we have two influences on pledgeability – the level of outstanding debt taken on to buy the firm and the prospective liquidity of non-incumbent experts.

Finally, consider banks. In our paper, for the most part they do not play a direct role in governance. Instead, they incentivize the borrower to improve pledgeability, which allows them to lend more upfront. Assume there are noisy proxies for pledgeability that are observable and verifiable. This could be the requirement that the firm submit periodic audited financial statements, and a covenant can be written on it. We examine what happens when the bank
observes a covenant violation, for instance a delayed submission, which signals, albeit with noise, that the realized pledgeability is low.

The bank has a number of advantages over arm’s length lenders with respect to covenants. It interacts with the borrower continuously and can catch a violation of the covenant early, it can monitor further to get a more precise read of pledgeability, and it can liquidate the firm early. Early liquidation is different from seizing and auctioning the firm for going-concern value or selling plant and equipment piecemeal. The liquidation value is not negligible early on because it includes the yet-to-be-invested portion of the loan amount. Importantly, unlike going-concern value, it is not dependent on the human capital of experts (Hart and Moore (1994)), and therefore liquidation can be used as a credible threat if the incumbent does not raise pledgeability.

Arm’s length loans can also be tied to the covenant, so long as the consequence of covenant violation is purely a change in the loan terms. For instance, the contract could mandate a rise in interest rates if the covenant is violated. We term such a loan contract *performance pricing*.

Our interest is in mapping how changes in prospective corporate liquidity affect the initial equilibrium choice of borrowing contract and lender. For simplicity, we look at contracts that allow the initial borrower to raise as much as possible initially. This allows us to describe the prevalence of different forms of lending and intermediation based on which forms maximize access to finance.

When prospective expert liquidity is relatively low, bank lending with covenants is particularly effective. If the incumbent expert sets pledgeability low, the covenant will likely be violated and expected future bids for going-concern value will be low. The early liquidation value will dominate expected future bids, so the bank’s liquidation threat will be credible. This then means the incumbent will set pledgeability high even when facing large repayments, knowing that otherwise she risks liquidation.

As prospective liquidity rises further, expected going-concern value will start dominating the early liquidation value. The bank’s threat to liquidate will no longer be credible, which renders its ability to verify information early and monitor of little value. Yet lending will not cease. Arm’s length lenders will induce the incumbent expert to set pledgeability high by limiting the amount of *straight debt* they offer. In such a situation, faced with only moderate levels of repayment of existing debt, and the need potentially to sell the firm (or, equivalently, raise more finance), the incumbent expert chooses high pledgeability.
It turns out that over a range of prospective liquidity, even though a performance pricing loan offers more contractual flexibility than straight debt, it adds nothing to the amount of funds that can be raised. It will be dominated if there are small transaction costs associated with its enforcement. However, as prospective liquidity rises still further above this range, under certain conditions arm’s length performance pricing debt offers contractual possibilities that straight debt does not. In particular, the automatic rise in interest rates conditional on covenant violation gives the incumbent stronger incentives to increase pledgeability, and allows her to borrow yet more.

Finally, as the level of prospective liquidity gets very high, pledgeability is no longer needed for debt repayment. Indeed, the ceiling on debt needed to maintain incentives for pledgeability becomes onerous. Instead, experts will take loans with high required repayment up front without any intent to raise pledgeability. Investors will be happy making large “covenant-lite” loans without covenants or monitoring, relying solely on high prospective liquidity for repayment.

We have distinguished between bank loans that require intervention and arm’s length loans that do not. We then examine the financing of intermediaries themselves. Banks must have incentives to undertake the costly unobservable actions such as information acquisition required by bank lending. This is achieved by requiring the bank to maintain some “skin in the game”, that is, a stake in the loans it has made so that it has the incentive to take these actions: Bank capital has to be positive when bank intermediation services are needed. However, as prospective liquidity rises and the bank’s costly actions are no longer needed, the bank can become a complete pass through, transferring the amounts collected from investors to the firm and vice versa. It will need no skin in the game, that is, bank capital. Equivalently, experts will be financed directly by investors through arm’s length loans or bonds. More generally, periods of high prospective liquidity are periods of substantial arm’s length lending, high corporate leverage, and high bank leverage. As we will see, this has implications for how episodes like the run-up to the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 are interpreted.

We have associated higher liquidity with high expert/corporate net worth (stemming from an economy-wide boom in the real sector). Higher expert bids could also result from accommodative monetary policy, easier credit conditions, rapid financial development, lax supervision, or even irrational exuberance in financial markets. Any of these will ease the financing of expert bidders, induce higher future bids, and higher leverage today, which in turn induces lower pledgeability and intermediation. This generalization will be useful in taking the model to the data.
Our paper follows an earlier paper (Diamond, Hu, and Rajan, 2020) on industry liquidity and firms’ pledgeability choices. It is closely related to Shleifer and Vishny (1992), where the liquidity of asset acquirers increases the resale value of assets, to Acharya and Vishwanathan (2011), where this allows highly levered borrowers to borrow, and Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006, 2008) where this reduces moral hazard. Dow, Gorton, Krishnamurthy (2005) study the choice of pledgeability, assuming that debt finance increased pledgeability. Philippon (2006) presents a model where investors tolerate poor corporate governance in booms which creates over-investment. This can lead to worse outcomes as shown in Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman (2000). Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2001) shows that collateral value, if independent of the project’s outcome, weaken the bank’s screening incentives. Closely related models where financial intermediation improves access to finance include Diamond (1984), Holmström and Tirole (1997) and Rampini and Viswanathan (2010).

In the rest of the paper, we will formalize our arguments. In section I, we describe the basic framework and the timing of decisions in a two-period model. In section II, we study the firm’s borrowing without aggregate uncertainty, and in section III we add aggregate uncertainty. In section IV we examine robustness and a few extensions and then conclude in section V.

I. The Framework and Model Setup

Let us start with the simplest setup possible. Consider an economy with two periods spanning three dates, $t = 0, 1, 2$. At date 0, there is an asset, specifically a firm, which is up for sale. At dates 1 and 2, the firm generates cash flows $C_1$ and $C_2$, respectively.

A. Agents

The economy is populated with three groups of agents: expert managers henceforth termed experts, financial intermediaries whom we refer to as banks, and investors. All agents are risk neutral and do not discount the future. Therefore, the prevailing gross interest rate is 1. Experts have the ability to produce cash flows with the firm. However, they need to bid against each other for the firm at date 0 (their initial bid also includes any amount required for firm investments), as well as possibly at date 1 (see shortly). Bidders can supplement their wealth by borrowing. We will determine the form of borrowing that allows an expert to raise the maximum possible at date 0. The winning expert manager will become the incumbent expert manager of the firm.

Let $\theta$ be a measure of the firm’s stability – the extent to which the firm’s technology or the skills it needs are unchanging. With probability $1 - \theta$ during period 1, the incumbent learns that her skills have become mismatched with the technologies needed, so after producing period-1
cash flows, she will lose her ability to produce cash flows in period 2. If this occurs, she will want
to sell the firm at date 1. Importantly, the event of the incumbent losing ability offers her a reason
to increase the date-1 resale value of the firm. If it occurs, we assume there are plenty of non-
incumbent experts around at date 1 who can run the firm, and will therefore bid for it.

\[ B. \text{ Payment Enforcement} \]

In general, a lender has two ways of getting repaid by the incumbent manager on the date that
a payment is due. Define *cash flow pledgeability* as the fraction of realized cash flow that can be
verified by a court and therefore can go directly to satisfy the lender’s claim. If $\gamma_2$ is the
pledgeability of cash flows $C_2$, the period-2 incumbent can commit to repay up to $\gamma_2 C_2$ of date-2
cash flows to a lender. This is the first channel for repayment.

Second, just before the end of the period, the lender gets the right to seize and auction the firm
to the highest expert bidder if it has not been paid in full. This allows it to extract repayment
either by the threat of, or by actually, seizing and auctioning the firm. In this auction, both other
experts and the incumbent manager are allowed to bid -- we assume the incumbent can always
bid using other proxies, so contracts that ban her from participating in the auction are infeasible.\(^4\)

\[ C. \text{ More on Cash flow Pledgeability} \]

Cash flow pledgeability is endogenous, and chosen by the incumbent expert one period in
advance. She can raise pledgeability by adopting more informative accounting practices, hiring
better accountants, setting up escrow accounts for cash flows, simplifying corporate
organizational structures and enhancing their transparency, or putting in place better governance
structures such as a more expert and independent board (see Rajan (2012)). Essentially, the
incumbent can credibly close off tunnels which divert cash flows generated by the firm. There are
also other ways she can change pledgeability. For instance, the incumbent can invest in projects
that require significant managerial inputs (or not make such investments) and thus alter the rents
future managers will capture (because of the need to provide them incentives for effort). This too
will affect the fraction of cash flow that can be pledged (see Shleifer and Vishny (1989)).

The range of feasible values for pledgeability $\gamma_2 \in [\underline{\gamma}, \overline{\gamma}]$, where $0 \leq \underline{\gamma} < \overline{\gamma} < 1$ are
determined by the economy’s institutions supporting corporate governance, both operating within

\[ \text{---} \]

\(^4\) If the incumbent could be prohibited from bidding, strategic defaults would be ruled out and debt
contracts would raise far more. More generally, credible threats by the incumbent to withdraw her human
capital from the project (as in Hart and Moore (1994)) would result in similar outcomes where the lender’s
outside option (of selling the firm to others) matters.
the firm (such as the availability of better auditors and accounting norms) and through outside institutions (such as laws protecting investors and the effectiveness of the judiciary). Linearity allows us to focus on the extremes of the range, without loss of generality. That is, we analyze only \( \gamma_2 = \gamma \) or \( \gamma_2 = \bar{\gamma} \). To keep notation simple, we assume the interim cash flows produced during period 1 are not pledgeable, so that \( \gamma_1 = 0 \) (this is simply a normalization).

Clearly, the process of improving pledgeability -- for example, selecting and installing a reputable auditor -- takes time. The incumbent manager has to invite applications, do due diligence to screen out unsuitable applicants, interview the final candidates, and select one at the end. Moreover, there could be some noise/errors in the process of improving pledgeability. So we assume if the incumbent in period 1 exerts effort \( \lambda \in \{0, \Lambda\} \) in raising pledgeability where

\[
0 < \lambda < \Lambda < 1, \quad \Pr\{\gamma_2 = \bar{\gamma}\} = \lambda
\]

Note therefore that high effort \( \Lambda \) results in a high probability \( \bar{\Lambda} \) of high pledgeability being realized one period later. The cost to the incumbent of high effort is \( \epsilon \). Throughout the paper, the result will be presented in the limiting case \( \epsilon \to 0 \), as we focus primarily on the benefits to the incumbent of higher pledgeability (which can be negative), rather than her direct cost. We also assume that the incumbent generally finds high effort attractive so that \( \lambda(1 - \theta) > \Delta \).

**D. More on Wealth and Liquidity**

We assume the experts start with no wealth or net worth at date 0, i.e., \( \omega_0 = 0 \) (this is again just a normalization, what matters is the need for outside funds). Then \( \omega_t = C_t \) is the incumbent’s personal wealth at date 1. Let \( \omega_t^E \) be the date-1 wealth of other experts who do not own any firm -- they do generate some wealth by working independently over period 1. In the spirit of Shleifer and Vishny (1992), we term this date-1 net worth of industry experts prospective “liquidity”. Prospective liquidity is exogenous to the model and driven by the economic environment. It will be important in what follows.

**E. Financial Contracts and Intermediation**

At date 0, each expert applies to one lender for funding. We assume the financial contract between the expert and the lender (bank or investor) is a one-period debt contract: the lender lends \( l_0 \) at date 0 in return for which the expert promises to repay \( D_1 \) at date 1. In the absence of aggregate uncertainty, one-period debt will turn out to be optimal without loss of generality. Our
focus is various forms of one-period debt contracts, each with different enforcement costs. We could allow long-term debt, but it will always be diluted and adds nothing if $\bar{\lambda}$ is sufficiently high, as we have shown in Diamond, Hu, and Rajan (2020).

With straight debt, only the repayment, $D_1$ is specified. The lender has the right to seize the firm and auction it if not fully paid. Straight debt requires no additional information. Only the transfer of the right to auction the firm for non-payment has to be enforced.

