Abstract

Although radically different from a traditional payment system, Bitcoin is functional and transmits value over the internet. Having fixed transaction processing capacity, it experiences service delays which motivate users to pay for service priority. These fees fund the computer servers ("miners") which support Bitcoin. This paper models Bitcoin as a platform that intermediates between users and miners. It derives closed form formulas of the fees and waiting times and studies their properties; compares the economics of the Bitcoin payment system (BPS) to that of a traditional payment system operated by a profit maximizing firm; and suggests protocol design modification to enhance the platform’s efficiency. The appendix describes and explains the main attributes of Bitcoin and the underlying blockchain technology.
1 Introduction

A trusted ledger of value transfers is at the heart of any electronic payment system. Traditionally, the technology underlying the ledger required a trusted party to maintain it. That party usually had market power to affect fees and fee structure, thereby adversely affecting welfare.

Blockchain technology, which is central to the Bitcoin payment system (BPS), offers a radical alternative in which competing parties (“miners”) maintain the ledger. Nobody owns BPS. At its core the BPS consists of a protocol, i.e., a set of rules. It is in a participant’s best interest to follow the rules if he believes that other participants follow the rules.

The BPS’s blockchain protocol employs a combination of cryptography and incentives to remove the need to trust any individual party. It also entails very different economics of supply and demand for the platform’s payment services. This paper provides a model and analysis of the BPS’s economic structure.

Bitcoin’s peculiarities notwithstanding, it provides payment services to users and consumes real resources. The model allows us to answer standard economic questions about the platform, such as the determination of prices, cost and welfare. As there is no party that controls the BPS, all of these are determined in equilibrium. The analysis facilitates comparison between the BPS and a firm-run payment system. We find that the BPS can eliminate monopoly dead-weight loss, but incurs other costs. Our analysis highlights a novel pricing mechanism and can be used to guide protocol design.

The model elaborates on the observation that the blockchain design makes the BPS a two-sided platform whose constituencies are: (i) miners who collectively provide the system’s infrastructure in return for payment; (ii) users who make transactions and pay fees. A brief description of the system is in order to explain the particular properties of this two-sided market that are the focus of our model. Appendix A provides a more detailed description of the system.

Users post transactions at random times; miners organize them into blocks, each block with the same, limited capacity; the block of a single randomly selected miner is added to the blockchain; this block selection amounts to processing of the transactions in that block; miner selection is a Poisson process with a fixed rate which is independent of the aggregate computing resources used by the miners. That, and the fixed capacity of the blocks imply that the BPS has a fixed expected transaction processing capacity.

The system’s limited capacity coupled with the randomness of transaction arrival and processing times imply that at times transactions will be processed with delays of random
lengths. To make the presentation cleaner we assume that on average, the system has sufficient capacity to process all transactions.

All miners perform the same tasks. Participation in the miner selection tournament is the most resource-consuming among these. A miner’s chance of being selected is proportional to his share of the total computational resources. For each block, the selected miner collects a fixed, system-generated reward plus the fees associated with the transactions in that block. Each user chooses the fee associated with his transaction. Each miner is free to enter and exit the system at no cost. Each participating miner chooses which transactions to include in his block.

We set up a model of fees, priority levels and mining intensity that captures the main features of the BPS. Its analysis highlights differences between the BPS and a traditional payment system operated by profit maximizing firm. The analysis delivers explicit formulas of the fees and delays, thereby enabling suggestions for design improvements. Figure 1 suggests an agreement between the fee formula and the data.

Beyond the quantitative results, the analysis offers a series of qualitative insights, as follows.

The BPS processes all transactions, albeit with delay; all users receive strict positive surplus. In contrast, the firm excludes low willingness to pay (WTP) transactions but processes the rest without delay. In the BPS, the fee level does not increase if user WTP increases whereas the firm charges more if users’ WTP increases.

User payments under the BPS are payments for service speed. A profit-seeking miner excludes the transactions which offer the lowest fees when the assembled block is full. Therefore, users to whom delays are costly will offer relatively high fees to gain priority and be served faster. In contrast, a traditional payment system charges for service which it usually offers at a uniform speed.

The possibility of entry of small marginal miners implies that even a miner who controls a substantial fraction of the mining resources cannot profitably affect the fees paid by users, as explained in Section 4.1. Thus, the entities who provide the service – the miners – act as price takers.

In equilibrium, users with higher delay costs receive higher processing priority and therefore shorter delays. The fee a user pays is equal to the delay externality he imposes on others who offer lower fees. Thus, fees are equal to those obtained by allocating priority through a Vickrey, Clarke, Groves (VCG) mechanism, although the BPS employs no auctioneer. User WTP does not affect fees, assuming it is sufficiently high.

An increase (respectively, decrease) in the arrival rate of new transactions results in
increased (resp., decreased) congestion, which in turn cause fees to be higher (resp., lower). No delays imply no fees. The analysis offers an explicit relation between block size (which reflects congestion) and the USD-denominated fee. Figure 1 provides a theoretical and an empirical summary of this relation. Notably, the dependence of fees on congestion is highly non-linear: fees are negligible when blocks are below 50% of their maximal size, positive when blocks are at 80% of their maximal size, and substantially higher when blocks are close to their maximal size.

The analysis assumes that the mining resources are sufficient to guarantee the system’s reliability and security. When so, increases in the mining resources do not affect the fees because they do not affect the system’s capacity, throughput or delays.

Newly minted coins and transaction fees fund the miners who acquire mining resources in USD-denominated markets. Exchange rate and fee level fluctuations affect miners’ aggregate income, which in turn affects aggregate mining power in the BPS. There is no mechanism that drives the level of resources acquired and deployed to an efficient level, however defined.

The analysis points to an efficiency contrast between the BPS and a profit maximizing firm. Namely, the latter’s service is associated with dead-weight loss, whereas the BPS can operate with excess capacity, serving all users and awarding each strictly positive
surplus. If miners are homogeneous, all surplus accrues to the users.

However, the costs of operating the BPS are likely to be higher than those of a traditional firm: its decentralized architecture requires duplication of computations and expenditure of efforts in the miner selection tournament; the aggregate mining level can be too high; costly delays are necessary to induce users to pay transaction fees. Thus, welfare under the BPS can be higher or lower than that under a traditional system, depending on the value of eliminating dead-weight loss.

Hundreds of variants of Bitcoin have emerged. Their founders, computer scientists, and, more recently, economists have been grappling with properties and analysis of blockchains. Our analysis raises economic insights from market design. It suggests that congestion is not merely an engineering necessity, but also a device to motivate users to pay transaction fees.

The design of a future version of the BPS can benefit from suggestions based on our model. Currently higher demand implies higher congestion, and therefore higher USD-denominated fees and higher mining levels. An alternative (and probably better) design can adjust the system’s capacity to the users’ demand, thereby steadying congestion, aggregate fee, and mining level.

Holding the capacity parameters fixed, higher congestion results in higher fees and higher delays. Allowing parameter choice, we offer an analytic expression for the delay costs required to raise a certain revenue level. Analysis and examples suggest that large blocks are less efficient in that they require longer delays to sustain a given level of revenue.

**Related Literature**

Famously, a white paper by Nakamoto (2008) coined the term Bitcoin and described the BPS. Its opening paragraph criticizes the costs of the existing financial system and its usefulness to small transactions, “Completely non-reversible transactions are not really possible, since financial institutions cannot avoid mediating disputes. The cost of mediation increases transaction costs, limiting the minimum practical transaction size and cutting off the possibility for small casual transactions.” Section 6 (“Incentive”) predicts that transaction fees will eventually fund the system, “The incentive can also be funded with transaction fees... Once a predetermined number of coins have entered circulation, the incentive can transition entirely to transaction fees...” The Section’s title notwithstanding, Nakamoto (2008) is silent on the incentive to pay transaction fees, their relation to other parameters and their implications; understanding these is the present paper’s task.
Engineering of Bitcoin

Eyal & Sirer (2014), Sapirshtein et al. (2016) analyze the equilibrium between miners and show that proper design of the blockchain protocol produces a reliable system in equilibrium if all miners are sufficiently small. Babaioff et al. (2012) analyze the incentives to propagate information in the BPS. Narayanan et al. (2016) offer an elaborate description and analysis of the system. Croman et al. (2016) provide cost estimates for the BPS and analyze the potential for transaction processing capacity. Eyal et al. (2016) suggest an alternative design aimed to construct a system with a higher capacity. Carlsten et al. (2016) analyze how incentives for miners change when miners are rewarded with transaction fees instead of newly created coins. Chiu & Koepl (2017) evaluate the welfare implications of printing new coins. Easley et al. (2017) is a contemporaneous piece which proposes and empirically examines an equilibrium model of exogenously specified transactions fees and block size assumed restricted to a single transaction. Their model predicts that miners’ profits are zero and that fees are positively correlated with transaction waiting times. The data appear consistent with these predictions.

The protocol proposed by Nakamoto (2008) posits that in case of a fork, miners will follow the longest branch. Biais et al. (2018) study the robustness of this rule. Budish (2018) studies the system’s vulnerability to attacks and its dependence on the price at which the mining equipment can be rented. Abadi & Brunnermeier (2018) posit three desired properties of distributed ledger technologies, (i) correctness, (ii) decentralization, and (iii) cost efficiency and argue that no ledger can satisfy all three properties simultaneously.

Prat & Walter (2018) study the dynamics of miner entry as it is influenced by changes in exchange rates and technological changes and predictions thereof. Felten (2013) argues that in equilibrium miners break even. Cong, He & Li (2018) argue that large mining pools confer risk sharing advantages on their members, which are mitigated due to the larger fees which larger pools charge their members. Arnosti (2019) develops a model where miners are heterogeneous in their cost structure, and quantifies how such asymmetries lead to the formation of oligopolies and concentration of mining power.

Kroll et al. (2013) offer an analysis of the incentives faced by participants in the system, and especially the incentives faced by miners. They conclude a brief discussion of transaction fees by stating, “We therefore do not expect transaction fees to play a significant long-term role in the economics of the Bitcoin system, under the current rules. We believe that a rules change would be necessary before transactions fees can play any major role in the Bitcoin economy.”
The present paper shows otherwise, i.e., that transaction fees have dual and crucial roles in the Bitcoin system: (i) They are supplanting newly minted coins as the funding source of the mining community; (ii) They are the arbiters of priority in the congestion of messages to be processed by the miners, i.e., they determine priority in the message queue.

**Bitcoin usage as a currency and the cryptocurrency market**

Yermack (2013) reviews the history of Bitcoin and the statistical properties of its price history to “argue that bitcoin does not behave much like a currency according to the criteria widely used by economists. Instead bitcoin resembles a speculative investment similar to the Internet stocks of the late 1990s.”


**Bitcoin valuation**

Recent work considers the valuation of bitcoin relative to fiat currencies and other goods. That work usually assumes away the limited capacity of the BPS although it induces delays and transaction fees.


Cong, Li & Wang (2018) study a dynamic pricing and adoption model in which wider adoption renders the cryptocurrency more valuable. Pagnotta & Buraschi (2018) study bitcoin pricing under the assumption that at all levels, higher aggregate mining effort delivers higher value to users. Sockin & Xiong (2018) propose a pricing model for an ICO for a platform on which households can exchange certain goods or services if they own the platform’s native coin.
Related work in queuing theory

Lui (1985), Glazer & Hassin (1986), and Hassin (1995) study a queuing system in which users with different waiting costs volunteer to pay transaction fees (termed bribes in Lui 1985) to gain priority in a queue to single service station which serves customers one at a time. The main observation of Lui is that the server may increase its profits by increasing the speed of service. Hassin (1995) shows that the service rate that maximizes the server’s profits is always slower than the socially optimal service rate. Hassin & Haviv (2003) provide a summary of the results, and Hassin (2016) provides an updated review.

The present analysis considers a queuing system in which transaction arrival and service arrival is stochastic, but the service is processed in batches of fixed maximal size. The prior work corresponds to a batch size of one. The interaction among the arrival and service rates and the maximal batch size and their impact on the transaction fees and server’s revenues are of major concern.

Separately, Kasahara & Kawahara (2017) analyze delays in a priority queueing system with batch service inspired by Bitcoin, but do not consider user incentives or equilibrium considerations.

Organization of the paper

Section 2 provides a model of traditional payment systems, the BPS, and users who may use either. For the sake of completeness, Section 3 provides the standard analysis of a traditional payment systems operated by a firm. Section 4 provides our main analysis and characterizes the equilibrium under the BPS. Section 5 leverages our analysis to provide design suggestions. Section 6 brings empirical evidence to bear on some of the model’s predictions. Section 7 provides some final remarks.

Appendix A provides a simplified explanation of the BPS and the underlying blockchain technology. Appendix B extends our analysis of the BPS to parameters where the participation constraint of some users binds. Appendix C gives additional properties of transaction fees under the BPS. Additional figures are in Appendix D. Omitted proofs are in Appendix E.
2 Economic Model of Traditional Payment systems and the BPS

This section sets up a model of a payment system to facilitate a comparison between a decentralized protocol like Bitcoin and a conventional payment system which is controlled by a profit maximizing firm. Section 2.1 describes the users. Their preferences are the same across the two payment systems. Section 2.2 very briefly states the familiar problem of a firm providing payment services. Section 2.3 describes succinctly the features of the Bitcoin payment system (BPS) relevant to its economic analysis and its comparison with a traditional system. Sections 4 and 5 offer equilibrium analyses of the firm and of the BPS, respectively.

2.1 Users

Each user has a single potential transaction; hence references to users and their transactions are interchangeable. Users are heterogeneous in two distinct dimensions. First, users differ in their willingness to pay (WTP) for using the system. The value a user derives from sending a transaction in the system above the value available via an alternative is his WTP \( R = v - v_{alt} \). Second, users have different delay costs per unit time \( c \). The net reward of user \((R, c)\) from sending a transaction that is processed after delay \( W \) and paying a transaction fee \( b \) is

\[
\begin{align*}
u(W, b | R, c) &= R - c \cdot W - b.
\end{align*}
\]

(1)

The variables \( R \) and \( b \) are denominated in USD;\(^1\) the variable \( c \) is in USD per unit time. By the definition of \( R \), a potential user will prefer using the system over the alternative (outside option) if \( u(W, b | R, c) \geq 0 \).

