Online Appendix for

“Inequality Aversion, Populism, and the Backlash Against Globalization”

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This Online Appendix presents the proofs of all propositions in Pástor and Veronesi (2019), additional theoretical results, multiple extensions of the baseline model, details of data construction, and additional empirical evidence.
Overview

This Appendix is organized as follows:

• Section A1. Theory: Additional Results

• Section A2. Theory: Proofs
  – The proofs of all theoretical results in the paper

• Section A3. Theory: Model Extensions
  – Extension: Time-Varying Output Shares
  – Extension: Time-Varying Population Shares
  – Extension: Lower Output in Autarky
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• Section A4. Data: Cross-Country Election Analysis

• Section A5. Data: International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)

• Section A6. Data: British Election Study (BES)

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• Section A8. Evidence: Which Countries Are Populist?
  – Political party positions
  – Robustness to alternative specifications

• Section A9. Evidence from the Brexit Referendum
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• Section A10. Evidence from the Trump Election
  – Robustness to alternative specifications

• Section A11. Evidence from the Stock Market
  – Evidence on stock price behavior around the Trump election
A1. Theory: Additional Results

This section has two subsections. In Section A1.1., we present additional theoretical results on country imbalances under globalization, adding to Section 4.2 in the paper. In Section A1.2., we analyze the impact of income taxes on the equilibrium, adding to Section 5.3 in the paper.

Throughout this Appendix, we take the finance interpretation of contracts between agents. The results under the labor interpretation are analogous. The finance interpretation can be formally mapped into the labor interpretation while retaining the same mathematics. Agents’ financial wealth, which is invested in stocks and bonds, maps into human capital, which is “invested” in a job whose risk exposure is the same as that of the stock-bond portfolio. Under the finance interpretation, agents receive dividends from their stock holdings and interest payments from their bond holdings. Under the labor interpretations, agents receive wages from their job. The wage of a given agent at a given time in a given state is the agent’s optimal consumption at that time in that state, as computed below. For any wage pattern, there exists a job that generates it. Each agent chooses a job that generates the wage pattern matching the agent’s optimal consumption.

A1.1. Imbalances under Globalization

In this subsection, we present some additional theoretical results that are summarized at the end of Section 4.2 in the paper. First, we establish some notation. The wealth of agent $i$ at time $t$ is

$$W_{it} = E_t \left[ \int_t^T \frac{\pi_s}{\pi_t} C_{is} \, ds \right], \quad (A1)$$

so the aggregate wealth of all agents in country $k \in \{US, RoW\}$ is

$$W^k_t = \int_{i \in \Omega^k} W_{it} \, di. \quad (A2)$$

We let $P^k_t$ denote the market price of country $k$’s stock, which is a claim on the stream of dividends produced by the country’s tree, and $P_t = P^{US}_t + P^{RoW}_t$ denote the value of the global stock market portfolio. Under globalization, all agents have positions in this stock portfolio and in risk-free bonds. We let $N_{it}$ and $B_{it}$ denote agent $i$’s holdings of stocks and bonds, respectively, and also define $N^k_t = \int_{i \in \Omega^k} N_{it} \, di$ and $B^k_t = \int_{i \in \Omega^k} B_{it} \, di$. In terms of the state variable $\delta_t$, we have $W^k_t = W^k(\delta_t)$ and $P_t = P(\delta_t)$. For each country, we then have

$$W^k(\delta_t) = N^k_t \, P(\delta_t) + B^k_t, \quad (A3)$$
which shows that a country’s wealth is equal to the value of its stock-bond portfolio.

**Corollary A1.** U.S. agents are net borrowers whereas RoW agents are net lenders. That is, $B_{US}^t < 0$ and $B_{RoW}^t > 0$. From Corollary A1 and equation (A3), we see that U.S. agents have a levered position in the stock market (i.e., $N_{US}^t P(\delta_t) > W_{US}^t(\delta_t)$), unlike RoW agents (for whom $N_{RoW}^t P(\delta_t) < W_{RoW}^t(\delta_t)$). As a result, U.S. agents benefit more from economic growth (i.e., from growing $\delta_t$) than do RoW agents.

**Corollary A2.** When output is large enough, U.S. agents’ total wealth exceeds the U.S. stock market capitalization. The opposite is true for RoW:

$$\frac{W_{US}^t}{P_t^{US}} > 1 > \frac{W_{RoW}^t}{P_t^{RoW}}. \quad (A4)$$

Since U.S. agents hold levered portfolios, their wealth exceeds the value of their own tree, increasingly so as output continues to grow. The U.S. is therefore “rich” relative to RoW under globalization.

The proofs of Corollaries A1 and A2 are in Section A2. of this Appendix, along with all other proofs. While Corollary A1 appears to hold generally, we are able to prove it only in the special case when the distribution of $\gamma_i$ satisfies equation (4) in the paper and agents perceive zero probability of a move to autarky at time $\tau$. In contrast, Corollary A2 holds more generally under condition (3) from the paper, as do our remaining results. The proof of Corollary A2 does not rely on Corollary A1; instead, it follows directly from Proposition 2.

### A1.2. Redistribution: Income tax

In this subsection, we supply the details for the results on income taxation, which are summarized in Section 5.3 in the paper. Section A1.2.1. addresses a flat tax, whereas Section A1.2.2. allows for agent-specific tax rates (e.g., progressive income taxation).

We analyze the impact of income taxation on equilibrium consumption and the state price density. Recall that the only income in our model is financial income derived from agents’ holdings of stocks and bonds. Agents’ stock holdings generate income in the form of dividends and capital gains, whereas agents’ bond holdings earn interest. We sidestep some realistic complications, such as the asymmetric impact of gains and losses and whether taxes are paid on “paper” profits or profits realized at the time of the asset’s sale. To focus on the key implications of income taxation, we consider a setting in which agent $i$’s after-tax income from holding $N_{it}$ shares in the global stock...
market portfolio is simply equal to \((1 - \tau_{P,i,t}) N_{it}(dP_t + D_t dt)\), where \(\tau_{P,i,t}\) is an agent-specific tax rate on the stock return earned at time \(t\). Similarly, the after-tax income from a bond position \(B_{it}\) is \((1 - \tau_{r,i,t}) B_{it} r_t\), where \(\tau_{r,i,t}\) is the tax rate on the bond return earned at time \(t\). We assume that the income tax revenue is immediately and equally redistributed to all agents within the same country, so that each country’s government runs a balanced budget.

A1.2.1. Flat Tax

We first consider a flat income tax schedule, under which all agents face equal, though possibly time-varying, income tax rates: \(\tau_{P,i,t} = \tau_{P,t}\) and \(\tau_{r,i,t} = \tau_{r,t}\) for all agents \(i\). We assume that both rates are bounded above: \(0 \leq \tau_{P,t} \leq \tau_P < 1\) and \(0 \leq \tau_{r,t} \leq \tau_r < 1\). The dynamic budget constraint of agent \(i\) in country \(k\) is then given by

\[
dW_{it} = N_{it} (1 - \tau_{P,t}) (dP_t + D_t dt) + B_{it} (1 - \tau_{r,t}) r_t dt + ds_t^k = C_{it} dt,
\]

where \(ds_t^k\) is the redistribution to agent \(i\) from the collected income tax revenue, so that

\[
ds_t^k = \frac{1}{m^k} \int_{j \in I^k} [N_{jt}\tau_{P,t} (dP_t + D_t dt) + B_{jt}\tau_{r,t} r_t dt] dj
\]

\[
= \frac{N_{it} \tau_{P,t} (dP_t + D_t dt) + B_{it} \tau_{r,t} r_t dt}{m^k}
\]

where

\[
N_{it}^k = \frac{\int_{j \in I^k} N_{jt} dj}{m^k}
\]

\[
B_{it}^k = \frac{\int_{j \in I^k} B_{jt} dj}{m^k}
\]

and \(m^k = \int_{j \in I^k} dj\) is the mass of agents in country \(k\) (so that \(m^{US} = m\) and \(m^{RoW} = 1 - m\)). Note that the redistribution amount \(ds_t^k\) is stochastic because higher stock returns imply higher tax revenue. Negative stock returns imply that agents receive tax rebates, which the government raises by levying \(ds_t^k\). This is a simplification; of course, additional lump-sum taxes may generate net positive redistribution on average.

**Proposition A1.** The equilibrium with a flat income tax is identical to the one with no taxes, except that the optimal stock and bond allocations are equal to

\[
N_{it} = \frac{V_{it} \sigma_{V_i} - \tau_{P,t}}{\sigma_P P_t (1 - \tau_{P,t})} \int_{j \in I^k} V_{jt} \sigma_{V_j} dj
\]

\[
B_{it} = V_{it} - \tau_{r,t} m^k \int_{j \in I^k} V_{jt} dj - \frac{V_{it} \sigma_{V_i} - \tau_{r,t}}{m^k} \int_{j \in I^k} V_{jt} \sigma_{V_j} dj
\]
where $V_{it} = E_t \left[ \int_t^T \pi_s^C C_{is} ds \right]$ and $\sigma_{V_i}$ is the diffusion of $dV_{it}/V_{it}$. The values of $\pi_s^*$ and $C_{is}$ in the expression for $V_{it}$ are equilibrium values of the state price density and consumption, respectively, whose expressions are given in the proof.

This proposition shows that with a flat income tax, the equilibrium consumption and state price density are the same as in the no-tax case analyzed in the paper, except that the optimal asset allocation is adjusted to reflect agents’ natural exposure to stock and bond returns due to redistribution. Note that if $\tau_P = 0$, then the position in stocks is the same as in the no-tax case. The result stems from the fact that stochastic redistribution makes agents exposed to stock return shocks. To hedge this exposure, agents adjust their portfolio positions. Similarly, if $\tau_r = 0$, the position in bonds becomes the standard $B_{it} = V_{it} \left( 1 - \sigma_V / \sigma_P (1 - \tau_{P,t}) \right)$, which can be positive or negative. With taxes on bond returns, agents are naturally long bonds, so they adjust their bond positions downward to obtain their desired exposure.

The proof of Proposition A1 is in Section A2. of this Appendix, along with all other proofs.

**A1.2.2. Agent-Specific Income Tax Rates**

Agent-specific income tax rates generate market segmentation. Agents $i$ and $j$ facing different tax rates earn different after-tax returns on the same securities. Therefore, even though each agent has access to the same stock and the same bond, agents $i$ and $j$ effectively perceive them as two different assets, albeit with perfectly correlated returns. This implies that each agent effectively faces his own state price density, which we denote by $\pi_{it}$. While the equilibrium is difficult to compute, we can obtain some necessary conditions that highlight the impact of agent-specific tax rates on agents’ consumption. Throughout, we make the simplifying assumption that the tax rates on stock returns are the same as the tax rates on bond returns:

$$\tau_{P,i,t} = \tau_{r,i,t} = \tau_{i,t} \tag{A7}$$

**Proposition A2.** In any equilibrium with agent-specific tax rates, the market price $\nu_t$ of risk is common to all agents. Each agent’s consumption satisfies

$$C_{it} = e^{g_t - \log(\xi_i) - \frac{1}{\gamma_i} \int_0^t \tau_{i,s} r_s ds}, \tag{A8}$$

where $\xi_i$ is the Lagrange multiplier from the static budget constraint, $g_t = -\phi t - \log(\pi_t)$, and $\pi_t$ is the common component of all state price densities $\pi_{it} = e^{\int_0^t \tau_{i,s} r_s ds} \pi_t^*$ such that

$$\pi_t = e^{-\int_0^t (r_s + \frac{1}{2} \nu_{s}^2) ds - \int_0^t \nu_s dZ_s} \pi_t^*.$$
Proposition A2 shows that in any equilibrium under the assumption (A7), each agent’s consumption depends on the agent’s tax rate and risk aversion. Each agent’s consumption decreases with the agent’s tax rate, to the extent that depends on the agent’s risk aversion. Since agents facing higher tax rates consume less, the tax schedule affects the equilibrium distribution of consumption across agents. We thus see that a progressive tax schedule, one that imposes higher income tax rates on higher-income agents, could in principle address the consumption externality.

The proof of Proposition A2 is in Section A2. of this Appendix, along with all other proofs.
A2. Theory: Proofs

Each country $k$’s stock price $P^k_t$ and riskless bond price $B^k_t$ follow the processes

\[
\frac{dP^k_t + D^k_t dt}{P^k_t} = \mu^k_{P,t} dt + \sigma^k_{P,t} dZ_t + q^k dA_t
\]

\[
\frac{dB^k_t}{B^k_t} = r^k_t dt + q^k dA_t
\]

where all parameter values are endogenously determined in equilibrium, $q^k$ is an $F_\tau$-measurable random variable, also determined in equilibrium, and

\[
A_t = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } t < \tau \\
1 & \text{if } t \geq \tau 
\end{cases}
\]

The jump component $dA_t$ arises in equilibrium due to the shift to autarky at time $\tau$ under the conditions obtained below. (In equilibrium, $q^k = 0$ if the mainstream candidate is elected, but $q^k \neq 0$ if the populist is elected and the move to autarky takes place.) Even with the move to autarky, markets are dynamically complete because the jumps in prices at time $\tau$ are perfectly predictable just before time $\tau$ and their magnitude is known. The state price density for country $k$ follows the process

\[
\frac{d\pi^k_t}{\pi^k_t} = -r^k_t dt - \sigma^k_{\pi,t} dZ_t - q^k dA_t
\]

where all quantities are again determined in equilibrium. The stock and bond prices of each country jump by the same percentage amount as the state price density so that $\pi^k_{\tau}P^k_{\tau}$ and $\pi^k_{\tau}B^k_{\tau}$ are continuous at time $\tau$: For instance, $\pi^k_{\tau}P^k_{\tau} = \left(\pi^k_{\tau} e^{-q^k}\right) \left(P^k_{\tau} e^{q^k}\right) = \pi^k_{\tau} P^k_{\tau-}$. Under this condition, standard replication arguments prove market completeness (see Karatzas and Shreve, 2010).

**Proof of equation (16):** Market clearing requires

\[
D_t = \int_{\cup_k I_k} C_{it} di
\]

Under globalization, $\pi^U_t = \pi^R_{RoW} = \pi_t$ and thus $g^U_t = g^R_{RoW} = g_t$. Optimal consumption is

\[
C_{it} = e^{\psi_i + \rho (g_t - y)}
\]

Substituting and invoking the law of large numbers gives

\[
D_t = E^i \left[ e^{\psi_i + \rho (g_t - y)} | i \in I \right] = E^i \left[ e^{\psi_i} | i \in I \right] E^i \left[ e^{\rho (g_t - y)} | i \in I \right]
\]
where the second equality stems from the independence of $\psi_i$ from $\rho_i$. Taking logs, we obtain

$$\delta_t = \log \left( E^i \left[ e^{\psi_i} \big| i \in I \right] \right) + \log \left( E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i(g_t - y)} \big| i \in I \right] \right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (A9)

Denote the solution as

$$g_t = g(\delta_t)$$

Thus, the state price density is

$$\pi_t = e^{-\phi t - g(\delta_t)}$$

The normalization $\pi_0 = 1$ implies $g_0 = g(\delta_0) = 0$. Normalizing $D_0 = 1$ without loss of generality, we obtain the restriction

$$E^i \left[ e^{\psi_i} \big| i \in I \right] = 1$$  \hspace{1cm} (A10)

which yields the equilibrium condition for $g_t$ given in equation (16):

$$\delta_t = \log \left( \frac{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i(g_t - y)} \big| i \in I \right]}{E^i \left[ e^{-y\rho_i} \big| i \in I \right]} \right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (A11)

Q.E.D.

**Lemma 1.** $g(\delta_t)$ is globally increasing and concave: $g'(\delta_t) > 0$ and $g''(\delta_t) < 0$ with $g(\delta_t) \to \infty$ when $\delta_t \to \infty$.