Alternatively, the loan may contain a covenant: After the incumbent chooses her pledgeability effort, a noisy and verifiable binary signal $\phi \in \{\phi^H, \phi^L\}$ about $\gamma_2$ will become available. If $\gamma_2 = \gamma$, the signal is $\phi = \phi^L$. If $\gamma_2 = \bar{\gamma}$, the signal is $\phi = \phi^H$ with probability $1 - \epsilon_1$ and $\phi = \phi^L$ (a “type I” error) with probability $\epsilon_1 < 0.5$ so that the signal is informative. When $\phi = \phi^H$, the covenant is deemed tripped or violated. The covenant in our model is representative of a variety of real world covenants that are violated when governance is deficient. Covenants requiring periodic audited financial statements, requiring compliance with certain accounting principles, or requiring earnings to be a minimum ratio of debt, get tripped when governance is of poor quality or tunneling of cash flows is excessive. Alternatively, covenants requiring maintenance of a certain amount of liquid assets/working capital or covenants prohibiting mergers ensure that the rents associated with managing the assets are limited. Such covenants get tripped when pledgeability of future cash flows is likely to be low.

The loan contract may itself specify a new interest rate based on the signal. We term this a performance pricing loan contract. Since we have one-period contracts, this means the face value $D_1$ is automatically augmented to $\hat{D}_1$ upon a covenant violation, $\phi = \phi^L$. We assume the lender incurs a small verification cost to establish the value of $\phi$ at date 1. This cost is assumed negligible (to avoid unnecessary notation) and is used only to break ties between contracts.

---

5 We examine Type II errors in the appendix, where the covenant trips even if pledgeability is high – apart from making it harder to incentivize pledgeability, it changes little qualitatively.

6 In practice, performance pricing contracts are based on a pricing grid. The most commonly used trigger is the debt to EBITDA ratio (see Asquith et al (2005)). For ease of comparison, we tie both the loan covenant and the pricing grid to the same information, so we use the term “covenant violation” both for performance pricing contracts as well as bank loan contracts.

7 Asquith, Beatty, and Weber (2005) describe interest increasing and interest decreasing performance pricing debt contracts. Given we have only two outcomes (covenant tripped or not), either face value can be thought of as the base. In other words, we do not distinguish between the two forms of debt pricing.
A bank loan covenant is also violated if $\phi = \phi^+$ -- we do not allow the bank to contract on finer information. However, the bank can verify the realization of $\phi$ earlier (say at date $\frac{1}{2}$). This allows the bank to intervene before the signal becomes public.\(^8\) We will assume that although vanishingly small, the bank’s *early verification cost* at date $\frac{1}{2}$ exceeds the *verification* cost of the signal at date 1 (if used in performance pricing). These costs will matter only in breaking ties.

If a lending bank sees the covenant violated at date $\frac{1}{2}$, it has two available actions at that time. First, it can pay an additional cost $\psi > 0$, monitor the incumbent, and learn the realized pledgeability $\gamma_2$. We term this a *monitored* loan. The information from monitoring is privately observed by the bank and therefore is not verifiable. As we will see later, monitoring is a powerful incentive device to increase pledgeability. However, its cost $\psi$ exceeds all of the previously mentioned costs. Second, the bank has the authority to demand immediate repayment of $D_1$ or propose a new face value. In case the bank demands immediate repayment, the incumbent can borrow from other banks to repay. If the incumbent cannot repay or rejects the proposed new face value, the bank can recover $L$. This recovery or early liquidation value is not simply the sale of plant and equipment after a violation or loan default (it is not necessarily the Chapter VII liquidation value in US bankruptcy). This early liquidation value includes recovering part of the upfront loan amount that has not been spent yet on investment. It encapsulates the bank’s advantage of getting the signal early and being able to act quickly to recover funds, before the borrower goes seriously off track. We assume $\sqrt{C_2} > L$ so that under high pledgeability, the amount of pledgeable cash flows exceeds the liquidation value.

\textbf{F. Timing}

The timing of events is described in Figure 2. After funding the project at date 0, the incumbent expert chooses her effort $\lambda$. The noisy and verifiable signal $\phi$ on $\gamma_2$ is realized. If the lender is a bank, it observes the signal early. The bank may monitor the incumbent to learn realized pledgeability and/or may demand repayment without further monitoring. If not repaid, the bank may raise the face value or liquidate. Subsequently, the incumbent’s ability in period 2 becomes known to all. If the project is not liquidated, the cash flows (if any) are produced. At

\(^8\) Dichev and Skinner (2002) and Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012) show that banks intervene long before distress while Ivashina, Iverson, and Smith (2011) show that arm’s length investors like hedge funds enter the picture only much later.
date 1, the incumbent either pays the remaining debt due or enters the auction. The period ends
with potentially a new incumbent in control.

II. Equilibrium without Aggregate Uncertainty

We first analyze this simple model, then add aggregate uncertainty. Since experts start with
equal wealth, the expert who can borrow the most upfront will bid the most at date 0, and
becomes the initial incumbent. Our interest is in determining what kind of debt this might be and
how much of it they will issue.

We fold backward from period 2. Any expert in place at the beginning of period 2 can only
commit to repay $D_2 = \gamma_2 C_2$ in period 2, where $\gamma_2$ is the pledgeability set in period 1. As a result,
they can borrow up to $\gamma_2 C_2$ when bidding for control at date 1.

Turn now to the decisions made during period 1, the most interesting part of the analysis.
Since the pledgeability of period 1 cash flows is assumed to be zero, the repayment of the debt
contracted at date 0 is driven entirely by the face value to be paid, $D_1$, and the non-incumbent
expert’s bid for the firm in a possible date-1 auction. This is determined by $\phi \omega$, her wealth on
date 1, as well as what she can borrow against future cash flows, which is determined by $\gamma_2$. A rational expert’s date-1 bid for the firm will not exceed the value of the future cash flows, $C_2$, so she will bid $B_1^E(\gamma_2) = \min\{\omega_1^E + \gamma_2 C_2, C_2\}$. Similarly, the maximum the incumbent will bid is $B_1^I(\gamma_2) = \min\{\omega_1^I + \gamma_2 C_2, C_2\}$. Comparing $B_1^I(\gamma_2)$ and $B_1^E(\gamma_2)$, and using the assumption $\omega_1^I = C_1 \geq \omega_1^E$, we see that if the incumbent retains ability, she can retain control by outbidding experts in any possible date-1 auction. Since the continuation value of the firm, $C_2$, is identical for the incumbent and experts, the incumbent always wants to retain the firm if she retains ability. To do so, she either pays the amount of debt outstanding or outbids other experts. So she pays 
$$\min\{D_1, B_1^E(\gamma_2)\} = \min\{D_1, \omega_1^E + \gamma_2 C_2, C_2\}.$$ 

Many of our results stem from this expression, so some points are worth noting. First, so long as outside expert bids are below $C_2$, the greater the wealth of outside experts, that is, their prospective liquidity, $\omega_1^E$, the greater will be the bid of experts, and the greater will be the debt face value that can be enforced. Similarly, the greater the pledgeability $\gamma_2$ chosen, the greater the date-1 bid, and hence the enforceability of debt payments. However, no rational bidder will pay more than the residual value of the firm, $C_2$. So when expert liquidity is sufficiently high (that is, $\omega_1^E \geq (1-\gamma)C_2$), higher pledgeability is no longer needed to enhance debt capacity – bidders have enough wealth of their own to make a bid for full value, without borrowing any more than the minimum pledgeable cash flows of the asset, $\gamma C_2$. In other words, high liquidity can crowd out any need for more pledgeability in enhancing borrowing capacity.

A. Straight Debt

We first analyze the (dis)incentives created by straight debt without covenants, $D_1$. Let $V_1(D_1, \lambda)$ be the incumbent’s payoff when she chooses effort $\lambda$, given $D_1$:

$$V_1(D_1, \lambda) = \lambda \theta\left[C_2 - \operatorname{Min}\left[B_i^E(\gamma), D_1\right]\right] + \lambda (1-\theta)\left[B_i^E(\gamma) - \operatorname{Min}\left[B_i^E(\gamma), D_1\right]\right] + (1-\lambda) \theta\left[C_2 - \operatorname{Min}\left[B_i^E(\gamma), D_1\right]\right] + (1-\lambda) \left(1-\theta\right)\left[B_i^E(\gamma) - \operatorname{Min}\left[B_i^E(\gamma), D_1\right]\right] - \varepsilon 1_{[\lambda=\bar{\lambda}]}$$
The first term on the right hand side of the payoff is if she retains ability and is successful in raising pledgeability, the second term is if she loses ability but has raised pledgeability so she can sell at a high price, the third term is if she retains ability but pledgeability turns out to be low, and the fourth term is if she loses ability and the firm has to be sold at a low price because pledgeability is also low. The final term is the direct cost of pledgeability effort if she sets it high.

For any debt level $D$, define $\Delta(D) = V(D, \lambda) - V(D, \tilde{\lambda})$ as the incumbent’s benefit from choosing high versus low effort. The level of contracted debt shifts the benefit, so $\Delta(D)$ (weakly) decreases in $D$. The reason is straightforward. If the incumbent retains her ability, she has to pay more on the outstanding debt if pledgeability is higher, and the higher the outstanding debt, the more this is. Similarly, if she loses her ability, she gets the residual value after the selling the firm, and higher the outstanding debt, the less this is when pledgeability is higher. So higher outstanding debt reduces the incumbent’s incentive to raise pledgeability. Specifically,

**Lemma 2.1:** An incumbent’s net benefit from choosing high pledgeability is

$$
\Delta(D) = \begin{cases} 
-(\lambda - \tilde{\lambda})\theta[B^E(\gamma) - B^E(\tilde{\gamma})] - \varepsilon & \text{if } D > B^E(\gamma) \\
(\lambda - \tilde{\lambda})[\theta B^E(\gamma) + (1-\theta)B^E(\tilde{\gamma}) - D] - \varepsilon & \text{if } B^E(\gamma) < D \leq B^E(\tilde{\gamma}) \\
(\lambda - \tilde{\lambda})(1-\theta)[B^E(\gamma) - B^E(\tilde{\gamma})] - \varepsilon & \text{if } D \leq B^E(\gamma). 
\end{cases}
$$

The proof directly follows from the definition of $V(D, \lambda)$ above and is therefore omitted. Let us define $D^{PayIC} = \theta B^E(\gamma) + (1-\theta)B^E(\tilde{\gamma}) - \frac{\varepsilon}{(\lambda - \tilde{\lambda})}$ as the maximum debt at which the incumbent still has an incentive to exert high pledgeability effort. Figure 3 plots the payoff to the incumbent at different levels of debt.

![Figure 2: The net payoff to high pledgeability](image-url)
For $D_1 \leq B^E_1(\gamma)$, debt repayment is not increased by higher pledgeability because the face value of outstanding debt is low. Instead, higher pledgeability only increases outside expert bids, which is beneficial to the incumbent when she loses ability and sells the asset. The expected benefits of higher pledgeability effort are
\[
\Delta_1(D_1) = (\lambda - \Delta)(1 - \theta)\left[ B^E_1(\varphi) - B^E_1(\gamma) \right] - \varepsilon.
\]

When $D_1$ rises above $B^E_1(\gamma)$, the incumbent has to pay more to debt holders when pledgeability is higher. So as the face value of debt increases further, $\Delta_1(D_1)$ falls to zero at $D_1 = D^{PayIC}_1$ and then goes negative. When $D_1 \geq B^E_1(\varphi)$, the incumbent has to pay the entire increment in sale price from increasing pledgeability to debt holders when she loses ability – she gets nothing from increasing pledgeability in this case. At the same time, if she retains ability and pledgeability is high she pays debt $B^E_1(\varphi)$ instead of $B^E_1(\gamma)$. Hence the expected negative benefit (of higher pledgeability effort) is
\[
-(\lambda - \Delta)\theta\left[ B^E_1(\varphi) - B^E_1(\gamma) \right] - \varepsilon \quad \text{in this region.}
\]

Finally, note that if liquidity is so high that $\alpha^E \geq (1 - \gamma)C_2$, non-incumbent experts can pay the full price of the asset $C_2$ even with low pledgeability. In that case, both $B^E_1(\varphi)$ and $B^E_1(\gamma)$ equal $C_2$, and $\Delta_1(D_1) = -\varepsilon$ for any $D_1$. Put differently, when liquidity crosses the threshold of $(1 - \gamma)C_2$, higher pledgeability does not increase bids.