To make the cleanest distinction between the systems, we consider a setting where \( R \in \{R_L, R_H\} \quad (R_L \leq R_H) \) and is not correlated with \( c \).\(^2\) The parameters \( R \) and \( c \) can vary independently of each other. Users with WTP \( R_H \) have no compelling alternative of making the transfer, and therefore their WTP \( R_H \) is almost the entire value of processing

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\(^1\)In practice, transaction fees in the BPS are denominated in bitcoin. However, since users decide transaction fees as they submit transactions, we will consider them as USD denominated without loss of generality. This is in contrast to the block reward \( S \) discussed in Section 2.3, which is fixed by the protocol, and hence is impacted by the USD/bitcoin exchange rate.

\(^2\)An alternative and analogous model entails \( u = V\delta^W - b - v_{alt} \). Variation in \( R \) is variation in \( v_{alt} \). Variation in \( c \) is variation in \( \delta \). All have the same \( V \).
the transaction. Users with WTP $R_L$ can use an alternative method, and therefore their WTP is equal to the cost of the alternative method.

Potential users arrive over time according to a Poisson process. The arrival rate of users with value $R_j$ is $\lambda_j$ with $j = L, H$ and $\lambda = \lambda_L + \lambda_H$. Both of these populations of users have heterogeneous delay costs per unit time $c$ that are distributed $c \sim F[0, \bar{c}]$, independently of the user’s WTP $R$. The cumulative distribution function $F(\cdot)$ has a density $f(\cdot)$, and its tail probability is denoted $\bar{F}(c) \triangleq 1 - F(c)$.

For tractability, users know the steady state behavior of the system, but do not observe other pending transactions at the time they submit their transaction. Users are risk neutral and maximize their expected net reward.

We focus our analysis on the case summarized below which gives the cleanest distinction between the BPS and a firm.

**Assumption 1.** The following hold:

- $\lambda_H R_H > (\lambda_L + \lambda_H) R_L$
- $R_H \geq R_L > \bar{R} > 0$ where $\bar{R}$ is defined in Lemma 8.
- User delay costs $c$ are distributed independently of WTP $R$.

Note that the assumption that $R > 0$ entails that users consider the system to be a reliable means of sending transactions.

### 2.2 Payment System run by a Firm

A firm-run conventional payment system can process transactions without delay at a marginal cost of $c_f$ per transaction. The firm sets its price in response to the distribution of consumer demand. The firm can costlessly delay transactions, and can offer different prices for processing transactions with different delays. In Section 3 we show that it does not pursue these policies because they do not increase the firm’s profit.

### 2.3 Decentralized Cryptocurrency

The BPS offers users a similar functionality to that offered by familiar payment systems, i.e., the ability to transfer balances from one user to another. In contrast to traditional payment systems, the BPS uses a decentralized network of computers (so called miners) to process transactions and maintain the ledger containing their history. The novel
blockchain design ensures the system as a whole is reliable and trustworthy, without the need to trust any individual miners.

A computer protocol governs the system and dictates the rules for how miners and users interact within the system. Thus the BPS system is a two-sided market with rules that are fixed by a computer protocol. The description in Appendix A provides further details regarding the protocol’s operations and functionality. In this Section we provide the implications of the design for the structure of the two-sided market.

Users send their transactions as they would under any payment system but also select the transaction fee they will pay. Transactions need not be processed in their order of arrival. Processing may take time.

Miners provide their computational infrastructure to the BPS at will, and can switch between being active and inactive. Collectively, the miners maintain a ledger of all transaction history. Transactions are periodically added to the ledger in batches, in the form of a block of transaction data. These additions are according to a Poisson process with rate $\mu$, irrespective of the number of miners. For each block, a randomly chosen active miner selects which pending transactions are processed in the block, and that miner is said to have mined the block. A block can contain up to $K$ transactions. Pending transactions not included in a block wait to be processed in a future block. The probability that a miner is selected is proportional to his computational power. Miners observe all pending transactions and their transaction fees.

Miners incur a cost per unit time while they are active. A miner who mines a new block is rewarded with the transaction fees paid by the transactions included in that block as well as a fixed block reward of newly minted coins. We denote by $S$ the expected number of coins the system awards per unit time. Of particular interest will be the case where $S = 0$, which describes the operation of the BPS in the long term.

We denote the total computational power of miners by $N$. The values $\mu, K$ are predetermined by the protocol and are unaffected by the number of miners $N$ or the transaction volume $\lambda$. The total expected processing capacity of the system is an average $\mu K$ transactions per unit time (independently of $N$). Realized processing capacity is random because block arrival time is random. The load parameter is $\rho = \lambda / \mu K$, which is the ratio of average demand to capacity. The parameter $\rho$ is a measure of congestion in the system.

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3A Poisson process is the limit of many independent binomial trials. See footnote 20.

4While in practice transactions may vary in size, for the sake of tractability we assume all transactions are of the same size.

5Note that all values are given per unit time.

6In BPS the block reward is halved every 4 years, until it is rounded down to 0.
Assumption 2. The system has sufficient capacity to eventually process all transactions, that is, $\rho < 1$.

Miners who possess a small fraction of the total computational power $N$ have a small chance of getting selected to mine a block. We refer to these as small miners. When mining a block, the miner has discretion as to which transactions to include in the block; excluded transactions remain pending and can be processed in the following block. The behavior of a small miner has a negligible effect on the timing of transaction processing. Therefore we assume that small miners cannot affect users’ choices of fees.

Assumption 3. There are many potential small miners who can provide one unit of computational power at cost $c_m$. Small miners cannot affect user behavior.

To highlight the distinctive properties of the system, the analysis focuses on the parameter range where all potential transactions can be processed. The assumptions in Section 2.1 imply that there are sufficiently many miners for the system to operate reliably and securely. In Section 4 we analyze the BPS under these assumptions and verify when they indeed hold.

Miners procure the resources they need in fiat currency-denominated markets. Therefore we consider all payments and costs denominated in USD rather than in bitcoin. In particular, the USD value of the block reward fluctuates with the exchange rate.

3 Analysis of the firm

The firm’s problem is standard, and is stated here for completeness. The firm chooses a menu of prices for processing transaction at different speeds to maximize its profits. The following proposition shows that the firm sets a transaction fee that precludes low WTP customers from using the system, and processes all the transactions that pay this fee with no delay. The firm can and does change the price it charges if $R_H$ changes.

Proposition 4. When $\lambda_H R_H > (\lambda_H + \lambda_L) R_L$, the firm charges the fee $b = R_H$ and process all transactions that are willing to pay the fee with no delay. It serves only high value customers. Consumer surplus is 0 and social surplus is $\lambda_H (R_H - c_f)$, all accruing to the firm.

The intuition for the result is that the firm cannot use delays to screen between high and low WTP customers, and therefore avoids delays that decrease a user’s willingness to
pay. When \( \lambda_H R_H > (\lambda_H + \lambda_L) R_L \) the firm makes higher profits by selling only to high WTP users. The proof can be found in Appendix E.5.

A few observations facilitate the comparison with the BPS which is carried in Section 4.3. First, the distribution of the user delay costs \( F \) does not appear in the equilibrium outcome when the firm is the service provider. Second, pricing out the low WTP customers entails a dead-weight loss of \( \lambda_L (R_L - c_f) \). Third, the amount the high WTP customers are charged is exactly their WTP. It will go up, e.g., if these customers lose their best outside option.

4 Analysis of BPS

We analyze the equilibrium of the system under the assumptions stated earlier. Subsections 4.1 and 4.2 analyze the behavior of each side of the market separately, holding the other fixed. Subsection 4.3 completes the analysis, giving the system’s equilibrium.

4.1 Miners

With \( N \) denoting the total amount of computing power provided by active miners, the probability that a miner is selected to mine a block is equal to his share of \( N \). We assume the presence of small potential miners, each of whom can become active and provide a small amount of computational power to the network at a cost \( c_m \) per unit of computation per unit time.

Each miner decides whether to be active, and selects which transactions to include when mining a block. The following proposition shows that potential entry of small miners disciplines all miners, even large ones.

Proposition 5. If any miners with cost \( c_m \) are active then

- all miners process the highest fee paying transactions up to the maximal block size;
- the total amount of computational power in the network, measured in small miner equivalents, is

\[
N = \frac{\text{Rev} + e \cdot S}{c_m}
\]  

where \( \text{Rev} \) is the total transaction fees in USD per unit time and \( e \) is the USD/bitcoin exchange rate.

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Proof. Consider a small miner. When active and selected to mine a block, small miners maximize their profit by assembling a block that includes the $K$ pending transactions offering the highest fees. (If there are fewer than $K$ pending transactions the block includes all of them.) Since some small miners are active, and there is free entry with many potential miners whose cost is $c_m$, the expected reward for a small miner must equal the cost $c_m$.

A large miner who controls a significant fraction of the computational power in the network can affect the transaction fees selected by users, for example by processing only transactions that offer sufficiently high fees, leading users to select higher transaction fees. Nonetheless, it is optimal for all miners to process the highest fee offering transactions that fit into a bloc. To see this, consider any given behavior by a large miner, the resulting transaction fees selected by users and the resulting entry decision of small miners. By the previous argument, small miners enter until the payoff for a small miner is $c_m$ per computational unit. Small miners attain the maximal possible reward given the transaction fees selected by users. Therefore, any strategy by the large miner leads to a reward per computational unit that is no greater than $c_m$ per unit time. Thus, it is optimal for any miner to process the $K$ pending transactions offering the highest fees for a reward of $c_m$ per computational unit.

Finally, given that all miners arrange the same blocks, and each computing unit has $1/N$ chance of getting selected, the reward per computational unit is $1/N$ of the total reward. By assumption $\rho < 1$ and all transactions are eventually processed. Therefore the total reward to miners per unit time is the total transaction fees $\text{Rev}$ plus the minted coins which are worth $e \cdot S$ in USD. Small miners break even if (2) holds and the result follows. \[\Box\]

Proposition 5 shows that even a miner who controls a substantial fraction of the mining resources cannot profitably affect transactions fees. Entry by small miners disciplines all miners, as any benefits from withholding capacity will be dissipated by the entry of small miners. Thus, miners act as price takers regardless of their size.

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7For example, suppose a miner who controls half of the computational power does not process transactions whose fee is below a threshold. Users who choose a fee below the threshold will be eventually processed by other miners, but will incur a longer delay. In response, some users may choose to raise the transaction fee they pay.

8Any behavior that incurs a cost to induce users to increase their transaction fees will lead to reward per computational unit that is strictly less than $c_m$. For example, excluding transaction whose fee is below a threshold.

9A malicious miner who controls a sufficiently large fraction of the mining resources may be able to employ other manipulation, such as selfish mining (Eyal & Sirer 2014). The result will hold as long as the malicious miner is not able to prevent small miners from entering.
Entry by small miners is essential for the result. Suppose a single large miner can control all the mining infrastructure. The blockchain protocol provides some security guarantees even when there is a single miner, but a single miner will be able to set a minimal transaction fee. The single miner can ensure that any transaction that offers a lower fee will not be processed. The single miner can preclude entry of small miners if it maintains the reward per computational unit strictly below \( c_m \), and can make positive profits if his own cost of is lower than \( c_m \).

The capacity of the system is fixed by the protocol, and does not depend on the number of miners. All miners make zero profit if all miners have the same cost \( c_m \) per computational unit. Miners can make positive profits if their cost is below \( c_m \).

This brief section presents a stylized view of miners thereby abstracting from various real-world issues. Actual miners incur fixed costs to purchase mining equipment; available equipment is heterogeneous in price, quality and vintage; innovative equipment manufacturers are also miners; electricity costs are location- and possibly miner-dependent. Future work will take up these nuances.

### 4.2 User behavior and equilibrium transaction fees

The analysis in Section 4.1 shows that the miners’ optimization implies that each block processes the \( K \) pending transactions which offer the highest transaction fees. Therefore users face a queuing game where higher transaction fees imply higher processing priority. The number of miners does not affect \( \mu \), the rate at which blocks are generated, or \( K \), the block size, and therefore the number of miners does not affect users’ choice of transaction fees.

We now characterize user behavior. Consider an equilibrium where all potential users participate and post their transactions in the system, with \( G(\cdot) \) denoting the cumulative distribution function of the chosen transaction fees. A user \( i \) with delay cost \( c_i \) who decides to post a transaction chooses his transaction fee \( b \) to maximize his net reward

\[
R - b - c_i \cdot W(b \mid G),
\]

with \( W(b \mid G) \) denoting the equilibrium expected delay given transaction fee \( b \) and the CDF \( G \). The following lemma characterizes the equilibrium expected delay.

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\(^{10}\)For example, miners who position their servers near dams can have lower cost due to cheap electricity. If such opportunities are scarce and can support only a limited number of servers they will not be competed away.
Lemma 6. Assume that all potential users participate. In any equilibrium, the expected delay for a user with delay cost $c_i$ is

$$
\mu^{-1}W_K(\hat{\rho}(c_i))
$$

(4)

where $\hat{\rho}(c_i) = \lambda \bar{F}(c_i)/K\mu = \rho \cdot \bar{F}(c_i)$ is the effective load from transaction with higher delay cost, and the function $W_K(\cdot)$ gives the expected number of blocks that pass until the transaction is processed.

The function $W_K(\cdot)$ is specified in Appendix E.1. In particular, $W_K(0) = 1$ and $W_K'(\hat{\rho}) \geq 0$ for $\hat{\rho} \in [0,1)$.

The intuition for Lemma 6 is as follows. A transaction is processed in the first block that does not fill with higher priority transactions. Standard arguments (see Hassin & Haviv (2003)) imply that users with higher delay cost will pay higher transaction fees and receive higher priority, and therefore the arrival rate of transactions with higher priority is $\lambda \cdot \bar{F}(c)$. Analysis of the stochastic system shows that the number of blocks that pass until a transaction depends only on the block size $K$ and the effective load from higher priority transactions $\hat{\rho}(c_i) = \lambda \bar{F}(c_i)/K\mu$. Although $\rho < 1$ implies the system has sufficient capacity to process all transactions on average, the randomness of the arrival times implies the possibility of backlogs. The expression (4) captures the expected wait from such cases. Finally, the term $\mu^{-1}$ in (4) enables the statement of the result in terms of calendar time rather than the number of blocks. The particular function $W_K(\cdot)$ endogenously arises by the incentives set in the protocol. Appendix D provides a plot of $W_K(\cdot)$.