**Proof of Proposition 1:** We first derive the expression for $V^k_t$ stated in the proposition. Recall the notation

$$\overline{C}_t^k = E^i \left[ C_{it} \big| i \in I^k \right]$$

Therefore

$$V^k_t = \text{Var} \left( \frac{C_{it}}{\overline{C}_t^k} \big| i \in I^k \right) = E^i \left[ \left( \frac{C_{it}}{\overline{C}_t^k} \right)^2 \big| i \in I^k \right] - E^i \left[ \frac{C_{it}}{\overline{C}_t^k} \big| i \in I^k \right]^2$$

$$= \frac{E^i \left[ (C_{it})^2 \big| i \in I^k \right]}{\left( \overline{C}_t^k \right)^2} - \left( \frac{E^i \left[ C_{it} \big| i \in I^k \right]}{\overline{C}_t^k} \right)^2$$

$$= \frac{E^i \left[ (C_{it})^2 \big| i \in I^k \right]}{E^i \left[ C_{it} \big| i \in I^k \right]^2} - 1$$

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Substituting for the optimal consumption, we obtain

\[ V^k_t = \frac{E \left[ e^{2\psi_i} | i \in I^k \right]}{E \left[ e^{\psi_i} | i \in I^k \right]^2} \frac{E \left[ e^{2\rho_i (g(\delta_i) - y)} | i \in I^k \right]}{E \left[ e^{\rho_i (g(\delta_i) - y)} | i \in I^k \right]^2} - 1 \]

We next show that \( \partial V / \partial \delta_t > 0 \). Because \( g_t = g(\delta) \) is uniformly increasing in \( \delta \) (from Lemma 1), it suffices to show that \( \partial V / \partial g > 0 \). Let us take the first derivative with respect to \( g_t \)

\[
\frac{\partial V^k_t}{\partial g_t} = 2 \left( 1 + V^k_t \right) \frac{E \left[ e^{\psi_i} \right]}{E \left[ e^{\psi_i} \right]^2} \frac{E \left[ 2 \rho_i e^{2\rho_i (g_t - y)} | i \in I_k \right]}{E \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} | i \in I_k \right]^2} - 2E \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} | i \in I_k \right] 2E \left[ \rho_i e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} | i \in I_k \right] \frac{E \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} | i \in I_k \right]}{E \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} | i \in I_k \right]^2} \]

\[
= 2 \left( 1 + V^k_t \right) \left[ \frac{E \left[ \rho_i e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} | i \in I_k \right]}{E \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} | i \in I_k \right]^{\frac{1}{2}}} - \frac{E \left[ \rho_i e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} | i \in I_k \right]}{E \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} | i \in I_k \right]^2} \right] \]

where the expectations \( E^* \left[ \rho | \delta_t \right] \) and \( \tilde{E} \left[ \rho | \delta_t \right] \) use the densities \( f^* \left( \rho | \delta_t \right) \) and \( \tilde{f} \left( \rho | \delta_t \right) \), respectively:

\[
f^* \left( \rho | \delta_t \right) = \frac{e^{\rho (g_t - y)} f \left( \rho \right)}{\int e^{\rho (g_t - y)} f \left( \rho \right) d\rho}
\]

\[
\tilde{f} \left( \rho | \delta_t \right) = \frac{e^{2\rho (g_t - y)} f \left( \rho \right)}{\int e^{2\rho (g_t - y)} f \left( \rho \right) d\rho}
\]

\[
= \frac{e^{\rho (g_t - y)} e^{\rho (g_t - y)} f \left( \rho \right)}{\int e^{\rho (g_t - y)} e^{\rho (g_t - y)} f \left( \rho \right) d\rho}
\]

\[\]

\[
= \frac{e^{\rho (g_t - y)} f^* \left( \rho | \delta_t \right)}{\int e^{\rho (g_t - y)} f^* \left( \rho | \delta_t \right) d\rho}
\]

For \( g_t > y \) we have \( e^{\rho (g_t - y)} \) is increasing in \( \rho \). Therefore, \( \tilde{f} \left( \rho | \delta_t \right) \) gives more weight to high \( \rho \). Thus, the average \( \rho \) computed using \( \tilde{f} \left( \rho | \delta_t \right) \) must be higher than the one computed using \( f^* \left( \rho | \delta_t \right) \). That is, \( \tilde{E} \left[ \rho | \delta_t \right] > E^* \left[ \rho | \delta_t \right] \). It follows that \( \partial V / \partial g > 0 \).

We next show that \( V^k_t \) is unbounded. We exploit our assumption that the distribution \( f \left( \rho \right) \) on \( \rho \in [\rho_L, \rho_H] \) is non-degenerate. To do so, we define a set of economies with \( n \) groups of agents with risk tolerances \( \{\rho_L, \rho_2, ..., \rho_{n-1}, \rho_H\} \) and each group with distributions \( f_{(n)} = \{ f_{(n),L}, f_{(n),2}...f_{(n),n-1}, f_{(n),H} \} \) with \( f_{(n),i} > 0 \) and \( \sum_{i=1}^{n} f_{(n),i} = 1 \). Define

\[
V^k_{(n),t} = \frac{E \left[ e^{2\psi_i} \right]}{E \left[ e^{\psi_i} \right]^2} \frac{E \left[ e^{2\rho_i (g_t - y)} \right]}{E \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} \right]^2} = \frac{E \left[ e^{2\psi} \right]}{E \left[ e^{\psi} \right]^2} \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} f_{(n),i} e^{2\rho_i (g_t - y)} \sum_{i=1}^{n} f_{(n),i} e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} }{\sum_{i=1}^{n} f_{(n),i} e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)}^2}
\]

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We can factor out $e^{2\rho_H g}$ from the sum in the numerator and $e^{\rho_H g}$ from the sum in the denominator to obtain
\[
V_k^{(n),t} = \frac{E\left[e^{2\psi} \sum_{i=1}^{n} f_{(n),i} e^{2(\rho_i - \rho_H)(g-y)}\right]}{E\left[e^{2\psi} \sum_{i=1}^{n} f_{(n),i} e^{(\rho_i - \rho_H)(g-y)}\right]^2} = \frac{E\left[e^{2\psi} \sum_{i=1}^{n} f_{(n),i} e^{2(\rho_i - \rho_H)(g-y)}\right]}{E\left[e^{2\psi} \sum_{i=1}^{n} f_{(n),i} e^{(\rho_i - \rho_H)(g-y)}\right]^2}
\]
As $\delta$ increases to infinity, so does $g = g(\delta)$, and thus for each term $i$ in the sum $e^{2(\rho_i - \rho_H)(g-y)} \to 0$ and $e^{(\rho_i - \rho_H)(g-y)} \to 0$, except for the last one $i = H$ which is always equal to 1. Thus, for every $n$ we have
\[
V_k^{(n),t} \to \frac{E\left[e^{2\psi}\right]}{E\left[e^{2\psi}\right]^2} \frac{1}{f_{(n),H}}
\]
As $n \to \infty$, the assumption of a non-degenerate distribution implies that the density of each risk-aversion group declines to zero, $f_{(n),H} \to 0$, and thus $V_k^{(n),t} \to \infty$. Q.E.D.

**Proof of Corollary 1.**

For any random variable $X$, skewness is given by
\[
Skew (X) = E\left[\left(\frac{X - E[X]}{\text{Std}(X)}\right)^3\right] = \frac{E[X^3] - 3E[X] \text{Var}(X) - E[X]^3}{\text{Var}(X)^{\frac{3}{2}}}
\]
In our case,
\[
X = \frac{C_{it}}{C_t^k}
\]
Therefore $E[X] = 1$ and $\text{Var}(X)$ is our inequality measure. Thus
\[
Skew\left(\frac{C_{it}}{C_t^k} | i \in T^k\right) = \frac{E\left[\left(\frac{C_{it}}{C_t^k}\right)^3 | i \in T^k\right] - 3\text{Var}\left(\frac{C_{it}}{C_t^k} | i \in T^k\right) - 1}{\text{Var}\left(\frac{C_{it}}{C_t^k} | i \in T^k\right)^{\frac{3}{2}}}
\]
Optimal consumption $C_i = e^{\psi_i + \rho_i(g-y)}$ implies
\[
\text{Var}\left(\frac{C_i}{C_t} | i \in T^k\right) = E\left(\left(\frac{C_i}{C_t^k}\right)^2 | i \in T^k\right) - E\left(\frac{C_i}{C_t^k} | i \in T^k\right)^2 = \frac{E\left[\left(e^{\psi_i + \rho_i(g-y)}\right)^2 | i \in T^k\right]}{E\left[e^{\psi_i + \rho_i(g-y)} | i \in T^k\right]^2} - 1
\]
and
\[
E\left[\left(\frac{C_i}{C_t^k}\right)^3 | i \in T^k\right] = \frac{E\left[\left(e^{\psi_i + \rho_i(g-y)}\right)^3 | i \in T^k\right]}{E\left[e^{\psi_i + \rho_i(g-y)} | i \in T^k\right]^3}
\]
Therefore

\[
Skew \left( \frac{C_i}{C^k} | i \in I^k \right) = \frac{\mathbb{E}[e^{\psi_i | i \in I^k}] \mathbb{E}[e^{3\psi_i (y_i - y_i) | i \in I^k}] - 3 \left( \mathbb{E}[e^{2\psi_i}] \mathbb{E}[e^{2\psi_i (y_i - y_i) | i \in I^k}] - 1 \right)}{\mathbb{E}[e^{\psi_i | i \in I^k}] \mathbb{E}[e^{2\psi_i (y_i - y_i) | i \in I^k}] - \left( \mathbb{E}[e^{2\psi_i}] \mathbb{E}[e^{2\psi_i (y_i - y_i) | i \in I^k}] - 1 \right)^{\frac{3}{2}}} - 1
\]

where we denote for simplicity

\[
\mathbb{S} = \frac{\mathbb{E}[e^{3\psi_i (y_i - y_i) | i \in I^k} | i \in I^k]}{\mathbb{E}[e^{\psi_i (y_i - y_i) | i \in I^k}]^3} \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbb{V} = \frac{\mathbb{E}[e^{2\psi_i (y_i - y_i) | i \in I^k} | i \in I^k]}{\mathbb{E}[e^{\psi_i (y_i - y_i) | i \in I^k}]^2}
\]

The first order limiting term is

\[
K = \frac{\mathbb{S}}{\mathbb{V}^{\frac{3}{2}}} = \frac{\mathbb{E}[e^{3\psi_i (y_i - y_i) | i \in I^k} | i \in I^k]}{\mathbb{E}[e^{\psi_i (y_i - y_i) | i \in I^k}]^3} = \frac{\mathbb{E}[e^{3\psi_i (y_i - y_i) | i \in I^k} | i \in I^k]}{\mathbb{E}[e^{\psi_i (y_i - y_i) | i \in I^k}]^3}
\]

Using the discretization and limiting argument used in the proof of Proposition 1,

\[
K = \frac{\sum e^{3\psi_i (y_i - y_i) f_i}}{(\sum e^{2\psi_i (y_i - y_i) f_i})^{\frac{3}{2}}} = \frac{e^{3\nu_H (y - y)} \sum e^{3(\rho_i - \rho_H) (y - y) f_i}}{e^{3\nu_H (y - y)} (\sum e^{2(\rho_i - \rho_H) (y - y) f_i})^{\frac{3}{2}}} = \frac{\sum e^{3(\rho_i - \rho_H) (y - y) f_i}}{(\sum e^{2(\rho_i - \rho_H) (y - y) f_i})^{\frac{3}{2}}} \rightarrow f_H = \frac{1}{f_H^3}
\]

which converges to infinity as \( f_H \to 0 \).

Therefore, we can write

\[
Skew \left( \frac{C_i}{C^k} | i \in I^k \right) = \frac{\mathbb{E}[e^{3\psi_i | i \in I^k}] \mathbb{S} - 3 \mathbb{E}[e^{2\psi_i}] \mathbb{V}}{\mathbb{E}[e^{\psi_i | i \in I^k}] \mathbb{S} - \mathbb{E}[e^{2\psi_i}] \mathbb{V} + 2}
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{\mathbb{V}^{\frac{3}{2}}} \left( \frac{\mathbb{E}[e^{2\psi_i}] \mathbb{S} - 3 \mathbb{E}[e^{2\psi_i}] \mathbb{V} + 2}{\mathbb{E}[e^{\psi_i}]^2 \mathbb{S} - \mathbb{E}[e^{2\psi_i}] \mathbb{V} + 2} \right) \frac{1}{\mathbb{V}^{\frac{3}{2}}}
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{\mathbb{V}^{\frac{3}{2}}} \left( \frac{\mathbb{E}[e^{2\psi_i}] \mathbb{S} - 3 \mathbb{E}[e^{2\psi_i}] \mathbb{V} + 2}{\mathbb{E}[e^{\psi_i}]^2 \mathbb{S} - \mathbb{E}[e^{2\psi_i}] \mathbb{V} + 2} \right) \frac{1}{\mathbb{V}^{\frac{3}{2}}}
\]

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\[
\frac{\partial K}{\partial g} = \frac{\mathbb{E}_c \left[ 3 \rho_i e^{3 \rho_i (g_i - y)} \right] - \mathbb{E}_c \left[ 3 \rho_i e^{2 \rho_i (g_i - y)} \right] + \mathbb{E}_c \left[ 3 \rho_i e^{2 \rho_i (g_i - y)} \right] \mathbb{E}_c \left[ \frac{e^{2 \rho_i (g_i - y)}}{\rho_i} \right] - 3 \mathbb{E}_c \left[ \rho_i e^{2 \rho_i (g_i - y)} \right] \mathbb{E}_c \left[ e^{2 \rho_i (g_i - y)} \right] \mathbb{E}_c \left[ \frac{e^{2 \rho_i (g_i - y)}}{\rho_i} \right]}{\left( \mathbb{E}_c \left[ e^{2 \rho_i (g_i - y)} \right] \mathbb{E}_c \left[ \frac{e^{2 \rho_i (g_i - y)}}{\rho_i} \right] \right)^2}
\]

As \( g \to \infty \),
\[
\text{Skew} \left( \frac{C_i^2}{C^2} | i \in I \right) \to \frac{\mathbb{E}_c \left[ 3 \rho_i e^{3 \rho_i (g_i - y)} \right] - \mathbb{E}_c \left[ 3 \rho_i e^{2 \rho_i (g_i - y)} \right] + \mathbb{E}_c \left[ 3 \rho_i e^{2 \rho_i (g_i - y)} \right] \mathbb{E}_c \left[ \frac{e^{2 \rho_i (g_i - y)}}{\rho_i} \right] - 3 \mathbb{E}_c \left[ \rho_i e^{2 \rho_i (g_i - y)} \right] \mathbb{E}_c \left[ e^{2 \rho_i (g_i - y)} \right] \mathbb{E}_c \left[ \frac{e^{2 \rho_i (g_i - y)}}{\rho_i} \right]}{\left( \mathbb{E}_c \left[ e^{2 \rho_i (g_i - y)} \right] \mathbb{E}_c \left[ \frac{e^{2 \rho_i (g_i - y)}}{\rho_i} \right] \right)^2} = \infty
\]

Finally, note that
\[
\frac{\partial K}{\partial g} = \frac{\mathbb{E}_c \left[ 3 \rho_i e^{3 \rho_i (g_i - y)} \right] - \mathbb{E}_c \left[ 3 \rho_i e^{2 \rho_i (g_i - y)} \right] + \mathbb{E}_c \left[ 3 \rho_i e^{2 \rho_i (g_i - y)} \right] \mathbb{E}_c \left[ \frac{e^{2 \rho_i (g_i - y)}}{\rho_i} \right] - 3 \mathbb{E}_c \left[ \rho_i e^{2 \rho_i (g_i - y)} \right] \mathbb{E}_c \left[ e^{2 \rho_i (g_i - y)} \right] \mathbb{E}_c \left[ \frac{e^{2 \rho_i (g_i - y)}}{\rho_i} \right]}{\left( \mathbb{E}_c \left[ e^{2 \rho_i (g_i - y)} \right] \mathbb{E}_c \left[ \frac{e^{2 \rho_i (g_i - y)}}{\rho_i} \right] \right)^2}
\]

where \( \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \left[ \rho_i | i \in I \right] \) and \( \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \left[ \rho_i | i \in I \right] \) use the following distributions, respectively:
\[
\tilde{f} (\rho | \delta_t) = \frac{e^{2 \rho (g_i - y)} f (\rho)}{\int e^{2 \rho (g_i - y)} f (\rho) d\rho}
\]
\[
\tilde{f} (\rho | \delta_t) = \frac{e^{3 \rho (g_i - y)} f (\rho)}{\int e^{3 \rho (g_i - y)} f (\rho) d\rho}
\]
This implies that \( \tilde{f}(\rho|\delta_t) \) gives more weight to high \( \rho \) for \( g_t > y \) and thus \( \tilde{E}[\rho_i| i \in I^k] > E[\rho_i| i \in I^k] \), which explains the inequality.

Therefore, for \( g \) large enough,

\[
Skew \left( \frac{C_t}{C^k} | i \in I^k \right) = \frac{\left( E[e^{\psi_i}| i \in I^k] \right) K - 3 \frac{E[e^{2\psi_i}]}{E[e^{\psi_i}]} \frac{1}{V^2} + \frac{3}{V^2} \right) \to \frac{E[e^{3\psi_i}| i \in I^k]}{E[(e^{2\psi_i})^2]} K
\]

and given \( \partial K/\partial g > 0 \) we have that

\[
\frac{\partial Skew}{\partial g} > 0
\]

for \( \delta \) large enough. Q.E.D.