Before moving on, note the role played by $\theta$. In choosing effort to increase pledgeability, the incumbent trades off being forced to make higher possible repayments conditional on retaining ability when she “buys” the firm back from the lender against the higher possible resale value when she sells the firm after losing ability. The higher the stability $\theta$, the more the disadvantage looms large relative to the benefit, and higher is the moral hazard associated with raising pledgeability. This is why the maximum debt consistent with high pledgeability effort, $D^{PayIC}_1$, falls in $\theta$.

The level of debt determines whether the borrower will choose high or low effort in pledgeability. For straight debt this implies that one of two levels of debt will allow the borrower to raise the most. The first is to issue straight debt at the incentive compatible limit, which thus encourages high pledgeability effort. Because pledgeability is induced without outside
governance action, we term this *internal governance debt*. The maximum amount the expert raises at date 0 is $I_0^{IC} = \lambda D_1^{payIC} + \left(1 - \lambda\right) B_1^E (\gamma)$. Given high effort, high pledgeability is realized with probability $\lambda$, in which case the incumbent repays $D_1^{payIC}$. Otherwise, she repays $B_1^E (\gamma)$.

The second possibility is for the expert to issue debt with $D_1 = B_1^E (\overline{\gamma})$. With this high level of covenant-free straight debt, the expert chooses low effort $\lambda = \overline{\lambda}$. Given the high debt, the low average pledgeability and low internal and external governance, the debt is best labeled *covenant-lite debt*. The expert is able to borrow $I_0^{CL} = \lambda B_1^E (\overline{\gamma}) + \left(1 - \lambda\right) B_1^E (\gamma)$. Given low effort, high pledgeability is only realized with probability $\lambda$. Note that internal governance straight debt and covenant-lite straight debt are both straight debt, but set at different levels so as to induce, or not induce, high pledgeability.

**B. Performance-Pricing Debt versus Straight Debt**

We now evaluate performance-pricing debt, where the face value moves up from $D_1$ to $\tilde{D}_1$ when the covenant is violated. It is without loss of generality to assume $D_1, \tilde{D}_1 \in \left[ B_1^E (\gamma), B_1^E (\overline{\gamma}) \right]$. Payments below $B_1^E (\overline{\gamma})$ will never be defaulted on, whereas those above $B_1^E (\overline{\gamma})$ can never be repaid. With some slight abuse of notation, let $V_1 (D_1, \tilde{D}_1, \lambda)$ be the incumbent’s payoff when she chooses effort $\lambda$, given the debt payments schedule $\{D_1, \tilde{D}_1\}$:

$$V_1 (D_1, \tilde{D}_1, \lambda) = \lambda (1 - e_1) \left[ \theta C_2 + (1 - \theta) B_1^E (\overline{\gamma}) - D_1 \right] + \lambda e_1 \left[ \theta C_2 + (1 - \theta) B_1^E (\overline{\gamma}) - \tilde{D}_1 \right] + (1 - \lambda) \theta \left[ C_2 - B_1^E (\gamma) \right] - \varepsilon 1_{[\lambda = \overline{\lambda}]}.$$

The four terms on the right-hand side are straightforward. With probability $\lambda (1 - e_1)$, the realized pledgeability is high and the covenant is not violated. In this case, with probability $\theta$, the incumbent retains her ability and receive cash flows $C_2$ in period 2. With probability $1 - \theta$, the incumbent loses her ability, in which case she has to sell the asset at price $B_1^E (\overline{\gamma})$. In both cases, she repays $D_1$ to the lender. The second term indicates that with probability $\lambda e_1$, the realized pledgeability is high and the covenant is triggered in error, in which case the payment increases to $\tilde{D}_1$ and is made whether the incumbent retains ability or not. The third term is when
the realized pledgeability is low \( \gamma_2 = \gamma \) and the covenant is violated for sure. In this case, regardless of the new face value \( \tilde{D}_1 \), if she keeps her ability the incumbent repays only \( B^E_1(\gamma) \) and retains control of the firm. If she loses her ability, however, the proceeds \( B^E_1(\gamma) \) from selling the firm at a date-1 auction are insufficient to repay creditors, and the incumbent receives nothing. The fourth term is the cost \( \varepsilon \) incurred whenever she chooses high effort \( \lambda = \tilde{\lambda} \).

High effort requires \( V_1(D_1, \tilde{D}_1, \tilde{\lambda}) \geq V_1(D_1, \tilde{D}_1, \lambda) \), which simplifies to

\[
(1-e_i)D_1 + e_i \tilde{D}_1 \leq D_1^{PayIC}
\]  

This IC constraint says the maximum expected performance pricing payment consistent with the incumbent choosing high pledgeability effort is limited to \( D_1^{PayIC} \). Let \( l_0^P \) be the maximum amount that an expert is able to raise with an incentive compatible perform pricing loan at date 0. Clearly, for any \( \{ D_1, \tilde{D}_1 \} \) s.t. \( D_1, \tilde{D}_1 \in [B^E_1(\gamma), B^E_1(\tilde{\gamma})] \), the lender is willing to lend

\[
\tilde{\lambda}(1-e_i)D_1 + \tilde{\lambda}e_i\tilde{D}_1 + (1-\tilde{\lambda})B^E_1(\gamma) \leq l_0^P \equiv \tilde{\lambda}D_1^{PayIC} + (1-\tilde{\lambda})B^E_1(\gamma).
\]

**Proposition 2.1**: if there is no aggregate risk and \( B^E_1(\gamma) < C_2 \), the incumbent can borrow more with the internal governance level of straight debt than with performance-pricing debt or the covenant-lite level of straight debt.

The rationale is straightforward hence the proof is omitted. Straight internal governance debt saves the tiny verification cost in performance-pricing debt, and otherwise raises the same expected amount. Moreover, the restriction \( \tilde{\lambda}(1-\theta) > \tilde{\lambda} \) implies high pledgeability effort is in general desirable for borrowing, so that \( l_0^{IG} > l_0^{CL} \), as long as \( B^E_1(\gamma) < C_2 \). Of course, if the level of industry liquidity gets sufficiently high such that \( B^E_1(\gamma) = C_2 \), then \( D_1^{PayIC} = C_2 - \frac{E}{\lambda - \tilde{\lambda}} \). In this case covenant-lite debt is best because \( l_0^{CL} = C_2 \). It dominates internal governance debt (because no costly pledgeability effort is needed) and performance-pricing debt (as verification costs are not needed).
C. Bank Early Verification of Covenants With or Without Monitoring

None of the loan contracts thus far requires non-contractual intervention, nor is performance pricing dominant, so nothing except payment default needs to be verified. The loans could well have been held directly by investors. Can bank lending add value here?

The bank can intervene early and recover $L$. In addition, if the bank observes a covenant violation early, it can monitor for more precise information before it decides to intervene. Throughout this subsection, we assume $D_1 \geq L$ without loss of generality: $D_1 < L$ is always riskless so it is always dominated by $D_1 = L$. Let $\pi = \frac{\bar{\lambda} e_1}{\bar{\lambda} e_1 + (1-\bar{\lambda})}$ and $\bar{\pi} = \frac{\hat{\lambda} e_1}{\hat{\lambda} e_1 + (1-\hat{\lambda})}$ be the posterior probability of high pledgeability conditional on $\phi = \phi^-$ under high and low effort, respectively. Then define $\overline{T}_1^{CV} = \overline{\pi} B_1^E(\overline{\gamma}) + (1-\overline{\pi}) B_1^E(\gamma)$ as the maximum expected payments that the bank can receive on date 1 upon a covenant violation, conditional on the incumbent manager having chosen high effort $\bar{\lambda} = \bar{\lambda}$. The subsequent analysis of what happens on covenant violation depends on the comparison between the liquidation value $L$, $B_1^E(\gamma)$ and $\overline{T}_1^{CV}$.

Case 1: $L \leq B_1^E(\gamma)$

The bank never liquidates since it is always better off seizing and auctioning the firm at date 1 in case of non-repayment. Early verification is of no use. Therefore, the maximum amount of borrowing with a bank-monitored loan is (weakly) dominated by a performance-pricing loan, which we saw was dominated by straight debt that induces internal governance.

Case 2: $B_1^E(\gamma) < L \leq \overline{T}_1^{CV}$

Upon covenant violation, the firm is liquidated if and only if the bank knows that pledgeability is low, which can only happen if it has monitored. Consider the bank’s incentive to monitor. A bank that monitors at date $\frac{1}{2}$ has an information monopoly (since the signal and $\gamma_2$ become public only at date 1). It will therefore set the renegotiated face value at $\overline{D}_1 = B_1^E(\overline{\gamma})$ if it has learned $\gamma_2 = \overline{\gamma}$ and liquidate to receive $L$ if $\gamma_2 = \gamma$. If the bank does not monitor and
simply makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer, then $\tilde{D}_1 = B_i^E(\bar{\gamma})$. Therefore, the benefit of monitoring comes from the bank’s option to liquidate the project upon learning $\gamma_2 = \gamma$. Let us define $M$ as the benefit from monitoring: $M = (1 - \bar{\pi})(L - B_i^E(\gamma))$. The bank monitors if and only if $M \geq \psi$.

Turn now to the borrower’s IC constraint in choosing high effort. If the bank does not monitor (and therefore does not liquidate) in equilibrium, the IC constraint is similar to the case of performance-pricing debt, with $\tilde{D}_1 = B_i^E(\bar{\gamma})$, i.e., $(1 - e_1)D_1 + e_1B_i^E(\bar{\gamma}) \leq D_1^{\text{PoiIC}}$. If the bank does monitor, the incumbent’s payoff is

$$V^M_i(D_1, \lambda) = \lambda (1 - e_1)\left[ \theta C_2 + (1 - \theta)B_i^E(\bar{\gamma}) - D_1 \right] + \lambda e_1\theta\left[ C_2 - B_i^E(\bar{\gamma}) \right] - e_11_{\{\lambda > \bar{\lambda}\}}.$$  

With probability $\lambda(1 - e_1)$, there is no covenant violation. If there is a covenant violation, there are two possibilities. If the bank finds pledgeability has been set high but the covenant has been erroneously tripped (with probability $\lambda e_1$), $D_1$ is augmented to $\tilde{D}_1 = B_i^E(\bar{\gamma})$. With probability $1 - \lambda$, pledgeability is low, and the firm is liquidated with the incumbent getting nothing. The incumbent’s IC constraint requires $V^M_i(D_1, \lambda) \geq V^M_i(D_1, \bar{\lambda})$, which holds for any $D_1$.

Therefore, with bank monitoring, the face value of debt is not limited by the need to provide the incumbent incentives. Intuitively, earlier the incumbent was tempted to lower pledgeability effort because it reduced debt repayment when pledgeability was low. Because low effort causes a higher probability of covenant violation and the bank monitors, detects, and liquidates when pledgeability is low, the incumbent has no incentive to shirk pledgeability effort now, and the face value of debt can be set at the highest level.

Let $I^M_0$ be the maximum initial borrowing under a loan that will induce incumbent effort and bank monitoring. Clearly, $I^M_0 = \bar{\lambda}B_i^E(\bar{\gamma}) + (1 - \bar{\lambda})L - \left[ \bar{\lambda}e_1 + (1 - \bar{\lambda}) \right]\psi$. Monitoring is

---

9 In the subgame following the covenant violation and subsequent monitoring, we assume the bank can match any offer that outsiders offer. The winners-curse effect therefore allows the monitoring bank to charge $\tilde{D}_1 = B_i^E(\bar{\gamma})$.

10 Note that if $D_1 > B_i^E(\bar{\gamma})$, only $B_i^E(\bar{\gamma})$ is collectible, so we just need to check the condition for all $D_1 \leq B_i^E(\bar{\gamma})$. 