Users’ individual optimization implies:

Proposition 7. Assuming that all potential users participate, there is a unique equilibrium. In it a user with waiting cost $c_i \in [0, \bar{c}]$ chooses to pay a transaction fee $b(c_i)$, given by

$$
b(c_i) = \rho \int_0^{c_i} f(c) \cdot c \cdot \mu^{-1}W'_K(\rho \bar{F}(c)) \, dc.
$$

(5)

These transaction fees coincide with the payments that result from selling priority of service in a VCG auction.
The net reward for a user with delay cost $c_i$ and WTP $R_i$ is

$$u(R_i, c_i) = R_i - \mu^{-1} \int_0^{c_i} W_K (\rho \tilde{F}(c)) \, dc.$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)

The Bitcoin protocol indirectly entails a priority auction, although no auctioneer is present. Users with higher waiting costs pay higher transaction fees and wait less. Users’ bids have the VCG property that each user bids an amount equal to the externality he imposes on others by delaying their transactions. Equation 6 implies that users with lower delay cost $c_i$ bear lower total costs (total of paid fees and delay costs). This is due to information rents. The highest costs are born by users with $c_i = \bar{c}$ and are equal to

$$\bar{R} = \mu^{-1} \int_0^{\bar{c}} W_K (\rho \tilde{F}(c)) \, dc.$$

The equilibrium allocation of priority is efficient. However, the allocation of delay takes the particular form because of the blockchain design. A different design or increased values of $\mu, K$ can reduce waiting costs for all transactions. Note that transaction fees depend on $\rho$, and therefore will change with changes in $\lambda, \mu, K$.

Finally, we verify that all potential users prefer to participate under the assumption that WTP is sufficiently high given the load $\rho$.

**Lemma 8.** Let $\bar{R} = \mu^{-1} \int_0^{\bar{c}} W_K (\rho \tilde{F}(c)) \, dc$. If $R_H \geq R_L > \bar{R}$ there is a unique equilibrium where all potential users participate. In equilibrium all users receive strictly positive net reward.

Thus, equilibrium behavior of users does not depend on their WTP $R$, assuming that it is sufficiently high. All users participate regardless of their WTP, and the transaction fees paid are independent of WTP. Each user pays a fee equal to the externality he imposes on other users, and since all transactions are eventually processed, the externality involves only delays to other transactions.

Transaction fees under the firm and the BPS depend on different parameters. The firm sets prices based on user WTP, and transactions that do not pay the required fee are not processed. Under the BPS prices are determined in equilibrium based on user delay costs. All transactions are processed regardless of the fees they offer. Some users offer higher fees to reduce delays. Transactions which offer lower or zero fees are processed with greater delays. The BPS transaction fees depend only on the parameters $K, \mu, \rho$ and the distribution of delay costs $F$. The transaction fees are nominally denominated in the system’s native currency, but their value in USD is independent of the exchange rate $e$.

We summarize these results in the following theorem.
Theorem 9. Let $\rho = \lambda/\mu K \in (0, 1)$ and assume that

$$R_H \geq R_L > \bar{R} = \mu^{-1} \int_0^{\bar{c}} W_K (\rho \bar{F}(c)) \, dc. \quad (7)$$

There is a unique equilibrium where all potential users participate and receive strictly positive surplus. Equilibrium transaction fees paid by users are independent of user WTP $R_H, R_L$ and of the exchange rate $e$.

Despite having excess capacity (i.e., $\rho < 1$), the system raises strictly positive revenue from transaction fees.

As seen in Section 3, the profit maximizing firm will raise prices until some users receive no net benefit. The possibility that all users are net beneficiaries of the system distinguishes its service from a similar service provided by profit maximizing firm.

Another distinguishing feature of the system is its commitment to congestion pricing, a commitment that is difficult to modify even when circumstances change. Thus, the users are protected from being held up should they get locked into the BPS: if users lose their alternative payment methods then their WTP for the system goes up, but because transaction fees are independent of the WTP $R$ (given that $R_H, R_L$ are sufficiently high), users are protected from price increases. In contrast, users should be wary of getting locked into a conventional payment system, as a firm would raise prices should its users lose their alternative options (Grossman & Hart 1986).

We highlight this as the following corollary.

Corollary 10. Assume that the conditions of Theorem 9 are satisfied. Then an increase in WTP $R$ does not change equilibrium transaction fees.

Corollary may appear as good news to users. However, the pricing level depends on the congestion in the system $\rho = \lambda/\mu K$ and may be inefficient.

4.3 Determination of Infrastructure Level and Welfare

Building on the two preceding subsections, this subsection shows the total revenue from transaction fees and the system’s level of infrastructure. Moreover, it calculates the welfare level associated with the BPS and compares it to that delivered by a profit maximizing firm.

Aggregating equation (5) over all users delivers
Theorem 11. Total revenue from transaction fees per unit time is

\[ \text{Rev}_K(\rho) = K\rho^2 \int_0^\rho c f(c) \tilde{F}(c) W_K' \left( \rho \tilde{F}(c) \right) dc. \] (8)

Equation (8) complements equation (2) to determine the network’s computational power in equilibrium. Equation (8) shows that total revenue from transaction fees depends only on \( K, \rho \) and the distribution of delay costs \( F \). It implies that the revenue depends on \( \mu \) and \( \lambda \) only through \( \rho = \lambda / \mu K \). Thus, holding the type distribution function \( F \) fixed, a system with double the demand \( \lambda \) and double the block rate \( \mu \) will raise the same amount of revenue as the original system but will have twice as many users, each of whom will pay half the transaction fee paid by the corresponding user in the original system.

Note that there is no guarantee that the equilibrium number of miners is adequate for the system’s reliability and security. The protocol can dictate the amount of newly minted coins \( S \) that are awarded to miners, but the exchange rate \( e \) may fluctuate during the life of the system. The revenue from transaction fees does not depend on the exchange rate, but varies with the congestion \( \rho \) which is a function of the predetermined parameters \( \mu, K \) as well as the potential demand \( \lambda \) that may change over time. Moreover, a shortage of mining resources does not lead to higher fees or more favorable exchange rate; if anything it is likely to result in the opposite. On the other hand, abundance of mining resources does not lead to lower fees or less favorable exchange rate. The equilibrium analysis is applicable if user WTP for the system \( R_H, R_L \) are sufficiently high given the equilibrium number of miners \( N \).

Next, we calculate welfare by accounting for the total benefits and costs of the system. Since all users are served, the system generates \( \lambda_H R_H + \lambda_L R_L \) for users per unit time. The users pay transaction fees and incur delay costs. All miners receive a reward equal to \( c_m \) per mining unit. Marginal miners whose cost is \( c_m \) will therefore break even and spend all the revenue they receive on operating costs.

Theorem 12. If all miners have a cost \( c_m \) per computational unit and no new coins are minted\(^{11} \) then welfare is given by

\[ \lambda_H R_H + \lambda_L R_L - \text{DelayCost}_K(\rho) - c_m \cdot N \] (9)

\(^{11}\text{That is, } S = 0, \text{ as will be the case for the BPS in the long run. Currently the BPS funds most of its mining cost by minting new coins. The welfare calculations remain unchanged if the BPS can mint a finite amount of new coin and the opportunity cost of awarding the coin to miners is equal to its value. We defer determination of the welfare costs of minting new coin to future work.} \]
where the total delay costs incurred by users is

\[
\text{DelayCost}_K(\rho) = K\rho \int_0^\rho c_f(c) W_K(\rho F(c)) dc.
\]

Miners break even and spend all the revenue they receive on operating costs.

The total benefits from processing transactions is \(\lambda_H R_H + \lambda_L R_L\), as all transactions are processed. The cost \(c_m \cdot N\) is the cost of server infrastructure, where competition between the miners ensures that infrastructure is provided at cost \(c_m\), and miners make no profit. The delay costs \(\text{DelayCost}_K(\rho)\) are necessary in order to raise revenue from users, as users have an incentive to pay higher transaction fees only if transactions with low fees suffer delays.

If, in deviation from the theorem’s assumption, some miners have a cost lower than \(c_m\), they make a profit. In such case, welfare will be higher by these miners’ profit.

This allows us to compare the BPS and a conventional payment system that is run by a firm. Under our assumptions, the costs of operating the BPS is \(c_m \cdot N\), while the cost of operating a firm-run payment system is \(c_f \cdot \lambda_H\). It appears that it is more expensive to run the BPS because the decentralized protocol requires additional computational overhead. Moreover, if the BPS is successful and popular the implied congestion can lead to an equilibrium value of \(N\) that is too high. The BPS also has the additional cost \(\text{DelayCost}_K(\rho)\) due to delay cost, while the firm processes transactions immediately. On the other hand, the BPS serves all potential demand, while under the firm there is a dead-weight loss because \(R_L\) users are not served, losing \(\lambda_L \cdot R_L\) of potential generated value. Altogether, we get that if

\[
\lambda_L R_L > c_m \cdot N - c_f \lambda_H + \text{DelayCost}_K(\rho)
\]

welfare is higher under the BPS than under a firm. Note that the two sides of inequality (11) depend on different sets of parameters, and therefore the comparison can go either way. Essentially, the BPS allows society to pay for a more costly infrastructure on which competitive pricing is guaranteed, and that can be beneficial if dead-weight loss is substantial.

Beyond this calculations-based comparison, there are differences worth mentioning. For instance, a firm-run system operates under the legal system and can offer procedures to retrieve lost accounts and reverse erroneous or fraud-inspired payments. The BPS cannot offer such services, but is transparent and does not require trust in any individual component.
5 Protocol Design for Efficient Congestion Pricing

The following corollary of Section 4 motivates this section’s main question, namely how to set the system’s parameters $K$ and $\mu$ in response to $\lambda$ in order to achieve desired combinations of fee revenue and delays.

**Corollary 13.** *In equilibrium, if $\rho = 0$, both delay cost and revenue are zero. For any fixed $K$, both revenue (and with it infrastructure provision by miners) and delay cost are strictly increasing in $\rho$.***

Figure 2 shows how revenue from transaction fees and delay cost vary with $\rho$ under the parameters $K = 2,000$ and $c \sim U[0, 1]$. The figure assumes that all agents participate, and therefore revenue tends to infinity as $\rho \to 1$. When agents choose whether to participate, revenue will be bounded, as agents may not participate as the system gets congested (see Appendix B). The figure looks similar for other distributions of delay costs (see Appendix D for a plot of other distributions).

Figure 2: Revenue and delay cost for varying congestion level $\rho$. Delay costs are distributed according to $c \sim U[0, 1]$ and the block size is $K = 2,000$.

The current Bitcoin protocol uses a fixed $\mu$ and a fixed $K$, and therefore $\rho$ varies with demand. This is undesirable, as the amount of revenue generated can be too high or too low relative to the desired levels of reliability and security. Instead, an alternative design for the BPS can set $(K, \mu)$ by a rule that uses only information available in the
blockchain. When $\rho < 1$, the fraction of recent block capacity on the blockchain that was used can serve as a good proxy for $\lambda$. Thus, a modification of current BPS protocol can allow adjustments of $(K, \mu)$ in response to demand (within a range that is technically feasible).

Such a rule can be implemented by modifying the adjustment of the hash difficulty. Currently, the difficulty adjusts in accordance with the total computing power of the network to maintain average block mining frequency of 10 minutes. Our suggested alternative design can similarly adjust the difficulty to maintain that on average a fraction $\rho$ of blocks is used.

The choice of $(K, \mu)$ should achieve the target revenue from transaction fees, and should minimize the delay costs imposed on users. Note that by appropriate choice of $(K, \mu)$ in response to demand $\lambda$ we can achieve desired $\rho$ and desired revenue from transaction fees in USD, regardless of exchange rate fluctuations. Raising revenue from transaction fees requires positive $\rho$, and therefore delay costs. To better understand the dependency on $(K, \mu)$ and the implied trade-offs between revenue and delay costs, we provide the following simplified approximate expressions.

**Lemma 14.** For any $\hat{\rho} \in [0, 1)$ we have that

$$
\lim_{K \to \infty} W_K(\hat{\rho}) = W_\infty(\hat{\rho}) = 1 + \frac{1}{\rho} e^{-1/\rho} + o\left(\frac{1}{\rho} e^{-1/\rho}\right)
$$

where the function $W_\infty : [0, 1) \to [1, \infty)$ is explicitly given in Appendix E.4. Moreover, $W_\infty(0) = 1, W'_\infty(0) = 0$ and $W'_\infty(\hat{\rho}) > 0$ for $\hat{\rho} \in (0, 1)$.

A given transaction with $\hat{\rho} \in [0, 1)$ will be processed within $W_K(\hat{\rho})$ blocks on average. We have that $1 \leq W_K(\hat{\rho}) < \infty$ because the inclusion of a transaction in a block depends on how many pending transactions have accumulated at the time the block is generated, and how the priority of the given transaction ranks among the accumulated transactions. The former is random due to the random time between blocks, and the composition of pending transactions is random due to the random arrival of transactions. When blocks are fairly large there is still randomness due to their random arrival time, but the arrival of higher priority transactions does not create much additional randomness.\textsuperscript{13} As a result,

\textsuperscript{12}Given arbitrary functions $f(\cdot)$ and $g(\cdot)$, and a positive function $h(\cdot)$, as $\rho \to 0$, we will say that $f(\rho) = g(\rho) + O(h(\rho))$ if $\limsup_{\rho \to 0} |f(\rho) - g(\rho)|/h(\rho) < \infty$, i.e., if the difference between $f$ and $g$, is asymptotically bounded above by some constant multiple of $h$. Similarly, we will say that $f(\rho) = g(\rho) + o(h(\rho))$ if $\limsup_{\rho \to 0} |f(\rho) - g(\rho)|/h(\rho) = 0$, i.e., if the difference between $f$ and $g$ is asymptotically dominated by every constant multiple of $h$.

\textsuperscript{13}To gain intuition, consider a user $i$ with delay costs $c_i$ that posts a transaction at time $t_0$ when there
$W_K(\hat{\rho})$ is almost independent of $K$ for large $K$. Calculations show that the approximation appears good already for $K = 20$; with Bitcoin’s $K = 2000$ we can comfortably use this approximation. For additional intuition and the proof of Lemma 14, see Appendix E.4.

Using Lemma 14 we can give the following simplified expressions for revenue and delay costs.

**Theorem 15.** For a fixed load $\rho \in [0, 1)$, as the block size $K \to \infty$, we have that\(^{14}\)

\[
\text{Rev}_K(\rho) = K \cdot \text{Rev}_\infty(\rho) + o(K),
\]

\[
\text{DelayCost}_K(\rho) = K \cdot \text{DelayCost}_\infty(\rho) + o(K),
\]

where

\[
\text{Rev}_\infty(\rho) \triangleq \rho \int_0^\infty \left( \tilde{F}(c) - cf(c) \right) W_\infty(\rho \tilde{F}(c)) \, dc,
\]

\[
\text{DelayCost}_\infty(\rho) \triangleq \rho \int_0^\infty cf(c)W_\infty(\rho \tilde{F}(c)) \, dc.
\]

Theorem 15 offers simple approximations of the dependencies of revenue and delay costs on $K$. The expressions $\text{Rev}_\infty(\rho), \text{DelayCost}_\infty(\rho)$ are functions of only $\rho$ and $F$. To a good approximation, the dependency of $\text{Rev}_K(\rho), \text{DelayCost}_K(\rho)$ on $K$ is only through a scaling factor of both of these expressions. See Appendix D for plots showing the goodness of approximation.