**Proof of Corollary 2.**

The consumption share of U.S. agent \( i \) is given by

\[
s^i_t = \frac{C_t}{C^US} e^{\psi_i} e^{\rho_i (g^{US}_t - y)}
\]

Recall that \( g^{US}_t(\delta_t) \) is monotonically increasing in \( \delta_t \). Therefore, to determine the conditions under which \( s^i_t \) is increasing in \( \delta_t \), we only need to consider the sign of

\[
\frac{ds^i_t}{dg^{US}_t} = \frac{\rho_i e^{\rho_i (g^{US}_t - y)} E^I \left[ e^{\rho_i (g^{US}_t - y)} | i \in I^{US} \right] - e^{\rho_i (g^{US}_t - y)} E^I \left[ e^{\rho_i (g^{US}_t - y)} | i \in I^{US} \right] \left( E^I \left[ e^{\rho_i (g^{US}_t - y)} | i \in I^{US} \right] \right)^2}{E^I \left[ e^{\rho_i (g^{US}_t - y)} | i \in I^{US} \right]}
\]

Therefore,

\[
\frac{ds^i_t}{dg^{US}_t} \geq 0
\]

iff

\[
\rho_i > \frac{E^I \left[ \rho_i e^{\rho_i (g^{US}_t - y)} | i \in I^{US} \right]}{E^I \left[ e^{\rho_i (g^{US}_t - y)} | i \in I^{US} \right]}
\]

iff

\[
\rho_i > \bar{p}(\delta_t) = E^* \left[ \rho_i | g^{US}_t(\delta_t) \right], \quad (A12)
\]

where \( E^* \left[ \cdot | g^{US}_t(\delta_t) \right] \) uses the distribution

\[
f^* (\rho_i| g^{US}_t(\delta_t), i \in I^{US}) = \frac{f \left( \rho_i | i \in I^{US} \right) e^{\rho_i (g^{US}_t(\delta_t) - y)}}{\int f \left( \rho_i | i \in I^{US} \right) e^{\rho_i (g^{US}_t(\delta_t) - y)} d\rho_i}.
\]
The weights \( e^{\rho_i (g^{US}(\delta_t) - y)} \) are increasing in \( \rho_i \) when \( g^{US}(\delta_t) - y > 0 \), which is true when output \( \delta_t \) is large enough. Moreover, as \( g^{US}_t \) increases further, the distribution \( f^{*} (\rho_i | g^{US}(\delta_t), i \in I^{US}) \) assigns increasingly large weights to larger values of \( \rho_i \). That in turn implies that \( E^{*} [\rho_i | g^{US}(\delta_t)] \) increases as \( \delta_t \) increases. That is, the fraction of agents who satisfy condition (A12) shrinks as \( \delta_t \) increases. Q.E.D.

**Proof of Proposition 2.** We prove the more general statement in Section A3.1. with stochastic \( F_t \). The case \( F_t = F = m \), which is presented in the paper, is a special case. First, note that

\[
\int_{i \in I^{US}} C_{it} di > D_t^{US}
\]

if and only if

\[
s^{US}_t = \frac{\int_{i \in I^{US}} C_{it} di}{D_t} > \frac{D_t^{US}}{D_t} = F_t
\]

Aggregate consumption in the U.S. is

\[
\int_{i \in I^{US}} C_{it} di = m \frac{E^{i} [e^{\rho_i (g^{(\delta_t)} - y)} | i \in I^{US}]}{E^{i} [e^{-\rho y} | i \in I]}
\]

Because by market clearing

\[
D_t = \int_{i \in I} C_{it} di = \int_{i \in I^{US}} C_{it} di + \int_{i \in I^{Row}} C_{it} di = m \frac{E^{i} [e^{\rho_i (g-y)} | i \in I^{US}]}{E^{i} [e^{-\rho y} | i \in I]} + (1 - m) \frac{E^{j} [e^{\rho_j (g-y)} | j \in I^{Row}]}{E^{i} [e^{-\rho y} | i \in I]}
\]

we obtain

\[
s^{US}_t (g) = \frac{\int_{i \in I^{US}} C_{it} di}{D_t} = \frac{m E^{i} [e^{\rho_i (g-y)} | i \in I^{US}]}{m (1 - m) E^{j} [e^{\rho_j (g-y)} | j \in I^{Row}]} + (1 - m) \frac{E^{j} [e^{\rho_j (g-y)} | j \in I^{Row}]}{E^{i} [e^{-\rho y} | i \in I]}
\]

where \( F (\delta) \) is in equation (A24). Equation (3) in the paper is

\[
R (x) = \frac{E [e^{\rho_j x} | j \in I^{Row}]}{E [e^{\rho_i x} | i \in I^{US}]} \to 0 \text{ as } x \to \infty
\]

Clearly

\[
s^{US}_t (g) = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{1-m}{m} R (g - y)}
\]
and we know from Lemma 1 that \( g(\delta_t) \to \infty \) as \( \delta_t \to \infty \). It follows that \( s^{US}(g) \to 1 \) as \( \delta_t \to \infty \). Therefore, if \( F_t < F(\delta_t) = s^{US}(g) \), the result follows.

The case \( F = m \) is a special case that just requires

\[
R(g(\delta_t) - y) = \frac{E[e^{\rho_i(g(\delta_t) - y)}|j \in I^{RoW}]}{E[e^{\rho_i(g(\delta_t) - y)}|i \in I^{US}]} < 1
\]

Indeed, if \( R(g(\delta_t) - y) = 1 \) then \( s^{US}(g) = m \) and thus \( R(g(\delta_t) - y) < 1 \) implies \( s(g) > m = F \). Letting \( \delta \) denote the threshold such that \( R(g(\delta_t) - y) < 1 \) for all \( \delta_t > \delta \) (such \( \delta \) exists from equation (3)), the result follows.

Q.E.D.

**Proof of Corollary A1.** We can prove Corollary A1 under the following sufficient conditions:

1. Let \( \gamma_i < \gamma_j \) (i.e., \( \rho_i > \rho_j \)) for all \( i \in I^{US} \) and \( j \in I^{RoW} \)

2. The probability of a switch to autarky is negligible

Then the proof follows from Veronesi (2018), who considers a single-country setting. From Cox and Huang (1986), the positions in stocks and bonds are, respectively,

\[
N_{it} = \frac{\sigma_{W_i} W_{it}}{\sigma_{P_i} P_t}
\]

\[
B_{it} = W_{it} \left( 1 - \frac{\sigma_{W_i}}{\sigma_{P_t}} \right)
\]

where \( \sigma_{W_i} \) is the volatility of the stochastic process driving agent \( i \)'s wealth \( W_{it} \) and \( \sigma_{P_t} \) is the volatility of the stock price process. In a one-country model (where the single country can represent the global economy in our model), Veronesi (2018) shows that for all \( \rho_i \) and \( \rho_j \leq 1 \)

\[
\sigma_{W,i} > \sigma_{W,j} \text{ if and only if } \rho_i > \rho_j
\]

The wealth volatilities of U.S. and RoW agents are the wealth-weighted averages of the individual agents’ volatilities. Denoting the wealth weights by \( \omega^k_i = W_i / \int_{I^k} W_i di \), the wealth-weighted averages are

\[
\sigma_{W,US} = \int_{i \in I^{US}} \omega^US_i \sigma_{W,i} di
\]

\[
\sigma_{W,RoW} = \int_{i \in I^{RoW}} \omega^RoW_i \sigma_{W,i} di
\]
Under the condition $\rho_i > \rho_j$ for $i \in \mathcal{I}^{US}$ and $i \in \mathcal{I}^{RoW}$ we thus have

$$\sigma_{W,US} > \sigma_{W,RoW}$$

The final step is to note that by market clearing we must have

$$P_t = W_t^{US} + W_t^{RoW}$$

and thus the global market volatility is

$$\sigma_P = \frac{W_t^{US}}{W_t^{US} + W_t^{RoW}} \sigma_{W,US} + \frac{W_t^{RoW}}{W_t^{US} + W_t^{RoW}} \sigma_{W,RoW}$$

which implies

$$\sigma_{W,RoW} < \sigma_P < \sigma_{W,US}$$

Thus, $B_t^{US} < 0$ and $B_t^{RoW} > 0$, i.e. U.S. borrows and RoW lends.

Q.E.D.

The conditions used in this corollary are only sufficient and do not appear to be tight. Unfortunately, a generalization appears difficult.

**Proof of Corollary A2.** We have

$$\frac{W_t^{US}}{P_t} = \frac{W_t^{US}}{W_t^{US} + W_t^{RoW}}$$

where

$$W_t^k = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \int_t^T \frac{\pi_s^k}{\pi_t^k} C_s^k ds \right]$$

and

$$C_s^k = \int_{i \in \mathcal{I}^k} C_i s^i d i$$

Denote by $\delta$ the threshold in Proposition 2 such that $C_s^{US} > D_s^{US}$ for $\delta > \delta$. Given our assumptions, for every $s > t$ we have $\delta_s|\delta_t \sim N (\delta_t + \mu_\delta (s-t), \sigma_\delta^2 (s-t))$. Thus, denoting by $\Phi (x; a, b)$ the cdf of a normal distribution with mean $a$ and variance $b$, the probability

$$\Pr (\delta_s < \delta|\delta_t) = \Phi (\delta; \delta_t + \mu_\delta (s-t), \sigma_\delta^2 (s-t)) \to 0 \text{ as } \delta_t \to \infty.$$ 

Thus, when $\delta_t$ is large enough, then we know that under globalization, $C_s^{US} > D_s^{US}$, while under autarky, $C_s^{US} = D_s^{US}$. In complete markets, the wealth of U.S. and RoW is given by

$$W_t^{US} = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \int_t^T \frac{\pi_s^{US}}{\pi_t^{US}} \left( \int_{i \in \mathcal{I}^{US}} C_i d i \right) ds \right] = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \int_t^T \frac{\pi_s^{US}}{\pi_t^{US}} (C_s^{US}) ds \right]$$

$$W_t^{RoW} = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \int_t^T \frac{\pi_s^{RoW}}{\pi_t^{RoW}} \left( \int_{i \in \mathcal{I}^{RoW}} C_i d i \right) ds \right] = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \int_t^T \frac{\pi_s^{RoW}}{\pi_t^{RoW}} (C_s^{RoW}) ds \right]$$
When $\delta_t$ is sufficiently large, $C_{s}^{US} \geq D_{s}^{US}$ for every $s$ with probability (close to) one, and by the same token $C_{s}^{RoW} \leq D_{s}^{RoW}$, with strict inequalities under globalization when $\delta_s > \delta$. It follows that for $\delta_t$ sufficiently large and $t < \tau$:

$$W_{t}^{US} = E_t \left[ \int_{t}^{T} \frac{\pi_{s}^{US}}{\pi_{t}^{US}} (C_{s}^{US}) \, ds \right] > E_t \left[ \int_{t}^{T} \frac{\pi_{s}^{US}}{\pi_{t}^{US}} D_{s}^{US} \, ds \right] = P_{t}^{US}$$

$$W_{t}^{RoW} = E_t \left[ \int_{t}^{T} \frac{\pi_{s}^{RoW}}{\pi_{t}^{RoW}} (C_{s}^{RoW}) \, ds \right] < E_t \left[ \int_{t}^{T} \frac{\pi_{s}^{RoW}}{\pi_{t}^{RoW}} D_{s}^{RoW} \, ds \right] = P_{t}^{RoW}$$

But market clearing also implies that

$$W_{t}^{US} + W_{t}^{RoW} = P_{t}^{US} + P_{t}^{RoW}$$

It follows

$$\frac{W_{t}^{US}}{P_{t}^{US}} > 1 > \frac{W_{t}^{RoW}}{P_{t}^{RoW}}$$

Q.E.D.

**Lemma 2.** (a) For every $\delta_t$,

$$g^{US} (\delta_t) < g (\delta_t) < g^{RoW} (\delta_t)$$

if and only if $F_t = D_t^{US}/D_t$ satisfies

$$F_t < F (\delta_t) = \left( 1 + \frac{E_t [e^{\rho_t (g_t - y) | i \in I^{RoW}} m^{RoW}]}{E_t [e^{\rho_t (g_t - y) | i \in I^{US}} m^{US}]} \right)^{-1}$$

(b) There exists $\delta$ such that $F_t < F (\delta_t)$ is always satisfied for $\delta_t > \delta$.

(c) In particular, the above holds for $F = m$.

(d) If $F = m$, then $g (\delta) = y$ implies $g^{US} (\delta) = y$ and $g^{RoW} (\delta) = y$. That is, the three functions $g (\delta_t), g^{US} (\delta_t)$ and $g^{RoW} (\delta_t)$ intersect at $\delta^* = g^{-1} (y)$.

**Proof of Lemma 2.**

(a) We first consider the general case with generic $F_t$ and then the special case of $F_t = F = m$.

The equilibrium consumption under autarky is the same as under globalization, except that the state price density is

$$\pi_{i}^{k} = e^{-\phi_t - g^k (\delta_t)}$$
where we retain the aggregate $\delta_t$ as the only state variable. In particular

$$C_{it} = e^{\psi_i + \rho_i (g^k (\delta_t) - y)}$$

where $\psi_i$ and $y$ are determined at time 0 (i.e., they do not change as we move to autarky; complete markets). The equilibrium condition for each country is

$$D^k_t = \int_{\mathcal{I}^k} C_{it} di = \int_{\mathcal{I}^k} e^{\psi_i + \rho_i (g^k (\delta_t) - y)} di = E^i \left[ e^{\psi_i + \rho_i (g^k (\delta_t) - y)} | i \in \mathcal{I}^k \right] m_k$$

where we used the fact that

$$E^i \left[ e^{\psi_i} | i \in \mathcal{I}^k \right] = E^i \left[ e^{\psi_i} | i \in \mathcal{I} \right] = \frac{1}{E^i \left[ e^{-\rho_i y} | i \in \mathcal{I} \right]}$$

as the distribution of $\psi_i$ does not depend on the country. Because

$$D^k_t = F^k_t D_t$$

we have

$$e^{\delta_t} \frac{F^k_t}{m^k} = \frac{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g^k (\delta_t) - y)} | i \in \mathcal{I}^k \right]}{E^i \left[ e^{-\rho_i y} | i \in \mathcal{I} \right]} \tag{A13}$$

Recall that market clearing under globalization had

$$e^{\delta_t} = \frac{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g (\delta_t) - y)} | i \in \mathcal{I} \right]}{E^i \left[ e^{-\rho_i y} | i \in \mathcal{I} \right]}$$

which gives the condition

$$\frac{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g (\delta_t) - y)} | i \in \mathcal{I} \right] F^k_t}{E^i \left[ e^{-\rho_i y} | i \in \mathcal{I} \right] m^k} = \frac{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g^k (\delta_t) - y)} | i \in \mathcal{I}^k \right]}{E^i \left[ e^{-\rho_i y} | i \in \mathcal{I} \right]}$$

(i) Let $k = US$ for simplicity and rewrite

$$(E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g (\delta_t) - y)} | i \in \mathcal{I}^{US} \right] m^{US} + E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g (\delta_t) - y)} | i \in \mathcal{I}^{RoW} \right] m^{RoW}) \frac{F^k_{US}}{m^{US}} = E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g^{US} (\delta_t) - y)} | i \in \mathcal{I}^{US} \right]$$
Divide throughout by $E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} \mid i \in \mathcal{I}^{US} \right]$:

$$
\left( m^{US} + \frac{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} \mid i \in \mathcal{I}^{RoW} \right]}{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_j (g_t - y)} \mid j \in \mathcal{I}^{US} \right]} m^{RoW} \right) \frac{F_t^{US}}{m^{US}} = \frac{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t^{US} - y)} \mid i \in \mathcal{I}^{US} \right]}{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} \mid i \in \mathcal{I}^{US} \right]} \tag{A14}
$$

The right hand side uses the same distribution of $\rho_i$ in both the numerator and the denominator. In addition, $\rho_i > 0$. Therefore,

$$
g_t^{US} < g_t
$$

if and only if

$$
\left( m^{US} + \frac{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} \mid i \in \mathcal{I}^{RoW} \right]}{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_j (g_t - y)} \mid j \in \mathcal{I}^{US} \right]} m^{RoW} \right) \frac{F_t^{US}}{m^{US}} < 1
$$

that is, if and only if

$$
F_t^{US} < F(\delta_t) = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} \mid i \in \mathcal{I}^{RoW} \right]}{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_j (g_t - y)} \mid j \in \mathcal{I}^{US} \right] m^{US}}}
$$

which is the statement in the Lemma.