18
preferred if \( l^M_0 > l^G_0 \) and \( M \geq \psi \). Otherwise, the expert picks the IG level of debt, \( D_1 = D_1^{PayIC} \) without any covenant, and voluntarily chooses high pledgeability effort. We can rewrite

\[
l^M_0 - l^G_0 = \left[ \overline{\lambda} e + (1 - \overline{\lambda}) \right] \left[ (M - \psi) + \frac{\overline{\lambda}}{\overline{\lambda} e + (1 - \overline{\lambda})} (B^E E (\overline{\gamma}) - D_1^{PayIC}) \right],
\]

which is always positive as long as \( M \geq \psi \).

**Case 3:** \( B^E E (\overline{\gamma}) \geq L > \overline{t}^CV \)

Upon the covenant violation here, the project is always liquidated unless the bank monitors and learns that pledgeability is high. If the bank monitors, it sets \( \tilde{D}_1 = B^E E (\overline{\gamma}) \) if \( \gamma_2 = \overline{\gamma} \) and liquidates to receive \( L \) if \( \gamma_2 = \gamma \). If it doesn’t monitor, it gets \( L \) instead. In this case, the benefit of monitoring comes from avoiding liquidating the project upon learning \( \gamma_2 = \overline{\gamma} \) so that \( M = \overline{\pi} (B^E E (\overline{\gamma}) - L) \). The bank chooses to monitor if and only if \( M \geq \psi \).

Next, let us turn to the borrower’s IC constraint in effort choice. Let superscript \( NM \) denote the case where the bank does not monitor (and therefore liquidates whenever the covenant is violated, even if in error). The incumbent receives

\[
V_{\psi}^{NM} \left( D_1, \overline{\lambda} \right) = \lambda (1 - e_i) \left[ \theta C_2 + (1 - \theta) B^E E (\overline{\gamma}) - D_1 \right] - e1_{[\lambda - \pi]}. \]

The IC constraint

\[
V_{\psi}^{NM} \left( D_1, \overline{\lambda} \right) \geq V_{\psi}^{NM} \left( D_1, \overline{\lambda} \right)
\]

is slack for any \( D_1 \) for reasons similar to the one described earlier. If the bank monitors, the incumbent receives \( V^M_1 \left( D_1, \overline{\lambda} \right) \) as in the previous case. Once again, the IC constraint \( V^M_1 \left( D_1, \overline{\lambda} \right) \geq V^M_1 \left( D_1, \overline{\lambda} \right) \) is always slack for any \( D_1 \). Then

\[
l^M_0 = \overline{\lambda} B^E E (\overline{\gamma}) + (1 - \overline{\lambda}) L - \left[ \overline{\lambda} e + (1 - \overline{\lambda}) \right] \psi \]

is unchanged. Moreover,

\[
l^M_0 = \overline{\lambda} (1 - e_i) B^E E (\overline{\gamma}) + \overline{\lambda} e + (1 - \overline{\lambda}) \right] L. \]

A simple comparison shows that

\[
l^M_0 - l^G_0 = \overline{\lambda} \left( B^E E (\overline{\gamma}) - D_1^{PayIC} \right) + \left[ \overline{\lambda} e + (1 - \overline{\lambda}) \right] \left( L - \overline{t}^CV \right), \]

which is greater than zero because \( L > \overline{t}^CV \). Moreover, it is easily shown that \( l^M_0 > l^NM_0 \) if and only if \( M > \psi \).

**D. Equilibrium Outcome**

Combining the results, we get the following, based roughly in descending order of liquidity \( \omega^E_1 \) :
Proposition 2.2:

i. If \( B_1^E(\gamma) = C_2 \), covenant-lite debt \( D_1 = B_1^E(\bar{\gamma}) \) is chosen, which induces low effort.

ii. If \( B_1^E(\gamma) \in [L, C_2) \), internal-governance debt \( D_1 = D_1^{PayIC} \) is chosen, which induces high effort.

iii. If \( B_1^E(\gamma) < L \leq \bar{l}_1^{CV} \), debt \( D_1 = B_1^E(\bar{\gamma}) \) with bank monitoring is chosen if and only if
\[
\psi \leq (1 - \bar{\pi})(L - B_1^E(\gamma)) \]. Otherwise, internal-governance debt \( D_1 = D_1^{PayIC} \) is chosen. In either case, high effort is chosen.

iv. If \( B_1^E(\gamma) \leq \bar{l}_1^{CV} < L \), bank debt \( D_1 = B_1^E(\bar{\gamma}) \) is chosen. The bank monitors if and only if
\[
\psi \leq \bar{\pi}(B_1^E(\gamma) - L) \]. Otherwise, the bank does not monitor and it liquidates following a covenant violation. In either case, high effort is chosen.

![Figure 3 Equilibrium without Aggregate Risk](image-url)

Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium results as a function of industry liquidity \( \omega_1^E \) and the bank monitoring cost, \( \psi \). We will discuss it shortly.

E. Discussion

Our analysis highlights the difference between external sources of corporate governance and internal sources of governance, and how this affects the source of financing. We identify two sources of external pressure on the firm to repay – the threat to liquidate the project (or halt the
further funding of project investment), which will incentivize the expert to enhance her effort to raise pledgeability, and the threat to take away the going-concern firm and sell it (a form of US Chapter XI), which is augmented by outside expert liquidity. In many situations, these external threats enhance repayment most when the incumbent is also incentivized to choose higher pledgeability – stronger internal commitment structures to repay cash flow. If outside experts had plenty of liquidity and could always bid full value, the threat to sell to them would be sufficient to enforce full repayment. Pledgeability matters when they are insufficiently liquid to bid full value.

Traditional models of agency and debt tend to focus on project choice. Since different projects result in different “pies”, a differential sharing of those pies with financiers ensures the incumbent manager chooses the biggest pie. Contract design is about incentivizing the right choice. In our paper, we essentially have a single pie. The key question is how much internal, and how much external, governance is brought about by the specific debt contract and by the environment. That determines how the pie is shared, and the amount financiers will put up initially for their share.

The key external variables are the early recovery/liquidation value, \( L \), and expert liquidity, \( \omega_1^E \), which enhances going concern value. It is essential that the liquidation value be something the bank can obtain without the borrower’s co-operation – only then can seizing it be a strong punishment for non-cooperation. It will certainly be high if the firm’s assets sold piecemeal (as opposed to as a going concern) have strong secondary market values, but it is also likely to be high when investment in a project is drawn out and the bank can halt further disbursement of cash. As we have seen, the threat of liquidation works best when the future going concern value with low pledgeability (that is, \( B_1^E (\gamma) \)) is likely to be low. This is when expert liquidity \( \omega_1^E \) is low. In these circumstances, bank financing with monitoring dominates.

Two points are worth noting. First, the liquidation value can be much lower than the contracted debt, and can nevertheless be useful in ensuring it is paid back – by ensuring the incumbent enhances the appropriable going-concern value of the firm through pledgeability effort (see Kermani and Ma (2020) for related evidence). Second, a bank loan with a covenant also protects the borrower from the bank when the covenant is not violated, thus improving incentives – if the bank always had the right to raise rates, the incumbent would never set pledgeability high.

However, as liquidity increases and the firm’s going concern value, \( B_1^E (\gamma) \), exceeds \( L \), the bank’s threat to liquidate is no longer credible, and bank finance is no longer attractive. Interestingly, the upfront debt the firm can issue may actually fall with higher prospective outside
expert liquidity $\omega_i$ as the firm transitions from bank finance to internal governance: since the firm has to be incentivized to boost pledgeability without liquidation threats, external debt has to be set at $D_i^{\text{PayIC}}$ rather than at $B_i^{E}(\bar{\gamma})$ – the loss of bank monitoring has consequences for borrowing capacity. Of course, as expert liquidity increases still further, first $D_i^{\text{PayIC}}$ increases, and eventually expert liquidity is so high that there is no need to incentivize pledgeability – debt can be set high at $C_2$ and covenant lite.

When we have no aggregate risk, performance pricing, which allows more contractual flexibility than straight debt, cannot improve over incentive compatible straight debt. The reason is interesting. Performance pricing allows the face value of debt to be raised from the pre-contracted value $D$, conditional on covenant violation. There are two reasons the covenant is violated. First, pledgeability could be low, $\gamma$. It might seem that raising face value in this situation should penalize the incumbent, and improve her incentives to choose high pledgeability. However, so long as $D \geq B_i^{E}(\gamma)$, which it always is, raising the face value further does nothing for payment recovery. Put differently, low pledgeability itself defuses the possible penalty imposed by performance pricing. Of course, the second situation where the covenant is violated is when it is violated in error – when pledgeability is actually high, $\bar{\gamma}$. However, while the face value can be raised from $D_i$ up to a collectible $B_i^{E}(\bar{\gamma})$, the higher face value acts as a disincentive to higher pledgeability effort (because it is collected when high pledgeability is realized). This is why the performance pricing IC constraint is $\left(1 - \epsilon_i\right)D_i + \epsilon_iB_i^{E}(\bar{\gamma}) \leq D_i^{\text{PayIC}}$.

Performance pricing cannot do better than setting the straight debt face value at $D_i^{\text{PayIC}}$ and not changing it based on covenant violation. Performance pricing thus cannot incentivize pledgeability because the penalty needs to be inflicted when the incumbent shirks effort, but this is precisely when the penalty is unenforceable. Aggregate uncertainty will alter this conclusion.

Finally, consider the role played by $\theta$, the stability of the firm’s technology. If $\theta = 1$, the incumbent never loses ability and never has to sell the firm. Consequently, higher pledgeability always hurts her by strengthening external creditor claims. The only way to get her to raise pledgeability is for the bank to threaten to liquidate her if she does not. Otherwise, she can get financing only to the extent available through external liquidity. So monitored bank finance or covenant lite debt are her only two options. A wider range of financing options opens up only
when $\theta < 1$ and the incumbent can be incentivized to raise pledgeability. Nevertheless, the availability of unmonitored finance decreases in $\theta$ because of the greater difficulty in incentivizing pledgeability, while the availability of bank finance does not, suggesting that bank finance dominates arm’s length finance when moral hazard over pledgeability is high.

Another interpretation of $\theta$ is it is the extent to which the firm can finance new projects from internal sources. A high $\theta$ thus is most consistent with a mature firm with high free cash flows and few investment opportunities in a stable industry – a class of firms that Jensen (1986, 1989) argues is prone to high agency costs and little internal governance.

We will examine the empirical evidence in the next section. Note however that performance pricing is dominated in this section because of small contracting costs of changing the face value. Let us now add uncertainty to the model to see if that continues to be the case.

III. Equilibrium with Aggregate Uncertainty

We will now show that with aggregate uncertainty, performance-pricing debt can be preferred to straight debt when the state cannot be contracted on, even though the covenant violation (based on firm-specific choices and outcomes) is uncorrelated with the aggregate state. Intuitively, through implicit state-contingency, performance-pricing debt can provide better incentives for high pledgeability than straight debt.

![Figure 4: States of Nature](image.png)

Let us introduce the following modifications to the model presented in the previous section. With probability $q$, let the economy be in the good prosperous state $G$ at date 1 where the firm
generates $C_i$ and industry liquidity is high. With probability $1 - q$, it is in the bad distressed state $B$, where the firm fails to generate any cash flow and industry liquidity is low. The aggregate state is realized after pledgeability effort is chosen, pledgeability realized, and the covenant tripped (or not). Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of the state of nature. Note that for simplicity, the cash flow at date 2 is assumed independent of the state at date 1.

Let $\omega^{I,s_1}_1$ be the incumbent’s wealth in state $S_1$ at date 1, so $\omega^{I,G}_1 = C_1$ and $\omega^{I,B}_1 = 0$. Let $\omega^{E,s_1}_1$ be the state-$S_1$ wealth of other experts who do not own any firm. The wealth of these non-incumbent experts (who work elsewhere when not running a firm) is augmented when the economy is in state $G$, so $\omega^{E,G}_1 > \omega^{E,B}_1$. As earlier, we assume $\omega^{I,G}_1 = C_1 > \omega^{E,G}_1$, and for simplicity that $\omega^{E,B}_1 = \omega^{I,B}_1 = 0$, so that the incumbent manager always has (weakly) more wealth than industry experts. Finally, to focus on the largest number of relevant cases, we assume the difference in liquidity between the two future states is large enough that regardless of pledgeability, possible repayment is higher in future state $G$ than in future state $B$.