Note that Theorem 15 critically relies on the randomness of block inter-arrival times. If $\rho < 1$ and blocks were to arrive at deterministic fixed time intervals (say, exactly every 10 minutes), then for large $K$ every pending transaction would be processed in the next block, and hence users would not have incentive to pay any transaction fees. The random arrival of blocks allows the system with large blocks to generate revenue even when $\rho < 1$.

are no pending transactions. The following block arrives after some random time $t \cdot \mu^{-1}$, where $t \sim \text{Exp}(1)$. The probability that $i$’s transaction is included in the following block is the probability that, between $t_0$ and $t_0 + t \cdot \mu^{-1}$, less than $K$ higher priority transactions arrive. The number of higher priority transactions given $t$ has distribution $A_t \sim \text{Poisson} \left( \lambda \tilde{F}(c_i) \cdot t \mu^{-1} \right) = \text{Poisson} \left( t \cdot K \hat{\rho} \right)$. The realized number is random because $t$ is random and also because the number of arrivals given $t$, $A_t$, is random. However, the variance of $A_t$ is of order $K$, and therefore, as $K \to \infty$, the number of arrivals given $t$ measured in block equivalents, $A_t/K$, can be well approximated by its expectation $t \hat{\rho}$. Thus, the probability that the transaction will be included in the next block converges according to $P(A_t < K) \to P(t < \hat{\rho}^{-1})$, which only depends on $\hat{\rho}$.

\(^{14}\)Given arbitrary sequences \{$f_K$\} and \{$g_K$\}, and a positive sequence \{$h_K$\}, as $K \to \infty$, we will say that $f_K = g_K + o(h_K)$ if $\lim \sup_{K \to \infty} |f_K - g_K|/h_K = 0$, i.e., if the difference between $f$ and $g$ is asymptotically dominated by every constant multiple of $h$. Similarly, we will say that $f_K = g_K + \Omega(h_K)$ if $\lim \inf_{K \to \infty} |f_K - g_K|/h_K > 0$, i.e., if the difference between $f$ and $g$ is asymptotically bounded below by some constant multiple of $h$. 

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Figure 3: The parametric curve \((\operatorname{Rev}_\infty(\rho), \operatorname{DelayCost}_\infty(\rho))\) for \(\rho \in [0, 1]\), describing (up to a scaling by blocksize) the achievable combinations of revenue and delay cost for systems with large blocksize. The distribution of delay costs is taken to be \(c \sim U[0, 1]\).

Figure 3 plots how the pairs \((\operatorname{Rev}_\infty(\rho), \operatorname{DelayCost}_\infty(\rho))\) vary with \(\rho\), assuming the distribution of delay costs is \(c \sim U[0, 1]\). From Theorem 15, the pairs \((\operatorname{Rev}_K(\rho), \operatorname{DelayCost}_K(\rho))\), for any fixed \(K\) and varying \(\rho\), are scaled versions of the depicted curve. Thus, the curve informs us of the delay costs that are necessary for raising a given amount of revenue for any \(K\).

The figure shows that a significant amount of delay cost is necessary to raise even a small amount of revenue. We formally show this in Theorem 16.

**Theorem 16.** For any \(F\), as \(\rho \to 0\), we have that

\[
\operatorname{Rev}_\infty(\rho) = O\left(e^{-1/\rho}\right),
\]
\[
\operatorname{DelayCost}_\infty(\rho) = \rho \cdot \mathbb{E}[c] + o(\rho).
\]

In other words, for small values of the load \(\rho\), the delay cost grows linearly, but the revenue grows more slowly than any polynomial.

The intuition is as follows. For \(\rho \approx 0\) all transactions are likely to be processed in the next block regardless of their priority, because a block is unlikely to reach its maximal size. In contrast, total delay costs scale linearly as every transaction needs to wait for at
least one block, and higher $\rho$ implies more waiting. Therefore, as the load increases from $\rho \approx 0$ both revenue and delay costs increase, but delay costs grow more than exponentially faster than revenue.

Together with Theorem 15, this implies that using a larger $K$ to raise a desired level of revenue $R^*$ would yield unfavorable results. We formally state this as the following theorem.

**Theorem 17.** Consider a desired level of revenue $R^* > 0$ and a block size $K$. Define $\text{DelayCost}^*_K(R^*)$ to be the delay cost required to achieve revenue $R^*$ under the approximation for large $K$, i.e.,

$$\text{DelayCost}^*_K(R^*) \triangleq K \text{DelayCost}_\infty \left(\text{Rev}^{-1}_\infty(R^*/K)\right),$$

with $\text{Rev}^{-1}_\infty(R^*) \triangleq \inf\{\rho > 0 : \text{Rev}_\infty(\rho) \geq R^*\}$ being the minimal load required to achieve revenue $R^*$.

Then,

$$\text{DelayCost}^*_K(R^*) = \Omega \left(\frac{K}{\log K}\right).$$

Figure 4 illustrates the possible attainable values for revenue and delay given different values of $K$ and $\rho$, assuming delay costs are distributed uniformly in $[0, 1]$. Each curve shows the attainable values for revenue and delay for a fixed value of $K$ and a range of possible $\rho$. The plot shows that a lower value of $K$ allows raising any level of revenue at a lower delay cost to users.

Each curve’s two main features are (i) monotonicity – longer delays are required to generate more revenue, and (ii) the curve is asymptotically vertical at the origin, i.e., to move from zero to some revenue, the delay cost has to be substantial. These insights transcend the specific $U[0, 1]$ distribution of $c$ underlying the figure. However, note that these calculations ignore technological constraints and assume that no users opt out of the system. All curves are approximately a scaled version of the curve in Figure 3 (note the logarithmic scale for the vertical axis), as implied by Theorem 15.

To summarize, this analysis suggests the following simple adaptation to the current protocol. First, a smaller block size $K$ is preferable. Second, an adjustment of the block rate to $\mu = \lambda / (K\rho^*)$ in response to demand $\lambda$. This keeps congestion constant at $\rho^*$, yielding a stable, desired level of revenue.\footnote{Clearly, there are communication and other limitations that limit the range of feasible $\mu$ and $K$. This paper ignores these engineering challenges.}
Figure 4: Possible pairs of revenue and delay cost as $\rho$ varies, for different values of $K$, where delay costs are distributed according to $c \sim U[0, 1]$.

6 Data

6.1 Mining profitability

We compare our results to empirical estimates given by Croman et al. (2016) who estimate that the total expenditure of miners during October 2015 was approximately 5,840 USD per block. Croman et al. (2016) attribute the vast majority of the cost to the costs of electricity and hardware used in the attempts to get selected to mine the next block. During that period the mining reward per block was 25 bitcoins plus negligible transaction fees, or approximately 6,000 - 7,500 USD (the bitcoin-USD exchange rate fluctuated during the month). This back of the envelope calculation suggests that miners who buy electricity at market prices approximately break even, which is consistent with our analysis. Websites that offer information to potential miners about mining profitability of various cryptocurrencies\footnote{https://www.coinwarz.com/cryptocurrency/, retrieved 6/20/2017.} give advice that is consistent with this observation. Furthermore, while some groups controlled a significant fraction of the computational power in the network, there is no evidence that even large miners tried to influence fee levels.
6.2 The relation between congestion and transaction fees

Average block size in MB can be used as measure of the actual congestion in the BPS. In practice, until August 21st 2017 the BPS limited blocks to 1MB of data per block, which corresponds to approximately $K = 2,000$ transactions per block. In our model the congestion parameter $\rho$ is equal to the average number of transactions per block divided by $K$. Analogously, we interpret the average size of a block relative to the 1MB limit as a proxy for congestion $\rho$. Each point in Figure 1 corresponds to one day in the BPS, displaying daily average transaction fees per block and daily average block size.\footnote{Transaction fee and block size data is from \url{http://blockchain.info}, the number of blocks per day is from \url{https://data.bitcoinity.org}. Each point is a daily average over the interval 4/1/2011–6/30/2017. The starting date 4/1/2011 was selected as this is roughly when the fees per block started exceeding 1 USD. The end date does not extend to present day because the BPS changed the method for calculating a block's size in August 2017.} The plot also includes a solid line generated by our model as follows. We set $K = 2,000$, and normalize time so that a time unit is 10 minutes and set $\mu = 1$. The distribution of users’ delay cost is unknown, and arbitrarily set to $F = U[0, \bar{c}]$ with $\bar{c} = 0.1$ USD/10 minutes. The resulting total revenue per unit time $\text{Rev}_{2000}(\cdot)$ is the expected total transaction fees per block, which is displayed by the solid black line in Figure 1.

Note that the solid line produced by our model matches the broad patterns in the data. Figure 1 shows that transaction fees are negligible when congestion is low. Transaction fees become substantial when congestion reaches 80%. As congestion approaches 1 transaction fees increase rapidly, even though the system has excess capacity.

7 Conclusion

Starting with the simple questions of who pays for the Bitcoin payment system, why and how much, this paper offers economic analysis of this radically novel payment system. It compares the new, blockchain-based system with traditional payment systems, delivers empirical implications which appear consistent with the data, and applies the analysis to suggest design improvements.

A comprehensive comparison between the BPS and a traditional payment system operated by a profit maximizing firm requires consideration of multiple attributes, many of them are outside the scope of the analysis in this paper. As opposed to traditional systems, the BPS does not require trust in any entity. On the other hand, the BPS cannot provide some services: for instance, transactions cannot be reversed in case of error or fraud, and users who lose the credentials to their accounts cannot retrieve their balances.
The BPS differs from traditional payment systems also in that it supports only transactions denominated in the system’s native coin, bitcoin. That native coin has value because payment recipients are willing to exchange a credit in it for other goods, services or traditional currencies. A bitcoin recipient accords it value because he believes it will be acceptable to future potential recipients. Embedded in this belief is the expectation of the continued viability of the BPS.

Another feature that sets Bitcoin apart is that a protocol rather than a managing organization runs Bitcoin. Unlike a managing organization, a protocol lacks an easily workable mechanism to change prices, offerings and rules, implying the stability of these attributes.

The blockchain protocol presents a novel economic design that would merit an economist’s attention and scrutiny even if it had not been functional. Currently the BPS handles daily transactions worth several billion dollars in aggregate which can serve as a compelling proof of concept and should further encourage economists to study this marvelous structure and its future descendants.

References


URL: https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2013/02/05/basic-economics-of-bitcoin-mining/


A Brief Description of the Bitcoin Payment System

This appendix provides a simplified explanation of the permissionless blockchain protocol that underlies the Bitcoin payment system and is the basis of many other cryptocurrencies. The description focuses on the economic elements. In order to describe what the Bitcoin system does, it is useful to first explain what is needed for a payment system such as PayPal or FedWire, or the maintenance of electronic balances in a modern bank.

An electronic payment system functions as a record (or a ledger) of accounts. Each account is associated with a user and his balance. It allows users to check their balances, and allows a user to debit his balance and credit the debited amount to another account. Only an account owner can debit the account. Balances do not change without a legal transfer, i.e., a transfer that conforms to the system’s stated rules.

One simple implementation is just a spread-sheet (or another bookkeeping device) that only a trusted authority can modify. Allowing multiple computers to maintain and update the ledger requires a more elaborate structure. This distributed ledger structure requires synchronization across the servers, but is, in principle, more robust than a single server system. Maintaining consensus in a distributed computer system has been known to be straightforward, as long as the computers are trusted (see Tanenbaum & Van Steen (2007)).

In particular, this description omits discussion of potential attacks on the system. For further details and an explanation of the cryptographic elements of the system please refer to Narayanan et al. (2016).
The Bitcoin system is designed for an environment which lacks a trusted authority. Therefore, its ledger must be maintained and updated by a collection of computer servers, called miners, none of which is trusted. They are assumed to be selfish, i.e., to respond to incentives in a profit maximizing way. Moreover, they offer or withdraw their services according to profit opportunities they perceive.

Although legal transactions are processed by untrusted miners, the system as a whole is secure, i.e., it processes all legal transactions, and no other transaction. The collection of miners jointly holds a single ledger, meaning that there must be consensus among miners about current balances. Moreover, consensus must be maintained as balances change.

Bitcoin’s ledger is a public database called blockchain, which can be verified by third parties through cryptography. The system arranges for the miners to be compensated for their services in such a way that when each of them maximizes his profit and believes that other miners similarly maximize their profits, the system has the properties sketched above.

Initially all balances are at zero. Over time the protocol mints new coins which it adds to the balances of successful miners. The system holds the record of all balance changes. The manifestation of a transaction is a message which a sending account transmits to all the miners. It states the sending account, receiving account, amount transferred, transaction fee, and a cryptographic signature by the sending account. A transaction is processed by adding the appropriate message to the end of the ledger. The cryptographic signature allows any third party to verify that the transaction was indeed authorized by the holder of the sending account. Since the ledger is public, any third party can verify that the sender indeed held a balance sufficient for the transfer.

The public ledger is saved in the distributed blockchain format, in which the transaction data is partitioned into a sequence of blocks. These blocks are periodic updates to the ledger. Notably, the ledger does not update instantly following the appearance of a new transaction. Rather, it updates on average every ten minutes with a block summarizing a subset of the recent pending transactions which hadn’t been included in a previous block. Remaining unprocessed transactions wait to be processed in future blocks. As of July 2017, the maximal block size is 1MB.\footnote{As of July 2017, the protocol limits each block to 1MB of data to ensure each block can be transmitted promptly throughout the network. This limits each block to no more than approximately 2,000 transactions, as the average transaction uses 0.5KB of data (Zohar 2015).}

New transactions are processed when they are included in a block that is added to the ledger, which happens as follows. Each miner holds a copy of the current ledger i.e., all previous blocks. All transaction requests are broadcast to all miners. The set
of pending transactions that reach each miner may vary slightly across miners due to network imperfections, rendering non-trivial the choice of a universally agreed upon record of transactions. To ensure that Bitcoin maintains a unique record of transactions, a single miner is selected to add a block of transactions to the ledger. Since there is no trusted authority to make the selection, a tournament is used to randomly select a winning miner. To participate in the tournament miners exert effort\(^{20}\) (known as proof of work) that is useful only for generating a verifiable random selection of a miner without the need of a trusted randomization device.