(ii) We now show that the same threshold applies for the case $k = RoW$. In this case, from

$$
\frac{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} \mid i \in \mathcal{I} \right]}{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} \mid i \in \mathcal{I} \right]} m^{RoW} \frac{F_t^{RoW}}{m^{RoW}} = \frac{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t^{RoW} - y)} \mid i \in \mathcal{I}^{RoW} \right]}{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} \mid i \in \mathcal{I} \right] m^{RoW}}
$$

rewrite

$$
\left( \frac{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} \mid i \in \mathcal{I}^{US} \right]}{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} \mid i \in \mathcal{I}^{RoW} \right] m^{US}} + \frac{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} \mid i \in \mathcal{I}^{RoW} \right] m^{RoW}}{m^{RoW}} \right) \frac{F_t^{RoW}}{m^{RoW}} = \frac{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t^{RoW} - y)} \mid i \in \mathcal{I}^{RoW} \right]}{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} \mid i \in \mathcal{I}^{RoW} \right]}
$$

Divide throughout by $E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} \mid i \in \mathcal{I}^{RoW} \right]$:

$$
\left( \frac{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} \mid i \in \mathcal{I}^{US} \right]}{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} \mid i \in \mathcal{I}^{RoW} \right] m^{US}} + \frac{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} \mid i \in \mathcal{I}^{RoW} \right] m^{RoW}}{m^{RoW}} \right) \frac{F_t^{RoW}}{m^{RoW}} = \frac{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t^{RoW} - y)} \mid i \in \mathcal{I}^{RoW} \right]}{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} \mid i \in \mathcal{I}^{RoW} \right]}
$$

The right hand side uses the same distribution over $\rho_i$ in both numerator and denominator. Thus,

$$
g_{RoW,t} > g_t
$$

if and only if

$$
\left( \frac{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} \mid i \in \mathcal{I}^{US} \right]}{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} \mid i \in \mathcal{I}^{RoW} \right] m^{US}} + \frac{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} \mid i \in \mathcal{I}^{RoW} \right] m^{RoW}}{m^{RoW}} \right) \frac{F_t^{RoW}}{m^{RoW}} > 1
$$

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(b) Note that from the equilibrium condition, we also have $g(\delta_t) \rightarrow \infty$ as $\delta_t \rightarrow \infty$. Thus, from equation (3), as $g(\delta_t) \rightarrow \infty$ we have $\frac{E^t[\epsilon \rho_i(\eta, -y) | i \in U^S]}{E^t[\epsilon \rho_i(\eta, -y) | i \in T^W]} \rightarrow 0$. Thus, in the limit,

$$F(\delta_t) \rightarrow 1$$

Hence, for every $F^t_{US}$ there is $\delta_t$ sufficiently large such that $F^t_{US} < F(\delta_t)$ and hence $g^t_{US} < g_t$. Vice versa, for every $\delta_t$, there is $F^t_{US} < F(\delta_t)$ such that $g^t_{US} < g_t$.

(c) In the case $F = m$, the condition required is simply

$$R(g(\delta_t) - y) = \frac{E^t[\epsilon \rho_i(\eta, -y) | i \in T^W]}{E^t[\epsilon \rho_i(\eta, -y) | i \in U^S]} < 1$$

which in turn implies

$$F(\delta_t) > m = F^t_{US}$$

which is the same condition as before.
(d) In the case $F = m$, condition (A13) is

$$
e^{\delta t} = \frac{\mathbb{E}^i\left[e^{\rho_i(y - y)}|i \in I\right]}{\mathbb{E}^i\left[e^{-\rho_i y}|i \in I\right]}
$$

$$
e^{\delta t} = \frac{\mathbb{E}^i\left[e^{\rho_i(g_{US} - y)}|i \in I^{US}\right]}{\mathbb{E}^i\left[e^{-\rho_i y}|i \in I\right]}
$$

$$
e^{\delta t} = \frac{\mathbb{E}^i\left[e^{\rho_i(g_{RoW} - y)}|i \in I^{RoW}\right]}{\mathbb{E}^i\left[e^{-\rho_i y}|i \in I\right]}
$$

If $\delta_t = \delta = -\log(\mathbb{E}^i\left[e^{-\rho_i y}|i \in I\right])$, then the equations become

$$
1 = \mathbb{E}^i\left[e^{\rho_i(g(\delta) - y)}|i \in I\right]
$$

$$
1 = \mathbb{E}^i\left[e^{\rho_i(g_{US}(\delta) - y)}|i \in I^{US}\right]
$$

$$
1 = \mathbb{E}^i\left[e^{\rho_i(g_{RoW}(\delta) - y)}|i \in I^{RoW}\right]
$$

The function $G(x) = \mathbb{E}^i\left[e^{\rho_i x}|i \in I^k\right]$ is monotonically increasing in $x$ (as $G'(x) = \mathbb{E}^i\left[\rho_i e^{\rho_i x}|i \in I^k\right] > 0$). Thus, the unique solutions are

$$
g(\delta) - y = g_{US}(\delta) - y = g_{RoW}(\delta) - y = 0
$$

That is, the equations all intersect at the same $\delta$. Q.E.D.

Lemma 2 implies that for every $\delta_t$, either

$$
g_{US}(\delta_t) < g(\delta_t) < g_{RoW}(\delta_t)
$$

or

$$
g_{US}(\delta_t) > g(\delta_t) > g_{RoW}(\delta_t)
$$

That is, the global $g(\delta_t)$ is always between the U.S. and RoW.

**Proof of Proposition 3.** We have already shown in Lemma 2 that for every $\delta_t$ we either have

$$
g_{US}(\delta) < g(\delta) < g_{RoW}(\delta)
$$

or

$$
g_{US}(\delta) > g(\delta) > g_{RoW}(\delta)
$$

Moreover, under the additional constraint that $F = m$, all these functions intersect at $y$. 
Consider now inequality under autarky. The formula is the same as before:

\[
V_k^t = \frac{\mathbb{E}[e^{2\psi_i|\mathbb{I}^k}] \mathbb{E}[e^{2\rho_i(g^k(\delta)-y)|\mathbb{I}^k}]}{\mathbb{E}[e^{\psi_i|\mathbb{I}^k}]^2 \mathbb{E}[e^{\rho_i(g^k(\delta)-y)|\mathbb{I}^k}]^2}
\]

We already know that

\[
\frac{\partial V_k}{\partial g} > 0
\]

holds if and only if \( g^k(\delta) - y > 0 \). Because all functions intersect at \( y \) for \( F = y \), we only have two possible cases:

1. \( 0 < g_{US}(\delta) - y < g(\delta) - y \). Then \( V_{US}^t(x) \) is increasing and thus \( V_{US}^t[g^US] < V_{US}^t[g] \)

2. \( 0 > g_{US}(\delta) - y > g(\delta) - y \). Then \( V_{US}^t(x) \) is decreasing and hence \( V_{US}^t[g^US] < V_{US}^t[g] \)

which proves the claim for the U.S. The proof for RoW is analogous.

Q.E.D.

**Proof of Proposition 4.** Consider the intertemporal utility of agent \( i \) in US at time \( \tau \):

\[
\mathbb{E}_{\tau} \left[ \int_\tau^T U_i(C_{it}, V_{US}^t(t)) \, ds \right] = \mathbb{E}_{\tau} \left[ \int_\tau^T e^{-\phi(t-\tau)} \left( \frac{C_{it}^{1-\gamma_i}}{1-\gamma_i} - \eta_i V_{US}^t[g(\delta_t) - y] \right) \, dt \right] = \mathbb{E}_{\tau} \left[ \int_\tau^T e^{-\phi(t-\tau)} \frac{e^{(1-\gamma_i)\psi_i + (1-\gamma_i)\rho_i(g(\delta_t)-y)}}{1-\gamma_i} - \eta_i V_{US}^t[g(\delta_t) - y] \, dt \right]
\]

where we now highlight that the function \( V_{US}^t \) depends on \( V_{US}^t[g(\delta_t) - y] \). Similarly

\[
\mathbb{E}_{\tau} \left[ \int_\tau^T U_i(C_{it}, V_{US}^t(t)) \, ds \right] = \mathbb{E}_{\tau} \left[ \int_\tau^T e^{-\phi(t-\tau)} \frac{e^{(1-\gamma_i)\psi_i + (1-\gamma_i)\rho_i(g_{US}(\delta_t)-y)}}{1-\gamma_i} - \eta_i V_{US}^t[g_{US}(\delta_t) - y] \, dt \right]
\]

Define

\[
u[x] = \frac{e^{(1-\gamma_i)\psi_i + (1-\gamma_i)\rho_i x}}{1-\gamma_i} - \eta_i V_{US}^t[x]
\]

We note that

\[
u'(x) < 0
\]

if and only if

\[e^{(1-\gamma_i)\psi_i + (1-\gamma_i)\rho_i x} < \eta_i \frac{dV_{US}^t[x]}{dx}\]

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For $\eta_i = 0$ this condition is never satisfied. For $\eta_i > 0$, rewrite

$$\frac{e^{(1-\gamma_i)\psi_i + (\rho_i - 1)x}\rho_i}{\eta_i} \leq \frac{dV^{US}[x]}{dx}$$

The right hand side does not depend on $x$, but it is bounded below, as $V^{US}[x]$ converges to infinity. It follows that as $x \to \infty$, for all $i$ the left hand side converges to 0 and thus for every $i$ (with $\eta_i > 0$) eventually $u'(x) < 0$ for all $x > x^i$. It follows that for $g(\delta_t) - y$ sufficiently high, a jump to $g^{US}(\delta_t) - y < g(\delta_t) - y$ will always increase the utility function. This is especially true for those agents with high $\eta_i$ and low $\rho_i$. If this is true for all $\delta_t$ sufficiently high, it must be true for the expectation of future values:

$$E_\tau \left[ \int_T^\tau U_i(C_{it}, V_{tUS}^t, t) \, ds \right] = E_\tau \left[ \int_T^\tau e^{-\phi(t-\tau)} \left( u[g^{US}(\delta_t) - y] \right) \, dt \right] \Rightarrow E_\tau \left[ \int_T^\tau e^{-\phi(t-\tau)} (u[g(\delta_t) - y]) \, dt \right] = E_\tau \left[ \int_T^\tau U_i(C_{it}, V_{tUS}^t, t) \, ds \right]$$

Q.E.D.

**Proof of Corollary 3.** From the proof of Proposition 4, if $\eta_i = 0$ then $u'(x) < 0$ is never true. Q.E.D.

**Proof of Proposition 5.** From the proof of Proposition 4, for every $i$ there exists $\delta^i$ such that for $\delta_t > \delta^i$ agent $i$ votes for the populist. Given a mass of agents with $\eta_i$ above zero, rank agents $i$ in ordering $i^*$ according to increasing thresholds $\delta^i$, i.e. $i^* > j^*$ if and only if $\delta^i > \delta^j$ and choose $\delta = \min \left( \delta^i : \int_i^* \, di^* = 0.5 \right)$. Q.E.D.

**Proof of Proposition 6.** The proof is implicit in the Proof of Proposition 4. To repeat, recall that $u'[x] < 0$ if and only if

$$\frac{e^{(1-\psi_i + (\rho_i - 1)x)}\rho_i}{\eta_i} < \frac{dV^{US}[x]}{dx}$$

(A15)

Clearly, the left hand side is decreasing in $\eta_i$. Moreover, the log left hand side of this expression

$$\log(LHS(\rho)) = \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\rho_i} \right) \psi_i + (\rho_i - 1)x + \log(\rho_i) - \log(\eta_i)$$

has

$$\frac{d \log(LHS(\rho))}{d\rho} = \frac{\psi_i}{\rho_i^2} + x + \frac{1}{\rho_i} > 0$$

for $x > -\frac{1}{\rho_i} \left( \psi_i \rho_i + 1 \right)$, which is always true for $\psi_i > -\rho_i$. Therefore, for $x$ large enough, the LHS of (A15) is increasing in $\rho_i$ making it less likely to be satisfied. I.e. agents with low risk tolerance (high risk aversion) are more likely to have (A15) satisfied and hence to vote for a populist. Q.E.D.
**Proof of Proposition 7.** Immediate from the paragraph following its claim. Q.E.D.

**Proof of Proposition 8.** Immediate from complete markets, under standard regularity conditions on $T_i (\delta_t)$ that ensure the existence of the expectation. Q.E.D.

**Proof of Corollary 4.** It follows from Proposition 8 and Proposition 5. Q.E.D.

**Proof of Equation (32) in the paper:** Under equation (3)

\[
(g^{US} (\delta_t))' < (g^{RoW} (\delta_t))'
\]

\[
(g (\delta_t))' < (g^{RoW} (\delta_t))'
\]

The equations determining $g^{US} (\delta_s)$ and $g^{RoW} (\delta_s)$ are

\[
(m^{US} + R (g_t - y) m^{RoW}) \frac{F_t^{US}}{m^{US}} = \frac{E_i [\epsilon^{\rho_i} (g_{US,t} - y)| i \in T^{US}]}{E_i [\epsilon^{\rho_i} (g_t - y)| i \in T^{US}]}
\]

and

\[
\left( \frac{1}{R (g_t - y) m^{US} + m^{RoW}} \right) \frac{F_t^{RoW}}{m^{RoW}} = \frac{E_i [\epsilon^{\rho_i} (g_{RoW,t} - y)| i \in T^{RoW}]}{E_i [\epsilon^{\rho_i} (g_t - y)| i \in T^{RoW}]}
\]

where

\[
R (x) = \frac{E_i [\epsilon^{\rho_i} x| i \in T^{RoW}]}{E_i [\epsilon^{\rho_i} x| i \in T^{US}]}
\]

\[
\frac{1}{R (x)} = \frac{1}{E_i [\epsilon^{\rho_i} x| i \in T^{RoW}]} = \frac{E_i [\epsilon^{\rho_i} x| i \in T^{US}]}{E_i [\epsilon^{\rho_i} x| i \in T^{RoW}]}
\]

As $g_t - y \to \infty$, then

\[
\frac{E_i [\epsilon^{\rho_i} (g_{US,t} - y)| i \in T^{US}]}{E_i [\epsilon^{\rho_i} (g_t - y)| i \in T^{US}]} \to F_t
\]

\[
\frac{E_i [\epsilon^{\rho_i} (g_{RoW,t} - y)| i \in T^{RoW}]}{E_i [\epsilon^{\rho_i} (g_t - y)| i \in T^{RoW}]} \to \infty
\]

This implies that $g^{RoW} (\delta_t)$ must increase unboundedly compared to both $g (\delta_t)$ and $g^{US} (\delta_t)$ and thus both $g^{RoW} (\delta_t) - g (\delta_t)$ and $g^{RoW} (\delta_t) - g^{US} (\delta_t)$ must increases unboundedly. It follows that for $\delta_t$ sufficiently large,

\[
(g^{RoW} (\delta_t))' > (g (\delta_t))'
\]

\[
(g^{RoW} (\delta_t))' > (g^{US} (\delta_t))'
\]
The final case
\[(g (\delta_t))^\prime > (g^U S (\delta_t))^\prime\]
is unfortunately too hard to prove under the general condition in equation (3). But we can prove it under the more restrictive condition in equation (4). In this case, in autarky we have (for \(t \geq \tau\) recall \(F_t = F_\tau\))

\[
D_t^k = m_k \frac{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g^k_t - y)} | i \in I^k \right]}{E^i \left[ e^{-\rho_i y} | i \in I \right]}
\]

\[
e^{\delta_t} F^k_\tau = m_k \frac{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g^k_t - y)} | i \in I^k \right]}{E^i \left[ e^{-\rho_i y} | i \in I \right]}
\]

or

\[
\delta_t + \log \left( \frac{F^k_\tau}{m_k} \right) = \log \left( E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g^k_t - y)} | i \in I^k \right] \right) - \log \left( E^i \left[ e^{-\rho_i y} | i \in I \right] \right)
\]

Thus, the total differential is

\[
1 = g'_{\delta_t} \left( \frac{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g^k_t - y)} | i \in I^k \right]}{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g^k_t - y)} | i \in I^k \right]} \right)
\]

or

\[
g'_{\delta_t} = \frac{1}{E^i_k [\rho]}
\]

where

\[
E^i_k [\rho] = \frac{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g^k_t - y)} | i \in I^k \right]}{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g^k_t - y)} | i \in I^k \right]}
\]

is the weighted average risk tolerance, where the weights are given by

\[
\left( \frac{e^{\rho_i (g^k_t - y)}}{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g^k_t - y)} | i \in I^k \right]} \right).
\]

Under equation (4) in the paper, namely, \(\rho_i > \rho_j\) for \(i \in I^U S, j \in I^{RoW}\), we clearly have

\[
E^i_{US} [\rho] > E^* [\rho] > E^*_{RoW} [\rho]
\]

which implies the claim. Q.E.D.

**Proof of Proposition 9.** Follows instantly from the two equations immediately preceding it in the paper.
Proof of Proposition 10. Note that \( \frac{p^{US}_t}{p^{RoW}_t} \) increases if and only if \( \frac{p^{US}_t}{p^{RoW}_t} \) increases. Consider the ratio

\[
\frac{p^{US}_t}{p^{RoW}_t} = \frac{E_t \left[ \int_t^T \frac{\pi^{US}_s}{\pi_t} D_s ds \right]}{E_t \left[ \int_t^T \frac{\pi^{RoW}_s}{\pi_t} D_s ds \right]} = \frac{F}{1 - F} \frac{E_t \left[ \int_t^T \pi^{US}_s D_s ds \right]}{E_t \left[ \int_t^T \pi^{RoW}_s D_s ds \right]}
\]

where \( \pi^{US}_s = \pi^{RoW}_s = \pi_s \) if \( s < \tau \) or \( s > \tau \) and \( \delta_\tau > \tilde{\delta} \).