**Assumption 1:** $\omega^{E,G}_1 + \gamma C_2 > \gamma C_2$

Some of the cases described in Proposition 3.2 below will disappear if Assumption 1 is violated.

**A. Internal-governance and Covenant-lite Debt**

Let us first study straight debt again. In the previous section with no uncertainty, we determined $\Delta_i \left( D_i \right)$, the incumbent’s benefit from choosing high versus low effort for any given $D_i$. Corresponding to the parameters of each state, we can determine $D^{B,PayIC}_i$ and $D^{G,PayIC}_i$, the respective incentive compatible levels of debt if state $B$ or state $G$ were to occur with certainty. With aggregate uncertainty, the risk-neutral incumbent will choose high pledgeability if and only if $q \Delta^G_i \left( D_i \right) + (1 - q) \Delta^B_i \left( D_i \right) \geq 0$, where $q$ is the probability of state $G$. Let $D^{IC}_i$ be the value of $D_i$ that makes this weak inequality equal zero. Since both $\Delta^G_i$ and $\Delta^B_i$ are weakly decreasing in $D_i$,
it must be that $D_{1}^{IC}$, the threshold of debt below which high effort is incentivized when the incumbent has to choose before the state occurs, lies between $D_{1}^{B,PayIC}$ and $D_{1}^{G,PayIC}$.\(^{11}\)

Lemma 3.1:

i. If $q \left\{ (1-\theta) \left[ B_{i}^{E,G}(\bar{\gamma}) - B_{i}^{E,G}(\gamma) \right] - \frac{\epsilon}{\lambda - \lambda} \right\} \geq (1-q) \left\{ \theta \left[ B_{i}^{E,B}(\bar{\gamma}) - B_{i}^{E,B}(\gamma) \right] + \frac{\epsilon}{\lambda - \lambda} \right\}$ \((2)\), then $D_{1}^{IC} = D_{1}^{G,PayIC} - \frac{(1-q)}{q} \left\{ \theta \left[ B_{i}^{E,B}(\bar{\gamma}) - B_{i}^{E,B}(\gamma) \right] + \frac{\epsilon}{\lambda - \lambda} \right\} > B_{1}^{E,G}(\gamma)$ and

\[ l_{0}^{IG} = q \left[ \bar{\lambda} D_{1}^{IC} + (1-\lambda) B_{i}^{E,G}(\gamma) \right] + (1-q) \left[ \bar{\lambda} B_{i}^{E,B}(\bar{\gamma}) + (1-\lambda) B_{i}^{E,B}(\gamma) \right]. \]

ii. Otherwise, $D_{1}^{IC} = D_{1}^{B,PayIC} + \frac{q}{1-q} \left\{ (1-\theta) \left[ B_{i}^{E,G}(\bar{\gamma}) - B_{i}^{E,G}(\gamma) \right] - \frac{\epsilon}{\lambda - \lambda} \right\} < B_{1}^{E,B}(\bar{\gamma})$ and

\[ l_{0}^{IG} = q D_{1}^{IC} + (1-q) \left[ \bar{\lambda} D_{1}^{IC} + (1-\lambda) B_{i}^{E,B}(\gamma) \right]. \]

iii. \[ l_{0}^{CL} = q \left[ \bar{\lambda} B_{i}^{E,G}(\bar{\gamma}) + (1-\lambda) B_{i}^{E,G}(\gamma) \right] + (1-q) \left[ \bar{\lambda} B_{i}^{E,B}(\bar{\gamma}) + (1-\lambda) B_{i}^{E,B}(\gamma) \right]. \] If $q$ is sufficiently high, there exists a unique $\omega^{*}$ such that $l_{0}^{IG} < l_{0}^{CL}$ if and only if $\omega_{0}^{E,G} > \omega^{*}$.

Proof: See appendix.

It is useful to understand the difference between case (i) and case (ii), for this will help us understand later when performance pricing is valuable. Condition

Error! Reference source not found.\(^{11}\) is more likely to hold when the degree of moral hazard $\theta$ is low, and the expected value of raising pledgeability in the G state itself is high. In that case, the face value of incentive-compatible debt is higher than $B_{i}^{E,G}(\gamma)$ because there is enough incentive to raise pledgeability emanating from the G state.

Conversely, as liquidity in the G state, $\omega_{0}^{E,G}$, rises, the value to raising pledgeability emanating

---

\(^{11}\) Let $D_{1}^{IC}$ be the highest value if there are multiple solutions to the equation $q \Delta_{1}^{g} \left( D_{1} \right) + (1-q) \Delta_{1}^{d} \left( D_{1} \right) = 0$, which only happens in a zero-measure parametric space.
from the G state falls.\textsuperscript{12} If so, we get case (ii). In this case, $D_i^{\text{IC}}$ has to be below $B_i^{E,B}(\overline{\gamma})$ so that some of the incentive to raise pledgeability also comes from the B state. Importantly, performance pricing will be helpful in this situation of lower face value.

An extreme case to illustrate (ii) and (iii) is if $\omega_i^{E,G} \geq (1-\gamma)C_2$, so that higher pledgeability does not enhance expert bids in the G state because the expert has enough wealth to bid full value with pledgeability even at $\gamma$. All the incentive to raise pledgeability then comes from state B. So to incentivize high effort, the promised payment cannot exceed $D_i^{\text{IC}} = D_i^{B,\text{PayIC}}$. If the probability of the good state $q$ is sufficiently high (the condition is presented in the appendix), it may be best to raise funds without incentivizing pledgeability – as covenant lite debt. Even in the general case where $\omega_i^{E,G} < (1-\gamma)C_2$, if $B_i^{E,G}(\gamma)$ is much larger than $D_i^{\text{IC}}$ (either because liquidity in the G state is high or the moral hazard associated with pledgeability is high so that $D_i^{\text{IC}}$ is low), the incumbent could commit to more repayment (and thus raise more) by setting $D_i = B_i^{E,G}(\gamma)$ and disincentivizing effort.

The broader point is that the prospect of a highly liquid future state not only makes feasible greater promised straight debt payments, but these high promised payments also eliminate incentives to enhance pledgeability – the covenant lite situation. To restore those incentives, debt may have to be set so low that funds raised are greatly reduced – something the incumbent will not want to do if she needs to compete to buy the firm at date 0. This situation where low-pledgeability covenant-lite loans are attractive can occur even if the probability of the low state is significant, and even if the direct cost $\epsilon$ of enhancing pledgeability is zero.

\textsuperscript{12} The left-hand side simplifies to $q \left\{ (1-\theta)(\overline{\gamma} - \gamma)C_2 - \frac{\epsilon}{\lambda - \tilde{\lambda}} \right\}$ when $\omega_i^{E,G} < (1-\gamma)C_2$. But when $\omega_i^{E,G} \geq (1-\gamma)C_2$, $B_i^{E,G}(\overline{\gamma})$ is capped at $C_2$, so it becomes

$q \left\{ (1-\theta) \left[ (1-\gamma)C_2 - \omega_i^{E,G} \right] - \frac{\epsilon}{\lambda - \tilde{\lambda}} \right\}$ which falls in $\omega_i^{E,G}$ until $\omega_i^{E,G} \geq (1-\gamma)C_2$, when it is $-q \frac{\epsilon}{\lambda - \tilde{\lambda}} < 0$. 

26
B. Performance-Pricing Debt

Once again, let \( \{D_1, \tilde{D}_1\} \) be the performance-pricing debt contract. We prove in Lemma A.1 in the appendix that it is without loss of generality to assume \( \tilde{D}_1 = B^{E,G}_1(\overline{y}) \) following a covenant violation. Intuitively, \( \tilde{D}_1 = B^{E,G}_1(\overline{y}) \) provides the harshest punishment for low effort choice under performance-pricing debt. Let us write down the incumbent’s IC constraint in choosing high effort:

\[
\begin{align*}
\overline{\lambda} (1 - e_1) \left\{ q \left[ \theta C_2 + (1-\theta) B^{E,G}_1(\overline{y}) - D_i \right] + (1-q) \left[ \theta C_2 + (1-\theta) B^{E,B}_1(\overline{y}) - \min \{D_i, B^{E,B}_1(\overline{y})\} \right] \right\} \\
+ \overline{\lambda} e_1 \left\{ q \theta \left[ C_2 - B^{E,G}_1(\overline{y}) \right] + (1-q) \theta \left[ C_2 - B^{E,B}_1(\overline{y}) \right] \right\} + (1-\overline{\lambda}) \left\{ q \theta \left[ C_2 - B^{E,G}_1(\gamma) \right] + (1-q) \theta \left[ C_2 - B^{E,B}_1(\gamma) \right] \right\} - \epsilon \\
\geq \overline{\lambda} (1 - e_1) \left\{ q \left[ \theta C_2 + (1-\theta) B^{E,G}_1(\overline{y}) - D_i \right] + (1-q) \left[ \theta C_2 + (1-\theta) B^{E,B}_1(\overline{y}) - \min \{D_i, B^{E,B}_1(\overline{y})\} \right] \right\} \\
+ \overline{\lambda} e_1 \left\{ q \theta \left[ C_2 - B^{E,G}_1(\overline{y}) \right] + (1-q) \theta \left[ C_2 - B^{E,B}_1(\overline{y}) \right] \right\} + (1-\overline{\lambda}) \left\{ q \theta \left[ C_2 - B^{E,G}_1(\gamma) \right] + (1-q) \theta \left[ C_2 - B^{E,B}_1(\gamma) \right] \right\}.
\end{align*}
\]

While seemingly complicated, the inequality is straightforward: with probability \( \lambda (1-e_1) \), the realized pledgeability is high, and the covenant is not violated. In this case, the incumbent manager receives \( \theta C_2 + (1-\theta) B^{E,ni}_1(\overline{y}) \) and repays \( \min \{D_i, B^{E,ni}_1(\overline{y})\} \). With probability \( \lambda e_1 \), however, the type-I error occurs, in which case \( D_i \) is augmented to \( \tilde{D}_i = B^{E,G}_i(\overline{y}) \).

Therefore, the incumbent only receives a payoff \( \left[ C_2 - B^{E,ni}_1(\overline{y}) \right] \) if she retains her ability. With probability \( (1-\lambda) \), the realized pledgeability is low and the covenant is correctly triggered. In this case, the incumbent receives a payoff \( \left[ C_2 - B^{E,ni}_1(\gamma) \right] \) if she retains her ability. Finally, the incumbent incurs the cost of effort \( \epsilon \). We can show that

**Lemma 3.2:** Under Assumption 1 and

\[
\begin{align*}
e_1 < 1 - \frac{\theta \left\{ q \left[ B^{E,G}_i(\overline{y}) - B^{E,G}_i(\gamma) \right] + (1-q) \left[ B^{E,B}_i(\overline{y}) - B^{E,B}_i(\gamma) \right] \right\} + \frac{\epsilon}{\overline{\lambda} - \lambda}}{q B^{E,G}_i(\overline{y}) + (1-q) B^{E,B}_i(\overline{y})},
\end{align*}
\]

there exists a unique \( D_i^p \) such that the incumbent chooses high effort if and only if \( D_i \leq D_i^p \). Furthermore
i. If \( (1 - e_1) q [B_{1}^{E,G} (\overline{\gamma}) - B_{1}^{E,B} (\overline{\gamma})] - \frac{\epsilon}{\lambda - \overline{\lambda}} \geq \theta \left\{ q \left[ B_{1}^{E,G} (\overline{\gamma}) - B_{1}^{E,G} (\gamma) \right] + (1 - q) \left[ B_{1}^{E,B} (\overline{\gamma}) - B_{1}^{E,B} (\gamma) \right] \right\}, \)
then
\[
D_{i}^{p} = B_{1}^{E,G} (\overline{\gamma}) - \frac{\theta}{q(1 - e_1)} \left\{ q \left[ B_{1}^{E,G} (\overline{\gamma}) - B_{1}^{E,G} (\gamma) \right] + (1 - q) \left[ B_{1}^{E,B} (\overline{\gamma}) - B_{1}^{E,B} (\gamma) \right] \right\} 
- \frac{\epsilon}{q(1 - e_1)(\lambda - \overline{\lambda})} > B_{1}^{E,B} (\overline{\gamma}).
\]

ii. Otherwise,
\[
D_{i}^{p} = \left[ q B_{1}^{E,G} (\overline{\gamma}) + (1 - q) B_{1}^{E,B} (\overline{\gamma}) \right] - \frac{\theta}{1 - e_1} \left\{ q \left[ B_{1}^{E,G} (\overline{\gamma}) - B_{1}^{E,G} (\gamma) \right] + (1 - q) \left[ B_{1}^{E,B} (\overline{\gamma}) - B_{1}^{E,B} (\gamma) \right] \right\} 
- \frac{\epsilon}{(1 - e_1)(\lambda - \overline{\lambda})} \leq B_{1}^{E,B} (\overline{\gamma}).
\]

In both (i) and (ii), under \( \{ D_{i}^{p}, B_{1}^{E,G} (\overline{\gamma}) \} \), the incumbent can raise
\[
l_{0}^{p} = \lambda \left[ q D_{1}^{G, PayIC} + (1 - q) D_{1}^{B, PayIC} \right] + (1 - \lambda) \left[ q B_{1}^{E,G} (\gamma) + (1 - q) B_{1}^{E,B} (\gamma) \right].
\]

Interestingly, and unlike the case without the aggregate risk, performance pricing can do strictly better than internal-governance debt when there is aggregate uncertainty. Summarizing the analysis above, we get the following result.