Periodically (currently approximately every 10 minutes), the tournament randomly selects one miner as the winner, assigning his block as the next in the chain, thereby making that block a mined block. The mined block is transmitted to all the other miners, who verify the legality of that block and vet all transactions included in the block. Miners add a newly mined legal block to their copy of the ledger and proceed to add new blocks on top of it. Miners ignore mined blocks that are not legal.

The tournament-winning miner is paid a reward when he mines a new block, but can withdraw his reward only after newer blocks augment the chain on top of his block. Other miners will build on top of his block only if they consider it legal. Hence the incentive to assemble and create legal blocks. Consensus forms on a ledger that includes the new block. The process continues in the same manner for the following ten minutes (on average) and so on.\(^{21}\)

\(^{20}\)The tournament selects a random winner without the need of a trusted authority through use of a hash function. The hash function is a deterministic one-way function that produces a hash value, interpreted as a pseudo-random real number between 0 and 1. A block is said to be a winning block if it is a legal block and its hash value is below a target value. A legal block contains, in addition to transaction data, an unrestricted “nonce” field for which the miner can input any numerical value. The cryptographic properties of the hash function imply that finding such a block requires a brute-force search, iterating over numerical values for the nonce and computing the hash value for each of them. Roughly speaking, each attempt for a value of the nonce generates an independent random draw of a hash value, distributed uniformly between 0 and 1.

To participate in the tournament, miners assemble their blocks and use their computational power to iterate over values of the nonce. Each attempt for a nonce value has an independent probability of generating a winning block, with probability equal to the target value. Because the target value is very small, a miner’s chance to win the tournament within a time period is proportional to the number of nonce values attempted within the period. A miner with a winning block is said to “mine the block”, and the winning block can be verified by any third party by recomputing the hash.

The target value adjusts over time so that a block is mined every 10 minutes (on average). For example, if the overall computational power of miners doubles, then the target value is halved and twice as many attempts (on average) are required to find a winning block.

\(^{21}\)There is a small probability that two or even more blocks are vying to be accepted as the newest block. This situation is called a fork. Bitcoin’s convention calls for newer blocks to be built on top of the longest chain. This convention resolves forks. Eyal & Sirer (2014) analyze strategic issues between miners.
The miner that created a block is paid from two sources. One consists of newly minted coins the exact number of which is protocol-determined and is decreasing with time. (Crediting successful miners with newly minted coins moves the system early on from having zero balances to having positive ones.) The second consists of the fees offered by the transactions in the mined block. This second source is the focus of the paper.

This system will have the following desired properties. All miners are synchronized to hold the same ledger of processed transactions. No single miner controls the system, because every 10 minutes the ability to process transactions is given to a randomly chosen miner. Balances change only with a legal transaction because any transaction that is added is vetted by other miners to be valid, and transactions cannot be deleted from the ledger.

B Endogenous Entry

The analysis in Section 4.2 assumed that the reward $R_L, R_H$ is sufficiently high for all users receive positive net reward. Lemma 8 shows that all users receive positive net reward if

$$\int_0^\bar{c} \mu^{-1} W_K \left( \rho \bar{F}(c) \right) dc \leq R_L.$$ 

This section extends the analysis to values of $R$ for which the inequality is not satisfied. For simplicity, assume that $R_H = R_L = R$ and let $c^* \in [0, \bar{c}]$ be the unique solution to

$$\int_0^{c^*} \mu^{-1} W_K \left( \rho \left( \bar{F}(c) - \bar{F}(c^*) \right) \right) dc = R.$$ 

It is straightforward to verify that in equilibrium users with delay cost $c_i \notin [0, c^*]$ opt out of the system, and that a user with delay cost $c_i \in [0, c^*]$ chooses a transaction fee

$$b(c_i) = \rho \int_0^{c_i} f(c) \cdot c \cdot \mu^{-1} W_K' \left( \rho \left( \bar{F}(c) - \bar{F}(c^*) \right) \right) dc.$$ 

The system’s revenue and total delay cost are given by

$$\text{Rev}_K(\rho|R) = K\rho^2 \int_0^{c^*} c f(c) \left( \bar{F}(c) - \bar{F}(c^*) \right) W_K' \left( \rho \left( \bar{F}(c) - \bar{F}(c^*) \right) \right) dc,$$
Figure 5: Total revenue per block as a function of $\rho$ when $c \sim U[0,1]$. The curve $Rev_{2000}(\rho)$ shows total revenue from transaction fees when WTP is sufficiently high so that the participation constraint does not bind for any user, and is only defined for $0 \leq \rho < 1$. The curve $Rev_{2000}(\rho|R = 10)$ shows total revenue from transaction fees when all users have WTP equal to 10 USD, and is defined for any $\rho \geq 0$.

$$\text{DelayCost}_K(\rho|R) = K\rho \int_0^{c^*} cf(c) W_K (\rho (\bar{F}(c) - \bar{F}(c^*))) \, dc.$$ 

The infrastructure available to the system is given by the number of miners

$$N = \frac{Rev_K(\rho|R)}{c_m}.$$ 

Note that these expressions coincide with their counterparts in Section 4.2 when $c^* = \bar{c}$. Figure 5 provides an illustration of these results.

## C Attributes of transaction fees

Figure 6 and 7 illustrate how transaction fees depend on the user’s delay cost $c$ and the overall congestion $\rho$. Both figures display equilibrium fees when $c$ is distributed uniformly over $[0,1]$, the block size is $K = 2,000$ and $\mu = 1$. Figure 6 shows how the transaction fees chosen by users in equilibrium vary with the overall system congestion $\rho$. Transaction
Figure 6: The dependence of equilibrium transaction fees on congestion ρ for fixed user’s delay cost c. Block size is taken to be K = 2,000, block arrival rate µ = 1 and delay costs are distributed according to c ∼ U[0, 1].

Fees are very small when the system is not congested, but can be arbitrarily high as ρ approaches 1.

Figure 7 shows that the transaction fees increase with the user’s delay cost, but do not vary much among users with high delay cost. One way to understand the result is by noting that offering high fees, users with high delay costs receive high priority and therefore are likely to be processed in the next block. All users within the same block are treated equally.

To form a complementary interpretation, observe that the expected wait for a user with cost c_i is W_K(ρ̂) with ρ̂ ≜ ρ̂F(c_i) < ̂F(c_i). When ρ̂ is small the expected wait W_K(ρ̂) is not very sensitive to variations in ρ̂, and therefore users with a high c_i are only slightly harmed when someone gains priority over them. However, W_K(ρ̂) can be very sensitive to changes in ρ̂ when ρ̂ is close to 1, and thus the externality on users with low delay cost can be substantial. All users with sufficiently high delay cost, for example c_i > 0.7, impose the same externality to other users with delay costs c_j ∈ [0, 0.7], plus a relatively small externality to other users with delay costs c_j ∈ (0.7, c_i).
Figure 7: The dependence of equilibrium transaction fees on the user’s delay cost $c$ for fixed congestion $\rho$. Block size is taken to be $K = 2,000$, block arrival rate $\mu = 1$ and delay costs are distributed according to $c \sim U[0, 1]$.

D Additional Figures

This appendix provides additional plots showing the goodness of approximation in Theorem 15, illustrating the delay function $W_K(\rho)$, and showing that different waiting cost distribution yield similar results.
Figure 8: Normalized revenue $\frac{\text{Rev}_K(\rho)}{K}$ when $c \sim \mathcal{U}[0, 1]$ and $K \in \{20, 200, 2000, 20000\}$, compared to the limiting values obtained from the approximation using $W_\infty(\cdot)$. The plot may appear to have only one line because all lines overlap.

Figure 9: Normalized revenue $\frac{\text{Rev}_K(\rho)}{K}$ when $c \sim \mathcal{U}[0, 1]$ and $K \in \{20, 200, 2000, 20000\}$, compared to the limiting values obtained from the approximation using $W_\infty(\cdot)$. The plot may appear to have only one line because all lines overlap.
Figure 10: The expected delay in blocks $W_K(\rho)$ of the lowest priority transaction given $\rho = \lambda/\mu K$ and $K \in \{20, 200, 2000, 20000\}$.

Figure 11: Revenue for $K = 2000$ and waiting costs $c$ distributed (i) uniformly on $[0, 1]$, (ii) as an exponential with mean 1 (iii) as a Log-normal with mean and variance equal to 1. All were calculated using the asymptotic approximation. The plot also shows $Rev_{2000}(\rho)$ for the uniform distribution in a dotted line that overlaps the asymptotic approximation.
Figure 12: Delay costs for $K = 2000$ and waiting costs $c$ distributed (i) uniformly on $[0, 1]$, (ii) as an exponential with mean 1 (iii) as a Log-normal with mean and variance equal to 1. All were calculated using the asymptotic approximation. The plot also shows $\text{Rev}_{2000}(\rho)$ for the uniform distribution in a dotted line that overlaps the asymptotic approximation.

E Proofs

E.1 Queueing Analysis

In this section, we will establish the main queueing result, which is the waiting time expression of Lemma 6. We begin with a standard result from the analysis of bulk service systems (e.g., Section 4.6, Kleinrock 1975):

**Lemma A1.** Consider a queue system consisting of a single queue, with arrivals according to a Poisson process of rate $\lambda \geq 0$ and bulk service in batches of size up to $K \geq 1$ with service times exponentially distributed with parameter $\mu > 0$. Suppose that the load $\rho \triangleq \lambda / (\mu K) \geq 0$ satisfies $\rho < 1$. Then, the queueing system is stable, and the steady-state queue length $Q$ has the geometric distribution

$$P(Q = \ell) = (1 - z_0)z_0^\ell, \quad \ell = 0, 1, \ldots$$

Here, the parameter of the geometric distribution $z_0 \triangleq z_0(\rho, K)$ is given as unique solution
of the polynomial equation
\[ z^{K+1} - (K\rho + 1)z + K\rho = 0, \]
in the interval \([0, 1)\).

Lemma A1 and Little’s Law are used to prove the following, which implies Lemma 6:

**Lemma A2.** Consider a transaction, and let \( \hat{\lambda} \) be the arrival rate of higher priority transactions (i.e., transaction that offer greater fees). The expected time until the transaction is processed is a function of the block size \( K \), the block arrival rate \( \mu \), and the load parameter \( \hat{\rho} \triangleq \hat{\lambda}/\mu K \in [0, 1) \), and is equal to

\[
\mu^{-1}W_K(\hat{\rho}) = \frac{1}{\mu} \frac{1}{(1 - z_0)(1 + K\hat{\rho} - (K + 1)z_0^K)}.
\]

Here, \( z_0 \triangleq z_0(\hat{\rho}, K) \in [0, 1) \) is the polynomial root defined in Lemma A1.

The quantity \( W_K(\hat{\rho}) \geq 1 \) is the expected waiting time measured in blocks. It satisfies

\[ W'_K(\hat{\rho}) > 0, \quad \forall \hat{\rho} \in (0, 1). \]

**Finally, we have that**

\[ W_K(0) = 1; \quad \lim_{\hat{\rho} \to 1} W_K(\hat{\rho}) = \infty; \quad W'_K(0) = 0, \quad \text{if } K > 1; \quad \lim_{\hat{\rho} \to 1} W'_K(\hat{\rho}) = \infty. \]

**Proof.** While this result can be established directly using a generating function argument, we will instead use a more intuitive approach based on Little’s Law.

To start, consider a queueing system with arrival according to a Poisson process of rate \( \hat{\lambda} \), exponential service time with parameter \( \mu \), and batch size \( K \). Define \( \hat{W}_K(\rho) \) to be the average waiting time of a user in this system measured in multiples of the mean service time \( \mu^{-1} \). Here, we highlight the dependence on the load \( \hat{\rho} \triangleq \hat{\lambda}/\mu K \). Lemma A1 implies that the mean queue length is given by

\[ E[Q_K] = \frac{z_0(\hat{\rho}, K)}{1 - z_0(\hat{\rho}, K)}. \]

Applying Little’s Law,

\[ \frac{z_0(\hat{\rho}, K)}{1 - z_0(\hat{\rho}, K)} = \frac{\hat{\lambda}}{\mu} \hat{W}_K(\hat{\rho}). \quad (12) \]

Now, Little’s Law (12) holds no matter what the service discipline. In particular, we
can specialize to the case where users are given preemptive priority service, where each user is given a priority type drawn uniformly over the interval \([0, \hat{\rho}]\), and where service for users of lower numerical priority type preempts service for higher numerical priority type. Define \(W_K(\rho)\) to be the expected waiting time (in multiples of the mean service time) for users with priority type \(\rho \in [0, \hat{\rho}]\). Then,

\[
\bar{W}_K(\hat{\rho}) = \frac{1}{\hat{\rho}} \int_0^{\hat{\rho}} W_K(\rho) \, d\rho.
\]

Substituting into (12), we have that

\[
\frac{z_0(\hat{\rho}, K)}{1 - z_0(\hat{\rho}, K)} = K \int_0^{\hat{\rho}} W_K(\rho) \, d\rho.
\]

Differentiating with respect to \(\hat{\rho}\) and simplifying, we have that

\[
W_K(\hat{\rho}) = \frac{\partial_{\hat{\rho}}z_0(\hat{\rho}, K)}{K (1 - z_0(\hat{\rho}, K))^2}.
\]

In order to simplify this expression, we will use the implicit function theorem. Denote by \(Q_K(z, \hat{\rho})\) the degree \(K\) polynomial in \(z\) defined by

\[
z^{K+1} - (K\hat{\rho} + 1)z + K\hat{\rho} = (z_0(\hat{\rho}, K) - z)Q_K(z, \hat{\rho}), \quad \forall (z, \hat{\rho}) \in \mathbb{R} \times [0,1). \tag{14}
\]

This polynomial exists and is unique since \(z_0 \triangleq z_0(\hat{\rho}, K)\) is a root of the degree \(K + 1\) polynomial on the left side. We apply the implicit function theorem and differentiate (14) with respect to \((z, \hat{\rho}) \in \mathbb{R} \times [0,1)\) to obtain

\[
(K + 1)z^K - (K\hat{\rho} + 1) = -Q_K(z, \hat{\rho}) + (z_0(\hat{\rho}, K) - z)\partial_zQ_K(z, \hat{\rho}), \tag{15}
\]

\[
-Kz + K = \partial_{\hat{\rho}}z_0(\hat{\rho}, K)Q_K(z, \hat{\rho}) + (z_0(\hat{\rho}, K) - z)\partial_{\hat{\rho}}Q_K(z, \hat{\rho}). \tag{16}
\]