We know that for \( \delta_s \) sufficiently large \( g^{US}(\delta_s) \leq g^{RoW}(\delta_s) \) and therefore

\[
\pi^{US}_s = e^{-\phi_s - g^{US}(\delta_s)} \geq \pi^{RoW}_s = e^{-\phi_s - g^{RoW}(\delta_s)}.
\]

It follows that

\[
\frac{p^{US}_t}{p^{RoW}_t} > \frac{F}{1 - F}
\]

Finally, the equations determining \( g^{US}(\delta_s) \) and \( g^{RoW}(\delta_s) \) are

\[
\left( m^{US} + R(g_t - y) m^{RoW} \right) \frac{F^{US}_t}{m^{US}} = \frac{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g^{US}_t - y)} \right]}{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} \right]} \quad \text{and}
\]

\[
\left( \frac{1}{R(g_t - y)} m^{US} + m^{RoW} \right) \frac{F^{RoW}_t}{m^{RoW}} = \frac{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g^{RoW}_t - y)} \right]}{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} \right]} \quad \text{where}
\]

\[
R(x) = \frac{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i x} \right]}{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i x} \right]}
\]

As \( g_t - y \to \infty \), then

\[
\frac{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g^{US}_t - y)} \right]}{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} \right]} \to F_i
\]

and

\[
\frac{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g^{RoW}_t - y)} \right]}{E^i \left[ e^{\rho_i (g_t - y)} \right]} \to \infty
\]

This implies that \( g^{RoW}(\delta_t) \) must increase unboundedly compared to \( g^{US}(\delta_t) \) and thus \( g^{US}(\delta_t) - g^{RoW}(\delta_t) \) also increases unboundedly. It follows that \( \frac{p^{US}_t}{p^{RoW}_t} \) increases as well as \( \delta_t \) increases. Q.E.D.
PROOFS OF THE RESULTS FOR INCOME TAXES (see Section A1.2. of this Appendix)

Proof of Proposition A1. First, consider an equivalent expression for the budget constraint using after-tax returns:

\[ dW_{it} = N_{it} (dP^*_t + D^*_t dt) + B_{it} r^*_t dt + ds^k_t - C_{it} dt , \]

where we define

\[ dP^*_t + D^*_t dt \equiv (1 - \tau_{P,t}) (dP_t + D_t dt) \]

\[ r^*_t \equiv (1 - \tau_{r,t}) r_t \]

and rewrite

\[ ds^k_t = N_t \sigma^k (1 - \tau_{P,t}) (dP^*_t + D^*_t dt) + \frac{\tau_{r,t}}{1 - \tau_{r,t}} r^*_t dt . \]

We can then define the stochastic discount factor using after-tax returns:

\[ \frac{d\pi^*_t}{\pi^*_t} = -r^*_t dt - \sigma^*_P dZ_t , \]

where

\[ \sigma^*_P = \frac{\mu_P (1 - \tau_{P,t}) - r_t (1 - \tau_{r,t})}{\sigma_P (1 - \tau_{P,t})} . \]

For notational convenience, we denote after-tax expected dollar return and volatility by

\[ \mu^*_P = E_t \left[ dP^*_t + D^*_t dt \right] = (1 - \tau_{P,t}) \mu_P P_t \]

\[ \sigma^*_P = \sqrt{E \left[ (dP^*_t + D^*_t dt)^2 \right]} = (1 - \tau_{P,t}) \sigma_P P_t . \]

We now show that agent \( i \)'s wealth at time \( t \) is equal to

\[ W_{it} = E_t \left[ \int_t^T \frac{\pi^*_s}{\pi^*_t} C_{is} ds \right] , \]

for any consumption path \( C_{is} \) satisfying the budget constraint. That is, there exists a replicating strategy that delivers consumption \( C_{is} \) as its outcome. From the budget equation, we have

\[ dW_{it} = \left[ N_{it} + \frac{\tau_{P,t}}{1 - \tau_{P,t}} \right] \mu^*_P dt \]

\[ + \left[ N_{it} + \frac{\tau_{P,t}}{1 - \tau_{P,t}} \right] \sigma^*_P dZ_t + \left[ B_{it} + \frac{\tau_{r,t}}{1 - \tau_{r,t}} \right] r^*_t dt - C_{it} . \]
Define $V_{it}$ as

$$V_{it} = E_t \left[ \int_t^T \frac{\pi_t^*}{\pi_t^s} C_{is} ds \right] = \frac{1}{\pi_t^s} \left\{ E_t \left[ \int_0^T \pi_s^* C_{is} ds \right] - \int_0^t \pi_s^* C_{is} ds \right\}.$$ 

It follows from the martingale representation theorem that there exists a process $\tilde{\eta}_{it}$ for which

$$dV_{it} = (\pi_t^*)^{-1} \{ \tilde{\eta}_{it} dZ_t - \pi_t^* C_{it} dt \} - (\pi_t^*)^{-2} d\pi_t^* \left\{ E_t \left[ \int_0^T \pi_s^* C_{is} ds \right] - \int_0^t \pi_s^* C_{is} ds \right\}$$

$$+ (\pi_t^*)^{-3} d\pi_t^b \left\{ E_t \left[ \int_0^T \pi_s^* C_{is} ds \right] - \int_0^t \pi_s^* C_{is} ds \right\} + (\pi_t^*)^{-2} \pi_t^b \pi_t^s \tilde{\eta}_{it} dt.$$ 

That is,

$$dV_{it} = (\pi_t^*)^{-1} \{ \tilde{\eta}_{it} dZ_t - \pi_t^* C_{it} dt \} - \frac{d\pi_t^b}{\pi_t^s} V_{it} + (\sigma^*_\pi)^2 V_{it} + (\pi_t^*)^{-1} \sigma^*_\pi \tilde{\eta}_{it} dt$$

or

$$dV_{it} = \eta_{it} V_{it} dZ_t - C_{it} dt + r_t^* V_{it} dt + V_{it} \sigma^*_\pi dZ_t + (\sigma^*_\pi)^2 V_{it} dt + \sigma^*_\pi \eta_{it} V_{it} dt$$

where

$$\eta_{it} = \tilde{\eta}_{it} \frac{1}{\pi_t^s} V_{it}.$$ 

or

$$dV_{it} = -C_{it} dt + r_t^* V_{it} dt + V_{it} (\sigma^*_\pi + \eta_{it}) dZ_t + V_{it} (\sigma^*_\pi + \eta_{it}) \sigma^*_\pi dt$$

For given values of $\overline{N}_t^k$ and $\overline{B}_t^k$, we choose $N_{it}$ and $B_{it}$ so that

$$\left[ N_{it} + \overline{N}_t^k \frac{\tau_{P,t}}{1 - \tau_{P,t}} \right] \mu^s_p = V_{it} (\sigma^*_\pi + \eta_{it}) \quad (A16)$$

$$\left[ N_{it} + \overline{N}_t^k \frac{\tau_{P,t}}{1 - \tau_{P,t}} \right] \mu^s_p + \left[ B_{it} + \overline{B}_t^k \frac{\tau_{r,t}}{1 - \tau_{r,t}} \right] r_t^* = V_{it} \left[ r_t^* + (\sigma^*_\pi + \eta_{it}) \sigma^*_\pi \right] \quad (A17)$$

From equation (A16),

$$N_{it} + \overline{N}_t^k \frac{\tau_{P,t}}{1 - \tau_{P,t}} = \frac{V_{it} (\sigma^*_\pi + \eta_{it})}{\sigma^s_p}$$

Substituting this expression into equation (A17), we obtain

$$\frac{V_{it} (\sigma^*_\pi + \eta_{it})}{\sigma^s_p} \mu^s_p + \left[ B_{it} + \overline{B}_t^k \frac{\tau_{r,t}}{1 - \tau_{r,t}} \right] r_t^* = V_{it} \left[ r_t^* + (\sigma^*_\pi + \eta_{it}) \sigma^*_\pi \right],$$

which we can rewrite as

$$\left[ B_{it} + \overline{B}_t^k \frac{\tau_{r,t}}{1 - \tau_{r,t}} \right] r_t^* = V_{it} \left[ r_t^* + (\sigma^*_\pi + \eta_{it}) \sigma^*_\pi \right] - \frac{V_{it} (\sigma^*_\pi + \eta_{it})}{\sigma^s_p} \mu^s_p$$

From the equilibrium condition of the SDF, the after-tax equity premium must be equal to the negative covariance of the SDF with the after-tax stock return, which immediately implies

$$\mu^s_p = r_t^* P_t + \sigma^*_\pi \sigma^s_p.$$
and therefore
\[
\left[B_{it} + \overline{B}_t^k \frac{\tau_{r,t}}{1 - \tau_{r,t}}\right] r^*_t = V_{it} r^*_t + V_{it} (\sigma^*_\pi + \eta_{it}) \sigma^*_p - \frac{V_{it} (\sigma^*_\pi + \eta_{it})}{\sigma^*_p} \frac{r^*_t P_t + \sigma^*_s \sigma^*_p}{\sigma^*_p}
\]
or
\[
\left[B_{it} + \overline{B}_t^k \frac{\tau_{r,t}}{1 - \tau_{r,t}}\right] r^*_t = V_{it} r^*_t + V_{it} (\sigma^*_\pi + \eta_{it}) \sigma^*_p - \frac{V_{it} (\sigma^*_\pi + \eta_{it})}{\sigma^*_p} r^*_t P_t - \frac{V_{it} (\sigma^*_\pi + \eta_{it})}{\sigma^*_p} \sigma^*_s \sigma^*_p,
\]
or
\[
\left[B_{it} + \overline{B}_t^k \frac{\tau_{r,t}}{1 - \tau_{r,t}}\right] r^*_t = V_{it} r^*_t + V_{it} (\sigma^*_\pi + \eta_{it}) \sigma^*_p - \frac{V_{it} (\sigma^*_\pi + \eta_{it})}{\sigma^*_p} r^*_t P_t - \frac{V_{it} (\sigma^*_\pi + \eta_{it})}{\sigma^*_p} \sigma^*_s \sigma^*_p,
\]
where \(\sigma_{Vi} \equiv \sigma^*_\pi + \eta_{it}\). Therefore, the following positions in stocks and bonds are budget-feasible, and they replicate the consumption flow of agent \(i\):

\[
N_{it} = \frac{V_{it} \sigma_{Vi}}{\sigma_P P_t (1 - \tau_{P,t})} - \frac{N_t^k}{1 - \tau_{r,t}} \frac{\tau_{P,t}}{1 - \tau_{P,t}}
\]

\[
B_{it} = V_{it} \left[1 - \frac{\sigma_{Vi}}{\sigma_P (1 - \tau_{P,t})}\right] - \frac{\overline{B}_t^k}{1 - \tau_{r,t}} \frac{\tau_{r,t}}{1 - \tau_{r,t}} \quad \quad (A18)
\]

We now solve for \(N_t^k\) and \(\overline{B}_t^k\), which are defined earlier as

\[
N_t^k = \frac{\int_{j \in I^k} N_{jt} dj}{m^k} \quad \text{and} \quad \overline{B}_t^k = \frac{\int_{j \in I^k} B_{jt} dj}{m^k}.
\]

Computing averages of both sides of \(N_{it}\) and \(B_{it}\) in equations (A18) and (A19), we obtain

\[
\overline{N}_t^k = \frac{1}{m^k} \int_{i \in I^k} V_{it} \sigma_{Vi} di - \frac{\overline{N}_t^k}{1 - \tau_{r,t}} \frac{\tau_{P,t}}{1 - \tau_{P,t}}
\]

\[
\overline{B}_t^k = \frac{1}{m^k} \int_{i \in I^k} V_{it} di - \frac{1}{m^k} \int_{i \in I^k} V_{it} \sigma_{Vi} di - \frac{\overline{B}_t^k}{1 - \tau_{r,t}} \frac{\tau_{r,t}}{1 - \tau_{r,t}}.
\]

Solving for \(\overline{N}_t^k\) and \(\overline{B}_t^k\), we find

\[
\overline{N}_t^k = \frac{1}{m^k} \int_{i \in I^k} V_{it} \sigma_{Vi} di - \frac{1}{m^k} \int_{i \in I^k} V_{it} di - \frac{1}{m^k} \int_{i \in I^k} V_{it} \sigma_{Vi} di
\]

\[
\overline{B}_t^k = (1 - \tau_{r,t}) \left[\frac{1}{m^k} \int_{i \in I^k} V_{it} di - \frac{1}{m^k} \int_{i \in I^k} V_{it} \sigma_{Vi} di\right].
\]
Therefore, the positions in stocks and bonds are

\[
N_{it} = \frac{V_{it}\sigma_{Vi} - \frac{\tau_{P,t}}{m_k} \int_{j \in I} V_{jt}\sigma_{Vj} dj}{\sigma_p P_t (1 - \tau_{P,t})}
\]

\[
B_{it} = V_{it} - \frac{\tau_{r,t}}{m_k} \int_{j \in I} V_{jt} dj - \frac{V_{it}\sigma_{Vi} - \frac{\tau_{r,t}}{m_k} \int_{j \in I} V_{jt}\sigma_{Vj} dj}{\sigma_p (1 - \tau_{P,t})}.
\]

Finally, from equation (A16) and the definition of \(\sigma_{Vi} = \sigma^*_{Vi} + \eta_{it}\), we have that for every \(i\),

\[
\left[ N_{it} + \frac{N_{it}^k}{(1 - \tau_{P,t})} \right] \sigma^*_P = V_{it}\sigma_{Vi}.
\]

Next, we integrate across \(i\) on both sides of this equation. Noting that \(\int N_{it} di = m^{USN^{US}} + m^{RoW}N^{RoW}\), we obtain

\[
\int N_{it} di + \int N_{it} di \frac{\tau_{P,t}}{(1 - \tau_{P,t})} \sigma^*_P = \int V_{it}\sigma_{Vi} di.
\]

Imposing market clearing \(\int N_{it} di = 1\), we obtain the restriction

\[
\left[ 1 + \frac{\tau_{P,t}}{(1 - \tau_{P,t})} \right] \sigma^*_P = \int V_{it}\sigma_{Vi} di
\]

or

\[
\frac{1}{(1 - \tau_{P,t})} \sigma_p P_t (1 - \tau_{P,t}) = \int V_{it}\sigma_{Vi} di
\]

or

\[
\sigma_p P_t = \int V_{it}\sigma_{Vi} di. \quad (A20)
\]

Similarly, from equation (A17), we have

\[
B_{it} + \frac{B_{it}^k}{(1 - \tau_{r,t})} = V_{it} \left[ 1 - \frac{\sigma_{Vi}}{\sigma_p (1 - \tau_{P,t})} \right].
\]

Taking the integral on both sides and recognizing that \(\int B_{it} di = m^{US}B^{US}_t + m^{RoW}B^{RoW}_t\), we obtain

\[
\int B_{it} di + \int B_{it} di \frac{\tau_{r,t}}{(1 - \tau_{r,t})} = \int V_{it} di - \int V_{it}\sigma_{Vi} di \frac{\sigma_{Vi}}{\sigma_p (1 - \tau_{P,t})}
\]

and from market clearing \(\int B_{it} di = 0\) we obtain the restriction

\[
0 = \int V_{it} di - \int V_{it}\sigma_{Vi} di \frac{\sigma_{Vi}}{\sigma_p (1 - \tau_{P,t})}. \quad (A21)
\]
Equations (A20) and (A21) imply that market clearing holds (by construction, given that we used market clearing to obtain these restrictions):

\[
\int N_t di = \int \frac{V_i \sigma V_i di - \tau_{P,t} \int V_i \sigma V_j dj}{\sigma P(1 - \tau_{P,t})} = \frac{\sigma_P P - \tau_{P,t} \sigma P}{\sigma P(1 - \tau_{P,t})} = 1
\]

\[
\int B_t di = \int \left( V_i di - \tau_{r,t} \int V_j \sigma V_j dj - \int V_i \sigma V_i di \right) = \left( \int V_i di - \sigma P(1 - \tau_{P,t}) \right) (1 - \tau_{r,t}) = 0.
\]

Finally, agent i’s wealth at time 0 is given by

\[
W_{i0} = E_0 \left[ \int_0^T \pi_t^* C_{it} dt \right] = w_{i0} + s_0^k,
\]

where \( w_{i0} \) is the financial endowment at time 0. The Lagrangean is thus

\[
L = E \left[ \int_0^T e^{-\phi t} \left( \frac{C_{it}^{1-\gamma_i}}{1-\gamma_i} - \eta_i V_i^k \right) dt \right] - \xi_t \left( E \left[ \int_0^T \pi_t^* C_{it} dt \right] - (w_{i0} + s_0^k) \right)
\]

obtaining the first-order conditions

\[
e^{-\phi t} C_{it}^{-\gamma_i} = \xi_t \pi_t^*
\]

and hence

\[
C_{it} = e^{-\rho_i \log(\xi_t) + \rho_i g^*(\delta_t)}
\]

where

\[
g^*(\delta_t) = -\phi t - \log (\pi_t^*)
\]

Substituting the consumption, we obtain the initial wealth restriction that determines the Lagrange multipliers

\[
e^{-\rho_i \log(\xi_t)} E_0 \left[ \int_0^T e^{-\phi t - g^*(\delta_t) + \rho_i g^*(\delta_t)} dt \right] = w_{i0} + s_0^k
\]

Finally, market clearing pins down \( g^*(\delta_t) \) as the solution to the following equation:

\[
D_t = \int C_{it} di = \int e^{-\rho_i \log(\xi_t) + \rho_i g^*(\delta_t)} di = E^T \left[ e^{-\rho_i \log(\xi_t) + \rho_i g^*(\delta_t)} \right].
\]

This is the same market-clearing condition as in the no-tax case examined in the paper. It follows that the state price density in the economy with taxes is the same as its counterpart in the economy.
Without taxes, except for the Pareto weights $\xi_i$, which depend on the initial distribution $w_{i0} + s_0^k$. It follows that consumption paths are also the same in both economies. Q.E.D.