**Proposition 3.1:** Under aggregate uncertainty,

If \( \text{Error! Reference source not found.} \) \( \text{Error! Reference source not found.} \) holds, (i) \( l_{0}^{IG} = l_{0}^{p} \). Given the enforcement cost, internal-governance debt raises more than performance-pricing debt (by the amount of enforcement cost).

Otherwise, (ii) \( l_{0}^{p} > l_{0}^{IG} \) so that performance-pricing debt raises more than internal-governance debt.

Finally, (iii) \( l_{0}^{p} > l_{0}^{CL} \) always holds as long as \( \alpha_{1}^{E,B} < (1 - \gamma)C_{2} \).

Recall that if \( \text{Error! Reference source not found.} \) \( \text{Error! Reference source not found.} \) \( \text{Error! Reference source not found.} \) holds, Lemma 3.1 states that the incentive compatible level of straight debt, \( D_{i}^{IC} \), is higher than \( B_{1}^{E,G} (\gamma) \). Performance pricing allows the face value to be raised conditional on covenant violation. It would add nothing to straight debt in the B state since the enforceable values,
$B^E_B\left(\bar{\gamma}\right)$ and $B^E_B\left(\gamma\right)$, are already below $D^IC$ regardless of the realization of pledgeability. Raising the face value any further would not alter the amount the lender could recover in that state. This then means that from the perspective of incentivizing effort, the two states effectively reduce to the one G state. However, we know from our analysis in the previous section that performance pricing cannot improve over straight debt in the G state if $D^IC > B^E_G\left(\gamma\right)$.

If Error! Reference source not found. Error! Reference source not found. does not hold, then Lemma 3.1 states that the incentive compatible level of straight debt, $D^IC$, is lower than $B^E_B\left(\bar{\gamma}\right)$. In this case, performance pricing can indeed improve over straight debt. In particular, if the covenant is violated, the face value of debt can be raised in the G state so that a higher payment can be collected. This higher payment penalizes the incumbent if low pledgeability is realized, which improves her incentive for high pledgeability effort.

Of course, performance pricing can also be triggered in error when the realized pledgeability is actually high. We know, however, that any disincentive effect of the higher repayment triggered by covenant error can be offset by setting the payment commensurately lower when pledgeability is high and there is no covenant error. In sum, when the incentive compatible face value for straight debt is low as in Proposition 3.1 (ii), it can be improved upon by raising the face value and collecting more when low pledgeability is realized in the G state. Not only does this directly increase repayment to the lender, it improves the incumbent’s effort incentives, and thereby further enhances the incentive compatible level of baseline debt.

Finally, Proposition 3.1 (iii) suggests performance-pricing debt outraises covenant-lite debt so long as higher pledgeability improves recovery in some state. We have

$$I^P_0 - I^CL_0 = \left[\bar{\lambda}(1-\theta) - \bar{\lambda}\right]\left[q\left(B^E_G\left(\bar{\gamma}\right) - B^E_G\left(\gamma\right)\right) + (1-q)\left(B^E_B\left(\bar{\gamma}\right) - B^E_B\left(\gamma\right)\right)\right] - \bar{\lambda} - \frac{\varepsilon}{\bar{\lambda} - \lambda} > 0,$$

which always holds when $\bar{\lambda}(1-\theta) > \bar{\lambda}$, $\omega^E_B < (1-\gamma)C_2$, and $\varepsilon$ small.

---

If the covenant is correctly tripped, $B^E_G\left(\gamma\right)$ can be repaid. If triggered by the type-I error, the actual payment is $B^E_G\left(\bar{\gamma}\right)$. 13
C. Bank Monitoring

With some abuse of notation, let us define
\[
\bar{t}_1^{CV} = \pi q \left[ B_1^{E,G}(\gamma) + (1-q) B_1^{E,B}(\gamma) \right] + (1-\pi) \left[ q B_1^{P,E,G}(\gamma) + (1-q) B_1^{P,E,B}(\gamma) \right].
\]
This is the maximum expected payment that the bank can receive on date 1 upon a covenant violation, conditional on the incumbent manager having chosen high effort \( \lambda = \bar{\lambda} \). The subsequent analysis depends on the comparison between the liquidation value \( L \), the minimum expected continuation value when realized pledgeability is low, \( \bar{L} = q B_1^{E,G}(\gamma) + (1-q) B_1^{E,B}(\gamma) \), and \( \bar{t}_1^{CV} \). Again, we assume \( D_1 \geq L \) and that \( L < q B_1^{E,G}(\gamma) + (1-q) B_1^{E,B}(\gamma) \); otherwise, the firm will always be liquidated. Since the solution with aggregate risk is qualitatively similar to that with no aggregate risk, we will only sketch the analysis. The cases are ordered according to decreasing state \( G \) liquidity, \( \omega_i^{E,G} \). Recall that beyond some level of liquidity, performance pricing debt will dominate internal governance debt as an alternative to bank debt.

Case 1: \( L \leq \bar{L} \)

It does not make sense to liquidate since continuation values are always higher. Therefore, the maximum amount of borrowing under a loan that induces bank monitoring is always (weakly) dominated by straight debt or performance-pricing debt, whichever raises more following Proposition 3.1.

Case 2: \( \bar{L} < L \leq \bar{t}_1^{CV} \)

Upon the covenant violation, the project is liquidated if and only if the bank knows that pledgeability is low, which can only happen if it has monitored. As earlier, the benefit of monitoring, \( M \), is \( (1-\pi)(L - \bar{L}) \). The bank chooses to monitor if and only if \( M \geq \psi \).

Next, let us turn to the borrower’s IC constraint in effort choice. If the bank does not monitor, the IC constraint is identical to the case of performance-pricing debt described in Lemma 3.2. So there will be a maximum incentive compatible \( D_1^P \) where \( D_1^P < B_1^{E,G}(\gamma) \). If the bank does monitor, the incumbent’s IC constraint is always satisfied for any \( D_1 \leq B_1^{E,G}(\gamma) \). This is because with monitoring, the project will be liquidated whenever realized pledgeability is low, in which case the incumbent receives nothing – there is no advantage to lowering pledgeability.
Case 3: \( L > \bar{l}_1^{CV} \)

Upon covenant violation, the project is always liquidated unless the bank monitors and learns that pledgeability is high. Once again, if the bank monitors, it sets \( \tilde{D}_1 = B^{E,G}_1(\bar{\gamma}) \) if it has learned \( \gamma_2 = \bar{\gamma} \) and liquidates if \( \gamma_2 = \underline{\gamma} \). The benefit of monitoring comes from the option to avoid liquidating the project upon learning \( \gamma_2 = \bar{\gamma} \) so that \( M = \bar{\pi} \left[ qB^{E,G}_1(\bar{\gamma}) + (1-q)B^{E,B}_1(\bar{\gamma}) - L \right] \). The bank chooses to monitor if and only if \( M \geq \psi \).

It is easily shown that the incumbent’s IC constraint \( V_1 \left( D_1, \text{x} \right) \geq V_1 \left( D_1, \bar{\text{x}} \right) \) is always satisfied for any \( D_1 \), regardless of whether the bank chooses to monitor (M) or not (NM) - any liquidation on covenant violation is a powerful threat. Also, \( l_0^{NM} > \max \{ l_0^p, l_0^G \} \) as long as \( L > \bar{l}_1^{CV} \). Finally, as earlier, \( l_0^M > l_0^{NM} \) if and only if \( M > \psi \).

**D. Equilibrium Outcomes**

Combining the results in the previous three cases, we have

**Proposition 3.2:**

i. If Error! Reference source not found. Error! Reference source not found. holds, internal governance debt with \( D_1 = D_1^{IC} \) is preferred to performance-pricing debt, else performance-pricing debt \( \{ D_1^p, B^{E,G}_1(\gamma) \} \) is chosen.

ii. If \( L < \bar{l}_1 \), the form of debt found superior in (i) is preferred.

iii. If \( L \in [\bar{l}_2, \bar{l}_1] \), the debt that triggers bank monitoring \( D_1 = B^{E,G}_1(\bar{\gamma}) \) is chosen if and only if \( \psi \leq (1-\bar{\pi})(L-\bar{l}_1) \). Otherwise, the form of debt found superior in (i) is preferred.

iv. If \( L \geq \bar{l}_1 \), the debt that triggers bank monitoring \( D_1 = B^{E,G}_1(\bar{\gamma}) \) is chosen if and only if \( \psi \leq \bar{\pi} \left[ qB^{E,G}_1(\bar{\gamma}) + (1-q)B^{E,B}_1(\bar{\gamma}) - L \right] \). Otherwise, \( D_1 = B^{E,G}_1(\bar{\gamma}) \), and the bank liquidates the project following a covenant violation.
Figure 5 Equilibrium with Aggregate Risk

Figure 6 offers a graphic illustration to the equilibrium described in proposition 3.2, where we have implicitly assumed the level of $\alpha_i^{E,G}$ that satisfies

$$q \left( 1 - \theta \right) \left[ B_i^{E,G} (\overline{y}) - B_i^{E,G} (\underline{y}) \right] - \frac{\epsilon}{\lambda - \underline{\lambda}} = \left( 1 - q \right) \left[ \theta \left[ B_i^{E,B} (\overline{y}) - B_i^{E,B} (\underline{y}) \right] + \frac{\epsilon}{\lambda - \underline{\lambda}} \right]$$

is above the one that satisfies $L = \underline{L}$. Otherwise, the dashed red line shifts towards the left, which further squeezes the region that internal-governance debt can be optimal. The qualitative features are unchanged from those in Figure 7, except that covenant-lite loan is always dominated by performance-pricing loan, as long as the liquidity in state B remains sufficiently low. Of course, if both $\alpha_i^{E,G}$ and $\alpha_i^{E,B}$ rise above $1 - \gamma\overline{C}_{\overline{y}}$ (not illustrated in Figure 8) so that pledgeability is not needed in either state, then covenant-lite loan always dominates all the other options.

E. Discussion and Empirical Evidence

The purpose of examining aggregate risk combined with debt contracts was to illustrate the rationale for performance pricing. Note that the probability of the realization of various aggregate states is orthogonal to the probability of the covenant tripping – the latter is tied only to the incumbent’s decision on pledgeability. Nevertheless, we still get performance pricing as a dominant contract – when the need to give the incumbent incentives to raise pledgeability in the presence of aggregate uncertainty forces down the face value of the incentive compatible debt contract, and creates room for the interest rate to be credibly raised conditional on genuine covenant violation. This allows the face value to increase, where it punishes the shirking borrower. Note that if state-contingent face values are hard to contract on, performance pricing brings in state contingency through the back door because expert bids, and therefore repayment
enforcement, are state contingent. Allowing pricing contingent on the firm-specific news about pledgeability effort can therefore strictly improve the available set of contracts. Of course, if covenant violations and the state were correlated, this would only strengthen the result.