Substituting \(z = z_0(\hat{\rho}, K)\) into (15), we have that

\[
Q_K(z_0, \hat{\rho}) = 1 + K\hat{\rho} - (K + 1)z_0^K. \tag{17}
\]

The same substitution into (16) yields that

\[
\partial_{\hat{\rho}}z_0(\hat{\rho}, K) = K \frac{1 - z_0}{Q_K(z_0, \hat{\rho})} = K \frac{1 - z_0}{1 + K\hat{\rho} - (K + 1)z_0^K}. \tag{18}
\]
Substituting (17)–(18) into (13) yields the desired result that

\[ W_K(\hat{\rho}) \triangleq \frac{1}{(1 - z_0)(1 + K\hat{\rho} - (K + 1)z_0^K)}. \]  

(19)

We will now show that \( W'_K(\hat{\rho}) > 0 \). Differentiating (19),

\[ W'_K(\hat{\rho}) = \frac{(Q_K(z_0, \hat{\rho}) + K(K + 1)(1 - z_0)z_0^{K-1}) \partial_{\hat{\rho}} z_0(\hat{\rho}, K) - K(1 - z_0)}{(1 - z_0)Q_K(z_0, \hat{\rho})^2} \]

Substituting \( z = z_0(\hat{\rho}, K) \) into (15), we have that

\[ \partial_{\hat{\rho}} z_0(\hat{\rho}, K) = \frac{K(1 - z_0)}{Q_K(z_0, \hat{\rho})} = K(1 - z_0)^2W_K(\hat{\rho}). \]

Then,

\[ W'_K(\hat{\rho}) = K\frac{(Q_K(z_0, \hat{\rho}) + K(K + 1)(1 - z_0)z_0^{K-1}) - Q_K(z_0, \hat{\rho})}{(1 - z_0)Q_K(z_0, \hat{\rho})^3} \]

\[ = \frac{K^2(K + 1)z_0^{K-1}}{Q_K(z_0, \hat{\rho})^3} \]

\[ = K^2(K + 1)z_0^{K-1}(1 - z_0)^3W_K(\hat{\rho})^3. \]

(20)

Since the waiting time must be at least one block, \( W_K(\hat{\rho}) \geq 1 \). Since \( z_0 < 1 \) and, if \( \hat{\rho} \in (0, 1) \), \( z_0 \neq 0 \) also, we have that \( W'_K(\hat{\rho}) > 0 \). Furthermore, since \( z_0(0, K) = 0 \), it is clear that

\[ W_K(0) = 1, \quad W'_K(0) = \begin{cases} 2 & \text{if } K = 1, \\ 0 & \text{if } K > 1. \end{cases} \]

Finally, we consider the asymptotic limits of \( W_K(\cdot) \) and \( W'_K(\cdot) \) as \( \hat{\rho} \to 1 \). Factoring the defining polynomial for \( z_0 \in [0, 1) \), we have that

\[ 0 = z_0^{K+1} - (K\hat{\rho} + 1)z_0 + K\hat{\rho} = (1 - z_0)\left(K\hat{\rho} - \sum_{\ell=1}^{K} z_0^{\ell}\right). \]

Therefore, \( z_0 \) satisfies

\[ \hat{\rho} = \frac{1}{K} \sum_{\ell=1}^{K} z_0^{\ell} \leq \frac{1}{K} \sum_{\ell=1}^{K} z_0 = z_0 < 1, \]

where the inequalities follow since \( z_0 \in [0,1) \). Taking a limit as \( \hat{\rho} \to 1 \), clearly \( z_0 \to 1 \).
and \( Q_K(z_0, \hat{\rho}) \to 0 \). Therefore, from (19), \( W_K(\hat{\rho}) \to \infty \), and also from (20),

\[
\lim_{\hat{\rho} \to 1} W_K(\hat{\rho}) = \lim_{\hat{\rho} \to 1} \frac{K^2(K + 1) z_0^{K-1}}{Q_K(z_0, \hat{\rho})^3} = \infty.
\]

\[\square\]

E.2 Equilibrium

**Proof of Proposition 7:** We consider agents equilibrium decisions conditional on being forced to participate. Let \( G \) denote the the cumulative distribution function of transaction fees in some equilibrium, and let \( b(c_i) \) be a transaction fee chosen by agents with delay cost \( c_i \). Consider a user \( i \) with delay cost \( c_i \). The user chooses his transaction fee \( b \) to maximize his net reward

\[
R_i - b - c_i \cdot W(b | G)
\]

with \( W(b | G) \) denoting the expected delay given transaction fee \( b \) and the CDF \( G \). By Lemma 6 the expected delay is decreasing with \( b \), and standard arguments (see Lui (1985), Hassin & Haviv (2003)) imply that \( b(c_i) \) is increasing in \( c_i \) and \( b(0) = 0 \). Monotonicity of \( b(\cdot) \) implies that \( G(b(c)) = F(c) \). Therefore we have that

\[
\hat{\rho}(c_i) = \frac{\lambda \cdot (1 - G(b(c_i)))}{\mu K} = \rho \cdot F(c_i),
\]

and

\[
W(b | G) = \mu^{-1} W_K(\rho \cdot G(b))
\]

\[
= \mu^{-1} W_K(\rho \cdot F(c_i)).
\]

Each agent is bidding optimally if and only if

\[
b(c_i) \in \arg \min_b \{ c \cdot W(b | G) + b \}.
\]

The first order condition implies

\[
W'(b_i | G) = -\frac{1}{c_i}.
\]

Plugging in \( G'(b_i) = f(c_i) / b'(c_i) \), we have that
\[ \mu^{-1} W'_K (\rho \cdot \bar{G} (b)) \cdot (-\rho f (c_i) / b' (c_i)) = -\frac{1}{c_i}, \]

or

\[ b' (c_i) = c_i \rho f (c_i) \mu^{-1} W'_K (\rho \bar{F} (c_i)). \]

Integration together with the fact that \( b(0) = 0 \) yields

\[ b (c_i) = \rho \int_0^{c_i} f(c) \cdot c \cdot \mu^{-1} W' (\rho \bar{F} (c)) \, dc. \]

Transaction fees coincide with the payments that result from selling priority in a VCG auction because of revenue equivalence. To directly see that \( b(c_i) \) is the externality imposed by \( c_i \), write the expected wait in terms of arrival rate of higher priority transactions as \( \mu^{-1} W_K (\hat{\lambda}) \triangleq \mu^{-1} W_K (\hat{\lambda} / \mu K) \). The transaction sent by \( c_i \) affects the waiting time of transactions with lower priority that are sent by users with \( 0 \leq c < c_i \); higher priority transactions are not affected. Integration over all affected types implies that the externality imposed by a marginal increase in the volume of transaction from users with \( c_i \) is

\[ \int_0^{c_i} \lambda f (c) \cdot c \cdot \mu^{-1} W'_K (\lambda \bar{F} (c)) \, dc = b (c_i). \]

Finally,

\[ b (c_i) = \rho \int_0^{c_i} c f(c) \mu^{-1} W'_K (\rho \bar{F} (c)) \, dc \]

\[ = - \int_0^{c_i} c \left( \mu^{-1} W_K (\rho \bar{F} (c)) \right)' \, dc \]

\[ = \int_0^{c_i} \mu^{-1} W_K (\rho \bar{F} (c)) \, dc - \left[ c \mu^{-1} W_K (\rho \bar{F} (c)) \right]_0^{c_i} \]

\[ = \int_0^{c_i} \mu^{-1} W_K (\rho \bar{F} (c)) \, dc - c_i \mu^{-1} W_K (\rho \bar{F} (c_i)) \]

\[ = \int_0^{c_i} \mu^{-1} W_K (\rho \bar{F} (c)) \, dc - c_i \mu^{-1} W_K (\rho \bar{F} (c_i)). \]

Therefore,

\[ u (R_i, c_i) = R_i - c_i \cdot W (b(c_i) \mid G) - b(c_i) \]

\[ = R_i - \int_0^{c_i} \mu^{-1} W_K (\rho \bar{F} (c)) \, dc. \]
Proof of Lemma 8: First, assume that all users participate. From Proposition 7 the equilibrium net surplus of an agent \((R_i, c_i)\) conditional on all agents participating is
\[
 u(R_i, c_i) = R_i - \mu^{-1} \int_0^{c_i} W_K (\rho \bar{F}(c)) \, dc.
\]
Because \(u(R_i, c_i)\) is decreasing in \(R_i, c_i\) we have that for all \((R_i, c_i)\)
\[
u(R_i, c_i) \geq u(R_L, \bar{c})
= R_L - \mu^{-1} \int_0^{\bar{c}} W_K (\rho \bar{F}(c)) \, dc
= R_L - \bar{R} > 0.
\]
Additionally, we have that \(W_K\) is an increasing function, which implies that the utility \(u(R_L, \bar{c})\) increases if less agents participate. Therefore, it is a strict best response for all agents to participate regardless of the participation decisions of other users. In other words, all agents participate in equilibrium and receive net surplus \(u(R_i, c_i) \geq u(R_L, \bar{c}) > 0\).

Proof of Theorem 9: From Lemma 8 we have that all agents participate and receive strictly positive surplus. From the expressions derived in Proposition 7 we have that transaction fees are \(b(c_i)\) are and independent of the user’s WTP and the exchange rate (a change in the exchange rate may change the nominal value written into the transaction, as users observe the exchange rate. Users trade off fees in USD against delay cost in USD equivalents).

Finally, if \(\rho > 0\) we have that \(b(c_i) > 0\) and the system raises strictly positive revenue.

Proof of Corollary 10: Note that if the conditions of Theorem 9 are satisfied, they will also be satisfied if we increase WTP \(R\) of some or all the users. Therefore, both before and after the increase, the equilibrium transaction fees are given by \(b(c_i)\) which is independent of WTP \(R\).

E.3 Delay and Revenue

In this section, we establish results relating to the total revenue generated by users and the total delay cost experienced by users in equilibrium. Theorems 11 and 12, which
provides an expressions for the total revenue and delay cost, are implied by the following result:

**Theorem A3.** The total revenue per unit time raised from users is

\[ \text{Rev}_K(\rho) = K \rho^2 \int_0^\rho cf(c) \bar{F}'(c) W_K (\rho \bar{F}(c)) \, dc \]  
(21)

\[ = K \rho \int_0^\rho (\bar{F}(c) - cf(c)) W_K (\rho \bar{F}(c)) \, dc. \]  
(22)

The total delay cost per unit time incurred by users is

\[ \text{DelayCost}_K(\rho) = K \rho \int_0^\rho cf(c)W_K (\rho \bar{F}(c)) \, dc. \]  
(23)

The total overall cost per unit time borne by users is

\[ \text{TotalCost}_K(\rho) \triangleq \text{Rev}_K(\rho) + \text{DelayCost}_K(\rho) = K \rho \int_0^\rho \bar{F}(c) W_K (\rho \bar{F}(c)) \, dc. \]  
(24)

**Proof.** Transactions arrive per unit time at rate \( \lambda \), and the expected revenue per transaction is

\[ \int_0^\rho f(c)b(c) \, dc. \]

Therefore, the total expected revenue per unit time is

\[ \text{Rev}_K(\rho) = \lambda \int_0^\rho f(c)b(c) \, dc \]

\[ = K \rho^2 \left( \int_0^\rho f(c) \int_0^c s f(s) W_K'(s) \rho \bar{F}(s) \, ds \right) \, dc \]

\[ = K \rho^2 \left( \int_0^\rho \int_0^c f(c) s f(s) W_K'(s) \rho \bar{F}(s) \, ds \, dc \right) \]

\[ = K \rho^2 \left( \int_0^\rho s f(s) \bar{F}(s) W_K'(s) \rho \bar{F}(s) \, ds \right). \]

This establishes (21). For (22), we integrate by parts with

\[ u = K \rho s \bar{F}(s), \quad du = K \rho \left( \bar{F}(s) - s f(s) \right) \, ds, \]

\[ dv = \rho f(s) W_K'(s) \rho \bar{F}(s) \, ds, \quad v = -W_K(\rho \bar{F}(s)). \]
to obtain

\[ \text{Rev}_K(\rho) = uv \left|_0^\rho - \int_0^\rho v \, du \right. \]

\[ = K \rho \int_0^\rho (\bar{F}(s) - sf(s)) W_K (p\bar{F}(s)) \, ds, \]

as desired.

For the delay cost, note that the expected delay cost per transaction is

\[ \int_0^\rho f(c) \cdot c \mu^{-1} W_K (\rho\bar{F}(c)) \, dc. \]

Since transactions arrive at rate \(\lambda\), the total expected revenue per unit time is then

\[ \text{DelayCost}_K(\rho) = \lambda \int_0^\rho c f(c) \mu^{-1} W_K (\rho\bar{F}(c)) \, dc \]

\[ = K \rho \int_0^\rho c f(c) W_K (\rho\bar{F}(c)) \, dc, \]

as desired. The expression for total cost per unit time (24) follows by combining (22) and (23).

\[ \square \]

Corollary 13, which establishes that total revenue and delay costs are increasing as functions of the load parameter \(\rho\), is implied by the following result:

**Corollary A4.** In equilibrium, if \(\rho = 0\), both revenue and delay cost are zero. For all \(\rho \in (0, 1)\),

\[ \text{Rev}'_K(\rho) = K \rho \int_0^\rho \bar{F}(c)^2 W'_K (\rho\bar{F}(c)) \, dc > 0, \]

\[ \text{DelayCost}'_K(\rho) = \frac{\text{TotalCost}_K(\rho)}{\rho} > 0. \]

In other words, both revenue (and with it infrastructure provision by miners) and delay cost are strictly increasing in \(\rho\).
Proof. Differentiating (22) and applying (21),

\[
\text{Rev}_K' (\rho) = K \int_0^\rho \left( \bar{F}(c) - cf(c) \right) W_K (\rho \bar{F}(c)) \, dc \\
+ K \rho \int_0^\rho \left( \bar{F}(c)^2 - cf(c) \bar{F}(c) \right) W'_K (\rho \bar{F}(c)) \, dc \\
= \frac{\text{Rev}_K (\rho)}{\rho} + K \rho \int_0^\rho \bar{F}(c)^2 W'_K (\rho \bar{F}(c)) \, dc - \frac{\text{Rev}_K (\rho)}{\rho} \\
= K \rho \int_0^\rho \bar{F}(c)^2 W'_K (\rho \bar{F}(c)) \, dc.
\]

Similarly, differentiating (23) and applying (21) and (24),

\[
\text{DelayCost}_K' (\rho) = K \int_0^\rho cf(c) W_K (\rho \bar{F}(c)) \, dc + K \rho \int_0^\rho cf(c) \bar{F}(c) W'_K (\rho \bar{F}(c)) \, dc \\
= \frac{\text{DelayCost}_K (\rho)}{\rho} + \frac{\text{Rev}_K (\rho)}{\rho} = \frac{\text{TotalCost}_K (\rho)}{\rho}.
\]

\[\square\]

E.4 Large Block Asymptotics

In this section, we establish asymptotic results in a “large block size” asymptotic regime. This is a regime where we consider a sequence of systems where the load parameter \( \rho \equiv \lambda / (\mu K) \in [0, 1) \) is held constant, while the block size \( K \to \infty \).