**Proof of Proposition A2.** The dynamic budget constraint is

$$dW_{it} = N_{it} (1 - \tau_{P,i,t}) (dP_t + D_t dt) + B_{it} (1 - \tau_{r,i,t}) r_t dt + ds_t^k - C_{it} dt,$$

where

$$ds_t^k = \frac{1}{m^k} \int [N_{jt} \tau_{P,j,t} (dP_t + D_t dt) + B_{jt} \tau_{r,j,t} r_t dt] \, dj.$$

This is equivalent to agent $i$ having access to stock and bond investments with returns

$$dP_{it} + D_{it} dt = (1 - \tau_{P,i,t}) (dP_t + D_t dt)$$

$$r_{it} = (1 - \tau_{r,i,t}) r_t$$

and being endowed with a security that pays the stochastic flow $ds_t^k$ over time. We denote by $s_t^k$ the value of such a security. The budget constraint is

$$dW_{it} = N_{it} (dP_{it} + D_{it} dt) + B_{it} r_{it} dt + ds_t^k - C_{it} dt.$$

Define the state price density for agent $i$ as

$$\frac{d\pi_{it}}{\pi_{it}} = -r_{it} dt - v_{it} dZ_t,$$

where the market price of risk is

$$v_{it} = \frac{\mu_{it} - r_{it}}{\sigma_{it}} = \frac{\mu_{P} (1 - \tau_{P,i,t}) - r_t (1 - \tau_{r,i,t})}{\sigma_{P} (1 - \tau_{P,i,t})}.$$

From equation (A7), all agents have the same market price of risk:

$$v_{it} = v_t = \frac{\mu_{P} - r_t}{\sigma_{P}}.$$

Standard results imply that the dynamic budget constraint for agent $i$ can be equivalently written in its static form as

$$w_{i0} + s_0^k = E_0 \left[ \int_0^T \pi_{is} C_{is} ds \right],$$

where we use the agent-specific state price density $\pi_{it}$. The first order conditions from the Lagrangean are

$$e^{-\psi t} C_{it}^{-\gamma_i} = \xi_t \pi_{it} = \xi_t e^{-f^t (1 - \tau_{is}) r_s ds - f^t v_s^2 / 2ds - f^t v_s dZ_s}$$

$$= \xi_t e^{-f^t (1 - \tau_{is}) r_s ds + f^t r_s ds - f^t r_s ds - f^t v_s^2 / 2ds - f^t v_s dZ_s}$$

$$= \xi_t e^{f^t \tau_{is} r_s ds} \pi_t,$$
where
\[ \pi_t = e^{-\int_t^\tau r_s ds - \int_t^\tau v_s^2/2 ds - \int_t^\tau \nu_s dZ_s} \]
is the common part of the state price density. Therefore, optimal consumption can be written as
\[ C_{it} = e^{g_t(\delta_t) - \log(\xi_t) - \frac{1}{\gamma_t} \int_t^\tau \tau_{ts} r_s ds}, \]
where
\[ g_t = -\phi t - \log(\pi_t). \]
Q.E.D.
The case with stochastic $F_t$ has been covered in general statements.

**Proof of Voting for Autarky under Higher Costs:**

We need to show

$$E_r \left[ \int_{\tau}^{T} U_i (C_{jt}, V_{k,t}, t) \, ds \bigg| A \right] > E_r \left[ \int_{\tau}^{T} U_i (C_{jt}, V_{k,t}, t) \, ds \bigg| G \right]$$

where now we have different distributions depending whether we are under $G$ or under $A$. Denote by $\delta^A_t$ the process under autarky. We have that for $h > 0$

$$\delta^A_{t+h} = \delta_t - j + \mu^A h + \sigma^A \sqrt{hx}$$

whereas in global economy we have

$$\delta_{t+h} = \delta_t + \mu h + \sigma \sqrt{hx}$$

Following Veronesi (2018), note that the expected utility is equivalent to the expectation over two independent random variables, a random time $h$ distributed according to a truncated exponential density with parameter $\phi$ and a random normal variable $x$ that determines $\delta_{t+h} = \delta_t + \mu \delta h + \sigma \delta \sqrt{hx}$.

Using the notation of Veronesi (2018), agent $i$ votes for autarky if and only if

$$E_r^{h,x} \left[ u \left[ g_{US} \left( \delta^A_{t+h} \right) \right] \right] - E_r^{h,x} \left[ u \left[ g \left( \delta_{t+h} \right) \right] \right] > 0$$

where

$$u \left[ g \right] = \frac{e^{(1-\gamma_i)\psi_i}}{1-\gamma_i} e^{(1-\gamma_i)\rho_i (g-y)} - \eta V \left[ g \right]$$

Now, recall that $h$ and $x$ are the two stochastic quantities. If $\sigma^A = \sigma$, then given $\mu^A < \mu$ and $j > 0$ we have

$$\delta^A_{t+h} < \delta_{t+h}$$

for each possible realization of $(h, x)$. Because $g_{US}$ and $g$ are increasing, this implies

$$g_{US} \left( \delta^A_{t+h} \right) < g_{US} \left( \delta_{t+h} \right) < g \left( \delta_{t+h} \right)$$

Therefore, if $u$ is decreasing in $g$, we have the result that agent $i$ under the jump $j$ and the decrease $\mu^A$ will be even more likely to vote for autarky against the alternative that $j = 0$ and $\mu^A = \mu$. 

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The case with higher volatility instead relies on the near linearity of the utility function for large $\delta$, which makes the expected utility insensitive to volatility for large $\delta_t$. In particular, the utility function is

$$u[g] = \frac{e^{(1-\gamma_i)\psi_i}}{1 - \gamma_i} e^{(1-\gamma_i)\rho_i (g - y)} - \eta V[g]$$

Note that

$$u'[g] = e^{(1-\gamma_i)\psi_i} \rho_i e^{(1-\gamma_i)\rho_i (g - y)} - \eta \frac{dV}{dg}$$

and

$$u''[g] = e^{(1-\gamma_i)\psi_i} \rho_i (\rho_i - 1) e^{(\rho_i - 1)(g - y)} - \eta \frac{d^2V}{dg^2}$$

Both terms converge to zero as $g$ diverges to infinity. That is, the function $u[g]$ becomes nearly linear in the limit. Therefore, in the limit, volatility of $g$ (through higher $\delta$ volatility) has no impact, and the discrete shift in $g(\delta) \rightarrow g_{US}(\delta) < g(\delta)$ must dominate. Q.E.D.

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A3. Theory: Model Extensions

In this section, we discuss four extensions of the baseline model presented in the paper. In Section A3.1., we allow the countries’ output shares to vary over time. In Section A3.2., we allow the countries’ population shares to vary over time, effectively permitting migration across countries. In Section A3.3., we assume that a move to autarky reduces subsequent output. We consider two such scenarios: (i) a lower long-term growth rate of output, and (ii) a one-time destruction of capital. Finally, in Section A3.4., we assume that a move to autarky makes output more volatile. In all four extensions, our main result about the fragility of globalization continues to hold. The extensions also produce additional insights into the conditions under which the populist candidate gets elected. For example, the first extension explains why the recent rise of China may have contributed to the rise of populism in the West. The second extension shows that immigration increases the likelihood of populist victory. The third extension shows that the prospect of a destruction of capital does not discourage agents from voting populist; on the contrary, it encourages them to do so.

A3.1. Extension: Time-Varying Output Shares

In the baseline model, each country’s share of global output is constant and equal to the country’s population share \( \left( \frac{D_{US}}{D_t} = m \right) \). We now generalize this setting by allowing the output shares to vary over time. Similar to Menzly, Santos and Veronesi (2004), we assume that

\[
F_t = \frac{D_{US}^t}{D_t},
\]

(A22)

is stochastic, following a diffusion process in the interval \((0,1)\). For tractability, we assume that \( F_t \) stops fluctuating at time \( \tau \) if agents elect the populist (i.e., \( F_t = F_\tau \) for \( t \geq \tau \) under autarky). We maintain all other assumptions of the baseline model.

In this more general setting, our main results continue to hold. More interesting, the outcome of the U.S. election depends on the value of \( F_\tau \). This value affects two necessary conditions for the populist to be elected. The first of these is \( g_{US}(\delta_t) < g(\delta_t) \), which ensures that U.S. inequality declines upon the move to autarky. The second one is that the U.S. runs a trade deficit. Both conditions hold if and only if

\[
F_t < F(\delta_t),
\]

(A23)
where

\[ F(\delta_t) = \left(1 + \frac{\mathbb{E}^i[e^{(g(\delta_t) - y_i)/\gamma_i} \mid i \in T^{RoW}] - 1 - m}{\mathbb{E}^i[e^{(g(\delta_t) - y_i)/\gamma_i} \mid i \in T^{US}] - m} \right)^{-1}. \] (A24)

The function \( F(\delta_t) \) monotonically increases from 0 to 1 as \( \delta_t \) increases from \(-\infty\) to \(+\infty\). The threshold condition (A23) implies that for any given value of \( F_t \), there exists \( \delta_t \) sufficiently large—larger than \( F^{-1}(F_t) \)—so that the two conditions mentioned above hold. Also, for any given \( \delta_t \), there exists \( F_t \) sufficiently low—lower than \( F(\delta_t) \)—so that the same two conditions hold. The threshold condition (A23) can thus be triggered by either an increase in \( \delta_t \) or a decrease in \( F_t \).

Building on these results, we prove that our main result—Proposition 5—continues to hold with a modified threshold: there exists a value \( \delta(F_t) \) such that the U.S. elects the populist when \( \delta_t > \delta(F_t) \). The backlash against globalization thus eventually happens also in this more general setting. Our main theoretical result is thus robust to allowing for time-varying output shares.

The threshold \( \delta(F_t) \) is increasing in \( F_t \) when \( F_t \) is large enough. Further increases in \( F_t \) then make the condition (A23) binding, so that \( \delta_t \) must exceed a larger threshold \( \delta(F_t) \) for this condition to hold. As a result, the populist’s victory becomes more likely when \( F_t \) declines from a high level. Intuitively, when \( F_t \) declines, a shift to autarky is more attractive to U.S. agents because it gives them less risk to share, resulting in less inequality. After moving to autarky, U.S. agents share only the risk associated with their own tree. This local risk is lower when \( F_t \) declines, implying less extreme portfolio positions across U.S. agents and thus less inequality, making autarky more desirable.

This result—that a decrease in \( F_t \) makes the populist victory more likely when \( F_t \) is large enough—provides the basis for a novel potential explanation for why populism in the West appeared in 2016. The rise of populism has its roots in the 2008 financial crisis. The argument is not that the crisis made the U.S. poorer in absolute terms; after all, the 2009–2016 period was characterized by a long uninterrupted economic expansion, one of the longer expansions in the U.S. history. But the crisis made the U.S. poorer relative to RoW. The 2008 crisis is often perceived as global, but it was more of an “Atlantic” crisis, which impoverished the West but not China or certain other parts of the world. While U.S. output shrank, Chinese output continued to grow at a rapid pace approaching 10% per year. (Australia did not have a recession in 2008 either.) As a result, China—and RoW more generally—grew richer relative to the U.S. in the decade preceding 2016, implying a decrease in \( F_t \). The lower U.S. output share implies more Chinese risk to share, making autarky more appealing to U.S. agents, as explained earlier.
A3.2. Extension: Time-Varying Population Shares

In the baseline model, the fraction of agents living in the U.S. is fixed at $m$. We now allow the U.S. population share $m_t$ to vary over time. An increase in $m_t$ can be interpreted, for example, as immigration from RoW into the U.S. While varying $m_t$, we hold constant the distributions of risk aversion in both countries, maintaining the interpretation of country-level differences in financial development. We also assume, similar to the previous section, that both $m_t$ and $F_t$ stop fluctuating at time $\tau$ if agents elect the populist.

Since the function $F(\delta_t)$ from equation (A24) depends on $m_t$, we relabel it as $F(\delta_t, m_t)$. Since $F(\delta_t, m_t)$ is an increasing function of $m_t$, the threshold condition (A23) is more likely to hold at time $\tau$ when $m_\tau$ is larger, holding $\delta_\tau$ and $F_\tau$ constant. Recall that the condition (A23) is necessary for the populist to get elected. As a result, immigration from RoW to the U.S. makes it more likely that the populist gets elected. Intuitively, when $m_t$ increases, autarky becomes more attractive to U.S. agents because they have more other U.S. agents to share local risk with. This result is consistent with the important role of immigration observed in the recent populist backlash. However, immigration is also closely related to cultural reasons that are outside our model.

A3.3. Extension: Lower Output in Autarky

In the baseline model, a move to autarky does not affect the output process. In this section, we consider two possible changes in that process upon a shift to autarky:

1. A reduction in the growth rate of output, $\mu \delta$.
2. A downward jump in output: $D_\tau = JD_{\tau-\epsilon}$, where $J < 1$.

Both changes capture the idea that a shift to autarky may be costly in terms of lost output. In the first change, growth slows down permanently when the gains from cross-border trade disappear. The second change is an abrupt one-time contraction at time $\tau$ resulting from the disruption of trade. Both changes have ambiguous effects on agents’ utility—while they imply lower consumption, they also reduce inequality.

Adding either or both of these changes to our baseline model leads to the same basic conclusions. As long as the values of $J$ and the drop in $\mu \delta$ are known, markets continue to be complete and our main results continue to hold. That includes the key Proposition 5, with a different threshold $\tilde{\delta}$ compared to the baseline case. The backlash against globalization thus eventually takes place—when output is large enough, U.S. voters find it optimal to elect a populist even if the move to autarky is costly in terms of lost output.
This result sheds new light on the 2016 EU referendum in Britain. Before the referendum, many economists predicted that Brexit would lead to significant output losses for Britain. The British voters heard the message and yet voted in favor of Brexit. Interpreting this fact through the lens of our model, lower output was a price the British voters were willing to pay in order to reduce inequality. Along the same lines, the British voters may have accepted that Brexit would weaken the City of London. Since inequality is driven mostly by the highest incomes, a particularly effective way to reduce it is to drive the wealthy London bankers out of Britain.

A reduction in output reduces inequality because it hurts the rich (i.e., the low-$\gamma_i$ agents) more than the poor. When output is large enough, the median voter welcomes a reduction in output because the resulting reduction in inequality outweighs the decline in consumption in utility terms. This is true even if there is no shift to autarky at time $\tau$. Suppose we replace the move to autarky by a destruction of capital at time $\tau$, so that the second change described above (a downward jump in output) happens in the absence of autarky. Agents then find it optimal to destroy some of the capital when inequality grows large enough, which in turn happens when output is large enough. Such destruction could also take the form of a war or a revolution (e.g., Scheidel, 2017). The implications of our model thus extend beyond the reversal of globalization.

A3.4. **Extension: Higher Output Volatility in Autarky**

Another potential cost of autarky is an increase in output volatility. After cross-border risk sharing stops, agents face the risk associated with local but not global output; they can no longer diversify country-specific risks. We do not model such risks, but in their presence, a shift to autarky would raise the output volatility faced by agents. To illustrate this fact, suppose the two countries’ outputs follow processes with identical drifts and volatilities:

$$\frac{d D^k_t}{D^k_t} = \mu_l dt + \sigma_l dZ^k_t, \quad k \in \{US, RoW\},$$

(A25)

where $dZ^US_t$ and $dZ^{RoW}_t$ are Brownian motions with correlation $\rho < 1$. Global output, $D_t = D^{US}_t + D^{RoW}_t$, then follows the process

$$\frac{d D_t}{D_t} = \mu_g dt + \sigma_g (F_t dZ^{US}_t + (1 - F_t) dZ^{RoW}_t),$$

(A26)

where $F_t = D^{US}_t / D_t$ as before. It follows that

$$\text{Var} \left( \frac{d D_t}{D_t} \right) = \sigma^2_g \left[ F_t^2 + (1 - F_t)^2 + 2F_t(1 - F_t)\rho \right] \leq \sigma^2_g,$$

(A27)
so that global output is less volatile than local output. Therefore, in the presence of country-specific risks, a move to autarky would raise output volatility due to the loss of cross-country diversification benefits.