There is an extensive literature on covenants (see, for example, Smith and Warner (1979) on covenants in public debt contracts, Bradley and Roberts (2015) in private debt contracts, and Stromberg and Kaplan (2003) in VC contracts). There are various categorizations of covenants. Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) term covenants that limit leverage, or require a minimum amount of equity, “capital” covenants. Performance covenants, on the other hand, are formulated directly in terms of cash flows or in combination with balance sheet data (such as a debt to EBITDA ratio). Performance covenants align well with the covenant in our paper. Since \( y_i C_i \) is the verifiable cash flow, the covenant will be tripped in practice whenever the entrepreneur diverts cash flows or puts in place weak governance, so verifiable cash flows are low. Christensen and Nikolaev argue that performance covenants are the ones that are associated with contract renegotiation.

In a more extensive study of the conditions under which contracts are renegotiated, Nikolaev (2018) finds a positive correlation between the audit premium – the unexplained variation from a linear regression of the natural log of audit fees onto a set of their determinants, which is an accounting measure of low transparency and information quality about a firm’s performance – and the frequency of renegotiation. The audit premium is a proxy for low pledgeability, and to the extent that covenant violations are necessary for creditor-initiated renegotiations, the positive correlation between audit fees and renegotiation is consistent with the structure of our model. Interestingly, Nikolaev (2018) finds that performance pricing contracts are significantly less likely to be renegotiated – the performance pricing grid substitutes for renegotiation. Asquith, Beatty, and Weber (2005) also provide suggestive evidence that performance pricing contracts are more arm’s length contracts meant to reduce the costs of monitoring and renegotiation – performance pricing contracts are associated with larger loan syndicates rather than single banks (also see Saavedra (2018)).

Turning to predictions, we find a role for performance pricing contracts (relative to straight debt contracts or bank debt contracts with extensive covenants) when there is aggregate risk and prospective liquidity is high so that the baseline incentive compatible level of debt is low. Relative to internal governance debt (straight debt with no covenants), our model suggest performance pricing is more likely when moral hazard is high. Asquith, Beatty, and Weber
(2005) find that performance pricing contracts are positively associated with their proxy for moral hazard – whether the contract is predicted to contain material restrictions on the borrower’s financing and investment behavior.

The covenant in our model is also representative of what Smith and Warner (1979) call maintenance covenants (requiring say a minimum amount of working capital) as well as covenants requiring compliance (such as regular audited statements) and covenants limiting mergers and acquisitions (so as to limit entrenching investment). Entrenching investment, which requires substantial management input in the future, and thus entrenches future managerial rents, reduces future pledgeability. Covenants that limit capital expenditure thus discourage managerial actions lowering pledgeability. More research on when such covenants are used is warranted.

IV. Extensions

It is useful to relax assumptions/extend the model in some directions.

A. Covenant Tightness

Suppose $e_1$ is chosen by the bank. It incurs some convex cost $\kappa(1-e_1)$ that satisfies,

$$\kappa(1-\bar{e}) = 0, \quad \kappa' > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \kappa'' > 0,$$

where $\bar{e}$ can be thought as the maximum probability of a type-I error. A higher $e_1$ corresponds to a slacker covenant. What would the optimal choice be?

Consider the case without aggregate uncertainty. The case with uncertainty is qualitatively similar.

If liquidity is sufficiently high such that $B^E_{1} \left(0\right) \geq L$, $e_1 = \overline{e}$ is chosen. This is because early liquidation is never incurred. This corresponds to the loosest covenant, when bank debt is equivalent to arm’s length debt. Recall that if the bank chooses to monitor upon a covenant violation, the amount that the incumbent can raise is

$$l_0^M = \lambda B^E_{1} \left(\frac{\nu}{\lambda}\right) + L - \left[\lambda e_1 + (1-\lambda)\right] \nu.$$

Clearly, a lower $e_1$ reduces the cost the bank incurs in unnecessary monitoring, so $e_1$ is chosen to maximize $-\lambda e_1 \nu - \kappa(1-e_1)$. If the bank always liquidates the project following a covenant violation, the amount that the incumbent can raise is

$$l_0^{NM} = \lambda (1-e_1) B^E_{1} \left(\frac{\nu}{\lambda}\right) + L - \left[\lambda e_1 + (1-\lambda)\right] L.$$

Clearly, a lower $e_1$ reduces the chances the bank liquidates inefficiently, so $e_1$ is chosen to maximize $-\lambda e_1 [B^E_{1} \left(\frac{\nu}{\lambda}\right) - L] - \kappa(1-e_1)$. In both cases, $e_1$ is optimally set less than $\overline{e}$. The broader point is that bank covenants are more detailed.
and precisely set than covenants in public debt because bank monitoring costs and the value consequences of bank actions are higher (see, for example, Kahan and Tuckman (1995)).

B. Maximizing borrowing vs. maximizing payoff

For simplicity, we have assumed the expert’s objective is to maximize her upfront borrowing. An alternative is to assume an expert owns the project idea and needs to borrow to make a fixed amount of investment upfront. Conditional on being able to borrow that amount, the incumbent will try to avoid loan contracts that cause a surplus loss. First, under the assumption $C_2 > L$, liquidation is always costly. Since liquidation will occur only under bank financing, this suggests a reason why the incumbent would prefer internal-governance debt and performance-pricing debt over bank financing. The second source of surplus loss comes if the incumbent loses her ability and must resell the asset. In this case, the future incumbent earns rents $C_2 - B_1^E(\gamma_2)$. Clearly, a contract that induces higher pledgeability $\gamma_2$ reduces the rents to acquirers and increases the initial incumbent’s surplus. Therefore, this source of surplus loss tends to reduce the attractiveness of covenant lite debt, except when $B_1^E(\gamma) = C_2$.

C. Banks Contributing to Pledgeability

Thus far, banks only choose whether to intervene if there is a covenant violation. In practice, intermediaries may do more to improve the governance of their borrower (this may be a role played by banks in less financially developed markets; in developed markets by banks for small young firms, by venture capitalists (VCs) for young innovative firms, and by private equity for large mature firms). For instance, VCs often work to make the enterprise more transparent, governable, and acceptable to the stock market (see Hellmann and Puri (2002), Rajan (2012)).

We extend our model to study this role of financial intermediaries. For simplicity, we assume $\lambda = 1$ and $\lambda = 0$ so that there is a one-to-one mapping between the incumbent’s effort and the realized pledgeability. Before the incumbent sets pledgeability, the bank could augment its final value by $\beta_2$ after paying an additional cost $\delta$ where $\beta_2 \in \{0, \bar{\beta}\}$. The date-1 bid of experts is then $B_1^E(\gamma_2, \beta_2) = \min \{\alpha^E_1 + (\gamma_2 + \beta_2)C_2, C_2\}$.

Following the analysis in section II, it is straightforward to show that the incumbent expert will choose high pledgeability $\gamma_2 = \gamma$ if and only if $D_1 \leq D_1^{PayIC}(\beta_2)$, where
$$D_1^{\text{PayIC}}(\beta_2) = \theta B_1^E(\gamma, \beta_2) + (1 - \theta) B_1^E(\bar{\gamma}, \beta_2) - \varepsilon.$$ Clearly, \(D_1^{\text{PayIC}}(\bar{\beta}) \geq D_1^{\text{PayIC}}(0)\), with the inequality being strict so long as \(B_1^E(\gamma, 0) < C_2\). So high bank-determined pledgeability \(\beta_2 = \bar{\beta}\) will increase the incumbent’s incentive-compatible level of debt (unless liquidity is high enough that pledgeability is never needed).

Next, let us turn to the bank’s incentive in choosing pledgeability. The bank chooses \(\beta_2 = \bar{\beta}\) if and only if

$$\min \left[ D_1, B_1^E(\gamma_2, \bar{\beta}) \right] - \min \left[ D_1, B_1^E(\gamma_2, 0) \right] \geq \delta.$$ It is straightforward to show that the banker’s incentive to increase pledgeability (the left hand side of the constraint above) is maximized at \(D_1 = D_1^{\text{PayIC}}(\bar{\beta})\). This illustrates an interesting double-blessing effect. Intuitively, \(D_1 = D_1^{\text{PayIC}}(\bar{\beta})\) is the highest claim that incentivizes \(\gamma_2 = \bar{\gamma}\) if \(\beta_2 = \bar{\beta}\). However, such a high level of debt will induce the incumbent to choose \(\gamma_2 = \gamma\) if \(\beta_2 = 0\). This means the incumbent expert will choose high pledgeability if and only if the bank also increases pledgeability. Therefore, in addition to giving the bank the maximum benefit of raising \(\beta_2\), \(D_1 = D_1^{\text{PayIC}}(\bar{\beta})\) will also induce high firm pledgeability. In this sense, firm internal governance and bank governance can complement each other. Any higher debt level will induce only the bank to raise pledgeability (a “single-blessing”, which lowers the bank’s incentive to do so), while a lower debt level will diminish the bank’s incentive to incur \(\delta\).

\[D. \text{ Intermediation and Intermediary Capital}\]

So far, we have implicitly assumed the bank will retain all the loans on its balance sheet and that the banker is self-financed. If the bank originates loans and finances them by raising money from investors, it will need to be provided incentives to take costly actions such as verification or monitoring. We now analyze the implications for bank capital (skin in the game).

Incentive compatibility requires that a sufficiently large part of the benefit from a costly action accrues to the intermediary. In other words, the intermediary must retain “skin in the game,” a sufficiently large claim whose value is increased by the costly action. We can see this most easily in the case of certainty. For instance, consider Case 2 in section 2C where

$$B_1^E(\gamma) < L \leq \bar{T}_1^{CV}.$$ Without monitoring, the bank will not liquidate the project. The repayment is
then $B_t^E (\tilde{\gamma})$ with probability $\bar{\pi}$ and $B_t^E (\gamma')$ with probability $1 - \bar{\pi}$. We would like to implement monitoring and liquidation following a covenant violation. This can be accomplished as long as $M = (1 - \bar{\pi})(L - B_t^E (\gamma')) \geq \psi$. The bank’s capital structure is, in general, not unique, once the bank’s stake is sufficiently sensitive to its actions. One feasible capital structure is for the bank to issue debt claims on itself with face value $B_t^E (\gamma')$. Next, it sells a fraction $\delta$ of the equity and retains a fraction $1 - \delta$, which satisfies $(1 - \delta)(1 - \bar{\pi})(L - B_t^E (\gamma')) = \psi$. 14

Of course, when monitoring and verification are not needed (for example, internal governance debt or covenant lite debt), the intermediary can sell or borrow against the entire loan. Thus the demand for intermediary to have skin in the game is highest in times of low prospective liquidity. Conversely, full pass through funding (with no requirement for intermediary skin in the game) will occur in times of high future liquidity.

The form of the intermediary’s skin in the game may vary with the nature of the desired intermediary intervention. If the intermediary is simply required to collect information to verify covenant violation (or screen out bad borrowers in a model of adverse selection), it is sufficient that the skin in the game take the form of a pari passu share in the loan repayments, or a junior stake in them (bank or securitization equity). Of course, if the intermediary could delegate some of this information production to an accounting firm (by requiring timely audited financial statements), the cost of information production might be (close to) zero, and the loan could (almost) totally sold or borrowed against, with little intermediary skin in the game. If, however, the intermediary has to exert costly effort to decide whether to liquidate, it must get a strictly positive payment from liquidation, it can help to have the loan made by the intermediary be effectively senior to some other claims on the project (see Park (2000), Rajan and Winton (1995)), and the intermediary’s stake in the loan repayments should be sufficiently large and sensitive to its monitoring and liquidation actions.

Empirically, periods with extremely high liquidity would thus be associated with either entry by highly levered intermediaries (pass through securitization vehicles) who do not screen or monitor and have a tiny fraction of junior claim retained as “skin in the game”, or a switch by

---

14 Similar results are in Holmström and Tirole (1997), DeMarzo and Duffie (1999), and Park (2000). Hu and Varas (2020) present a dynamic model in which intermediary cannot commit to its skin-in-the-game. The pricing impact deters the intermediary from selling too soon and too aggressively.
banks to higher leverage and a suspension of monitoring.\textsuperscript{15} The securitization vehicles can buy loans originated by banks or other intermediaries and the loans will be covenant lite. Thus covenant lite loans will have a large market share at times when intermediary leverage is high and non-bank lending increases. From a policy perspective, demanding that intermediaries hold more skin in the game during the period of high liquidity may have been futile. It would simply have accentuated the move toward lending structures that minimized intermediary involvement.