The first result we establish in this regime is Lemma 14. The core of this Lemma is the observation that, in the large block regime, the expected waiting time measured in blocks, \( W_K (\rho) \), is independent of \( K \). The main intuition for this result is as follows. Fix the value of \( \rho \). Consider a sequence of system, indexed by the block size \( K \), each with load \( \rho \), as \( K \to \infty \). When \( K \) is large, the arrival rate of new transactions must be very large relative to the service rate as which blocks are generated. Without loss of generality, suppose that the arrival rate of the \( K \)th system is \( \lambda_K = \rho K \) and the service rate of every system is \( \mu = 1 \), so the the load of each system is \( \lambda_K / (\mu K) = \rho \) as desired. Now, over an interval of time of length \( t \), the number of arrivals is given by a Poisson(\( \lambda_K t \)) = Poisson(\( \rho K t \)) distribution. Measured in units of the block size, this scaled number of arrivals process has the distribution

\[
\frac{1}{K} \text{Poisson}(\rho K t) \to \rho t,
\]

as \( K \to \infty \), where the convergence is because the random variable on the left side has
variance tending to zero, and hence is well-approximated by its mean. In other words, in this asymptotic regime, the number of new transactions is approximately deterministic and of order $K$, while services are at random times and also of order $K$. Therefore, it is natural to expect that the number of queued transactions, scaled by the block size $K$, converges in distribution as $K \to \infty$.

The following lemma makes this intuition precise:

**Lemma A5.** Consider a sequence of bulk service queueing systems (as in Lemma A1) indexed by block size $K \geq 1$ with a fixed load parameter $\rho \in (0,1)$, as $K \to \infty$. Define the random variable $Q_K$ to be the steady state distribution of the system when the block size is $K$.

Then, $Q_K$ is geometrically distributed with parameter $z_0(\rho, K)$ (cf. Lemma A1), where $z_0(\rho, K)$ asymptotically satisfies

$$z_0(\rho, K) = 1 - \alpha(\rho)/K + o(1/K),$$

as $K \to \infty$. Here, where $\alpha(\rho) > 0$ is the unique strictly positive root of the transcendental algebraic equation

$$e^{-\alpha} + \rho\alpha - 1 = 0.$$

Moreover, define $\tilde{Q}_K \triangleq Q_K/K$ to be the random variable corresponding to the steady state queue length when the block size is $K$, measured in units of the block size $K$. Then, as $K \to \infty$, $\tilde{Q}_K$ converges in distribution to an exponential distribution with parameter $\alpha(\rho)$.

**Proof.** Fix $\rho \in (0,1)$.

First, we will show that $\alpha(\rho)$ is well-defined. Define the transcendental function

$$T(\alpha) \triangleq e^{-\alpha} + \rho\alpha - 1.$$

Clearly $T(0) = 0$, $T'(0) < 0$, and $\lim_{\alpha \to \infty} T(\alpha) = \infty$. By the intermediate value theorem, there is at least one strictly positive root. Further, since $T''(\alpha) > 0$ for all $\alpha \geq 0$, the root must be unique. Thus,

$$T(\alpha) < 0, \quad \forall \ 0 < \alpha < \alpha(\rho); \quad T(\alpha) > 0, \quad \forall \ \alpha > \alpha(\rho).$$

(26)
Next, we wish to prove (25). From Lemma A1, recall the polynomial defining $z_0$,

$$P_K(z) \triangleq z^{K+1} - (K \rho + 1)z + K \rho.$$ 

Note that

$$P_K(0) = K \rho > 0, \quad P_K(1) = 0, \quad P'_K(1) = K(1 - \rho) > 0,$$

so $P_K(z)$ must be positive for $z$ sufficiently close to zero, and must be negative for $z$ sufficiently close to (but less than) 1. Since $z_0$ is the unique root of $P_K(\cdot)$ in the interval $[0, 1)$, we have that

$$P_K(z) > 0, \quad \forall \ 0 \leq z < z_0(\rho, K); \quad P_K(z) < 0, \quad \forall \ z_0(\rho, K) < z < 1. \quad (27)$$

Now, fix an arbitrary $\epsilon > 0$. Define

$$\nu_K \triangleq 1 - \frac{\alpha(\rho) + \epsilon}{K}, \quad \nu'_K \triangleq 1 - \frac{\alpha(\rho) - \epsilon}{K}.$$

Then,

$$\lim_{K \to \infty} P_K(\nu_K) = \lim_{K \to \infty} \nu_K^{K+1} - (K \rho + 1)\nu_K + K \rho$$

$$= \lim_{K \to \infty} \nu_K \left(1 - \frac{\alpha(\rho) + \epsilon}{K}\right)^K + (K \rho + 1)\frac{\alpha(\rho) + \epsilon}{K} - 1$$

$$= \epsilon^{-(\alpha(\rho)+\epsilon)} + \rho(\alpha(\rho) + \epsilon) - 1$$

$$= T(\alpha(\rho) + \epsilon)$$

$$> 0,$$

where (26) is used for the final inequality. Thus, for all $K$ sufficiently large, $P_K(\nu_K) > 0$. By (27), this implies that, for all $K$ sufficiently large, $z_0(\rho, K) > \nu_K$. Combining this with an analogous argument applied to $\nu'_K$, we have that, for all $K$ sufficiently large,

$$1 - \frac{\alpha(\rho) + \epsilon}{K} < z_0(\rho, K) < 1 - \frac{\alpha(\rho) - \epsilon}{K},$$

or equivalently,

$$\left|z_0(\rho, K) - \left(1 - \frac{\alpha(\rho)}{K}\right)\right| < \frac{\epsilon}{K}.$$ 

Since $\epsilon$ is arbitrary, we have established (25).

To prove the convergence of $\tilde{Q}_K$ to the appropriate exponential distribution, notice
that, for $t \geq 0$,
\[
P(\hat{Q}_K \geq t) = P(Q_K \geq tK) = P(Q_K \geq \lceil tK \rceil) = z_0(\rho, K)^{\lceil tK \rceil} = z_0(\rho, K)^{K(\lceil tK \rceil)/K}. \tag{28}
\]

Then,
\[
\lim_{K \to \infty} \frac{\log P(\hat{Q}_K \geq t)}{K} = \lim_{K \to \infty} \left( \frac{\lceil tK \rceil}{K} \cdot K \log z_0(\rho, K) \right) = t \cdot \lim_{K \to \infty} K \log z_0(\rho, K) = -t\alpha(\rho), \tag{29}
\]

where we have applied (25) and the fact that $\log(1-x) = -x + O(x^2)$ as $x \to 0$. \hfill \Box

The following lemma builds on the prior result to establish the first part of Lemma 14, which is that the expected waiting time (measured in blocks) converges and is independent of $K$:

**Lemma A6.** Consider a fixed load parameter $\hat{\rho} \in (0, 1)$. As block size $K$ increases, the expected waiting time measured in blocks converges according to

\[
\lim_{K \to \infty} W_K(\hat{\rho}) = W_\infty(\hat{\rho}).
\]

Here, $W_\infty(\hat{\rho})$ is the asymptotic expected delay (measured in blocks), defined for $\hat{\rho} \in (0, 1)$ by

\[
W_\infty(\hat{\rho}) \triangleq \frac{1}{1 - (1 + \alpha(\hat{\rho}))e^{-\alpha(\hat{\rho})}}, \tag{30}
\]

where $\alpha(\hat{\rho}) > 0$ is defined in Lemma A5. For $\hat{\rho} = 0$, define $W_\infty(\hat{\rho}) \triangleq 1$ to coincide with the limiting value.

Moreover, the asymptotic expected delay satisfies

\[
W'_\infty(0) = 0; \quad W'_\infty(\hat{\rho}) > 0, \quad \forall \hat{\rho} \in (0, 1).
\]

**Proof.** The result is trivial for $\hat{\rho} = 0$.

Fix $\hat{\rho} > 0$. Equation (25) implies that there exists a sequence $\{\epsilon_K\}$ with limit $\epsilon_K \to 0$, such that

\[
z_0(\hat{\rho}, K) = 1 - \frac{\alpha(\hat{\rho}) + \epsilon_K}{K}.
\]
Then,
\[
\lim_{K \to \infty} W_K(\hat{\rho})^{-1} = \lim_{K \to \infty} (1 - z_0) \left( 1 + K\hat{\rho} - (K + 1) z_0^K \right) \\
= \alpha(\hat{\rho})\hat{\rho} - \lim_{K \to \infty} \frac{K + 1}{K} (\alpha(\hat{\rho}) + \epsilon_K) z_0^K.
\]

But, as in (28)–(29), \(z^K_0 \to e^{-\alpha(\hat{\rho})}\). Also, from the transcendental algebraic equation defining \(\alpha(\hat{\rho})\), we have that
\[
\hat{\rho} = \frac{1 - e^{-\alpha(\hat{\rho})}}{\alpha(\hat{\rho})}.
\]

Therefore,
\[
\lim_{K \to \infty} W_K(\hat{\rho})^{-1} = \alpha(\hat{\rho})\hat{\rho} - \alpha(\hat{\rho}) e^{-\alpha(\hat{\rho})} = 1 - (1 + \alpha(\hat{\rho})) e^{-\alpha(\hat{\rho})},
\]
as desired.

It remains to establish that \(W'_\infty(\hat{\rho}) > 0\). Applying the implicit function theorem to differentiate the equation \(T(\alpha(\hat{\rho})) = 0\) with respect to \(\hat{\rho}\), we have that
\[
-e^{-\alpha(\hat{\rho})} \alpha'(\hat{\rho}) + \alpha(\hat{\rho}) + \hat{\rho} \alpha'(\hat{\rho}) = 0.
\]

Simplifying, we obtain that
\[
\alpha'(\hat{\rho}) = \frac{\alpha(\hat{\rho})}{e^{-\alpha(\hat{\rho})} - \hat{\rho}} = -\alpha(\hat{\rho})^2 W_\infty(\hat{\rho}).
\]

Then, differentiating (30), we have that
\[
W'_\infty(\hat{\rho}) = -\frac{e^{-\alpha(\hat{\rho})} \alpha(\hat{\rho}) \alpha'(\hat{\rho})}{(1 - (1 + \alpha(\hat{\rho}) e^{-\alpha(\hat{\rho})})^2} = e^{-\alpha(\hat{\rho})} \alpha(\hat{\rho})^3 W_\infty(\hat{\rho})^3 > 0,
\]
where the inequality holds for \(\hat{\rho} \in (0, 1)\). Observing that \(\alpha(\hat{\rho}) \to \infty\) as \(\hat{\rho} \to 0\), it follows that \(W'_\infty(0) = 0\).

Finally, we establish the second part of Lemma 14, which described the behavior of the large block asymptotic waiting time in the low load regime, as follows:

**Lemma A7.** As \(\rho \to 0\), we have that
\[
W_\infty(\rho) = 1 + \frac{1}{\rho} e^{-1/\rho} + o\left(\frac{1}{\rho} e^{-1/\rho}\right),
\]

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Proof. First, we will derive an asymptotic expression for $\alpha(\rho)$ when $\rho \to 0$. Suppose $\rho > 0$, if $\alpha > 0$ is the solution of

$$e^{-\alpha} + \rho \alpha - 1 = 0,$$

then $\beta \triangleq \alpha - 1/\rho > -1/\rho$ must solve

$$-\frac{1}{\rho} e^{-1/\rho} = \beta e^\beta.$$

The two real solutions to this transcendental equation can be expressed as

$$\beta = W_i \left( -\frac{1}{\rho} e^{-1/\rho} \right), \quad \forall \, i = -1, 0,$$

where $W_0(\cdot)$ and $W_{-1}(\cdot)$ are the two branches of the Lambert $W$-function (for the definition and properties of this function, see, e.g., Olver et al. 2010). Since $\beta > -1/\rho$, we can restrict to the $i = 0$ case (the so-called ‘principal branch’), to obtain

$$\alpha(\rho) = \frac{1}{\rho} + W_0 \left( -\frac{1}{\rho} e^{-1/\rho} \right).$$

As $x \to 0$, from the Taylor expansion it is easy to see that $W_0(x) = x + O(x^2)$. Then, as $\rho \to 0$,

$$\alpha(\rho) = \frac{1}{\rho} + O \left( \frac{1}{\rho} e^{-1/\rho} \right).$$

Now, we can analyze the asymptotic waiting time. As $\rho \to 0$, $\alpha(\rho) \to \infty$, so that

$$(1 + \alpha(\rho)) e^{-\alpha(\rho)} \to 0.$$  

Since $1/(1 - x) = 1 + x + O(x^2)$ as $x \to 0$, we have that

$$W_\infty(\rho) = 1 + (1 + \alpha(\rho)) e^{-\alpha(\rho)} + o \left( (1 + \alpha(\rho)) e^{-\alpha(\rho)} \right)$$

$$= 1 + \alpha(\rho) e^{-\alpha(\rho)} + o \left( \alpha(\rho) e^{-\alpha(\rho)} \right)$$

$$= 1 + \frac{1}{\rho} e^{-1/\rho} + o \left( \frac{1}{\rho} e^{-1/\rho} \right).$$

The following Theorem implies Theorems 15–16:
**Theorem A8.** For a fixed load $\rho \in [0, 1)$, as the block size $K \to \infty$, we have that

$$
\begin{align*}
\text{Rev}_K(\rho) &= K \cdot \text{Rev}_\infty(\rho) + o(K), \\
\text{DelayCost}_K(\rho) &= K \cdot \text{DelayCost}_\infty(\rho) + o(K), \\
\text{TotalCost}_K(\rho) &= K \cdot \text{TotalCost}_\infty(\rho) + o(K),
\end{align*}
$$

where

$$
\begin{align*}
\text{Rev}_\infty(\rho) &\triangleq \rho \int_0^\bar{c} (\bar{F}(c) - cf(c)) W_\infty (\rho \bar{F}(c)) \ dc, \\
\text{DelayCost}_\infty(\rho) &\triangleq \rho \int_0^\bar{c} cf(c) W_\infty (\rho \bar{F}(c)) \ dc. \\
\text{TotalCost}_\infty(\rho) &\triangleq \text{Rev}_\infty(\rho) + \text{DelayCost}_\infty(\rho) = \rho \int_0^\bar{c} \bar{F}(c) W_\infty (\rho \bar{F}(c)) \ dc.
\end{align*}
$$

Furthermore, for all $\rho \in (0, 1)$,

$$
\begin{align*}
\text{Rev}'_\infty(\rho) &= \rho \int_0^\bar{c} \bar{F}(c)^2 W'_\infty (\rho \bar{F}(c)) \ dc > 0, \\
\text{DelayCost}'_\infty(\rho) &= \frac{\text{TotalCost}_\infty(\rho)}{\rho} > 0.
\end{align*}
$$

In other words, both the asymptotic revenue (and with it infrastructure provision by miners) and the asymptotic delay cost are strictly increasing in $\rho$.