Motivated by this fact, we extend our model by allowing the volatility of the output process, \( \sigma_\delta \), to rise at time \( \tau \) if a move to autarky occurs. We find that our main results continue to hold in that setting.
A4. Data: Cross-Country Election Analysis

In this section we fill in some details regarding the data used in our cross-country election-based analysis. The scoring used in the 2014 Chapel Hill Survey of Experts is as follows:

1. NATIONALISM: Position towards nationalism.
   0 = Strongly promotes cosmopolitan rather than nationalist conceptions of society
   10 = Strongly promotes nationalist rather than cosmopolitan conceptions of society

2. IMMIGRATE_POLICY: Position on immigration policy.
   0 = Strongly opposed tough policy
   10 = Strongly favors tough policy

3. ANTI_ELITE_SALIENCE: Salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric.
   0 = Not Important at all
   10 = Extremely Important

We match the timing of the independent variables to the timing of the election. For an election in a given country-year, we measure inequality, current account balance, and financial development in the same country-year. If the same-year value is unavailable, we use the prior-year value. If financial development is unavailable for both years, we record it as missing. If inequality is unavailable for both years, we go farther back in time until we find a non-missing value. This approach is motivated by the high persistence of the inequality series. We do not have to go much farther back—our oldest Gini coefficient is from 2014, and our oldest top 10% share is from 2013. Current account balance data are available for each country-year.
A5. Data: International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)

This survey covers the following countries: Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain, Georgia, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, India, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, Lithuania, Latvia, Mexico, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Russian Federation, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey, Taiwan, United States, and South Africa. We only use data for OECD countries as of 2013, which implies that we exclude Croatia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Philippines, Russia, South Africa, and Taiwan.

National Identity insets are available in 2013, 2003, and 1995. We use the 2013 inset.

When we match the country-level protectionism scores to our data on inequality, financial development, and current account balance, we use the 2013 values of these variables to match the year of the ISSP survey. If the 2013 value of financial development is missing, we take the most recent value since 2010; if all values since 2010 are missing, we record financial development as missing. For inequality, we go as far back as necessary to find a non-missing observation. Our oldest top 10% share observation is from 2008; our oldest Gini coefficient is from 2012. Current account balance is available in 2013 for each country.

The question we focus on, “Country should limit the import of foreign products,” is question 5a. Individual responses in the database are on the scale of 1 to 5, with 1 indicating “agree strongly” and 5 indicating “disagree strongly.” We flip the original numerical ranking so that higher response values indicate a stronger anti-globalization attitude. That is, in our data, 5 indicates “agree strongly” and 1 indicates “disagree strongly.”

Two other ISSP questions seem somewhat related to globalization, though not as closely related as question 5a, in our view. One is question 2c: “Important to have lived in a country for most of one’s life.” The other is question 5d: “Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in country.” The results based on question 2c are similar to those for question 5a: all four slopes have the same sign and three of them are statistically significant. The results based on question 5d are weaker: three of the four slopes have the same sign but none are statistically significant. We show those results in Section A8. of this Appendix.

The full list of questions asked in the national identity survey:

- **Q1a-d** Identification with [City/ County/ Country/ Continent]
- **Q2a-h** What is important to be (NATIONALITY)
• Q3a-h Attitudes towards own nation
• Q4a-j Proud of national and political achievements
• Q5a-e Views on national versus international issues, attitudes towards rights of foreigners
• Q6a-e Views on national versus international issues
• Q7 a/b Attitudes towards foreign cultural presence
• Q8 Maintain traditions – adapt in society
• Q9a-h Attitudes towards foreigners and their rights
• Q10 Number of immigrants increase to country
• Q11 Statements about immigrants and [Country’s] culture
• Q12 How proud are you of being [Country Nationality]
• Q13a-d Impact of patriotic feelings on [country’s unification/ intolerance/ ...]
• Q14 Are you a citizen of [Country]
• Q15 Parents citizens of [Country] at birth
• Q16 Heard or read about [the European Union]
• Q17 OPTIONAL Benefits from being member of [the European Union]
• Q18 OPTIONAL [Country] should follow decisions of [the European Union]
• Q19 OPTIONAL EU should have more power than national government
• Q20 OPTIONAL EU Referendum to become new member
• Q21 OPTIONAL EU members: Referendum to remain member

We do not use EU-related questions because our sample contains also countries outside the EU such as Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, and Turkey.
A6. Data: British Election Study (BES)

To measure the support for Brexit, we use the BES variable *profile_eurefvote*, which contains three possible responses to the question “Which way did you vote?” in the 2016 EU referendum: “Remain in the EU,” “Leave the EU,” or “Don’t know.” The response “Leave the EU” indicates support for Brexit. If the variable *profile_eurefvote* is missing, we use the variable *euRefVote* from wave 10, which contains the same voter’s response as to how they would vote in the same referendum. If the wave-10 value is missing, we use the corresponding values from waves 9, 8, or 7, in that order. The waves 7 though 10 were all conducted between April and December of 2016. We define a dummy variable *SupportForBrexit*, which is equal to one if the voter voted for Brexit and zero otherwise.

We measure the respondent’s willingness to take risk, or *WillingnessToTakeRisk*, by using the BES variable *riskTaking*, which contains the response to the question “Generally speaking, how willing are you to take risks?” We convert the four possible responses to integer values between 0 and 3 as follows:

- ‘Very unwilling to take risks’ → 0
- ‘Somewhat unwilling to take risks’ → 1
- ‘Somewhat willing to take risks’ → 2
- ‘Very willing to take risks’ → 3

We use the wave-8 value to keep the timing as close as possible to the EU referendum. But if the wave-8 value is unavailable, we use the most recent wave in which it is available.

To measure income, we use the BES variable *profile_gross_household*, which reports each household’s annual gross income in one of 15 income ranges. We construct *Income* by assigning the values 1 through 15 as follows:

- under £5,000 per year → 1
- £5,000 to £9,999 per year → 2
- £10,000 to £14,999 per year → 3
- £15,000 to £19,999 per year → 4
- £20,000 to £24,999 per year → 5
- £25,000 to £29,999 per year → 6
- £30,000 to £34,999 per year → 7
- £35,000 to £39,999 per year → 8
- £40,000 to £44,999 per year → 9
- £45,000 to £49,999 per year → 10
- £50,000 to £59,999 per year → 11
- £60,000 to £69,999 per year → 12
- £70,000 to £99,999 per year → 13
- £100,000 to £149,999 per year → 14
- £150,000 and over → 15

We measure the respondent’s education by using the BES variable profile_education, which contains the responses to the question “At what age did you finish full-time education?” We create a dummy variable Education, which is equal to zero if the response is 18 years or less and one otherwise.

We construct our first measure of the respondent’s aversion to inequality by using two BES variables: inequalityChange and inequalityGoodBad. The variable inequalityChange contains the response to the question “Do you think the difference in incomes between rich people and poor people in the UK today is larger, smaller, or about the same as it was 20 years ago?” The variable inequalityGoodBad contains the response to the follow-up question “And do you think this is a good thing, a bad thing, or haven’t you thought about it?” Both variables are available only in waves 2, 3, and 4. We use the wave-4 values whenever available; if they are unavailable, we use the most recent wave for which they are available. We construct our InequalityBad variable as an integer value 1, 2, or 3 as follows:

- If inequalityChange = “Larger” then we compute InequalityBad as
  - If inequalityGoodBad = 'Good thing' → 1
  - If inequalityGoodBad = 'Don’t know' → 2
  - If inequalityGoodBad = 'Bad thing' → 3

- If inequalityChange = “Smaller” then we compute InequalityBad as
  - If inequalityGoodBad = 'Good thing' → 3
  - If inequalityGoodBad = 'Don’t know' → 2
  - If inequalityGoodBad = 'Bad thing' → 1
• If inequalityChange is neither “Larger or “Smaller then we declare InequalityBad as missing

We measure the respondent’s LeftRight orientation by using the BES variable leftRight, which contains the response to the question “In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on the following scale?” The possible values range from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). We use these numerical values directly. We use the most recently observed value of the leftRight variable.

We measure the respondent’s religiosity by using the BES variable profile.religion, which contains the response to the question “Do you have a religious affiliation?” We create a dummy variable Religious, which is equal to zero if the response is “No, I do not regard myself as belonging to any particular religion” and one otherwise.

To measure the respondent’s dislike of the elites, we create three variables: PoliticiansFavorTheRich, LawFavorsTheRich, and DoNotTrustExperts based on the responses to the question “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” for three different statements as follows:

• “Politicians only care about people with money.” → PoliticiansFavorTheRich
• “There is one law for the rich and one for the poor.” → LawFavorsTheRich
• “I’d rather put my trust in the wisdom of ordinary people than the opinions of experts.” → DoNotTrustExperts

Each of the three variables takes integer values from 1 to 5, which we assign as follows:

• ‘Strongly disagree’ → 1
• ‘Disagree’ → 2
• ‘Neither agree nor disagree’ → 3
• ‘Agree’ → 4
• ‘Strongly agree’ → 5

Our variable PoliticiansFavorTheRich is derived from the BES variable polForTheRich. We use the most recent available value of this variable; that is the value from wave 7 or from prior waves 4, 3, 2, and 1, in that order. Our variable LawFavorsTheRich is derived from the BES variable lr4W7W8W9, which comes from waves 7 through 9. Our variable DoNotTrustExperts is derived
from the BES variable *antiIntellectual*, which is available from waves 7 through 11. We use the most recent available value of that variable.

We measure the respondent’s ethnic minority status by using the BES variable *profile_ethnicity*, which contains the response to the question “To which of these groups do you consider you belong?” If the response is “White British” (this is the response given by 88.8% of respondents) then we set the dummy variable *Minority* equal to zero; otherwise we set it equal to one.

We measure the respondent’s *Feminist* attitude by using the BES variable *femaleEquality*, which contains the response to the question “Please say whether you think these things have gone too far or have not gone far enough in Britain: Attempts to give equal opportunities to women.” We convert the five possible responses to integer values between 1 and 5 as follows:

- ‘Gone much too far’ → 1
- ‘Gone too far’ → 2
- ‘About right’ → 3
- ‘Not gone far enough’ → 4
- ‘Not gone nearly far enough’ → 5

The variable is available as an aggregate from waves 6 through 12.

Finally, to measure the respondent’s age, we use the BES variable *Age* (“What is your age?”), and to measure the respondent’s gender, we use the BES variable *gender* (“Are you male or female?”).
A7. Data: Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES)

We use data from the 2016 CCES.

To measure the support for Trump, we use the CCES variable CC16.410a, which contains the responses to the question “For whom did you vote for President of the United States?” in the 2016 election. We set the variable SupportForTrump equal to one if the voter voted for Trump and zero otherwise.

To measure income, we use the CCES variable faminc, which reports the response to the question “Thinking back over the last year, what was your family’s annual income?” in multiple income ranges. We construct Income by assigning the values 1 through 16 as follows:

- Less than $10,000 → 1
- $10,000 to $19,999 → 2
- $20,000 to $29,999 → 3
- $30,000 to $39,999 → 4
- $40,000 to $49,999 → 5
- $50,000 to $59,999 → 6
- $60,000 to $69,999 → 7
- $70,000 to $79,999 → 8
- $80,000 to $99,999 → 9
- $100,000 to $119,999 → 10
- $120,000 to $149,999 → 11
- $150,000 to $199,999 → 12
- $150,000 or more → 12
- $200,000 to $249,999 → 13
- $250,000 to $349,999 → 14
- $250,000 or more → 14
- $350,000 to $499,999 → 15
• $500,000 or more → 16

To measure Education, we use the CCES variable educ, which contains the response to the question “What is the highest level of education you have completed?” We convert the six possible responses to integer values between 1 and 6 as follows:

• ‘No high school’ → 1
• ‘High school graduate’ → 2
• ‘Some college’ → 3
• ‘2-year’ → 4
• ‘4-year’ → 5
• ‘Post-grad’ → 6

To measure how Religious the respondent is, we use the CCES variable pew_religimp, which contains the response to the question “How important is religion in your life?” We convert the four possible responses to integer values between 0 and 3 as follows:

• ‘Very important’ → 3
• ‘Somewhat important’ → 2
• ‘Not too important’ → 1
• ‘Not at all important’ → 0

To measure the respondent’s ethnic minority status we use the CCES variable race, which contains the response to the question “What racial or ethnic group best describes you?” If the response is one of ‘Black’, ‘Hispanic’, ‘Asian’, ‘Native American’, or ‘Middle Eastern’ then we classify the respondent as Minority.

The Republican variable is based on the CCES variable pid3, which contains the response to the question “Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...?” If the response is ‘Republican’ then we set Republican equal to one; otherwise we set it to zero.

We back out the respondent’s age from the variable birthyr. Gender comes from the variable gender.
A8. Evidence: Which Countries Are Populist?

This section presents additional information and empirical evidence that is mentioned but not shown in the paper.


Table A1 reports the positions of all political parties in our sample along four dimensions related to anti-global populism: nationalism, attitudes toward immigrants and ethnic minorities, and the salience of anti-elite rhetoric. Each number in the table is the party’s score on the scale of 0 to 10, with higher values indicating a more populist stance. Each party’s scores are averaged across all experts evaluating this party in the 2014 Chapel Hill Survey.


Figure A1 is the counterpart of the vote share figures in the paper, except that it defines populist parties as anti-ethnic-minority (as opposed to nationalist, anti-immigrant, or anti-elite). Analogous to the other three definitions of populist parties, we classify a party as populist if its average score for the position towards ethnic minorities is at least six. The scoring used by the experts in the survey is on the scale of 0 to 10 as follows:

0 = Strongly supports more rights for ethnic minorities
10 = Strongly opposes more rights for ethnic minorities


Figures A2 through A4 are the counterparts of the corresponding vote share figures in the paper, except that they do not use the results from European Parliament elections. In other words, they use the results from national elections only.


Figures A5 through A7 are the counterparts of the corresponding vote share figures in the paper, except that they do not use the results from national elections. In other words, they use the results
from European Parliament elections only.

A8.5. Alternative Election Set: Excluding the U.S.

Figures A8 through A10 are the counterparts of the corresponding vote share figures in the paper, except that they exclude the results from the U.S. elections. Similarly, Figures A11 through A16 are the counterparts of the corresponding vote share figures in Sections A8.3. and A8.4. of this Appendix, except that they exclude the results from the U.S. elections.


Figures A17 through A19 are the counterparts of Panels D of the vote share figures in the paper, except that they replace stock market capitalization / GDP by three other measures of financial development. Figure A20 does the same for the survey figure in the paper. The three alternative measures are:

- Private credit / GDP
  - Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions, divided by GDP
- Stock market trading volume / GDP
  - Also known as stock value traded, divided by GDP
- The sum of stock and bond market capitalizations / GDP
  - Calculated by adding the following three series:
    * Private Bond Market Capitalization / GDP
    * Public Bond Market Capitalization / GDP
    * Stock Market Capitalization / GDP

All measures of financial development are taken from the World Bank’s Financial Development and Structure database. As of this writing, this database was most recently revised in June 2017 and contains cross-country data from 1960 to 2015. All variables are in percentage terms.
A8.7. **Alternative Measure of Trade Balance.**

Figures A21 through A23 are the counterparts of Panels C of the vote share figures in the paper, except that they replace current account balance / GDP by an alternative measure of trade balance: net trade in goods and services, which we scale by GDP. Figure A24 does the same for the survey figure in the paper.

A8.8. **Alternative Survey Questions.**

Figures A25 and A26 are the counterparts of the corresponding figure in the paper, except that they are based on different questions from the 2013 ISSP survey. Instead of using responses to question 5a, they use responses to questions 2c and 5d.