In sum, our discussion in this sub-section focuses on the demand for intermediary services and consequently for intermediary capital as liquidity conditions vary. In contrast, most of the analysis of intermediary asset pricing and intermediary capital has studied the effects of variation in the supply of intermediary capital (see Holmström and Tirole (1997), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), Rampini and Vishwanthan (2019) and He and Krishnamurthy (2013) for example). In such models, fluctuations in repayments shock intermediary net worth, which affects the supply of intermediary capital. Because some types of monitored lending can only occur if the intermediaries have sufficient own net worth, these shocks have pervasive effects of their own (in addition to their direct effects on intermediary net worth).

\textbf{E. Alternative Interpretations of Liquidity and Agency Problems}

Note that a range of agency problems can be addressed by future bidders bidding with their own wealth. Underlying this is the assumption that there is no problem with the underlying asset (the firm), and its full production possibilities can be obtained in large measure by seizing and selling the asset to the right expert. If, however, the asset itself (and the cash flows that can be produced with it), rather than the human capital that controls it, is of variable and hidden quality, future liquidity will be of little help in correcting malfeasance. Similarly, if the incumbent can make away with the asset in period 1 before it can be sold upon default, date-1 liquidity will be of little use. The broader point is that prospective liquidity can correct a variety of problems of asymmetric information and moral hazard, not all.

\textbf{F. Complete Contracts}

If the aggregate state were observable and verifiable and could be written into contracts, and there was no other reason to use debt contracts (such as tax advantages), then the face values on

\textsuperscript{15} See Diamond (1984), DeMarzo (2005), DeMarzo and Duffie (1999), and Gorton and Souleles (2006) for related work on the benefits of securitization.
date 1 could be made state contingent.\textsuperscript{16} If so, the results without aggregate risk apply, state by state. The contract which raises the largest initial proceeds in that state is chosen. There will be no need for performance pricing to deal with pledgeability incentives. With debt contracts (as we have seen) or contracts contingent on a noisy measure of the aggregate state, we will recover a role for performance pricing.

Finally, even with debt contracts let alone complete contracts, there is no gain from making contract payments contingent on the loss of ability of the incumbent. To see this, let us assume the one-period debt is denoted as \( \{D_1^\theta, D_1^{1-\theta}\} \), where the payment due depends on whether the incumbent retains her ability or not. In the case without the aggregate uncertainty, the IC constraint in choosing high effort is

\[
\theta \left[ C_2 - D_1^\theta \right] + (1 - \theta) \left[ B_1^\varepsilon(\gamma) - D_1^{1-\theta} \right] - \frac{\varepsilon}{\lambda - \lambda_\theta} \geq \theta \left[ C_2 - B_1^\varepsilon(\gamma) \right],
\]

which implies the expected payments satisfy \( \theta D_1^\theta + (1 - \theta) D_1^{1-\theta} \leq D_1^{\text{postIC}} \). Therefore, in the case of straight debt, making debt payments contingent on the incumbent’s ability does not alter either the incumbent’s IC constraint or the expected amount that the lender can collect.

\[ \textbf{V. Conclusion} \]

While this paper describes how financial intermediation varies with prospective liquidity in the underlying real borrowing sector, there is a more general point here. Liquidity tends to diminish the consequences of many kinds of moral hazard over repayment. Internal governance matters little if the firm can be seized and sold for full repayment in a chapter 11 bankruptcy. Therefore, prospective liquidity encourages leverage at both the borrower and intermediary level, even while requiring less governance. Equivalently, because the intermediary performs fewer useful functions, high prospective liquidity encourages disintermediation.

Risky loans to highly leveraged borrowers, made by highly leveraged intermediaries, may therefore not be evidence of systemic moral hazard or over-optimism, but may simply be a consequence of high prospective liquidity crowding out intermediation. Such crowding out may, of course, have adverse consequences. As prospective liquidity fades and the demand for intermediation services expands again, the need for intermediary capital also increases. To the

\textsuperscript{16} Our results are unchanged if the incumbent’s project is risk free and only industry liquidity varies by state. In that case, to justify debt contracts, it is sufficient (and plausible) to require that contracts cannot be contingent on outside expert liquidity.
extent that intermediary capital is run down in periods when liquidity is expected to be plentiful, it may not be available in sufficient quantities when liquidity conditions turn and demand for capital ramps up. Prospective liquidity breeds a dependence on continued liquidity for debt enforcement as it crowds out other modes of enforcement, especially governance. This will make debt returns more skewed.

We have not examined multiple claims on the same firm and the relationship between creditors (see, for example, Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) or Diamond (1991)). We have also not explored how intermediaries might behave as the demand for their services wax and wane. Can they shrink easily after having expanded, or do they compete for mandates even when they have little comparative advantage relative to other forms of finance? Does this contribute to financial fragility? Finally, at a macroeconomic level, liquidity is endogenous and deserves to be explored further (see, for example, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)). These are important areas for future research.

References


Hart, Oliver, and John Moore, 1994, A theory of debt based on the inalienability of human capital, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 841-879


Kermani, Amir and Yueran Ma, 2020, Two Tales of Debt, working paper, University of Chicago.


Saavedra, Daniel, 2018, Syndicate Size and the Choice of Covenants in Debt Contracts


Vickery, J. I., & Wright, J. (2013). TBA trading and liquidity in the agency MBS market.
Appendix

Proof of Lemma 3.1

Let us define $V_1^{\text{na}} (D_1, \tilde{\zeta})$, $V_1^{\text{na}} (D_1, \tilde{\lambda})$, and $\Delta_1^{\text{na}} (D_1)$ as in section II. Assumption 1 leads to $B_{1}^{E,G} (\gamma) > B_{1}^{E,B} (\bar{\gamma})$. The condition in (i) satisfies $q \Delta_1^{E,G} (B_{1}^{E,G} (\gamma)) + (1-q) \Delta_1^{B} (B_{1}^{E,G} (\gamma)) > 0$, in which case $D_1^{\text{IC}} > B_{1}^{E,G} (\gamma)$. Otherwise, as in case (ii), $D_1^{\text{IC}} \leq B_{1}^{E,B} (\bar{\gamma})$. The solution is unique unless $q \left\{ (1-\theta) [B_{1}^{E,G} (\bar{\gamma}) - B_{1}^{E,G} (\gamma)] - \frac{\epsilon}{\lambda - \lambda} \right\} = (1-q) \left\{ \theta [B_{1}^{E,B} (\bar{\gamma}) - B_{1}^{E,B} (\gamma)] + \frac{\epsilon}{\lambda - \lambda} \right\}$, in which case we pick the highest solution.

The condition for case (iii) is $q \left\{ C_2 - D_{1}^{B,PayIC} \right\} > (1-q) \left\{ \tilde{\lambda} (1-\theta) - \lambda \right\} \left[ B_{1}^{E,B} (\bar{\gamma}) - B_{1}^{E,B} (\gamma) \right]$, which follows from comparing $l_0^{IG} < l_0^{CL}$ at $B_{1}^{E,G} (\gamma) = C_2$, in which case $D_1^{\text{IC}} = D_{1}^{B,PayIC}$. This guarantees the existence of $\omega^*$. The uniqueness follows from the monotonicity of $l_0^{IG} - l_0^{CL}$ with respect to $\omega_{1}^{E,G}$ once $B_{1}^{E,G} (\gamma) < C_2 = B_{1}^{E,G} (\bar{\gamma})$.

Proof of Lemma 3.2

This constraint is easily simplified to

$$(1-e_1) \left\{ q \left[ B_{1}^{E,G} (\bar{\gamma}) - D_1 \right] + (1-q) \max \left\{ B_{1}^{E,B} (\bar{\gamma}) - D_1, 0 \right\} \right\} - \frac{\epsilon}{\lambda - \lambda} \geq \theta \left\{ q \left[ B_{1}^{E,G} (\bar{\gamma}) - B_{1}^{E,G} (\gamma) \right] + (1-q) \left[ B_{1}^{E,B} (\bar{\gamma}) - B_{1}^{E,B} (\gamma) \right] \right\}.$$

Given that the left-hand side is decreasing in $D_1$, the condition on $e_1$ follows from evaluating the constraint at $D_1 = 0$. Case i and ii follow from evaluating this constraint at $D_1 = B_{1}^{E,B} (\bar{\gamma})$.

Lemma A.1: in performance-pricing debt, it is without loss of generality to assume

$\hat{D}_1 = B_{1}^{E,G} (\bar{\gamma})$.

Proof: Let us write down the IC constraint under $\left\{ D_1, \hat{D}_1 \right\}$:
Meanwhile, the goal is to maximize

$$l_0^* = \bar{\lambda} (1 - e_1) \left\{ qD_1 + (1 - q) \min \{ D_1, B_1^{E,B} (\bar{\varphi}) \} \right\} + \lambda (1 - e_1) \left\{ q\tilde{D}_1 + (1 - q) \min \{ \tilde{D}_1, B_1^{E,B} (\bar{\varphi}) \} \right\} + (1 - \bar{\lambda}) \left\{ q\tilde{D}_1 + (1 - q) B_1^{E,B} (\gamma) \right\} - \varepsilon.$$ 

Let \( \{ D_1^*, \tilde{D}_1^* \} \) be the solution. If we increase \( \tilde{D}_1^* \) and decrease \( D_1^* \) such that \( l_0^* \) is unchanged, it is straightforward to see that the IC constraint gets more slack because \( \bar{\lambda} > \bar{\lambda} \).

Q.E.D.

A.1. Type-II error

For simplicity, we have assumed that the signal \( \phi \) only involves a type-I error. A type-II error, where low pledgeability may not trigger a covenant violation, will only change the results qualitatively, as we show in this subsection – it makes it harder to incentivize effort. Specifically, let us assume that if \( \gamma_2 = \gamma \), the signal is \( \phi = \phi^H \) with probability \( e_2 \) and \( \phi = \phi^L \) with probability \( 1 - e_2 \). In this case, we need to redefine \( \bar{\pi} = \frac{\bar{\lambda} e_1}{\bar{\lambda} e_1 + (1 - \bar{\lambda})(1 - e_2)} \). Again, we are going to focus on the case without the aggregate risk.

In the case of performance-pricing debt, the incumbent’s payoff stays unchanged (and remains no better than straight debt.) The incumbent could retain control by paying \( B_1^{E} (\gamma) \).

The presence of the type-II error reduces the incumbent’s incentive to choose high effort under monitoring. To see this, suppose that the bank monitors following a covenant violation and
liquidates the project if it learns the pledgeability is low. In this case, the incumbent's IC constraint in choosing high effort becomes

\[
\bar{\lambda} (1-e_1)\left[\theta C_2 + (1-\theta) B_1^E(\bar{\gamma}) - D_1\right] + \bar{\lambda} e_1 \theta \left[ C_2 - B_1^E(\bar{\gamma}) \right] + (1-\bar{\lambda}) e_2 \theta \left[ C_2 - B_1^E(\gamma) \right] - \varepsilon
\]

\[
\geq \lambda (1-e_1)\left[\theta C_2 + (1-\theta) B_1^E(\bar{\gamma}) - D_1\right] + \lambda e_1 \theta \left[ C_2 - B_1^E(\bar{\gamma}) \right] + (1-\lambda) e_2 \theta \left[ C_2 - B_1^E(\gamma) \right].
\]

If \( e_2 = 0 \), this constraint is always slack whenever \( D_1 \leq B_1^E(\bar{\gamma}) \). Under a general \( e_2 \), the constraint holds if and only if

\[
D_1 \leq \frac{\theta (1-e_2) C_2 + (1-e_1 - \theta) B_1^E(\bar{\gamma}) + e_2 \theta B_1^E(\gamma)}{(1-e_1)} - \frac{\varepsilon}{(\bar{\lambda} - \lambda)(1-e_1)}. \text{ The higher is } e_2, \text{ the lower the right hand side, and lower the incentive compatible level of debt.}
\]

By a similar argument, in the case of aggregate uncertainty an increase in the probability of a high type-II error will reduce the amount that can be raised with performance pricing, whenever performance pricing raises more than straight debt.