Finally, as $\rho \to 0$,

$$
\begin{align*}
\text{Rev}_\infty(\rho) &= O \left( e^{-1/\rho} \right), \\
\text{DelayCost}_\infty(\rho) &= \rho \cdot \text{E}[c] + o(\rho).
\end{align*}
$$

In other words, for small values of the load $\rho$, the asymptotic delay cost grows linearly in $\rho$, but the revenue grows slower than any polynomial in $\rho$.

**Proof.** Note that, from (22),

$$
\frac{\text{Rev}_K(\rho)}{K} = \rho \int_0^\bar{c} (\bar{F}(c) - cf(c)) W_K (\rho \bar{F}(c)) \ dc. \quad (31)
$$

Since $W_K(\cdot)$ is strictly increasing,

$$
| (\bar{F}(c) - cf(c)) W_K (\rho \bar{F}(c)) | \leq (\bar{F}(c) + cf(c)) W_K (\rho).
$$
Now, pick any \( \bar{\rho} \in (\rho, 1) \). Then \( W_K(\rho) \to W_\infty(\rho) < W_\infty(\bar{\rho}) \) by Lemma A6, so for \( K \) sufficiently large,

\[
\left| (\bar{F}(c) - cf(c)) W_K(\rho\bar{F}(c)) \right| \leq (\bar{F}(c) + cf(c)) W_\infty(\bar{\rho}),
\]

which is integrable over \( c \in [0, \bar{c}] \). Then, we can apply the dominated convergence theorem to (31) to obtain

\[
\lim_{K \to \infty} \frac{\text{Rev}_K(\rho)}{K} = \rho \int_0^\bar{c} (\bar{F}(c) - cf(c)) W_\infty(\rho\bar{F}(c)) \, dc \triangleq \text{Rev}_\infty(\rho),
\]

as desired.

The asymptotic \( K \to \infty \) limits for delay cost and total cost can be established using similar dominated convergence theorem arguments. Further, the derivative expressions can be derived directly by differentiation.

Finally, we wish to describe the asymptotic revenue \( \text{Rev}_\infty(\rho) \) and the asymptotic delay cost \( \text{DelayCost}_\infty(\rho) \) as \( \rho \to 0 \). For the asymptotic revenue,

\[
\text{Rev}_\infty(\rho) = \rho \int_0^\bar{c} (\bar{F}(c) - cf(c)) W_\infty(\rho\bar{F}(c)) \, dc \\
= \rho \int_0^\bar{c} (\bar{F}(c) - cf(c)) (W_\infty(\rho\bar{F}(c)) - 1) \, dc
\]

where we have used the fact that

\[
\int_0^\bar{c} \bar{F}(c) \, dc = \int_0^\bar{c} cf(c) \, dc = \mathbb{E}[c].
\]

Then, applying Lemma A7

\[
\text{Rev}_\infty(\rho) \leq \rho \int_0^\bar{c} |\bar{F}(c) - cf(c)| \cdot |W_\infty(\rho\bar{F}(c)) - 1| \, dc \\
\leq \rho \int_0^\bar{c} (\bar{F}(c) + cf(c)) \cdot |W_\infty(\rho) - 1| \, dc \\
\leq 2\rho\mathbb{E}(c) |W_\infty(\rho) - 1| \\
\leq 2\mathbb{E}(c)e^{-1/\rho} + o(e^{-1/\rho}).
\]

For the asymptotic delay cost, applying the dominated convergence theorem,

\[
\lim_{\rho \to 0} \frac{\text{DelayCost}_\infty(\rho)}{\rho} = \int_0^\bar{c} cf(c)W_\infty(0) \, dc = \mathbb{E}[c].
\]
The following theorem implies Theorem 17:

**Theorem A9.** Consider a target level of revenue $R^* > 0$ and a block size $K$. Define $\text{DelayCost}^*_K(R^*)$ to be the delay cost required to achieve revenue $R^*$, under the asymptotic large $K$ regime. That is, define

$$
\text{DelayCost}^*_K(R^*) \triangleq K \text{DelayCost}_\infty \left( \text{Rev}^{-1}_\infty \left( \frac{R^*}{K} \right) \right),
$$

where

$$
\text{Rev}^{-1}_\infty (r) \triangleq \inf \{ \rho > 0 : \text{Rev}_\infty (\rho) \geq r \},
$$

for $r > 0$.

Then, as $K \to \infty$,

$$
\text{DelayCost}^*_K(R^*) = \Omega \left( \frac{K}{\log K} \right).
$$

**Proof.** Define $\rho_K \triangleq \text{Rev}^{-1}_\infty \left( \frac{R^*}{K} \right)$, so that $\text{Rev}_\infty (\rho_K) = \frac{R^*}{K}$ for all $K$. Then,

$$
\text{DelayCost}^*_K(R^*) = K \text{DelayCost}_\infty (\rho_K)
= K \rho_K \int_0^e cf(c)W_\infty (\rho_K \bar{F}(c)) \, dc
\geq K \rho_K \mathbb{E}[c],
$$

using the fact that $W_\infty (\cdot) \geq 1$. Hence, it suffices to prove that

$$
\rho_K = \Omega \left( \frac{1}{\log K} \right) \tag{32}
$$

as $K \to \infty$.

Now, if $\rho_K$ is bounded away from zero as $K \to \infty$, (32) clearly holds. Assume otherwise that $\rho_K \to 0$ as $K \to \infty$. Theorem A8 implies that there exists a constant $C$ such that, for $K$ sufficiently large,

$$
\frac{R^*}{K} = \text{Rev}_\infty (\rho_K) \leq Ce^{-1/\rho_K}.
$$

Equivalently,

$$
\rho_K \geq \frac{1}{\log CK/R^*},
$$

for $K$ sufficiently large, which establishes (32). \qed
E.5 Profit Maximizing Firm

Proof of Proposition 4. Notice that the firm can make a profit of \( \lambda_H (R_H - c_f) \) by processing only transaction of \( R_H \) agents without delay at a fee \( R_H \). Since this extracts all the possible surplus from \( R_H \) agents, this is optimal for the firm out of all pricing schemes that do not process transactions from \( R_L \) agents.

We follow to formulate the problem and show the firm cannot do better by processing some transactions from \( R_L \) agents. The firm’s problem can be written as a choice of an incentive compatible direct mechanism where the firm offers a menu \((x(\cdot,\cdot), W(\cdot,\cdot), b(\cdot,\cdot))\).

Agents report their type \((R_i, c_i) \in \{R_H, R_L\} \times \mathbb{R}_+\). If \( x(R_i, c_i) = 0 \) the agent’s transaction is not processed and the agent does not pay or wait. If \( x(R_i, c_i) = 1 \) the agent’s transaction is processed after delay \( W(R_i, c_i) \) and the agent is charged a transaction fee \( b(R_i, c_i) \). The utility of a \((R_i, c_i)\) agent who reports type \((R, c)\) is

\[
u(R, c| R_i, c_i) = x(R, c) (R_i - c_i \cdot W(R, c) - b(R, c))
\]

and we write \( u(R_i, c_i) = u(R_i, c_i| R_i, c_i) \).

The firm’s problem is stated by the following optimization problem.

\[
\max_{x,W,b} \int_0^{\bar{c}_L} x(R_L, c) (b(R_L, c) - c_f) dF(c) + \lambda_H \int_0^{\bar{c}_H} x(R_H, c) (b(R_H, c) - c_f) dF(c)
\]

\[
\text{s.t.:} \quad u(R_i, c_i) \geq u(R, c| R_i, c_i) \quad \forall R_i, c_i, R, c \text{ (IC)}
\]

\[
\forall R_i, c_i \text{ (PC)}
\]

\[
x(R, c) \in \{0, 1\}, \ W(R, c) \geq 0, \ b(R, c) \geq 0
\]

First, there is an optimal menu where \( b(R, c) \geq c_f \) for all \( R, c \). Otherwise, we can weakly increase the objective and satisfy all constraints by setting \( x(R, c) = 0, b(R, c) = c_f \) for all \( R, c \) such that \( b(R, c) < c_f \).

Second, if \( R_i \geq R_0 \) and \( c_i \leq c_0 \) then \( u(R_0, c_0| R_i, c_i) \geq u(R_0, c_0| R_0, c_0) \). Given the previous observation, the firm would weakly increase its objective by serving more customers. Therefore, there is an optimal menu where if \( x(R_0, c_0) = 1 \) then \( x(R_i, c_i) = 1 \) for all \( R_i \geq R_0 \) and \( c_i \leq c_0 \). In other words, if any \( R_L \) are served, we can restrict attention to menus that serve agents in \( \{R_H\} \times [0, \bar{c}_H] \cup \{R_L\} \times [0, \bar{c}_L] \) with \( \bar{c}_L \leq \bar{c}_H \) and ignore the IC constraint for unserved agents.
As we assume that some $R_L$ agents are served, the optimization problem simplifies to

$$\max_{\bar{c}_H, \bar{c}_L, W, b} \lambda_L \int_0^{\bar{c}_L} (b(R_L, c) - c_f) \, dF(c) + \lambda_H \int_0^{\bar{c}_H} (b(R_H, c) - c_f) \, dF(c)$$

$$u(R_i, c_i) \geq u(R, c| R_i, c_i) \quad \forall c \in [0, \bar{c}_i], R, R_i, c_i \quad \text{(IC)}$$

$$W(R, c) \geq 0, \quad b(R, c) \geq 0, \quad \bar{c}_H \geq \bar{c}_L > 0 \quad \forall R_i, c_i,$$

where we use $\bar{c}_i$ to be $\bar{c}_H$ if $R_i = R_H$ and $\bar{c}_L$ if $R_i = R_L$.

Considering $L$ types and $H$ types separately and invoking the envelope theorem we get for $R = R_H, c \leq \bar{c}_H$ or $R = R_L, c \leq \bar{c}_L$ that

$$u(R, c| R, c) = u(R, 0| R, 0) - \int_0^c W(R, \tau) \, d\tau$$

$$b(R, c) = R - c \cdot W(R, c) - u(R, 0| R, 0) + \int_0^c W(R, \tau) \, d\tau.$$

Because $u(R, c| R_H, c) = u(R, c| R_L, c) + R_L - R_H$ the IC implies that $b(R_H, 0) = b(R_L, 0)$ and that for any $c \leq \bar{c}_L$ we have that $W(R_H, c) = W(R_L, c)$. Therefore, we can define $W(c) = W(R_H, c) = W(R_L, c)$ for $c \leq \bar{c}_L$ and $W(c) = W(R_H, c)$ for $\bar{c}_L < c \leq \bar{c}_H$ and define

$$b_0 = b(R_H, 0)$$

$$= R_H - u(R_H, 0| R_H, 0)$$

$$= R_L - u(R_L, 0| R_L, 0).$$

Observe that $u(R_i, c_i)$ is decreasing in $c$ and $R_i$. Therefore, the participation constraint must bind for $(R_L, \bar{c}_L)$, otherwise we can improve the objective by either increasing $\bar{c}_L$ or increasing $b_0$. This implies

$$0 = u(R_L, \bar{c}_L) = R_L - b_0 - \int_0^{\bar{c}_L} W(\tau) \, d\tau,$$

and therefore we have

$$b_0 = R_L - \int_0^{\bar{c}_L} W(\tau) \, d\tau,$$

$$b(c) = b_0 + \int_c^{\bar{c}_L} W(\tau) \, d\tau - c \cdot W(c)$$

$$= R_L - \int_c^{\bar{c}_L} W(\tau) \, d\tau - c \cdot W(c).$$

The objective simplifies to

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\[
\lambda L \int_0^{cL} (b(c) - c_f) dF(c) + \lambda H \int_0^{cH} (b(c) - c_f) dF(c)
= (\lambda L + \lambda H) \int_0^{cL} (b(c) - c_f) dF(c) + \lambda H \int_{cL}^{cH} (b(c) - c_f) dF(c).
\]

By plugging in and simplifying, we get that the problem simplifies to

\[
\max_{W(\cdot), \bar{c}_L, \bar{c}_H} (\lambda L + \lambda H) \int_0^{cL} \left( R_L - W(c) \left( c + \frac{F(c)}{f(c)} \right) - c_f \right) dF(c) + \lambda H \int_{cL}^{cH} (b(c) - c_f) dF(c)
\]

\[
\text{s.t.:} \quad u(R_H, c_i) \geq 0 \quad \forall c \leq \bar{c}_H \quad (\text{PC}_H)
\]

\[
\bar{c}_L \leq \bar{c}_H, \quad W(c) \geq 0
\]

Notice that \( c + \frac{F(c)}{f(c)} \geq 0 \), and therefore the profit from agents with \( c \in [0, \bar{c}_L] \) is at most

\[
F(\bar{c}_L) (\lambda L + \lambda H) (R_L - c_f) < F(\bar{c}_L) \lambda H (R_H - c_f).
\]

Because of \( \text{PC}_H \), the profit from agents with \( c \in [\bar{c}_L, \bar{c}_H] \) is at most

\[
\lambda H (F(\bar{c}_H) - F(\bar{c}_L)) (R_H - c_f) \leq (1 - F(\bar{c}_L)) \lambda H (R_H - c_f).
\]

Together, we find that overall profits of any menu that services some \( R_L \) agents will yield a profit that is strictly lower than \( \lambda H (R_H - c_f) \), which is the profit achievable by only processing \( R_H \) transactions. \( \square \)