A8.9. **Alternative Set of Survey Countries: Excluding the U.S.**

Figure A27 is the counterpart of the survey figure in the paper, except that it excludes the results from the U.S. elections. Similarly, Figures A28 and A29 are the counterparts of the corresponding survey figures in Section A8.8. of this Appendix, except that they exclude the results from the U.S. elections.
Figure A1. Vote Share of Anti-Ethnic-Minority Parties. This figure plots the election vote share of the parties we classify as anti-ethnic-minority, in percent. For each country, we use either the most recent national parliamentary election as of January 1, 2017 or the same country’s May 2014 European Parliament election, whichever occurs later. The vote share is plotted against country-level measures of the Gini coefficient of disposable net income (Panel A), the share of income going to the top 10% of earners (Panel B), the current account balance as a fraction of GDP (Panel C), and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (Panel D). The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its t-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression.
Figure A2. Vote Share of Nationalist Parties: National Elections Only. This figure plots the election vote share of the parties we classify as nationalist, in percent. For each country, we use the most recent national parliamentary election as of January 1, 2017. The vote share is plotted against country-level measures of the Gini coefficient of disposable net income (Panel A), the share of income going to the top 10% of earners (Panel B), the current account balance as a fraction of GDP (Panel C), and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (Panel D). The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its t-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression.
Figure A3. Vote Share of Anti-Immigrant Parties: National Elections Only. This figure plots the election vote share of the parties we classify as anti-immigrant, in percent. For each country, we use the most recent national parliamentary election as of January 1, 2017. The vote share is plotted against country-level measures of the Gini coefficient of disposable net income (Panel A), the share of income going to the top 10% of earners (Panel B), the current account balance as a fraction of GDP (Panel C), and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (Panel D). The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its $t$-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression.
Figure A4. Vote Share of Anti-Elite Parties: National Elections Only. This figure plots the election vote share of the parties we classify as anti-elite, in percent. For each country, we use the most recent national parliamentary election as of January 1, 2017. The vote share is plotted against country-level measures of the Gini coefficient of disposable net income (Panel A), the share of income going to the top 10% of earners (Panel B), the current account balance as a fraction of GDP (Panel C), and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (Panel D). The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its t-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression.
Figure A5. Vote Share of Nationalist Parties: European Parliament Elections Only. This figure plots the election vote share of the parties we classify as nationalist, in percent. For each European country, we use its May 2014 European Parliament election. The vote share is plotted against country-level measures of the Gini coefficient of disposable net income (Panel A), the share of income going to the top 10% of earners (Panel B), the current account balance as a fraction of GDP (Panel C), and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (Panel D). The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its $t$-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression.
Figure A6. Vote Share of Anti-Immigrant Parties: European Parliament Elections Only. This figure plots the election vote share of the parties we classify as anti-immigrant, in percent. For each European country, we use its May 2014 European Parliament election. The vote share is plotted against country-level measures of the Gini coefficient of disposable net income (Panel A), the share of income going to the top 10% of earners (Panel B), the current account balance as a fraction of GDP (Panel C), and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (Panel D). The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its t-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression.
Figure A7. Vote Share of Anti-Elite Parties: European Parliament Elections Only. This figure plots the election vote share of the parties we classify as anti-elite, in percent. For each European country, we use its May 2014 European Parliament election. The vote share is plotted against country-level measures of the Gini coefficient of disposable net income (Panel A), the share of income going to the top 10% of earners (Panel B), the current account balance as a fraction of GDP (Panel C), and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (Panel D). The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its t-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression.
Figure A8. Vote Share of Nationalist Parties. Excluding the U.S. This figure plots the election vote share of the parties we classify as nationalist, in percent. For each country, we use either the most recent national parliamentary election as of January 1, 2017 or the same country’s May 2014 European Parliament election, whichever occurs later. The vote share is plotted against country-level measures of the Gini coefficient of disposable net income (Panel A), the share of income going to the top 10% of earners (Panel B), the current account balance as a fraction of GDP (Panel C), and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (Panel D). The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its t-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression. The U.S. is excluded from the sample.
Figure A9. Vote Share of Anti-Immigrant Parties. Excluding the U.S. This figure plots the election vote share of the parties we classify as anti-immigrant, in percent. For each country, we use either the most recent national parliamentary election as of January 1, 2017 or the same country’s May 2014 European Parliament election, whichever occurs later. The vote share is plotted against country-level measures of the Gini coefficient of disposable net income (Panel A), the share of income going to the top 10% of earners (Panel B), the current account balance as a fraction of GDP (Panel C), and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (Panel D). The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its \( t \)-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression. The U.S. is excluded from the sample.
Figure A10. Vote Share of Anti-Elite Parties. Excluding the U.S. This figure plots the election vote share of the parties we classify as anti-elite, in percent. For each country, we use either the most recent national parliamentary election as of January 1, 2017 or the same country’s May 2014 European Parliament election, whichever occurs later. The vote share is plotted against country-level measures of the Gini coefficient of disposable net income (Panel A), the share of income going to the top 10% of earners (Panel B), the current account balance as a fraction of GDP (Panel C), and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (Panel D). The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its t-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression. The U.S. is excluded from the sample.
Figure A11. Vote Share of Nationalist Parties: National Elections Only. Excluding the U.S. This figure plots the election vote share of the parties we classify as nationalist, in percent. For each country, we use the most recent national parliamentary election as of January 1, 2017. The vote share is plotted against country-level measures of the Gini coefficient of disposable net income (Panel A), the share of income going to the top 10% of earners (Panel B), the current account balance as a fraction of GDP (Panel C), and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (Panel D). The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its t-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression. The U.S. is excluded from the sample.
Figure A12. Vote Share of Anti-Immigrant Parties: National Elections Only. Excluding the U.S. This figure plots the election vote share of the parties we classify as anti-immigrant, in percent. For each country, we use the most recent national parliamentary election as of January 1, 2017. The vote share is plotted against country-level measures of the Gini coefficient of disposable net income (Panel A), the share of income going to the top 10% of earners (Panel B), the current account balance as a fraction of GDP (Panel C), and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (Panel D). The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its t-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression. The U.S. is excluded from the sample.
Figure A13. Vote Share of Anti-Elite Parties: National Elections Only. Excluding the U.S. This figure plots the election vote share of the parties we classify as anti-elite, in percent. For each country, we use the most recent national parliamentary election as of January 1, 2017. The vote share is plotted against country-level measures of the Gini coefficient of disposable net income (Panel A), the share of income going to the top 10% of earners (Panel B), the current account balance as a fraction of GDP (Panel C), and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (Panel D). The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its t-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression. The U.S. is excluded from the sample.
Figure A14. Vote Share of Nationalist Parties: European Parliament Elections Only. Excluding the U.S. This figure plots the election vote share of the parties we classify as nationalist, in percent. For each European country, we use its May 2014 European Parliament election. The vote share is plotted against country-level measures of the Gini coefficient of disposable net income (Panel A), the share of income going to the top 10% of earners (Panel B), the current account balance as a fraction of GDP (Panel C), and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (Panel D). The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its t-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression. The U.S. is excluded from the sample.
Figure A15. Vote Share of Anti-Immigrant Parties: European Parliament Elections Only. Excluding the U.S.
This figure plots the election vote share of the parties we classify as anti-immigrant, in percent. For each European country, we use its May 2014 European Parliament election. The vote share is plotted against country-level measures of the Gini coefficient of disposable net income (Panel A), the share of income going to the top 10% of earners (Panel B), the current account balance as a fraction of GDP (Panel C), and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (Panel D). The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its t-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression. The U.S. is excluded from the sample.
Figure A16. Vote Share of Anti-Elite Parties: European Parliament Elections Only. Excluding the U.S. This figure plots the election vote share of the parties we classify as anti-elite, in percent. For each European country, we use its May 2014 European Parliament election. The vote share is plotted against country-level measures of the Gini coefficient of disposable net income (Panel A), the share of income going to the top 10% of earners (Panel B), the current account balance as a fraction of GDP (Panel C), and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (Panel D). The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its $t$-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression. The U.S. is excluded from the sample.
Figure A17. Vote Share of Nationalist Parties: Other Measures of Financial Development. This figure plots the election vote share of the parties we classify as nationalist, in percent. The vote share is plotted against three alternative country-level measures of financial development: private credit to GDP (Panel A), stock market trading volume to GDP (Panel B), and the sum of stock and bond market capitalizations to GDP (Panel C). The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its t-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression.
Figure A18. Vote Share of Anti-Immigrant Parties: Other Measures of Financial Development. This figure plots the election vote share of the parties we classify as anti-immigrant, in percent. The vote share is plotted against three alternative country-level measures of financial development: private credit to GDP (Panel A), stock market trading volume to GDP (Panel B), and the sum of stock and bond market capitalizations to GDP (Panel C). The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its $t$-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression.
Panel A.

Panel B.

Panel C.

Figure A19. Vote Share of Anti-Elite Parties: Other Measures of Financial Development. This figure plots the election vote share of the parties we classify as anti-elite, in percent. The vote share is plotted against three alternative country-level measures of financial development: private credit to GDP (Panel A), stock market trading volume to GDP (Panel B), and the sum of stock and bond market capitalizations to GDP (Panel C). The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its $t$-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression.
Figure A20. Support for Protectionism: Other Measures of Financial Development. This figure plots the extent to which the country’s respondents in the 2013 ISSP survey agree with the statement “Country should limit the import of foreign products.” The survey responses range from 1 to 5, with 5 indicating “agree strongly” and 1 “disagree strongly.” The original scoring is in reverse but we flip it around so that a higher score indicates stronger support for protectionism. The country-level score is the average of all individual responses in the country. This score is plotted against three alternative country-level measures of financial development: private credit to GDP (Panel A), stock market trading volume to GDP (Panel B), and the sum of stock and bond market capitalizations to GDP (Panel C). The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its t-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression.
Figure A21. Vote Share of Nationalist Parties: Alternative Measure of Trade Balance. This figure plots the election vote share of the parties we classify as nationalist, in percent. The vote share is plotted against an alternative country-level measure of trade balance: net trade in goods and services, scaled by GDP. The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its t-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression.
Figure A22. Vote Share of Anti-Immigrant Parties: Alternative Measure of Trade Balance. This figure plots the election vote share of the parties we classify as anti-immigrant, in percent. The vote share is plotted against an alternative country-level measure of trade balance: net trade in goods and services, scaled by GDP. The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its $t$-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression.
Figure A23. Vote Share of Anti-Elite Parties: Alternative Measure of Trade Balance. This figure plots the election vote share of the parties we classify as anti-elite, in percent. The vote share is plotted against an alternative country-level measure of trade balance: net trade in goods and services, scaled by GDP. The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its t-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression.
Figure A24. Support for Protectionism: Alternative Measure of Trade Balance. This figure plots the extent to which the country’s respondents in the 2013 ISSP survey agree with the statement “Country should limit the import of foreign products.” The survey responses range from 1 to 5, with 5 indicating “agree strongly” and 1 “disagree strongly.” The original scoring is in reverse but we flip it around so that a higher score indicates stronger support for protectionism. The country-level score is the average of all individual responses in the country. This score is plotted against an alternative country-level measure of trade balance: net trade in goods and services, scaled by GDP. The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its t-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression.
Figure A25. Support for Protectionism: Alternative Survey Question (2c). This figure plots the extent to which the country’s respondents in the 2013 ISSP survey agree with the statement “It is important to have lived in a country for most of one’s life.” The survey responses range from 1 to 4, with 4 indicating “very important” and 1 “not important at all.” The original scoring is in reverse but we flip it around so that a higher score indicates stronger support for protectionism. The country-level score is the average of all individual responses in the country. This score is plotted against country-level measures of the Gini coefficient of disposable net income (Panel A), the share of income going to the top 10% of earners (Panel B), the current account balance as a fraction of GDP (Panel C), and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (Panel D). The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its t-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression.
Figure A26. Support for Protectionism: Alternative Survey Question (5d). This figure plots the extent to which the country’s respondents in the 2013 ISSP survey agree with the statement “Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in country.” The survey responses range from 1 to 5, with 5 indicating “agree strongly” and 1 “disagree strongly.” The original scoring is in reverse but we flip it around so that a higher score indicates stronger support for protectionism. The country-level score is the average of all individual responses in the country. This score is plotted against country-level measures of the Gini coefficient of disposable net income (Panel A), the share of income going to the top 10% of earners (Panel B), the current account balance as a fraction of GDP (Panel C), and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (Panel D). The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its t-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression.
Figure A27. Support for Protectionism: Excluding the U.S. This figure plots the extent to which the country’s respondents in the 2013 ISSP survey agree with the statement “Country should limit the import of foreign products.” The survey responses range from 1 to 5, with 5 indicating “agree strongly” and 1 “disagree strongly.” The original scoring is in reverse but we flip it around so that a higher score indicates stronger support for protectionism. The country-level score is the average of all individual responses in the country. This score is plotted against country-level measures of the Gini coefficient of disposable net income (Panel A), the share of income going to the top 10% of earners (Panel B), the current account balance as a fraction of GDP (Panel C), and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (Panel D). The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its $t$-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression. The U.S. is excluded from the sample.
Figure A28. Support for Protectionism: Alternative Survey Question (2c). Excluding the U.S. This figure plots the extent to which the country’s respondents in the 2013 ISSP survey agree with the statement “It is important to have lived in a country for most of one’s life.” The survey responses range from 1 to 4, with 4 indicating “very important” and 1 “not important at all.” The original scoring is in reverse but we flip it around so that a higher score indicates stronger support for protectionism. The country-level score is the average of all individual responses in the country. This score is plotted against country-level measures of the Gini coefficient of disposable net income (Panel A), the share of income going to the top 10% of earners (Panel B), the current account balance as a fraction of GDP (Panel C), and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (Panel D). The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its $t$-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression. The U.S. is excluded from the sample.
Figure A29. Support for Protectionism: Alternative Survey Question (5d). Excluding the U.S. This figure plots the extent to which the country’s respondents in the 2013 ISSP survey agree with the statement “Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in country.” The survey responses range from 1 to 5, with 5 indicating “agree strongly” and 1 “disagree strongly.” The original scoring is in reverse but we flip it around so that a higher score indicates stronger support for protectionism. The country-level score is the average of all individual responses in the country. This score is plotted against country-level measures of the Gini coefficient of disposable net income (Panel A), the share of income going to the top 10% of earners (Panel B), the current account balance as a fraction of GDP (Panel C), and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (Panel D). The circle around each country’s observation has an area proportional to the country’s GDP. The slope and its t-statistic are from the GDP-weighted cross-country regression. The U.S. is excluded from the sample.
Table A1
Political Party Positions

This table reports the positions of all political parties in our sample along four dimensions related to anti-global populism: nationalism, attitudes toward immigrants and ethnic minorities, and the salience of anti-elite rhetoric. Each number in the table is the party’s score on the scale of 0 to 10, with higher values indicating a more populist stance. Each party’s scores are averaged across all experts evaluating this party in the 2014 Chapel Hill Survey.

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A9.  Evidence from the Brexit Referendum

Table A2 is the counterpart of the table presented in the paper except that it uses probit rather than logit estimation.
### Table A2
Determinants of the Support for Brexit

This table reports the slope coefficients from a cross-sectional probit regression. The left-hand-side variable is the support for Brexit among the respondents to the British Election Survey. The right-hand-side variables are listed in the first column. The intercept is included in the regression. The $t$-statistics are in parentheses.

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A10. Evidence from the Trump Election

Table A3 is the counterpart of the table presented in the paper except that it uses probit rather than logit estimation.
Table A3
Determinants of the Support for Trump

This table reports the slope coefficients from a cross-sectional probit regression. The left-hand-side variable is the support for Donald Trump in the November 2016 presidential election. Panel A controls for whether the survey respondent self-identifies as Republican; Panel B does not. The right-hand-side variables are listed in the first column. The intercept is included in the regression. The t-statistics are in parentheses.

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Panel A. Controlling for Republican Dummy

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Panel B. No Control for Republican Dummy
A11. Evidence from the Stock Market

According to Proposition 10, a continued increase in output before the election should lead to a rising global share of the U.S. stock market. We examine this prediction in the context of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. We obtain data on two monthly stock market return indices, for the U.S. and World-except-the-U.S., from Morgan Stanley Capital International. We invest $1 in both markets at the beginning of 2014, thus normalizing the global share of the U.S. market on January 1, 2014 to 50%. We track the performance of this hypothetical investment through 2017, updating the U.S. market share in light of the differential return performance of the U.S. and non-U.S. stocks. The market share we construct differs from the actual U.S. market share in two respects: the actual share reflects not only returns but also new equity issues and repurchases, and it is not exactly 50% on January 1, 2014. From the perspective of our model, the initial market share is irrelevant and neither issues nor repurchases appear. Therefore, the market share series constructed here is more suitable than the actual series for the purpose of testing our model.

Figure A30 shows the evolution of our U.S. market share series over time. The share increases steadily, from 50% in January 2014 to 57% in early 2017, ending at 56.2% in December 2017. In the context of our model, this increase reflects the growing strength of the global economy and, consequently, the rising probability of Trump winning the U.S. election. Trump announced his candidacy in June 2015, became the Republican nominee in July 2016, and won the election in November 2016. As his candidacy gained momentum, market participants updated their expectations and stock prices responded. Of course, this model-based interpretation ignores first-order determinants of stock prices such as macroeconomic fundamentals, corporate profits, and tax policy. There are many reasons why U.S. stocks outperformed non-U.S. stocks in 2014–2017. We do not claim that the mechanism highlighted by our model is the main reason, or even one of the main reasons. We simply conclude that the stock price evidence is broadly consistent with the model.

The event examined here, featuring the U.S. and RoW, closely matches our theoretical setting. Brexit would not match our setting from the asset pricing perspective. We have a two-country model, whereas the Brexit setting features not only the UK and the rest of the EU but also the rest of the world. Many agents who hold European stocks, such as American or Japanese investors, reside in neither the UK nor the EU. Therefore, in the Brexit setting, stocks are priced to a significant extent by agents who are absent from the model.
Figure A30. The U.S. Market Share. This figure plots the dynamics of the U.S. stock market’s share of the global market capitalization. We normalize this share to 50% as of January 1, 2014 and update it monthly as a result of the differential return performance of the U.S. and non-U.S. stocks.
REFERENCES

